Herman van der Wusten (University of Amsterdam)
The view from the capital city
Despite, or perhaps thanks to, globalization the world of a national politician looks like a wrinkled face: full of lines that produce fragments. His, not to speak of her, appearance may have to be smooth in the age of television, the cartographic inner mind can not be. Some of these lines are borders, others not although we may use the term in a metaphorical sense. Relevant distinctions show up on maps, that are not borders. Southeast Asia has no borderline, the distinction between continental and maritime parts of a continent is not portrayed by a border, although there may be a line that distinguishes the two. A border in this connection is the outer limit of a social system of rule, one needs an authority to impose a border. Among other things a system of rule has a provision of regulated access to its domain. This may show up at the border as one enters or it may show up as a result of sanctioning by enforced removal. Different authorities compete over the imposition of rule systems and over borders. Individuals may perceive all sorts of rule systems and borders. In most cases they will not be durable signposts for action if they are not backed up by the realities of authority.
In the preceding paragraph systems of rule and borders are projected on the earth surface and thus produce territories. Are they necessarily territorial in nature? This is not the case in principle. But the territorial solution for demarcating authority domains is attractive for a number of reasons that Sack has enumerated. History also shows that encompassing systems of rule that are effectively imposed have in actual fact been territorial. There is no reason why this would be different in the electronic age and beyond. This does by no means imply that the state system is the end of history.
Seen from the capital cities of states there are two types of territorial borders that are particularly relevant: borders that are closely connected with the demarcation of the entire system of rule embodied by the state authority itself, and borders that are consequential to the day to day functioning of the power apparatus that is the heart of the state.
State borders are important lines of demarcation. As territoriy is an integral part of the definition of statehood politicians have always been sensitive to territory, thus to the location of borders. Borders separate more insistently as mobility grows and the stakes of being here, not there grow higher. At the same time there are strong forces that support crossborder interaction. The outcome of these contrary tendencies is unstable over time. Policies in the fields of migration, international trade and finance have always been difficult, often volatile issues. But it involves in any case intricate control mechanisms, possibly not at the border but elsewhere e.g. by moving the line of control further outward (e.g. by visa regulations and supervision at the moment that one enters a mode of transport) or by areal controls across the territory. The notion of border also becomes more complicated as air travel creates multiple entry- and exit points on the state territory. Consequently new border landscapes take shape around them. Finally, interstate cooperation creates new territories where rule systems and access regulations are commonly upheld with assent of the state in question. This refers to military alliances as well as to other forms of cooperation, NATO and the EU.
Capital cities are home to a specific function in the state system (for the moment I put aside the very few cases where this function is merely symbolic). From the perspective of the state apparatus there has historically been a certain though not universal urge to isolate the location of this function in a separate city or in earlier times as an isolated function altogether. The retreat of the French king to Versailles is the ultimate example, special purpose capital cities like Washington are a less far-reaching case (inside the beltway is the current translation in popular parlance) as are the location of the political function in originally very small, second rate places like The Hague or Bern or Bonn. National governments tend to pursue a certain special authority with respect to the place where the national political function is established, e.g. the longstanding special status of Paris in the French administrative system. If local government develops largely independently from national government there may be trouble between the two authorities, e.g. the longstanding conflict between the Kaiser and the local government of Berlin in the late 19th century and the fierce battle between Mrs Thatcher and the metropolitan government of London in the late 20th century. The border of these administrative units is always of some concern and sometimes a major worry. In the recently reconfigured polities of Eastcentral Europe capital cities have got a territorially fragmented administrative structure, possibly to avoid a local, secundary political power centre. In federal systems there is a special status for these places, the federal district.
There may be extra borders for the central political complex within the capital. In capital cities the vast majority of the most important national political functions is as a rule concentrated in a small area. In this area special police regimes or extra supervision may be maintained (think also of the air routes near National/Reagan Airport close to the White House). In earlier times the military and its headquarters were normally close by, not only for deliberative purposes in the sphere of international security but also for purposes of specific protection. The territoriality in this domain is much more finegrained and functions in a cascading fashion. A case in point is the extra territoriality (from the point of view of the state under review) of the diplomatic posts and the international functions (e.g. the UN police in the different headquarters of the UN organization). Although we remain in many instances in the public sphere, control is generally tight. Think of the way you enter the Dutch parliament building where security is all pervasive but at the same time everything is done to suggest and underline the public, open nature of the place (e.g. the lobby just outside the main assembly hall which has a glass wall that opens it up - but only apparently - to the outside world). Other official buildings are more carefully sealed off with different zones where one needs special permission to enter controlled directly by security personnel up to the offices of the main officeholders protected by secretaries.
Once office holders start to move their protection moves with them depending on status. We are now outside the realm of strict territoriality although we may consider the protection of a moving person as the control of a tiny, everchanging part of the territory. The self inflicted regulation of access of politicians vis a vis their environment stretches even further when we realize that public relations people increasingly control interactions of main office holders controlling their behaviour inside and outside the public sphere.
In light of the increased salience of international migration as a political issue in Europe it has suddenly become less fashionable to underplay the territoriality of states. The debate on global cities and the important role capital cities play in this respect invite a sharper focus on the administrative embedding of these cities. Finally the fear of international terrorism underlines the importance of the security of the political complex and consequently the regulation of access. This is an extremely complicated question as it has in democracies/open societies to be combined with a demonstrable presence of public space and all it entails. Consequently the wrinkled face perception of national politicians concerned with their country’s role in the world is not fading, however boyish or girlish they have to look. On the contrary. The implications of the resurgence of areal fragmentation for controlling purposes are manifold, partially interdependent and difficult to manage.