Human Face of a Crisis

The Human Face of a Crisis - Lessons from BeaconsfieldDr Robert Long

The Human Face of a Crisis

Lessons From Beaconsfield

Dr Robert Long

Dr Robert Long

Director

Human Dymensions Pty Ltd

10 Jens Place

Kambah ACT 2902

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Mobile: 0424547115

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ABN: 34 123 347 080

1.0 Introduction

The rockfall tragedy of 25 April 2006 at Beaconsfield captured intense Australian and international interest, with a focus on the recovery and rescue underground. Attention often concentrates ontechnical details: the recovery of Larry Knight; the traumatic experiences of Todd Russell and Brant Webb; engineering of the rescue; and the experiences of the rescuers.The Beaconsfield crisispresented many challenges and lessons for all involved, not just for those underground.

A great deal was learned for those above ground, inside and outside the mine fence including: how the crisis affectedmine employees; mine families; volunteers; the Beaconsfield community;the media; political groups; experts and the Emergency Coordination Operations Group (ECOG).

This paper has a focus on lessons learned above ground with a particular focus on psychological and cultural aspects of the crisis. The structure of the paper discusses the general nature of crisis on communities, the nature of ‘mindfulness’ as articulated by Prof. K. E. Weick, the uniqueness of the Beaconsfield crisis, the presence of ‘mindfulness’ in the Beaconsfield story and finally, lessons and strategies learned from the Beaconsfield event.

2.0 Crisis, Communities and Impact

Before exploring specific issues about Beaconsfield it may be helpful to review the nature ofhow a crisis affects a community.

A crisis is 'a testing time' or 'emergency event'. A crisis incident involves a threat with the potential to seriously damage the status quo. A crisis is also an emotional, psychosocial and physical disruption to normal day-to-day functioning. A crisis provokes moments of extreme tension, conflict, modification, interference and turbulence.

Communities are rarely a blissful assembly of harmonious relationships but nonetheless by definition have a shared sense of cohesion and purpose. People tend to gather in communities and manage day-to-day tensions based on altruism, history, shared symbols, shared values, common language, territory and common interest networks. These comprise the nature of community culture. When a community experiences a crisis regardless of its magnitude, it tends to drive a wedge through relationships and amplifies natural ‘fault lines’. A crisis by its nature puts significant pressures on individuals and groups in a variety of ways, many of which prior to the crisis were unknown or unidentified. A crisis by its nature at first tends to push and pull at the margins of the community as is represented in Figures 1 & 2. Initially the crisis brings people together only to later pierce and disrupts life's continuum and relationships and open up latent ‘fault lines’ as is represented in Figures 3 & 4.

Over time,with community leadership ‘fault lines’ and wounds begin to heal or diffuse and the community returns to a state of normalcy as is represented in Figures 5 & 6.

Figures 1 and 2. A community as a gathering of groups, the crisis event pushes at the community pushing relationships about.

Figures 3 & 4. The early stages of the crisis pushes the community together but quickly opens up ‘fault lines’ in relationships and interrupts the community dynamic.

Figures 5 & 6. The community in time heals and resumes back to business as normal but the history and scars are present, below the surface.

3.0 Managing the Unexpected

A number of experts believe that the unexpected nature of a crisis can be prepared for (Weick, 2001) or that a crisis can be managed before it happens (Mitroff, 2001). Indeed, Mitroff (2005) contends that there are essential characteristics in an organisation and community which help manage a crisis and contribute to emerging stronger after the crisis. Whilst it may be a truism that ‘time heals many things’ it is Mitroff's (2005) contention that there are specific things an organisation or community can do to help heal and bring together people following the tension and fracturing caused by a crisis. Mitroff argues that in order to effectively manage a crisis an organisation or community need to have:

1. Right heart (emotional capability);
2. Right thinking (creative capability);
3. Right social and political skills (social and political capability);
4. Right integration (integrative capability);
5. Right technical skills (technical capability);
6. Right transfer (aesthetic capability); and
7. Right soul (spiritual capability).

Whilst it is not the purpose of this paper to discuss these elements it is important to note that a crisis can if not well managed, creates organisational disintegrationthat continues to injure its people. The key elements of ‘crisis readiness’are the capacity to learn and develop resilience.

If a community is able to effectively manage a crisis then the process of healing and transfer back to normality (Figures 5 & 6) should be achievable in a short time period. The damage of lingering psychological and cultural injury disables organisations and communities and increases even greater vulnerabilities should they experience another crisis.

Organisations who practice ‘mindful management of the unexpected’ are said by Weick (2001, p. 3 ) to be High Reliability Organisations (HRO). As Weick (2001, p. 3) states:

HROs strive to maintain an underlying style of mental functioning that is distinguished by continuous updating and deepening of increasingly plausible interpretations of what the context is, what problems define it, and what remedies it contains.

According to Weick (2001, p. 10) HROs are characterised by mindfulness. Mindfulness is much more than just ‘having your wits about you’, mindfulness is the practice of the following:

• Preoccupation with failure;
• Reluctance to simplify interpretations;
• Sensitivity to operations;
• Commitment to resilience;
• Deference to expertise.

It is with reference to these characteristics that the discussion of the Beaconsfieldcrisis is structured. Before discussion of these five characteristics evidenced at Beaconsfield a brief reminder of the unique events of Beaconsfield may be helpful.

4.0 Unique Characteristics of the Beaconsfield Crisis

At Beaconsfield there were many unique challenges, expressed in the following sample questions:

1. How does an organisation manage a media contingent of such size and voracious appetite for a story when the object of that story is hidden one kilometre underground?
2. How can an organisation communicate effectively with and through the media when the media themselves carry so much hidden agenda and the potential for unethical behaviour?
3. How does an organisation manage the emotions of its own people when the emotionsare so driven by the media?
4. What can an organisation do to manage the presence of cultural heroes and non-heroes and the human temptation to let the emotions rather than rational logic lead behaviour?
5. What can be done to manage the necessary influx of specialists (strangers) into a community? How are the tensions caused by lack of space, territorial ownership and displacement of identities managed?
6. How do leaders in a crisis manage their own sleep, fatigue and well being in the face of unrealistic demands and so much hidden agenda?
7. How does an organisation communicate and manage complexity in the face of community and media expectations for simplistic solutions?
8. What resources are needed to help ordinary people cope with the grief and stress?
9. How does a community manage the distress of simultaneous recovery and rescue?
10. How does a community preoccupied with a recovery and rescue manage people who utilise a crisis for over servicing, opportunism and egocentrism?

What is not known is that I had been working with Beaconsfield for three years prior to the Anzac Day crisis of 2006. This work included: organisational development; leadership and management coaching; team development, and psychology and culture safety training. This longitudinal and relational investment in capacity building meant that the challenges of the crisis were well managed. The maturing of the leadership team and mine managers in particular over the three years prior played a significant part in the success of the Beaconsfield rescue and community recovery.

Beaconsfield was unique withaccumulated stressors, media intensity, setting, and peculiar characteristics. The crisis commenced with the belief that three miners had been killed. This was followed by attempts to locate and determine the status of the three and a recovery operation commenced. The crisis then transformed to a recovery and rescue operation on the discovery of Todd Russell and Brant Webb still alive. During the recovery and rescue operation the community experienced a number of moments of simultaneous grief and elation, these were: the discovery of Todd Russell and Brant Webb’s survival simultaneous with recovery of the body of Larry Knight; the death of Richard Carlton; extended delays and transitions in the rescue process; a simultaneous rescue and funeral; numerous post rescue celebrations culminating in an event hosted by the Prime Minister at Parliament House Canberra, and on-going national and international media intensity.

Many people described their emotions during the crisis as being on a ‘roller coaster ride’. The push and pull of emotions on a daily basis evolved in time to be a significant constraint on the rescue and one which required strategic response inside the fence. This will be discussed in the final section of this paper on lessons and strategies.

The following section of the paper discusses Weick’s five characteristics of ‘mindfulness’ (2001, p. 10) as they were evidenced at Beaconsfield.

5.0 Preoccupation with failure

The first characteristic of mindfulness is evidenced in the practice of a preoccupation with failure. This doesn’t mean having a failure ‘mindset’ or a preoccupation with negativity or pessimism but rather refers to a sense of trajectory. Some might call this ‘teleological thinking’. The practice of ‘mindfulness’ is able to discern and foresee the trajectory of decisions.

The defense mechanism of denial is often the modus operandi for those in political circles for incident management. Records show (eg. AWB affair, Children Overboard, Costa Concordia) that defensiveness as a strategy is neither pragmatic nor successful. On the contrary organisations who practice ‘mindfulness’ are focused on what must not happen more than the denial of what has happened.

In the case of the Beaconsfield preoccupation with failure was one characteristic of its success. Preoccupation with failure is more than just thinking about the worst that could happen, it is far more intentional than that. Preoccupation with failure is a fearless mindset that is the foundation of all planning and strategy. In the case of Beaconsfield it was having as many options as possible, risk assessing all options, testing in theory and in practice all of those options above and below ground and having the creative space and security of culture to imagine the worst that could happen.

At Beaconsfield a preoccupation with failure was evident in an openness to all discussion, entertaining doubt and ‘hair-brained’ ideas, radical thoughts and suggestions in a climate of resilience, this was the climate and culture which permeated the Emergency Operations Control Group (EOCG) and operations in the coordination room. ‘Mindfulness’ enables the entertainment of doubt within the constraints of time, it also knows that leadership can be caught in ‘paralysis by analysis’.

The enemy of the preoccupation with failure is:risk arrogance;blind complacency and rigid compliance.

6.0 Reluctance to simplify interpretations

Another way HRO’s manage the unexpected is by being reluctant to accept simplifications. HRO’s simplify less and see more, they encourage diverse experience, skepticism towards received wisdom and strategically manage differences of opinion without devaluing the nuances that diverse people detect. HRO’s have leadership which does not insist on homogeneity but values adaptation, flexibility, learning and problem solving capacity. The enemy of reluctance to simplify operations is naivety and ignorance. It is difficult to practice the characteristic of ‘mindfulness’ when the populist media and vested political interests thirst for simplistic solutions.

In the case of Beaconsfield the EOCG culture of acknowledged complexity enabled a flexibility of operations and responsible risk taking which achieved a successful rescue, rather than a recovery operation. The EOCG itself was a complex mix of miners, managers, engineers, geotechs, safety experts, paramedics, emergency services, mines rescue, media experts, shift bosses, administration support and an organisational psychologist.

The idea that miners could heroically go in and pluck Todd and Brant from the rockfall was contemplated by those who understood the world simplistically. When the heart rules the head under stress things tend to go pear shaped. On the other hand, and against all received information at the time, it was extremely difficult to think that Todd and Brant were alive.

Beaconsfield safety staff and myself visited Todd’s, Brant’s and Larry’s familiesmany times each day. It was decided early that physical contact, comfort, empathy and accurate communication in person was essential for managing the families most immediately affected by the crisis. Each time a visit round was undertaken meant a trip to Beauty Point, several stops in Beaconsfield and finally a trip to the other side of Launceston to Jackie Knight’s home.

These visits became more intensified as the crisis eschewed due to a lack of discipline demonstrated through the media and the eagerness of some political opportunists to capitalise on the huge media presence. It is unfortunate that the offensive actions of a few was so disruptive to the rescue. If something is to be learned from the media ‘circus’ which tracked the events of Beaconsfield it is the mammoth energy and expertise (apart from the energy committed to the rescue) required to manage a sometimes unethical and voracious appetite for news. ‘Mindfulness’ knows that simplistic ideas are seductive.

The media presence certainly exacerbated an already complicated and stressful operation. The early engagement of a professional media company was an excellent strategy in communicating and managing the media enterprise itching outside the gate. The engagement of a local security firm ensured understanding of unique issues, ensured trust and enable the bolstering of resources when required.

The enemy of reluctance to simplify interpretations is: simplistic thinking; black and white thinking; resistance to complexity; laziness; poor communication and the news cycle.

7.0 Sensitivity to operations

Sensitivity to operations indicates an ongoing concern with the unexpected, what Reason (2005, p. 10) calls ‘latent conditions’. The HRO which is sensitive to operations is conscious of loopholes systems. Unfortunately, most organisations only discover loopholes after the fact usually because the organisation is limited in resilience and a capacity to learn. The HRO is constantly in assessment of its own health, particularly its safety culture, this was a role I played during and following the crisis. It was important to have someone who was intimate with the organisation but who could step back from operations and offer doubt, analysis and advice as a respected ‘critical friend’.

The HRO is attentive to the frontline, where the work gets done. At Beaconsfield all personnel underground were or had the ability to be in constant contact with the EOCG control room above ground by phone or radio. Communication is vital: providing observations, descriptions and any information, which was in turn tabulated on a running tally board which was visible for all in the EOCG as well as noted by stenographers. Understanding that all communication is subjective and culturally interpreted is also critical to the sending and receiving of information.

The walls of the EOCG room were used to visually organise every facet of the rescue and recovery operation. EOCG members who were leading the operation above and below ground (miners/rescuers/mining engineers) would surface periodically providing updates. Once the rescue was in full swing digital and video data was also possible and provided vital information for decision making including input from the two trapped miners themselves.

The enemy of sensitivity to operations is: myopia;territoriality; exclusivity and fortress thinking.

8.0 Commitment to resilience

Weick (2001, p. 14) comments that the signature of an HRO is not the absence of errors but the fact that errors don't disable the organisation. Resilience is about keeping errors small and ensuring that they are the key to learning, improvisation and problem solving so that the system keeps functioning. Without a commitment to resilience reporting is driven ‘underground’.

HRO leadership is resilient because it knows the culture and psychology of its organisation: personnel, experts, skills, cultural and sub-cultural beliefs, trends, resources and structures. At Beaconsfield the commitment to resilience was illustrated in how it followed an information, communication, interpretation and planning cycleas illustrated in Figure 7. This cycle was evident in the way the ECOG managed relationships, communications and time.

Figure 7.Information, communication, interpretation and planning cycle

A critical part of commitment to resilience is the valuing of community dynamic and participatory dialogue as avenues of educated decision making. The geography of space (Soja)is critical in this regard. The design of the buildings as Beaconsfield enabled the funnelling of all personnel on arrival, thru traffic and departure of people to be observed and engaged. This is illustrated in Figure 8. This created a ‘meeting place’ for community discussion, announcements and meeting. Much of this happened incidentally in the courtyard area, as people naturally interacted with each other a sense of mutuality and pastoral support developed. Meeting and communication was also engendered by the provision of food (BBQ) for breakfast and lunch, set up at the entrance to the courtyard.

Figure 8. Design of traffic and Beaconsfield buildings