Hayden 2007-2008

  1. INTENTIONAL TORTS
  2. BATTERY
  3. Elements
  4. Act
  5. Intent to make harmful/offensive contact
  6. Single v. Dual
  7. Single Intent
  8. Intends to contact only
  9. Dual Intent
  10. Intends to contact AND
  11. Intends to have contact be harmful/offensive
  12. Can be either
  13. Purposeful OR
  14. Substantial Certainty
  15. Acting with knowledge that invasive result could occur
  16. Contact
  17. Can be caused by offender
  18. Offender does not need to physically touch (i.e. pulling out chair that causes fall)
  19. Actual harm/offense
  20. Can be mentally offended
  21. Does not need to be physical harm
  22. Liability
  23. Parents
  24. Parents not held liable for children’s torts
  25. Can be held liable for their own torts
  26. Example: they tell child to commit tort, or have knowledge that the tort is occurring and don’t do anything
  27. Mentally infirm
  28. Not a defense
  29. Intent is issue
  30. Does not need to be rational
  31. Dual intent
  32. Harder to prove because mentally infirm might not appreciate harmfulness of contact
  33. Transferred Intent
  34. Tortfeasor liable to anyone he harms from his intentional act
  35. Intent to cause battery on A and causing a battery on B is still battery on B
  36. Intent to cause assault on A and causing a battery on A or B is still battery

  1. ASSAULT
  2. Elements
  3. Act
  4. Words AND circumstances
  5. Words alone not enough
  6. Negating words don’t count
  7. “If police weren’t here, I’d hit you” is not assault because you know it won’t happen
  8. Intent to place plaintiff in apprehension of imminent contact that would be a battery if it occurred
  9. Purposeful OR
  10. Substantial certainty
  11. Apprehension (awareness) that imminent contact will occur
  12. Fear is not required, but it is a type of awareness
  13. Must be aware that contact will happen soon
  14. Threat of battery in future is not assault (not imminent)
  15. Having your back turned and finding out later is not awareness!
  16. Liability
  17. Transferred Intent
  18. Tortfeasor is liable to anybody harmed from his intentional act
  19. Intent to cause assault on A and causing an assault on B is still assault on B
  20. Intent to cause assault on A and causing battery on A or B is still assault
  21. FALSE IMPRISONMENT
  22. Elements
  23. Intent to confine
  24. Purposeful OR
  25. Substantially certain
  26. Confinement
  27. Threats
  28. If security says “come with me” or “you can’t leave”, P would reasonably believe he needs to stay – it’s confinement
  29. Authority
  30. Burly officer standing guard could lead P to reasonably believe that he can’t leave
  31. Duress of goods
  32. Store taking away someone’s wallet to prevent them from leaving is confinement
  33. Awareness of confinement, or physical harm from confinement
  34. Person can’t have a reasonable means of escape
  35. If there is an open door with no obstacles, it’s not confinement
  36. If the only option is jumping out the window or the door of a moving car, it’s confinement (not reasonable to escape)
  37. If victim is unconscious before, during, and after confinement and isn’t harmed, it’s not false imprisonment
  38. TRESPASS TO LAND
  39. Elements
  40. Intent to enter property
  41. Can occur even if it’s a good faith or mistaken intent
  42. Entry onto property
  43. Can be D throwing/leaving something on other’s property
  44. CONVERSION
  45. Elements
  46. Person must intend to take property of another AND
  47. Exercise substantial dominion over chattel
  48. Dominion
  49. Taking property mistakenly for a substantial period of time is still conversion
  50. Breaking property or rendering it useless is conversion
  51. Serial Conversion
  52. If B steals watch from A and sells it to C, both B AND C are converters
  53. If B tricks A into selling watch and sells it to C, neither are converters!
  54. TRESPASS TO CHATTELS
  55. Elements
  56. Person must intend to
  57. Exercise dominion to a lesser degree than conversion
  58. Taking someone’s watch and putting it back is trespass
  59. Taking someone’s watch and accidentally damaging it is no longer trespass, but conversion!

  1. DEFENSES TO INTENTIONAL TORTS
  2. SELF DEFENSE
  3. Elements
  4. A person may use a reasonable amount of force to defend himself, AND
  5. He must reasonably believe that self defense is necessary
  6. DEFENSE OF THIRD PERSON
  7. Elements
  8. You may defend a third person as you may defend yourself
  9. Majority/Minority
  10. Some courts argue that if you are mistaken, you lose the privilege of the defense
  11. ARREST AND DETENTION (Shopkeeper’s)
  12. Elements
  13. A person must reasonably believe that someone took goods without paying, AND
  14. The manner and duration of detention must be reasonable
  15. Necessary to conduct reasonable investigation
  16. DEFENSE AND REPOSSESSION OF PROPERTY (Non-shopkeeper’s)
  17. Elements
  18. A person may use reasonable force to defend property, AND
  19. He must reasonably believe that such force is needed
  20. Human life always takes precedence over property
  21. Hot pursuit
  22. If you’re chasing someone for stealing property, you can use reasonable force to capture them
  23. Once pursuit ends, privilege lifts
  24. I.e., You can’t tackle them a week later
  25. DISCIPLINE
  26. Elements
  27. A person must believe that discipline was necessary, and
  28. The manner of discipline was reasonable

  1. SPECIAL CASE OF CONSENT
  2. Elements
  3. Apparent existence
  4. Person must reasonably believe that consent existed under the circumstances
  5. Implied consent
  6. Oral consent
  7. Apparent scope
  8. Person consents to the act (and, technically, resulting consequences)
  9. However, a person does not consent to a substantially different act
  10. Physician’s rule
  11. A doctor may extend scope of consent only if
  12. IT IS during an emergency AND
  13. There is no other authority he may get consent from
  14. Consent does not exist
  15. Incapacity
  16. When a person is incapable and the tortfeasor knows it
  17. Power relationships
  18. Person may not be capable to consent to someone with great authority over them
  19. Example: teacher/student
  20. PUBLIC NECESSITY
  21. Defendant can have absolute privilege to harm another’s property if
  22. He reasonably believed that harm was necessary to prevent an imminent public disaster, and
  23. The manner and extent of harm was reasonable
  24. PRIVATE NECESSITY
  25. Defendant protected from a technical trespass where no damage occurs
  26. If damage occurs, defendant is liable

  1. NEGLIGENCE
  2. DUTY OF CARE
  3. Existence of Duty
  4. General duty of “due care”
  5. “One way street” duties
  6. Example: doctor/patient, teacher/student
  7. Standard of Care
  8. Adult Standard (RPP/SSC)
  9. That of a reasonable/prudent person under the same or similar circumstances as defendant was in
  10. Sudden Emergency
  11. What would RPP do in an emergency?
  12. Standard never changes, but circumstance does
  13. Circumstances That Matter
  14. Outside factors not in actor’s control
  15. Physical Infirmities
  16. What would a blind RPP do?
  17. Example: a blind RPP wouldn’t drive
  18. Superior Knowledge
  19. Held to what a RPP with same knowledge would have done
  20. An RPP would use any knowledge he possesses
  21. Circumstances That Don’t Matter
  22. Mental Infirmities
  23. Intoxication
  24. Child Standard
  25. That of a child of the same age, intelligence, and experience
  26. A child that is engaging in inherently dangerous activity will be held to adult standard
  27. BREACH OF DUTY (Negligent Conduct)
  28. If duty is owed, any unreasonable risk is a breach
  29. Negligence per se
  30. Occurs when a relevant non-tort statute setting the standard of care is broken
  31. To be invoked, plaintiff must prove:
  32. The plaintiff was in the class of persons the statute is designed to protect AND
  33. The plaintiff’s injury was a type of harm the statute was designed to prevent
  34. Excuses
  35. Incapacity
  36. Example: mental infirmity, youth
  37. Factual Ignorance
  38. Example: the tail light goes out while driving (but it was on when he got into the car) at night
  39. Impossibility
  40. Example: Trying to brake once the brakes fail
  41. Emergency not of actor’s making
  42. Example: If brakes fail (though they were in good working order) and he coasts over a double line
  43. Greater risk of harm
  44. Example (class): You must walk facing traffic but the sidewalk’s not there so you have to walk on the other side for safety
  45. Res Ipsa Loquitur
  46. In some circumstances, the mere fact of an accident's occurrence raises an inference of negligence so as to establish a prima facie case
  47. “The thing speaks for itself”
  48. May be invoked if
  49. The accident was one which does not happen unless someone was negligent AND
  50. The accident’s cause was under the exclusive control of the defendant AND
  51. The accident was not caused or contributed to by any act or negligence by the plaintiff
  52. ACTUAL HARM
  53. Categorically
  54. Measurement of money
  55. CAUSE IN FACT
  56. “But for” test
  57. This wouldn’t have happened but for your negligent act
  58. “Substantial Factor”
  59. SCOPE OF RISK (Proximate Cause)
  60. Type of harm foreseeable AND
  61. Class of Persons foreseeable

  1. DEFENSES TO NEGLIGENCE
  2. Contributory Negligence
  3. Common law rule (Butterfield)
  4. If P was negligent AND a cause of his own harm, he recovers nothing from a negligent defendant who also caused his harm.
  5. EXCEPTIONS (P can recover)
  6. Where P was a rescuer
  7. Last clear chance or discovered peril
  8. Where P was negligent but D acted recklessly or intentionally
  9. Where P’s harm is not within the scope of risks created by P’s negligence, or was not actually caused by P’s negligence
  10. Where D owes a duty to protect P from P’s own negligence
  11. Comparative Fault (Majority)
  12. Pure form
  13. P’s negligence will reduce his recovery in the amount of negligence/fault/responsibility found by jury
  14. Modified Form
  15. Same reduction as “pure,” but P will be barred from all recovery if amount of P’s negligence/fault/responsibility is greater than (or equal to, depending on the state) D’s.
  16. Multiple Defendants
  17. Depending on the state, P will be against either all D’s combined, OR
  18. Against each individual D, which may limit recovery if one D’s fault is less than P’s.
  19. Example: If P is 10% at fault, D1 is 5%, D2 is 40%, D3 is 45%, P will recover 85% in a state that separates defendants, and 90% where the state combines defendants.
  20. Factors for assigning shares of responsibility:
  21. The nature of the person’s risk-creating conduct, including any awareness or indifference of risks, and any intent with respect to the harm; AND
  22. The strength of the causal connection between the person’s risk-creating conduct and the harm.
  23. California damages
  24. Non-economic damages, such as pain, suffering, etc, are several only.
  25. Economic damages are joint and several
  26. P may still be barred from recovery IF:
  27. P’s negligence is too high (modified jurisdictions)
  28. P acted illegally
  29. P doesn’t establish prima facie case against D
  30. Assumption of the Risk
  31. Contractual assumption of risk (express)
  32. General rule
  33. Contractual disclaimers of liability are generally valid and completely bar a P’s claim.
  34. EXCEPTION
  35. The disclaimer is void as against public policy when:
  36. Where the service is essential to members of the public, AND
  37. P faces compulsion to agree to the disclaimer “despite his economic inability to do so,” AND
  38. P is “completely dependent” upon D’s responsibility.
  39. Example: emergency rooms!
  40. Implied assumption of risk
  41. Traditional approach
  42. Completely bars claim if P assumes the risk, with special “elements” (minority):
  43. P actually knows of risk, AND
  44. P actually appreciates nature of risk, AND
  45. P voluntarily chooses to encounter the risk
  46. Different approaches (3)
  47. PRIMARY A/R
  48. Because P impliedly consented to relieve D of duty, then:
  49. No duty of due care owed to P, OR
  50. No duty breached
  51. SECONDARY A/R
  52. Contributory/comparative fault with P’s negligence
  53. Eliminate altogether as a defense
  54. Participants in sports (two approaches)
  55. Negligence claim
  56. Allow P to sue for negligence, BUT
  57. Allow D to defend on grounds of implied a/r, by focusing on whether the risk was “inherent in the sport”
  58. More than negligence
  59. Person injured in a sports event by another participant must prove more than negligence (i.e. recklessness) to recover. (MAJORITY)
  60. Statute of Limitations
  61. Discovery rule
  62. Claim accrues when P knows or should know of:
  63. Her injury AND
  64. Its likely cause (and sometimes who caused it)
  65. Pre-Accrual Bar
  66. Statute might bar claim before it even accrues if a certain amount of time (usually 10 years) passes
  67. Tolling (stopping the clock) happens when:
  68. Tolling for disability of the plaintiff:
  69. Minority, tolled until age of majority reached
  70. Mental disability, tolled until mental ability regained
  71. Equitable estoppel
  72. Defendant induces P not to take legal action, AND
  73. P relies to his detriment by failing to seek redress
  74. Preemption (government)
  75. Defendant’s Compliance with Statute
  76. This is relevant to the reasonableness of D’s conduct.

  1. LIMITING OR EXPANDING DUTY OF CARE ACCORDING TO CONTEXT OR RELATIONSHIP
  2. Class or Status of Parties
  3. Carriers
  4. Common Carriers are sometimes said to owe a “higher duty of care” to passengers
  5. Higher degree of care meant foreseeing as well as guarding against danger (old standard)
  6. New standard is reasonable care under all circumstances.
  7. Common carrier definition:
  8. Those in the business of carrying passengers and goods who hold themselves out for hire by the public
  9. Host-Drivers
  10. “Guest statutes” said a non-paying guest passenger was owed a lower standard of care than paying passengers
  11. Entrants on Land (Conditions, Not Activities!)
  12. Classifications
  13. Invitees
  14. Entrants with “business purpose” that will bring pecuniary benefit to land owner OR
  15. Entrants on premises held open to the general public
  16. Basic duty owed:
  17. RPP/SSC to both business and public invitees
  18. Licensees (a) and Trespassers (b)
  19. Limited permission to enter – “license to enter”
  20. No permission to enter
  21. Basic duty owed:
  22. Not to intentionally, willfully, wantonly or recklessly injure
  23. Mere negligence will NOT lead to liability
  24. Dual knowledge rule
  25. Landowner may owe a duty of reasonable care if he knows:
  26. That entrants are present or likely to be present; AND
  27. Of a hidden, dangerous condition on the land.
  28. Landowner might be “wanton” in not warning of the danger.
  29. Obvious Danger Rule
  30. Where a danger would be obvious to a person of ordinary perception and judgment, there is no duty owed by LO to warn of the danger.
  31. Trespassing Children
  32. Landowner owes duty of reasonable care IF:
  33. Trespass by children is reasonably foreseeable, AND
  34. Landowner knows or has reason to know of a danger, AND
  35. Landowner should know that the child cannot protect himself from the danger.
  36. Attractive Nuisance Doctrine
  37. Special duty of care (RPP) is imposed on a land occupier with respect to conditions on the land that involve a risk of harm to children unable to recognize the danger involved.
  38. Child Trespasser: child must be so immature as to be unable to recognize the danger involved.
  39. Firefighter’s Rule
  40. Professional rescuers cannot sue the landowner/occupier for negligently causing the very problem that brought the rescuer to the scene.
  41. These include firefighters, police officers, etc.
  42. So, if a fire erupts and a rescuer is crushed from a wall that fell from the fire, he cannot sue (because he went there for the fire in the first place).
  43. If, however, the rescuer goes to a burning house and is bit by a dog, he can sue (because he went there for the fire, not the dog!)
  44. The duty owed to professional rescuers is only not to willfully or wantonly harm them.
  45. California approach
  46. Rejects all categories of land occupants and instead adopts a “reasonable person” standard for all entrants
  47. New York approach
  48. A reasonable person duty is owed to all entrants BUT
  49. One of the circumstances that is to be considered is whether P was a trespasser
  50. Recreational Use
  51. A landowner who holds land open to non-paying recreational users will not be liable for harms caused by LO’s mere negligence in maintaining the property.
  52. Again, landlord will be liable if his conduct is wanton or reckless!
  53. Duties Based On Relationships or Their Absence
  54. Nonfeasance
  55. General rule is that there is no duty to assist or rescue!
  56. Distinguish from misfeasance, which means D did something bad.
  57. EXCEPTIONS
  58. Where D creates the risk of harm to P, or where D harms P and further harm is risked
  59. Where a statute creates a duty to assist
  60. Where D beings to assist (takes charge)
  61. Where D has a “special relationship”
  62. What is a special relationship?
  63. Duty to Protect from Third Persons
  64. General rule is that there is no duty!
  65. EXCEPTIONS
  66. Where D creates risk of harm
  67. Where D begins to protect (takes charge)
  68. Where D has special relationship with P
  69. Where D has special relationship to source of harm
  70. Foreseeability analysis
  71. Focuses on the foreseeability of the harm in determining whether a particularized duty exists.
  72. Four approaches:
  73. Specific harm test
  74. Prior similar incidents test
  75. Totality of circumstances test
  76. Balancing test
  77. Negligent Entrustment
  78. Duty of reasonable care may exist to not entrust chattels (especially cars and weapons) to people who are likely to use them in dangerous ways.
  79. Elements for this duty to exist:
  80. D must have the right to control the chattel, AND
  81. The risk of harm by the third party must be reasonably foreseeable.
  82. Example: If D sees drunken person and hands over keys to car anyway, it is reasonably foreseeable that the drunken person (3rd party) will hit P and cause harm.
  83. Providers of Alcohol
  84. Sellers (2 approaches)
  85. Modern approach
  86. There is a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid foreseeable harms.
  87. Traditional approach
  88. The drinker’s act is a superseding cause, OR
  89. There is no duty owed to protect P
  90. Social hosts
  91. Most courts impose no duty

  1. LIMITING DUTIES TO PROTECT AGAINST SPECIAL TYPES OF HARMS
  2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
  3. Elements:
  4. Intent to cause extreme emotional distress, or recklessness, AND
  5. Extreme and outrageous conduct, AND
  6. Resulting severe emotional distress
  7. Common fact patterns
  8. Repeated, harassing misconduct
  9. Abuse of power
  10. Third party IIED recoveries
  11. D can be liable if he directs an outrageous act towards A and distresses B IF
  12. B is present at the time AND
  13. B is a member of A’s family OR
  14. B suffers physical (bodily) harm as a result of the emotional distress caused by D’s outrageous conduct
  15. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
  16. Conduct required:
  17. Subjecting plaintiff to physical impact or threat of impact
  18. Original claim was for fright or shock from risk of physical harm
  19. Variations
  20. Impact rule
  21. D’s negligence causes impact or physical harm which THEN causes emotional distress
  22. Physical manifestations rule
  23. D’s negligence causes emotional distress, which THEN causes “physical manifestations” (or a “physical injury”)
  24. Pure emotional distress
  25. D’s negligence causes emotional distress, with neither impact nor physical manifestations
  26. When emotional harm results from injury to another
  27. Many states don’t recognize this UNLESS
  28. Zone of danger rule
  29. P must be in the vicinity and fear for his own safety
  30. If P says he feared for another’s safety, there is no recovery!
  31. Example: “I feared for my child” is bad
  32. Bystander recovery
  33. Dillon v. Legg multi-factor test
  34. P must be near scene,
  35. P suffers direct emotional impact from contemporaneous observation,
  36. P must have close relationship to victim
  37. Not all factors must be satisfied
  38. What is a close relationship?
  39. Thing v. LaChusa rule
  40. P present at scene and aware victim is injured, AND
  41. P suffers “serious” emotional distress, AND
  42. P is closely related to victim
  43. The relationship list is an exclusive one that allows close family to recover but not relatives such as aunts and cousins (siblings, parents OK)
  44. How to approach NIED:
  45. Negligence elements, and P must suffer “impact” before emotional harm.
  46. Negligence elements, and P must have “physical manifestations” of emotional harm
  47. Negligence elements, and P must be in the “zone of danger.”
  48. Split the case into direct victim and bystander, and use Dillon factors for the bystander analysis
  49. Direct victim would be a straight negligence case!
  50. Split the case into direct victim and bystander, and use Thing elements for the bystander analysis
  51. No special rules needed for “serious or severe” distress, and treat it as a regular negligence case (expert testimony may help)