How and Why Might Organisations Adopt a Behavioural Safety Approach

How and why might organisations adopt a behavioural safety approach

Peter Webb, HSEQ Manager, Basell Polyolefins UK Ltd., Carrington Site, Manchester, M31 4AJ, England. October 2003.

Introduction

It is widely accepted that within the broader scope of human factors, specifically human behaviour at all levels within an organisation influences the effectiveness with which risks are controlled. Behavioural safety approaches aim to promote behaviours which are critical to health and safety. This essay outlines why a behavioural safety approach might be adopted.

Behavioural safety programmes vary significantly in their success. Some fail altogether. An overview is given of how to adopt such a programme. Some key barriers and enablers which have been shown to affect the outcome are highlighted.

This essay will not go into detail about what behavioural safety is, except insofar as it is necessary to explain the “why” and the “how”.

Why Organisations Might Adopt a Behavioural Safety Approach

Safety performance in many organisations has tended to reach a plateau. This follows significant improvements which were achieved initially through technological approaches (better understanding of physical hazards, inherently safe design etc.), and subsequently systems approaches (implementation of HSE management systems, quality systems etc.).

The term organisation was defined by W. J. Duncan as “a collection of interacting and interdependent individuals who work toward common goals and whose relationships are determined according to a certain structure”. This definition suggests that fundamentally organisations are made up of people, rather than buildings, equipment and machinery. In occupational organisations, people usually share a number of common goals such as controlling the level of risk to their health and safety and working towards financial objectives. In fact these goals are often synergistic. It follows that an understanding of “what makes people tick” , or psychology, should lead to insights into how these common goals can be achieved.

Within psychology there are several competing and quite different concepts of the person, of which the behaviourist approach is one. In recent years, the principles behind this approach have been applied with some success to behaviours which are critical to safety (Komaki et al. 2000).

Organisational factors which underlie a successful behavioural safety programme, can also be expected to lead to successes in other areas of the business. For example, transformational leadership styles have been shown (HSE 2002, p51) to have a strong positive impact on safety compliance of individuals who were less committed to safety. Similarly it has been shown that a transformational leadership style motivates employees to achieve organisational goals (Arnold et al. 1998, p 338).

How to Implement a Behavioural Safety Programme

Implementing a behavioural safety programme is not a trivial task, and success is not guaranteed. It is important to get it right first time, since having tried once and failed, the organisation will be less receptive to a second attempt. Figure 1 gives an overview of the essential elements of a behavioural safety programme.

Figure 1; Overview of a behavioural safety programme

Assess Cultural Maturity or Readiness

It is necessary for an organisation to have a mature safety culture before it embarks on such a programme. It can be assessed by questionnaires, interviews or observation. Key components of a positive safety culture include management commitment, communication, productivity versus safety, learning organisation, safety resources, participation, shared perceptions about safety, trust, industrial relations and job satisfaction and training (see for example HSE 2000, and HSE 1998).

Management and Work Force Support

Getting the support of the people in the organisation is vital. This can be achieved by involving people in the selection and design of the programme, usually through a steering group made up of volunteers. Steering group members should be respected (but not high ranking) staff members, and should be representative of the work group. Getting the support of first line supervisors is key, as they can either facilitate or prevent observations from being carried out.

Behavioural Safety Training

This should initially target the steering group, who need to understand underlying psychological principles, as well as the specific techniques associated with identifying critical behaviours, and carrying out observations. Some programmes train all staff as observers, while others train only a minority. If the resources can be committed, it would seem to make sense to have as many observers as possible.

Specifying Critical Safety Behaviours

A critical behaviour checklist, to be completed by the observers during their observations, has to be developed, normally by the steering committee. The list can be developed from incident reports, risk assessments, audits, input from front line staff, and expert judgement.

Establishing a Baseline

The final element in the implementation phase is establishing a baseline, by carrying out observations to establish the levels of safe behaviours, for the critical behaviours identified. A baseline is a useful but not essential means of providing feedback on the success of the programme.

Observation and Feedback Process

Once the implementation phase is complete, the observation and feedback loop starts. Observations are in general conducted by peers, but they can be conducted by superiors. The observer uses the check list of critical behaviours to record whether the individual was safe, at risk, or that the behaviour was not relevant. In order for useful data on the percent safe to be generated, the checklist must clearly describe the behaviours. The name of the person being observed is not normally recorded, to avoid a blame culture being established. Feedback is crucial to achieving improvements. In particular, positive or “summative” feedback about a safe behaviour is important in providing motivation. “Formative” feedback regarding any at risk behaviours is also important. Feedback tends to be most successful when it is given immediately after the behaviour, but broader feedback to the organisation about progress with trends is also important. Realistic and achievable goals must be set, and progress communicated. Unsafe conditions or barriers to safe behaviour revealed in the environment (antecedents) must be dealt with. Performance is monitored to track progress, and to prompt investigation if expected improvements are not achieved. New behaviours can be added to the check list, and existing ones removed if they have reached “habit strength”, i.e. consistently observed as safe.

Conclusions

There is strong evidence that behaviour modification is effective in changing a range of behaviours in an organisation. This essay has described why such a programme could be effective in achieving desired safety targets, and how it could be achieved. The focus of the implementation described has been front line staff, where critical behaviours would be for example, wearing of correct PPE, or following operational procedures. These are typically where the “active failures” in an organisation are to be found (Reason 1997). Arguments have been made (HSE 2002) for promoting critical health and safety procedures which support the HSE management system. This adjusted focus has the possibility to use behavioural safety to make improvements in the “latent conditions” in an organisation; weaknesses in the latent conditions in an organisation are in many cases currently only identified reactively in incident investigations.

References

Arnold, J, Cooper, CL, Robertson, I.T., (1998) Work Psychology, Third Edition Understanding Human Behaviour in the Work Place, Financial Times Management, London

Health & Safety Executive (2000). Safety culture maturity model Offshore Technology Report 2000/049. HSE Books, Sudbury.

Health & Safety Executive (1998). Health and safety climate survey tool. Available from

Komaki, J et al (2000). A rich and rigorous examination of applied behaviour analysis research in the world of work. International Review of Industrial and Organisational Psychology, 15, 265 – 367.

Reason, J. (1997) Managing the Risks of Organisational Accidents. Ashgate, Aldershot, UK

Bibliography

Health & Safety Executive (2002). Strategies to promote safe behaviour as part of a health and safety management system, Contract Research Report 430/2002, HSE Books, Sudbury. Available from