Graham T. Allison, Directorwriter, Editor: Henry E. Hale

RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH

No.7, February 4, 2000

Graham T. Allison, DirectorWriter, Editor: Henry E. Hale

Strengthening Democratic Institutions ProjectProduction Director: Melissa C. Carr

John F. Kennedy School of GovernmentAssistants: Emily Van Buskirk, Ben Dunlap

Harvard UniversityProduction Assistant: Emily Goodhue

JANUARY’S TOP NEWS

Russia to vote for president on March 26
Acting President Putin appears all but certain winner, Primakov bows out
Risks to Putin’s victory: catastrophe in military campaign, loss of control of news about Chechnya, plausible connection between Putin and the September apartment bombings
Surprise Unity-Communist alliance dominates Duma leadership
Putin names Kasyanov right-hand-man in government
Yavlinsky sounds lonely campaign voice against Chechen war

THE PRESIDENTIAL POLLS

Sept.Oct.Nov.Dec.Jan.

Putin421 455158

Zyuganov2720 171915

Primakov1916 996

Yavlinsky 97 553

Others (all less than 3%)9

Undecided9

Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) polls: January 28-30, December 17-20, November 26-29, October 15-19, 1999, September 17-21. Percentages are from the total of those who said they intended to vote. December data from

BACK ISSUES AVAILABLE ON THE WEB AT:

SEE INSIDE

WHO IS PUTIN? The man, the acting president, the modern politician (p.2). How people who know him describe him (p.4). Putin vs. Yavlinsky on the Chechen War (p.4). In his own words (p.5). Putin’s campaign team (p.3).
Putin’s Would-Be Rivals (p.6).
Opinions of Russian Voters (p.6).
The New Duma. Emerging balance of forces (p.7). Unity-Communist Deal (p.7).
Regional Election Results (p.7).
Spin Control: Five major Russian parties assess Putin’s electoral chances (p.8).
Insider Information: Some of Russia’s best political analysts examine the presidential race and its implications (starting p.10). New Communist analyst (p.20).
PLUS: latest polls; key dates (p.1).

KEY DATES

February 13Deadline for presidential candidates to submit signatures for registration

February 21Deadline for Central Election Commission to register candidates

March 26Presidential election

April 16Runoff presidential election (if no one gets 50% on March 26)

WHO IS PUTIN?

Acting President Vladimir Putin personifies Winston Churchill’s characterization of Russia: “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” Even among fellow KGB spooks, Putin had a reputation for being “secretive.” Our answer to the current riddle is that Putin is first and foremost a determined political candidate single-mindedly focused on winning the election on March 26. All other considerations are subordinated to this immediate, overriding objective. As Putin himself said disparagingly about campaigning two years ago, “One has to be insincere and promise something which you cannot fulfill…So you either have to be a fool who does not understand what you are promising, or deliberately be lying” (Washington Post 1/30/00).

What follows from this answer is recognition that Putin’s words and actions today offer little evidence about his personal convictions or his prospective program as president. Rather, they are tactical moves in high-stakes electoral combat. Through this prism, Putin’s short-term behavior can best be understood by asking what a skillful, wily, ruthless campaign strategist would do. In effect, he is “wagging the Russian dog.”

Only after victory will Putin remove his electoral mask. When he does, he will have firmly in his strong hand the vast powers vested in the Yeltsin Constitution’s “democratic monarchy.” (Does the Putin phenomenon signal the rise of “regulated democracy” in Russia? Read Markov on p.15.)

Nonetheless, Putin’s conduct of the current political campaign does offer suggestive clues about his operating style. In dramatic contrast with Yeltsin, he is healthy and energetic. Decisive and opportunisticallyflexible, he appears unconstrained by ideology or principle. He can project a menacing aura. Like the Godfather of American fiction, he conveys the sense that he is not interested in “no” for an answer and takes everything personally, especially in relations with the press. Most telling, however, his campaign behavior reveals him to be a very professional modern politician, adept at finding words and actions that encourage each important constituency to perceive him as a champion of their aspirations. Reformers see a closet reformer. Communists see a patriot. Oligarchs see a guarantor of their position.

The military and security structures see an advocate of their concerns. Putin has also proven masterful at generating a political bandwagon, conveying the sense that the train is leaving and opponents must either get on board or be left behind. (Might elite competition to get on board ironically hurt Putin’s electoral chances? Read Boxer on p.10.)

This realism, pragmatism, ruthlessness, and, above all, strategic political style are evident not only in his major pronouncements but in his early actions:

Campaign Message. Putin has prudently embraced the new “Russian consensus” about what must be done. First, he stresses stability and predictability. Second, he vows to strengthen the Russian state. Third, he promises to reestablish the rule of law in Russia, simplifying and removing contradictions in existing law and enforcing it accordingly. Fourth, he promises to continue the most popular directions of the current path of economic reform: lowering taxes on individuals and industry, strengthening tax collection, integrating Russia into the world economy (including the IMF, the international capital market, and the World Trade Organization), and moving on to structural reform. Finally, instead of talk, he vows to “do it.” (What are Putinite policies likely to be? Read Nikonov on p.18.)

Naming Mikhail Kasyanov First Deputy PM. By tapping this representative of the mainstream Yeltsin economic reform program, someone well-known to the West through the Paris Club debt negotiations and other fora, to be his de facto Prime Minister, Putin sent a signal to the government, domestic markets, and the international community that he is committed to continuing the basic path of recent market reforms. The appointment also rewarded technocratic professionalism and efficiency. Since Kasyanov (pictured) lacks clear ties to any single “oligarchic” group, he is an ideal appointee for the campaign period.

The Unity-Communist Deal. In a brash political move, the pro-Putin Unity bloc on January 18 announced a deal with the Communist Party to form a majority of members and vote themselves into virtually all of the key Duma committee chairmanships, giving the Duma speakership back to Communist Gennady Seleznev. When the “smaller factions” (Fatherland-All Russia, the Union of Right-Wing Forces, and Yabloko) predictably reacted with outrage, storming out of the parliament en masse, Putin then stepped in as the “peacemaker,” brokering a deal that kept Unity’s advantage but mollified the offended. With this one stroke, Putin effectively checkmated his only potentially

serious rival, Yevgeny Primakov, by denying him the one platform that could have provided a basis for a campaign against Putin. Putin also rendered the Communists dependent on his parliamentary faction. (Was this alliance primarily electoral in nature? Read Gelman on p.12. Or was it a longer-term strategic move? Read Golosov on p.14.)

The Chechen War. With election day nearing, Putin is working hard to achieve something that can be declared “victory” in Chechnya. He identifies Chechnya as “the place where Russia’s fate is being decided.” Rejecting Western entreaties, he has pushed the troops into a fierce battle over the capital city of Grozny. As casualties mounted, and some Russian media began reporting this bad news, Putin sought to protect his flanks by warning ominously that Chechen terrorists might launch new attacks on Russian apartment buildings, accelerating a series of bomb scares across Russia.

Dishing Out Pork. Knowing that people are more likely to vote for the government if it pays them, Putin and Kasyanov have started doling out pork and promises. On January 11, Putin announced that industrial growth was now strong enough to finance a 20% hike in pensions, effective February 1. A day later, he visited a hospital and promised higher wages for its staff. Two days after that, he spoke to education workers and promised a 20% wage hike for all state employees starting April 1. His largesse also extended to the military-industrial complex, for which he promised a 50% increase in state purchase orders. His government has likewise promised to pay all back wages to state-budget workers by April 15, “coincidentally” the day before a runoff election would take place if this is necessary, and has declared that there will be no spending cuts in the year 2000.

Demoting “Family” Figures. After his surprise appointment, Putin quickly removed or demoted some of the most controversial or threatening figures in Yeltsin’s political “Family,” as one would expect a canny candidate to do. The most notable “outs” include Yeltsin’s daughter Tatyana Dyachenko (fired as presidential image-maker), Pavel Borodin (fired as the Kremlin’s property manager and now wanted by Swiss authorities on corruption charges), and one-time presidential prospect and potential political rival Nikolai Aksenenko (pictured), who was stripped of his first

PUTIN’S CAMPAIGN TEAM

Putin has yet to formally unveil his campaign team, but it is increasingly clear who is in his inner circle. It includes Dmitry Kozak (his longtime chief of staff), Dmitry Medvedev (deputy head of the Kremlin administration), Viktor Cherkesov (first deputy director of the FSB), German Gref (head of Putin’s Strategic Research Center), Igor Sechin (chief of Putin’s personal chancellery), Viktor Ivanov (deputy head of presidential administration), and Sergei Ivanov (Security Council secretary). Other influentials reportedly include Aleksei Golovkov (Unity campaign manager and insurance magnate), Aleksandr Voloshin (Putin’s and Yeltsin’s chief of staff), and Igor Shabdurasulov (deputy chief of presidential staff).

deputy prime minister status and left with his old post of Railways Minister).

Seizing the CIS Reins. At its summit on January 25, the Commonwealth of Independent States’ Council of Heads of State elected Putin its chairman (largely a symbolic post) despite the fact that it was the turn of Tajikistan’s president in a rotational leadership scheme. This boosts Putin’s image as a leader, and potential integrator, in Russia’s top sphere of influence.

Intimidating the Media. While Putin has gone out of his way to affirm his commitment to civil liberties, Russian state agencies have nonetheless pressured media outlets (primarily television) not to report negative aspects of the war and the two major state-controlled channels paint a persistently optimistic picture. A number of Western reporters (including the Boston Globe’s David Filipov) have been detained or kicked out of the country after straying from Russian military guidance in Chechnya, and one Radio Liberty correspondent, Andrei Babitsky (pictured), was arrested in Chechnya and accused of aiding the Chechens (he was handed over to the Chechens on February 3 in a “prisoner exchange”). For at least a year, Kremlin-friendly structures have also sought to put a financial squeeze on the opposition Media-Most holding group and this pressure shows no signs of abating. While some newspapers have printed all kinds of negative allegations about the war, including conspiracy theories that both the war and the apartment bombings were masterminded in order to get Putin elected president, the incidents of harassment have cast a chill over Russia’s independent and opposition media, especially television.

Signing the new National Security Concept. Emphasizing his capacity to stand up for Russian national interests against foreign interference, a very popular stance after NATO expansion and the Kosovo crisis, one of Putin’s first acts as acting president was to sign into force a new National Security Concept with a much more combative tone vis-à-vis the West. In concrete terms, the document differs from its 1997 predecessor primarily in ending talk of a “partnership” with the West. Nonetheless, it retains the view that Russia’s future lies in integration with the world economy and observance of international law. For more extensive analysis, see the policy memos posted at

Endorsing START II. Shortly after becoming acting President, Putin declared that he would make START II ratification a priority – hitting a responsive chord with Western governments, especially the US.

Professing Orthodox Christian Faith. On Orthodox Christmas (January 7), Putin talked about the life of Christ in a way unusual for Russian political leaders. Friends and a priest describe him as a true and active Christian, his faith forged three years ago when he rescued his two daughters from a fire at a dacha (cottage) near St. Petersburg. By publicly associating himself with the central symbol of the ethnically Russian nation, Putin has certainly not harmed his electoral chances, but he simultaneously makes minority constituencies somewhat uneasy. (See Moscow Times 1/21)

PUTIN VS. YAVLINSKY ON CHECHEN WAR

Putin to soldiers in Chechnya: “I want you to know that the country really needs what you have been doing here. I do not merely mean protection of the honor and dignity of the country. I mean more serious things. We are talking about putting an end to the disintegration of Russia. This is our task here.” (Trud-7, 1/6)

Yavlinsky on the Chechnya operation: “The conflict began as an anti-terrorist operation. Now it has turned into a war against the people…It is a crime because thousands of people have been killed and this war has no future, no political solution.” (Reuters 2/3)

Putin to security officials at the Interior Ministry: “The danger of terrorist acts in Russia is growing…You recall what happened in Moscow, Buynaksk, and Volgodonsk when we smashed the bandits’ faces in Dagestan, when they felt how weak they were in direct combat with us.” (Moscow Times 1/22)

Yavlinsky on Putin’s warning: “Whatever the origins of the explosives and of the current events in Chechnya, they are being deliberately used as a background for the ongoing electoral campaign…. Someone made the choice to use this strategy (either to exploit the events or to create them) in order to derange people's minds. When you know your close relatives are in a house that can explode at any moment, you cannot be in full control of your mind.” ( 1/22)

Sergei Ivanov, Security Council Secretary, Putin ally: “One must admit the obvious fact that along with the real fighting there is a virtual war underway, a media war.” (Washington Post 1/25)

PERSPECTIVES ON PUTIN FROM FRIENDS AND OBSERVERS

For an earlier round of views on Putin (pictured), see the January issue of Russian Election Watch (

Valery Golubev, a former KGB agent with Putin, a close friend of his, and currently the head of the St. Petersburg city committee on tourism: “Recruiting Germans is difficult. Neither money nor blackmail works particularly well. To build something is possible only on the basis of personal contact – if a person believes in you, “falls in love” with you, he will work. Putin’s results were simply fantastic. He was able to establish very close contact with ideological opponents, without any barriers – he could make friends with the enemy such that it would force him to act to his own advantage.” (Obshchaya Gazeta 1/13)

KGB foreign agentwho knew Putin: “He is an experienced manipulator. People for him are material, but the sympathy and trust that he inspired, recruiting a conversation partner, were unconditional.” (Obshchaya Gazeta 1/13)

Anatoly Sobchak, Putin’s former professor and boss as St. Petersburg Mayor: “He told me that he could not stand the betrayal that took place when Germany was unified and our organs gave up our agent network to the Germans.” (Obshchaya Gazeta 1/13)

Anatoly Sobchak: "I saw that his inability to betray, his loyalty, reliability andhonesty are the main traits of his character, which really make him a rare person in our times." (LA Times 1/4)

Sergei Stepashin, former Prime Minister May–August 1999,for whom Putin served: “Yes, I really do know Putin very well, perhaps better than anyone in Moscow. With the exception, probably, of Anatoly Chubais. I frequently talk with Putin. And I can tell you that this man is not authoritarian. But he will likely be able to achieve getting everyone without exception to obey the law.” (Nezavisimaya Gazeta 1/14)

Sergei Stepashin (pictured): “In relation to Chechnya I can say the following. The plan for active operations in this republic was worked out starting in March. And we planned to move to the Terek in August-September. So this would have happened even if there had not been explosions in Moscow. I actively conducted work on strengthening the borders with Chechnya, preparing for an active offensive. Thus Vladimir Putin did not discover anything new here. You can ask him himself about this. He was at that time the director of the FSB and had all of the information. I was always a supporter of a strong and tough policy in Chechnya. But I would have thought well about whether it was worth crossing the Terek and going further to the south.” (Nezavisimaya Gazeta 1/14)

Igor Malashenko, NTV executive who knows media magnate Boris Berezovsky better than Putin: "Boris Berezovsky said many times (there are many witnesses; I heard it myself) that he sincerely believes that in Russia anybody can be elected President with adequate financial support and control of TV…Anybody." (LA Times 1/4)