No. 05-0984
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ILLINOIS DEPARRTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
Plaintiff –Appellee
vs.
ANTONIO VERNÓN,
Defendant-Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
LAKE COUNTY, ILLINOIS
Case # 05CV1395
Honorable Christopher Stride, Presiding
Date of Judgment: September 13, 2005
Date of Post-Judgment Motion Order: NA
Date of Notice of Appeal: September 28, 2005
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S Bystander’s Report
Antonio Vernón, pro se
5300 South Shore Dr. - #77
Chicago, IL 60615
(mobile) 312-401-TONY (8669)
(e-mail)
(efax) (215) 974-3312
cc: Robert Mangan, Clerk of the Appellate Court
55 Symphony Way
Elgin, IL 60120-5508
(847)-695-3750
IL Supreme Court Rules
Article III. Civil Appeals Rules
Part C. Record on Appeal
Rule 323. Report on Proceedings
(c) Procedure If No Verbatim Transcript Is Available (Bystander's Report). If no verbatim transcript of the evidence of proceedings is obtainable the appellant may prepare a proposed report of proceedings from the best available sources, including recollection. In any trial court, a party may request from the court official any audiotape, videotape or other recording of the proceedings. The court official or any person who prepared and kept, in accordance with these rules, any audiotape, videotape, or other report of the proceedings shall produce a copy of such materials to be provided at the party's expense, Such material may be transcribed for use in preparation of a bystander's report. The proposed report shall be served on all parties within 28 days after the notice of appeal is filed. Within 14 days after service of the proposed report of proceedings, any other party may serve proposed amendments or an alternative proposed report of proceedings. Within 7 days thereafter, the appellant shall, upon notice, present the proposed report or reports and any proposed amendments to the trial court for settlement and approval. The court, holding hearings if necessary, shall promptly settle, certify, and order filed an accurate report of proceedings. Absent stipulation, only the report of proceedings so certified shall be included in the record on appeal.
When I arrived on Tuesday, September 13, 2005 at 2:58 for my 3:00 hearing, the objects in question (described as martial arts devices by the plaintiff) were not allowed into the courtroom. Therefore, I had to return them to my car. Thus, I entered the courtroom at about 3:02.
By agreement the September 6, 2005 court appearance was continued to September 13, 2005. Conservation Patrol Officer (henceforth CPO) Tepovich (Badge 440) who issued the citation and for whom the appearance was continued was not present. Fortunately, CPO Fehrenbacher (399) was present. I asked the courtroom supervisor named Leah, if there was a way to get this case into the annotated records. She did not know. I asked if I won, would they appeal. She first claimed that this would be double jeopardy (which an appeal is not). Then, she said that although she is not a lawyer, she felt that they would not appeal a rule of law. My objective is not only to win, but to have a win on the record based on the distinction between farming implements and martial arts devices.
The case (05CV1395) began around 3:45. I represented myself pro se. I explained to the Honorable Associate Judge Christopher Stride of Illinois Nineteenth Judicial Circuit that the implements in question were prohibited from the court room. I requested permission to bring them into the court room. This request was denied.
Illinois Assistant States Attorney Jennifer Kearney was listed as the attorney of record, but Illinois Assistant States Attorney Thomas Anger questioned CPO Fehrenbacher, who stated he had been on duty in uniform, at 4:30 PM on July 9, 2005 at Illinois Beach State Park. He and CPO Tepovich approached me on the beach at a time when I was unarmed. He noted that I was training topless. They saw several implements, including sticks of varying lengths, chains with tennis balls on the ends, nunchucks, sais, and rubber knives, that he described as weapons on my blanket and direct proximity thereof. I later acknowledged that I had been utilizing the items described on the day in question. I further affirmed that I had been topless, but wearing a black belt with my name, black belt conferring Grandmaster and School and year of conference. I did not contest the inaccurately described location (I was north of the concession stand although I was cited for being south of the stand). I believe I was utilizing an implement at the time of first encounter. He reported that they questioned me about these weapons, asked me to leave the beach and cited me for violating 17 IL Admin. Code 110.170: “It shall be unlawful for any person, other than authorized peace officers, to display or use on Department-controlled lands, except as authorized . . . martial arts devices.” under the authority of 20 ILCS 835/6 (7): “It is a violation of this Section for any person to violate any rule or regulation adopted and published by the Department of Natural Resources pursuant to the provisions of this Act.”
He claimed that I had said Sais were a projectile weapon to be thrown like a dart. I later reminded him that I had identified myself as one of Chicago’s most prominent non-projectile weapons practitioners. He recalled this statement. I reminded him that non-projectiles are things that are not thrown. I then clarified to the judge my belief that the items in question are not in fact martial arts devices, but instead are farming implements. This clarification was basically a restatement of highlights of a July 19, 2005 statement made to the court with my trial request. I explained the history of eastern cultures using weapons of opportunity such as fishing and farming implements when they had been vanquished and forced to surrender their firearms and traditional weapons. I explained that my practice was in fact a tribute to these cultures. I further cited the definitions of “nunchuck” and “use” from the aforementioned July statement to show they did not fall under the statute. As per my letter to the court:
The definition for nunchaku found in the Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (Second Edition) is “an Oriental hand weapon for defense against frontal assault, consisting of two foot-long hardwood sticks joined by a chain or thick cord.” However, continued reading [of this definition] shows the following “1965-70; < Okinawan Japan version of a dial. Chin (Taiwan) word for a farm implement,. . .” The < symbol here is an etymology symbol denoting that the word actually came to the English language from the Okinawan Japanese language. Thus, the original entry to the English language was as a farming implement.
I then attempted to cite further details from my letter to the court regarding the word use. I cited the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Third Edition), which has a special 13 line usage note debating distinction between the word use and utilize. As in my letter (but not verbatim), I stated:
The intended use of nunchaku, commonly called nunchucks, is as a farming implement. It is used to separate the wheat from the chafe. Unlike the aforementioned ninjitsu weapons, it was not originally intended for use in martial arts as an implement, device or weapon. Nunchucks seem to be martial arts devices because over the last 40 years it has become popular to employ them in the study of martial arts. Basically, the distinction is that you can find a way to utilize an implement for many purposes, but you can only use it for its intended uses. I.e, there is a distinction between putting nunchucks to use for their intended use and finding ways to employ nunchucks by utilizing them for non farming purposes.
I attempted to illustrate my point by stating that if I were using a screwdriver as a chisel in a place where sculpting tools, such as chisels were prohibited, that I feel it would be wrong to cite me for possession of a sculpting tool or specifically a chisel. Nonetheless, Honorable Associate Judge Stride stated that he would rule based on the fact that the commonly accepted definition of nunchuck make them martial arts devices and the fact that he knew what the words use and display meant. He further stated that he needed no grammar lesson from me. Trial court confirmed that defendant was not a peace officer and had no authorization. He also asked the attending officer if he noticed any farming activities being performed at the time of the charged offenses. He asked about several activities such as “Did you see any wheat being harvested?”; “Did you see any rice being planted?”; “Were any cows being milked?” After this I attempted to make the point that the proper definition and characterization of the implements was independent of their utilization to no avail. I reattempted to show that the common definition was not applicable.
He upheld the citation based on its decision that the common definition of nunchucks made them martial arts devices. He asked about my criminal record. I stated I did not have one. The court considering the circumstances of the offense, and my history, character and condition, then sentenced me to 60 days of court supervision where I was not to use my implements on IL State Beach Park property. I immediately inquired about my appeal. He said I can file a “Motion - To Reconsider Order” with his court within the next 30 days. This would be an appeal based on a matter of law that he may have not correctly considered. He then stated that I could file a notice to appeal with the appellate court within 30 days after that. I asked whether I would get 60 days if I skipped the motion to reconsider so as not to risk missing an the opportunity for an appearance in the annotated statutes. He said I would only get 30 days. The judge confirmed that my July 19th statement to the court was included in my file.
I then asked the court clerk, Ann N., why I was not given my requested jury trial. She confirmed that I had requested a trial by jury. She said she thought that there might be a fee. After inquiring, she stated that there was a $112 fee that I was never asked for, that appears on no forms that I completed, that had not been requested with the confirmation of my court date or with the phone call requesting a continuance, and that I should have known to pay. Having not paid, I was given a trial by judge automatically. I requested a copy of my citation with an x in the box next to the words “Trial by Jury.” She requested $2.50 for a photocopy, but a sympathetic police officer copied the back of the citation and the court appearance request that mentioned no fee. He also copied my original envelope with the July 22nd receipt date so that it was clear that the court had been duly notified of my request.
It was now 4:10 and the sympathetic officer directed me to the Office of the Circuit Court of Lake County to obtain my pro se Notice to Appeal paperwork. I arrived at 4:30 and offices close at 5:00. Pat S. said that since no transcript had been made, I must file a “Bystander’s Report” of the proceedings based upon my personal recollection in order to appeal. When I arrived at Lake County Law Library and got Bystander’s report details it was 5:05. The Nineteenth District Circuit Court’s signs indicate that they accept all major credit cards, but they only take Discover and do not take personal checks. Due to lateness and credit confusion I was did not file my paperwork that day.