Hurricane Katrina9

Hurricane Katrina

Introduction

Hurricane Katrina was one of the most expensive storms in the history of the United States for the New Orleans government, with help from the federal government to have to clean up and help to recover the areas it hit in Louisiana. Almost 1,300 people died making this hurricane the deadliest in the United States since 1928 (Knabb, Rhome & Brown, 2005). The property damage of Hurricane Katrina to the affected areas was about $108 billion based on the 2005 USD (Knabb, Rhome & Brown, 2005).

This essay will set out to discuss the disaster planning of the New Orleans government using Hurricane Katrina as an example. Here is some background of the hurricane in this introduction:

Over fifty breaches inNew Orleans's hurricane surge protection are the cause of the majority of the death and destruction during Katrina on August 29, 2005. Eventually 80% of the city and large tracts of neighboringparishes became flooded, and the floodwaters lingered for weeks (Plyer, August 28, 2015).According to a modeling exercise conducted by theU.S. Army Corps of Engineers(USACE), two-thirds of the deaths in Greater New Orleans were due to levee and floodwall failure (Charles, Anderson & Battjes, 2007).All of the major studies concluded that the USACE, the designers and builders of the levee system as mandated by theFlood Control Act of 1965, is responsible. This is mainly due to a decision to use shorter steel sheet pilings in an effort to save money (Robertson, May 23, 2015).In January 2008, JudgeStanwood Duval, U.S. District Court, ruled that despite the corps role in the flooding, the agency[7]could not be held financially liable because ofsovereign immunityin theFlood Control Act of 1928. Exactly ten years after Katrina, J. David Rogers, lead author of a new report in the official journal of theWorld Water Councilconcluded that the flooding during Katrina "could have been prevented had the corps retained an external review board to double-check its flood-wall designs (Stoltz, August 24, 2015).

There was also an investigation of the responses from federal, state and local governments, resulting in the resignation ofFederal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA) directorMichael D. Brown, and ofNew Orleans Police Department(NOPD) SuperintendentEddie Compass. Many other government officials were criticized for their responses, especially New Orleans MayorRay Nagin, Louisiana GovernorKathleen Blanco, and PresidentGeorge W. Bush. Several agencies including theUnited States Coast Guard(USCG),National Hurricane Center(NHC), and National(NWS) were commended for their actions. They provided accurate hurricane weather tracking forecasts with sufficient lead time (United States Congress, February 19, 2006).

This essay will discuss what the United States government has done to help the areas affected by Hurricane Katrina since the hurricane hit back in 2005.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Here is what the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), has done to help the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina:

NEW ORLEANS – In the continued recovery from hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Federal Emergency Management Agency has provided nearly$19.6 billionto help Louisiana’s communities and families rebuild and protect their property against future hazards.“Since 2005, FEMA has remained committed to Louisiana’s post-Katrina and Rita recovery. In the last eight years, we have funded one of the most significant comebacks in the history of natural disasters. This would not have been possible without the strong partnerships we share with our state and local recovery partners,” said FEMA’s Louisiana Recovery Office Executive Director Mike Womack. FEMA’sPublic Assistance Programassists in rebuilding disaster-damaged public infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, publicly owned utilities, schools, police and fire departments and healthcare facilities. FEMA has provided approximately$11.9 billionin public assistance funding to 1,849 Louisiana applicants for their Katrina and Rita recovery projects. “In the past year alone, parish governments have held more than 50 ground-breaking and ribbon cutting events related to Katrina and Rita projects. These celebrations highlight the hard work and commitment that spurs the progress being made every day in Louisiana,” said Womack. “Our new, online photo essay at www.fema.gov/la8yearoffers a glimpse at some of the major, completed projects in local parishes.” FEMA’sHazard Mitigation Grant Programhelps communities rebuild stronger and smarter by providing grants for projects that are designed to save lives and protect properties. Specifically, in response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita, FEMA has made more than$1.86 billionin HMGP funding available to the state of Louisiana. Regarding individuals and families, after hurricanes Katrina and Rita, hundreds of thousands of Louisiana residents needed help rebuilding their lives. To aid these residents, FEMA provided approximately$5.8 billionIndividuals and Households Programgrants to 915,884 individuals and families statewide. These dollars were used as housing assistance for rent, repairs and replacement housing, as well as other needs assistance for such things as furniture, clothing and replacement vehicles. FEMA also housed more than 92,000 households in travel trailers, park models and mobile homes across Louisiana to combat the largest housing shortage ever seen in the agency’s history. Units were located on private properties, at industrial sites, in commercial mobile home parks and across 111 FEMA built and maintained group sites throughout the state. The last temporary housing unit was vacated last year in 2012 (FEMA, August 28, 2013).

The Response of the Government to Hurricane Katrina

There was a National Response Plan by the United States government to handle the disaster of Hurricane Katrina that focused its efforts on the local government. As the local government became lost as to what to do to resolve the problem, they called on the resources of the federal government as well as added resources from the federal government. Problems arose from inadequate planning and back-up communication systems at various levels (The White House, January 20, 2009).

Somedisaster recoveryresponse to Katrina began before the storm, withFederal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA) preparations that ranged from logistical supply deployments to amortuaryteam with refrigerated trucks. A network of volunteers began rendering assistance to local residents and residents emerging from New Orleans and surrounding parishes as soon as the storm made landfall (even though many were directed to not enter the area), and continued for more than six months after the storm. Of the 60,000 people stranded in New Orleans, the Coast Guard rescued more than 33,500.Congress recognized the Coast Guard's response with an official entry in the Congressional Recordand theArmed Servicewas awarded thePresidential Unit Citation. TheUnited States Northern CommandestablishedJoint Task Force (JTF) Katrinabased out ofCamp Shelby, Mississippi, to act as the military's on-scene response on Sunday, August 28, withUS ArmyGeneral Russelas commander.Approximately 58,000 National Guard personnel were activated to deal with the storm's aftermath, with troops coming from all 50 states.TheDepartment of Defensealso activated volunteer members of theCivil Air Patrol. (The White House, January 20, 2009).

Criticism of Government Response

The criticisms of the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina primarily consisted of criticism ofmismanagementand lack of leadershipin the relief efforts in response to the storm and its aftermath (Thevenot & Russell, 2005). More specifically, the criticism focused on the delayed response to the flooding of New Orleans, and the subsequent state of chaos in the Crescent City (TheneologismKatrinagatewas coined to refer to this controversy, and was a runner-up for “2005 word of the year.” (Clark, January 6, 2006).

Within days of Katrina's August 29 landfall, public debate arose about the local, state and federal governments' role in the preparationsfor and response to the hurricane. Criticism was initially prompted by televised images of visibly shaken and frustrated political leaders, and of residents who remained stranded by flood waters withoutwater,food, or shelter. Deaths fromthirst, exhaustionandviolencedays after the storm had passed fueled the criticism, as did the dilemma of the evacuees at facilities such as the Louisiana Superdome and the New Orleans Civic Center. Some alleged thatrace,class, and other factors could have contributed to delays in government response. For example, duringA Concert for Hurricane Relief, a benefit concert for victims of the hurricane, rapperKanye Westveered off script and harshly criticized the government's response to the crisis, stating that “George Bush doesn't care aboutblack people” (de Moraes, 2005). In accordance with federal law, President George W. Bush directed theSecretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, to coordinate the Federal response. Chertoff designatedMichael D. Brown, head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, as the Principal Federal Official to lead the deployment and coordination of all federal response resources and forces in the Gulf Coast region. However, the President and Secretary Chertoff initially came under harsh criticism for what some perceived as a lack of planning and coordination. Brown claimed that Governor Blanco resisted their efforts and was unhelpful. Governor Blanco and her staff disputed this (Kirkpatrick & Shane, September 15, 2005).

Conclusion

Hurricane Katrina was one of the most expensive storms in the history of the United States for the New Orleans government, with help from the federal government to have to clean up and help to recover the areas it hit in Louisiana. Almost 1,300 people died making this hurricane the deadliest in the United States since 1928 (Knabb, Rhome & Brown, 2005). The property damage of Hurricane Katrina to the affected areas was about $108 billion based on the 2005 USD (Knabb, Rhome & Brown, 2005).

This essay set out to discuss the disaster planning of the New Orleans government using Hurricane Katrina as an example. Here is some background of the hurricane from the introduction:

Over fifty breaches inNew Orleans's hurricane surge protection are the cause of the majority of the death and destruction during Katrina on August 29, 2005. Eventually 80% of the city and large tracts of neighboringparishes became flooded, and the floodwaters lingered for weeks (Plyer, August 28, 2015).According to a modeling exercise conducted by theU.S. Army Corps of Engineers(USACE), two-thirds of the deaths in Greater New Orleans were due to levee and floodwall failure (Charles, Anderson & Battjes, 2007).All of the major studies concluded that the USACE, the designers and builders of the levee system as mandated by theFlood Control Act of 1965, is responsible. This is mainly due to a decision to use shorter steel sheet pilings in an effort to save money (Robertson, May 23, 2015).In January 2008, JudgeStanwood Duval, U.S. District Court, ruled that despite the corps role in the flooding, the agencycould not be held financially liable because ofsovereign immunityin theFlood Control Act of 1928. Exactly ten years after Katrina, J. David Rogers, lead author of a new report in the official journal of theWorld Water Councilconcluded that the flooding during Katrina "could have been prevented had the corps retained an external review board to double-check its flood-wall designs (Stoltz, August 24, 2015).

References

Charles F. Anderson, J. Battjes, A. (2007). "The New Orleans Hurricane Protection

System: What Went Wrong and Why"(PDF)). American Society of Civil Engineers.

Clark, Heather. (January 6, 2006). "Linguists Vote 'Truthiness' Word of 2005."ABC News.

de Moraes, Lisa (2005)."Kanye West's Torrent of Criticism, Live on NBC".The Washington

Post.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (August 28, 2013). “Louisiana Recovery: Eight Years

After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,” FEMA. Washington: Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved from: http://www.fema.gov/news-release/2013/08/28/louisiana-recovery-eight-years-after-hurricanes-katrina-and-rita

Kirkpatrick, D & Scott S. (September 15, 2005)."Ex-FEMA Chief Tells of Frustration and Chaos". The New York Times.

Knabb, R. D; Rhome, J. R. & Brown, D. P. (December 20, 2005). National Hurricane

Center.Hurricane Katrina: August 23 – 30, 2005(PDF)(Tropical Cyclone Report). United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National Weather Service.

Plyer, A. (August 28, 2015)."Facts for Features: Katrina Impact". The Data Center.

Robertson, C. (May 23, 2015)."Decade after Katrina pointing finger more firmly at Army Corps". New York Times.

Stoltz, M. H. (August 24, 2015)."Flood damage after Katrina could have been prevented, S&T expert says". Missouri S&T.

United States Congress(February 19, 2006).A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina(PDF).Washington, DC:Government Printing Office. Archived fromthe original(PDF).

The White House. (January 20, 2009)."The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned". The White House.

Thevenot, B. & Russell, G. (September 26, 2005). "Reports of anarchy at Superdome overstated."Seattle Times.September 26, 2005.