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In The XXX District Court

Parish Of XXX, State Of Louisiana

STATE OF LOUISIANA,
Plaintiff,
v.
XXXXXXX
Defendant. / No. XXXXX
Section XX
Hon. XXX
FILED / DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT

MOTION TO PRECLUDE THE STATE FROM SEEKING A SENTENCE OF LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE BECAUSE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, SECOND DEGREE MURDER IS NOT THE WORST OFFENSE

COMES NOW, XXXXXXX, through undersigned counsel, and respectfully moves this Court, pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article 1, §§ 1, 2, 3, 5, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, and 24 of the Louisiana Constitution, and other applicable law, to preclude the prosecution from seeking a sentence of life without parole in this case because, as a matter of law, second degree murder is not the worst offense.

Introductory Statement

The United States Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama that a sentencing scheme that imposes “mandatory life without parole [on] those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” 567 U.S. ---, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). Most recently, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court clarified that Miller’s holding must be applied retroactively to juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences were final when Miller was decided.--- U.S. ---, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).

Prior to the Court’s decisions in Miller and Montgomery, XXX was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, a mandatory sentence under Louisiana law. See La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1(B). XXX was under the age of 18 at the time of the crime. Thus, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, XXX’s sentence violates the Eighth Amendment and must be vacated.

The Supreme Court made clear in Miller that a life-without-parole sentence may be constitutionally permissible only in the “uncommon” homicide case involving “’the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,’” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469(citations omitted, emphasis added). This is not one of those “uncommon” cases because XXX was not charged with or convicted of first degree murder – a crime that the Louisiana Legislature has designated to capture the most aggravated homicides. See La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30(C). Because XXX is not one of those “rare” offenders guilty of committing the worst offense defined by Louisiana law, he may not be resentenced to life without parole.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On XXXX, XXX was convicted of second degree murder. XXX was subsequently sentenced to life without the possibility of parole by the XXXX Judicial District Court in XXXX Parish. XXX was born on XXXX, making him only XX years old at the time of the offense, on XXXX.

[APPLICABLE PROCEDURAL HISTORY]

Following the United States Supreme Court ruling in Miller v. Alabama, XXX filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. This Court docketed a hearing for XXX XX, XXX.

ARGUMENT

  1. The United States Supreme Court’s Decision InMiller v. AlabamaRenders XX’s Life Without Parole Sentence Unconstitutional Because He Was Under 18 Years Old At The Time Of His Crime And The Sentence Was Mandatory Under Louisiana Law.

In Miller v. Alabama, the U. S. Supreme Court held that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” 132 S.Ct. at 2469. The Court concluded that “[b]y making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” Id. As the Court explained:

Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors … or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. And … [it] disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.

Id. at 2468 (internal citations omitted). In short, “[s]uch a scheme prevents those meting out punishment from considering a juvenile’s ‘lessened culpability’ and greater ‘capacity for change,’ and runs afoul of … [the] requirement of individualized sentencing for defendants facing the most serious penalties.” Id. at 2460 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2026-27, 2029-30 (2010)).

Louisiana’s sentencing scheme for defendants convicted of second degree murder, and thus the sentence imposed upon XXX, violate the rule announced in Miller.Louisiana’s second degree murder statute states that “[w]hoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1(B).[1] Because La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1(B) makes life without parole a mandatory sentence for defendants convicted of second degree murder, it is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles in general and XXX in particular.

  1. The Constitution Precludes the State from Seeking A Life Without Parole Sentence For A Juvenile Convicted Of Second Degree Murder.

“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment ‘guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.’ Roper, 543 U.S., at 560.” Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012). In Miller, the Court explained that this right “flows from the basic precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to both the offender and the offense. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). While the Court was unwilling to categorically ban life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide, it made clear that sentencing schemes that fail to limit the practice to the worst offenders and the worst offenses run afoul of the Eighth Amendment:

“[G]iven all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon. That is especially so because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this early age between ‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender who crime reflects irreparable corruption.’”

Id. at 17.

The Louisiana Legislature has defined two categories of murder – first degree murder and second degree murder – with first degree murder being the most serious and aggravated crime. Compare La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30 (first degree murder) with La. Stat. Ann. § 14:31 (second degree murder). Adults convicted of first degree murder may be sentenced to death, La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30(C), while the death penalty is not an option for any defendant convicted of second degree murder (or any other crime). See La. Stat. Ann. § 14:31(B). Because XXX was not convicted of the most aggravated kind of murder under Louisiana law, it cannot be that he is an offender “whose extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of [the harshest penalty].” Roper, 543 U.S. at 553 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).

In Louisiana, a jury can convict a defendant of second degree murder without finding that he had any intent to kill. The state need merely prove that the victim was killed when XXXX was “engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration” of one of the enumerated felonies “even though he had no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” La.R.S. 14:30.1. Therefore, no jury had to make or has made any finding that XXX even possessed the intent to kill or killed. Since Louisiana’s statute does not require a jury to make such a finding, a conviction of second degree murder does not constitutionally allow for a sentence of life without parole under Miller or Graham.

An offender deserving of the harshest penalty would have been convicted of first degree murder: the crime designated by the Legislature to include the most horrific homicides and the most culpable offenders. See State v. Bartie, 2012-673 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/5/12), 104 So. 3d 735, 750, writ denied, 2013-0039 (La. 9/30/13), 120 So. 2d 256 (“[W]ith regard to the maximum sentences imposed on the defendant, the courts agree that maximum sentences are typically reserved for the most serious offenses and the most egregious offenders.”).See also Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (“To pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing scheme must ‘genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.’”)(citations omitted, emphasis added).

Sentencing a child convicted of second degree murder(by law not the most heinous type of murder and requiring no intent to kill) to life without the possibility of parole does not comport with the constitutional mandates of Roper, Graham and Miller. It fails to sufficiently narrow the class of juvenile offenders eligible for this harshest possible penalty to those convicted of the worst offenses. SeeLa.C.Cr.P. art. 878.1 (“Sentences imposed without parole eligibility should normally be reserved for the worst offenders and the worst cases.”). Given that XXX was a juvenile at the time of the offense and was not convicted of the “worst” type of murder or found to have any intent to kill, the constitution precludes the Court from imposing upon him the most severe sentence. For XXX to be resentenced to life without parole would be in clear violation of Miller, which clearly holds that outside of the most egregious cases such a sentence is unconstitutional for juvenile offenders.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, because XXX has not been convicted of the most serious offense, he asks this Court to rule that the imposition of the maximum penalty in his case would be unconstitutional.

Respectfully submitted,

______

XXX, La. Bar No. XXXX XXXX

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of this motion has been served by e-mail on the date of filing upon the State of Louisiana through the Office of the District Attorney.

______

1

[1] Although a provision of Louisiana’s parole statute grants parole eligibility to juveniles convicted of first or second degree murder after they have served a minimum of thirty-five years, see La. Stat. Ann. § 15:574.4(E), the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that this statutory provision applies only prospectively to juveniles convicted of first or second degree murder after June 25, 2012 – the date the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Miller v. Alabama. See Tate v. State, 130 So. 3d 829, 843-44 (La. 2013), rev’d on other grounds by Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. at 736. Although Montgomery overruled the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Tate that Milleris not retroactive, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s holding that La. Stat. Ann. § 15:575.5(E) applies only prospectively still stands.