Free speech and the market state: Race, media and democracy in new liberal times

Gholam Khiabany and Milly Williamson

Abstract

Press freedom and free speech have again become central questions in discussions ofdemocracy andpower.Awholerangeofeventshavecalledintoquestiontheroleofthepressinthe democratic process in today’s combined context of economic crisis and the free reign ofmarket forces. From the publication of the racist cartoons in Denmark, to the Wikileaks witch hunt,to theLevesoninquiryinBritain,therhetoricofpressfreedomisrevealedasauniversalizingconcept that masks political and class interest – free expression is not treated universally, but is tiedto questions of social, political and economic power. This article argues, however, that it is notthe casethatliberaldemocracyhaslatterlybeencorruptedorimpaired.Instead,thesignificantlimits of liberalism, highlighted by the above instances, stem from the historical conditions whichgave risetoit;massrevolutionandreactioninthe19thcenturyresultedinconstitutionaldemocracies whichestablishedtheprincipleoffreedom,butnotthefact.Thisarticlewillsuggestthatfrom the outset, constitutional democracies were shaped by the class interests of an economicelite. There has been a historic entanglement of emancipation and de-emancipation in liberalthought, andtheroleofthepressinthisenterprisehasbeentousearaciallychargeddefinitionoffreedom andthenotionofathreatto‘ourfreedoms’toscapegoattheMuslimpopulationandtojustify curbing ‘their’ freedoms.

Keywords

Anti-Muslim racism, democratic swindle, emancipation, freedom, free speech, liberalism, market state, race

Introduction

Recently, press freedom and free speech have again become central questions indiscussionsofdemocracyandpower.Awholerangeofeventshavecalledintoquestiontherole ofthepressinthedemocraticprocessintoday’scombinedcontextofeconomiccrisis andthefreereignofmarketforces.Fromthepublicationoftheracistcartoonsin Denmark, to the Wikileaks witch hunt, to the Leveson inquiry in Britain, the rhetoricof pressfreedomisrevealedasauniversalizingconceptthatmaskspoliticalandclassinterest – free expression is not treated universally, but is tied to questions of social,political and economicpower.

Significantcomponentsofthisbroaderperceptionof‘freedom’inneo-liberaltimesaretheissuesofraceandclass.Anumberofcontroversieshavearisen,suchasthatsurroundingtheYouTubevideo‘TheInnocenceofMuslims’,ortheoffensivecartoonsoftheProphet Muhammed in the French satirical newspaper, ‘Charlie Hebdo’, that havehigh- lighted the importance of race and class in definitions of free expression. Criticismsofthesepublicationswerecharacterizedas‘Muslim’andlambastedintheBritishnewsmediaasattacksonfreespeech.Indeed,thereisawidelycirculatingideainthemediaandinthepoliticalclassthat‘Muslims’opposefreespeechperseandareinfavourofcensor- ship – in particular, of any criticism of Islam. The horrific murders of journalists attheCharlie Hebdo offices in January 2015 have once again highlighted the significanceoffreespeech.Themassacreof12peoplewasaninexcusablecrime.Thetragedyleadparadoxically,ontheonehand,towidespreadcalls(bothinsideFranceandinternationally)todefendfreespeechunderallcircumstancesandinthefaceofanyprovocation,butontheother resulted in an increased number of citizens in France being arrested foroffensivespeech. This article will argue that a selected reading and apseudo-universalizingpresentationoftheideaoffreespeechanditshistory,servespoliticalandcorporateelitesandaimstosilenceoppositionalvoicesandsidelinestherightsoftheMuslimpopulation(and others). The defence of free speech in this context in effect curtails and limitsthe‘universality’ of free speech. This, we suggest, has exposed the limits of liberalism ata time when the post-war social democratic legitimacy of the state (based on welfareandpublicservice)hasbeenseverelyshaken.Thecontinuedeconomicdownturn,thewhole- saleattacksonpublicspendingandtheincreasedgapbetweenrichandpoorarematchedby a legislative context entirely devoted to corporate interests and a cultural contextinwhichsocialvaluesarereplacedwithmarketvalues.Underthesecircumstance,thenewsmedia’sstokingofanti-Muslimracismhasplayedakeyrolenotonlyinassertinganotionof freedom which excludes the many, but also in justifying a new authoritarian statebyprovidingthepublicwithananti-Islamiccommonpurpose.

This article will argue, however, that it is not the case that liberal democracy haslatterlybeencorruptedorimpaired.Instead,thesignificantlimitsofliberalism,highlighted bytheaboveinstances,stemfromthehistoricalconditionswhichgaverisetoit;mass revolution and reaction in the 19th century resulted in constitutional democracies which establishedtheprincipleoffreedom,butnotthefact.Fromtheoutset,constitutional democracieswereshapedbytheclassinterestsofaneconomicelite.Afterexamining andcritiquingthecontradictionwithinliberalismandthehistoricentanglementofemancipationandde-emancipationinliberalthought,wethenexaminetheroleofthepressin

thisenterprise,inparticularexaminingthewaythatthepresshasusedaraciallycharged definitionoffreedomandthenotionofathreatto‘ourfreedoms’toscapegoattheMuslim population and to justify curbing ‘their’freedoms.

The ‘Democratic Swindle’ and the limits of liberal democracy

Tounderstandthehistoricaloriginsofthelimitsofliberaldemocracy,itisusefultoturn tothecritiquesofconstitutionaldemocraciesthatMarxandEngelsproducedinthe periodafterthe1848/1849revolutions.Marx’scritiquesoftheFrenchandPrussiandemocraticconstitutionscentreonthewaythatdemocracywascurtailedbylawandtheway that by legal means, the interests of an economic elite were served. Engels too writesof the revolutions:

The people had been victorious, they had won freedoms of a decisively democratic nature, but theimmediaterulingpowerpassednotintotheirhandsbutintothebigbourgeoisie[….]in short the revolution was not complete. (Marx and Engels, 1969: 64–65)

Instead of the establishment of democracies which set up and safeguardedfreedoms andassociatedrights(ofthepress,oftheindividual,ofassembly),MarxandEngels argue that the establishment of constitutions became the legal means of curtailingfreedomofworkersandthepoor.FreedomforMarxbecomesclassinterestdisguisedas universal value. He writes in The Eighteenth Brumaire that the laws of theconstitution regulated all liberties granted ‘in such a manner that the bourgeoisie in its enjoymentof them finds itself unhindered by the equal rights of other classes’ (Marx, 2010a:159).

HalDraperreintroducesustoMarx’sideasonthe‘democraticswindle’.Although Marxgivesnosystematicaccountofthisconcept,itisnonethelessoneheusesinavariety of places to refer to the way that post-revolutionary governments in the 19thcentury presented a façade of democracy in order to restrain the democratic will of thepopulation.Draper(1974)arguesthatMarxusesthistermtorefertothe‘methodswherebythe bourgeoisie utilized (used and abused) democratic forms for the purposes ofstabilizing its socio-economic rule’ (p. 118). After the defeats of the 1848–1849 revolutions,Marx turnedtothequestionofthelimitsandproblemsofconstitutionaldemocracytotryto understandhowdemocraticforms(inparticularthelegislature)wereusedtofrustrate democratic process (control from below). Draper suggests that Marx’s writingdemonstratedadeepconcerntodevelopatheoreticalunderstandingoftheexperienceof1848– 1851andoftherestrictiononpoliticalfreedomfollowingtheBonapartistandBismarkian reactionsinFranceandGermany.ForMarx,democracywasgenuineinsofarasitmeant popularcontrolfrombelowandheidentifiedthemodesbywhichdemocracywaslimited inbothregimes,whiletherhetoricofdemocracyremainedthenormativelanguageofthe political class. In particular, in both instances, there was an effective attempt toincrease thelegislativeandexecutivepowersofgovernmentanddecreasetherepresentativepowersoftheelectorate.AwholenewseriesoflawswereintroducedinFrancetorestrictthe franchise (on domicile grounds) and the movement of ordinary people (through theuse ofpassports),toreintroducecensorship(ofthepressandtheatre),alongsidepolitical repression,particularlyaftertheJuneinsurrectioninParis(whichsaw3000deadand 15,000transported).ThecasewassimilarinGermany,whichalsorestrictedthefranchiseandreintroducedtotalcensorshipin1850,andpoliticalrepressionagainstdissidents.MarxarguedvociferouslyagainsttheserestrictionsinNeueRheinischeZeitug (until it too was closed down in 1850).

IntheFrenchcase,MarxidentifiesintheFrenchconstitutionthelegalmeansby which freedom is granted and simultaneously withdrawn. Marx writes,

Observe here and throughout that the French constitution guarantees liberty, but alwayswith the proviso of exceptions made by law, or which may STILL BE MADE! (Marx,1851)

Freedomisnegatedbytheverylawthatgrantsit.Freedomisalsoguaranteedand nullifiedintheclauserelatingtofreeexpressionandassemblywhichstates,‘Theenjoymentoftheserightshasnootherlimit,thantheequalrightsofothers,andthepublic safety’.ForMarx,thelimitationmadebythe‘publicsafety’clause,‘takesawaythe enjoymentoftherightaltogether’because,ofcourse,anythingthatisconsideredto underminethesafetyoftherulingeliteisunderstoodasathreatto‘publicsafety’.These constitutionalclauses(andothers)arethelegalmeansoffreedomnegated.AsMarx writes,

solongasthenameoffreedomwasrespectedandonlyitsactualrealizationprevented,of courseinalegalway,theconstitutionalexistenceoflibertyremainedintact,inviolate,however mortal the blows dealt to its existence in actual life. (Marx and Engels, 1969: 409)

Thus, while the French constitution guarantees liberty, it invalidates it ‘byallowing for exceptions made by law’ which are specifically aimed at curbing public powerand consolidatingthepowerofcapital.MarxwrotethattheFrenchconstitution‘…from beginningtoendisamassoffinewords,hidingamosttreacherousdesign.Fromitsvery wording,itisimpossibletoviolateit,foreveryoneofitsprovisionscontainsitsown antithesis – utterly nullifies itself’ (Marx,1851).

In his blistering critiques of the way that legislation universalizes (bourgeois)class interestinconstitutionaldemocracies,Marxpointedoutthatwhileconstitutionaldemocracieswerebornoutofmassmovementsofpeopleagainstthearistocracy(andthebourgeoisiewereapartofthismass–albeitaprivilegedpart),thereactionthatfollowedhad a lasting impact on the form of liberal democracy, as the capitalist class consolidatedits powerinthemid-19thcenturyandshapedconstitutionaldemocracyinitsownimage. This meant the establishment of states that were based on legislative activities thatbenefitedcapital.Inshort,liberaldemocracywaslimitedfromalmostthemomentofits origin.Theroleofthelegislatureisimportant–governmentcanproducelegislation (madeinaccordancewiththeproperconductofconstitutionaldemocracy)thatundercuts rightsandfreedoms,andindeedtheefficacyofdemocracyitself(andTheEighteenth Brumaire demonstrates this in great detail). According to Draper (1974), ‘Marxargued thatsuchmeasureswereexamplesofthewaythatparliamentaryorbourgeoisdemocracy is, in good part, a safety-valve for the effervescing passions of the country’ (p. 113),a meansofcontainingpopularpressuresratherthanexpressingthem.The‘democratic

swindle’, then, refers to the manner in which bourgeois democratic politics is an‘exercise in convincing the maximum of the people that they are participating in statepower by means of minimum concessions to democratic forms’ (Draper, 1974:119).

AlthoughBritain’sroadtoliberaldemocracyhasadifferentandlongerhistory,beginningwiththeEnglishCivilWar(EngelscalledEnglandlessunfreethanotherliberal democracies), the state also played a major role in limiting the effectiveness ofdemocracy.Priortothe1867ReformAct,whenthefranchisewasnotuniversalforworking men,thestateoperatedatthebehestofgovernment,withouttheinterferencefromthe workingclassvoter.Thefranchisewasextendedafterover100yearsofstruggle,culminating on the mass march on Hyde Park in 1866, but as the voting populationincreased, thecharacterofthestatebegantotransform,preciselyatthemomentwhenthevote threatenedrepresentativecontrolfrombelow.Oncethevotewasconcededtomaleurban workers, its effect was limited by gradually removing real power from parliamentand vesting it in an enlarged state machine encompassing a variety of powerfulinstitutions: the civil service, the army, the police, the judiciary (formally independent of theexecutive).Thesestateinstitutionswerenotandarenotaccountabletotheelectorate,butonly tothecabinet,andarestaffedbyunelectedpeople.Thesestateinstitutionsalsocoincided with a change in the capitalist class from a system of small firms to large-scalecorporations and monopoly capitalism that was necessarily served by large-scaleinfrastructure and supporting state institutions.

Thus,Europeanliberaldemocracywaslimitedbytheveryconditionsandhistory from which it emerged, acting as a safety-valve for the population and serving theinterestsoftheeconomicandpoliticalliberalelite.This,forMarx,isattheheartofthelieof constitutional democracy or rather, the ‘democratic swindle’; using a legislativeframe- worktoprovidethefreedomtoactinclassinterestwhileappearingtoactintheinterests of all. Any advances in the democratic, social and representative role of the statehave been the subject of continual struggle from below ever since, rather thansomething implicittoliberalism;inthe20thcentury,thishasimportantlytakentheshapeofdemands thatpoliticalstructuresmustsupportgreatersocialandeconomicequality.Theestablishmentofpost-warwelfaresystemsacrossEuropewasaresponsetodeepsocialandpoliticalunrest(‘givethemreformorthewillgiveusrevolution’);thebenefitssystem(oneof thebugbearsofourday)andotherwelfarereformswerethemeansbywhichthestate was forced to partially redistribute the wealth of society on a more equitable basis –to make economic demands on the political class.

Liberalism does not equal democracy: The case of race, class and Empire

In contrast, one of the most significant myths about capitalism has been the tendencyto separatethe‘economic’fromthe‘political’.This,asmanyhaveargued,hasservedcapitalistideologyratherwell(Wood,1995).Thisispartlytodowiththedefinitionofliberty in liberalism. Liberty is narrowly defined only in relation to and from the state.Linked tothisisanothermyth–theequationofliberalismwithdemocracy(Bobbio,1990; Losurdo,2011).Bobbioarguesthata‘liberalstateisnotnecessarilydemocratic’.Indeed,

while liberalism is about ‘a particular conception of the state’, democracy ‘denotesone of the many possible modes of government’ (Bobbio, 1990: 7). Bobbio furthersuggests that the relationship between liberalism and democracy resolves itself into a more problematicrelationbetweenlibertyandequality.Thequestion,contrarytorigidliberal thought, has not just been simply about liberty or freedom, but precisely over the nature andthedefinitionoflibertyitself:freedomofwhatandtodowhat?Intheeconomic sphere, asserts Bobbio (1990), ‘liberty and equality are antithetical values, in thesense thatneithercanbefullyrealizedexceptattheexpenseoftheother:aliberallaissez-faire society is inevitably inegalitarian, and an egalitarian society is inevitablyilliberal’ (p.32).However,libertyinitsbroadersenseislinkedtothequestionofequalityandthe conditionswhichmakeitpossibleforbothtobeabsentorpresentarethesame.For Balibar,thismeansthat‘thediverseformsofsocialandpolitical“power”thatcorrespond to either inequalities or constraints on the freedom of man the citizennecessarily converge.Therearenoexamplesofrestrictionsorsuppressionsoffreedomswithout social inequalities, nor of inequalities without restrictions or suppressions offreedoms’ (Balibar,1994:49).Muchofthehistoryofliberalismhasbeenaboutseparatingthese two historic demands.

It is in such a context that the liberal state, which champions individual freedomand indeedhastheprotectionofindividualfreedomasoneofitsverylimitedallocatedfunctions,hasturnedintoasurveillancestate(Eagleton,2009).Andhereliesthegreatcontradiction within liberalism – embedded in this system of thought areemancipation andde-emancipation.

Liberalismwithoutadoubtisaprojectofemancipation,insofarandaslongasemancipationisdefinedintermsof,andinrelationto,thelibertyoftheindividualfromabsolutism.Losurdo’sengagingaccountofthehistoryofliberalismflushesoutthecontradictionofliberalism.Inansweringwhathecalls‘aseriesofembarrassingquestions’,includingwhatisliberalismandwhoisaliberal,Losurdo(2011)demonstratesthatthegreatliberalthinkerswereunitednotonlyintheirloveforlibertybutmoreimportantlytheircontemptfortheindigenouspeopleofthecoloniesandtheworkingclass.Theyalsosharedawillingnesstocallforimplementingthemostrepressiveofmeasures,includinggenocide,slaveryandchildlabour.Losurdo(2011)remindsusthatliberalthinkers–Locke,SmithandFranklinincluded–sharedanenthusiasmfor‘aprocessofsystematicexpropriationandpracticalgenocidefirstoftheIrishandthenoftheIndians’,aswellasfor‘blackenslavementandtheblackslavetrade’ (p.20).Thecontradictionattheheartofliberalismalsoshowsitselfinacontradictoryapproachto‘liberty’.LosurdostressesthatslaverywasnotsomethingthatprecededliberalismbutratherengendereditsmaximumdevelopmentafterthesuccessofLiberalrevolutions.Inthatsense,thelimitationofabsolutepowerbyliberalrevolutionsledtonewand‘unprecedentedabsolutepower’asthetotalslavepopulationintheAmericashadincreasedfrom330,000in1700tothreemillionin1800andthentoover6millioninthe1850s(Losurdo,2011:35).Thetangleofemancipationandde-emancipationalsoshowsitselfinthesloganoftherebelcolonistsduringtheAmericawarofindependence,‘Wewon’tbetheirNegroes’.TheirdemandforequalityinrelationtoBritishEmpirerecognizesandendorsesinequalityinrelationtoBlacksandNativeAmericans.Losurdo remarks that ‘liberalism and racial chattel slavery emerged together in a twin birth’ (Losurdo,2011:302).Evenforthemostradicalofliberalthinkers,JohnStuartMill,democracywasonlyfitfor‘civilised’community.‘Despotism’Millasserted,‘isalegitimatemodeofgovernmentindealingwithbarbarians,providedtheendbetheirimprovement,andthemeansjustifiedbyactuallyeffectingthatend’(Mill,2005:14).Indeed,theDeclarationoftheRightsofMansaidnothingabouttherightsofslavesorpeopleofcolonies,orwomen.Andthepowerofcapitalinthelandof‘barbarians’ camenotthrough‘peacefulcompetition’butthroughthebarrelofgun.Thescarsarestill deep and stillfresh.

Liberty,forMillaswellasotherliberals,wasexclusivetothosewith‘developed’faculties.Assuch,itwasnotjustthe‘barbarians’,butalsonativeworkingclass,theilliterates(thatisthemajority)thatwereconsideredineligiblefortherighttovote.Nothingwasconsideredworsethangivingrepresentation(andtherighttovote)totheworkingclass,foritwouldgivethemthechancetonegotiateforbetterwagesandworkingconditions!Thelackoffreedomincolonies,therefore,wasextendedtothemetropolis.Theissuesofraceandclasswereintertwinedfromthestart.Losurdohaspointed outthat

At its inception, liberalism expressed the self-consciousness of a class of owners of slavesor servantsthatwasbeingformedasthecapitalistsystembegantoemergeandestablishitself, thanks in part to those ruthless practices of expropriation and oppression implemented inthe metropolis, and especially the colonies, which Marx described as ‘originalcapitalist accumulation’. (Losurdo, 2011:309)

The self-congratulatory account of liberalism fails to mention this ‘exclusionclause’(Losurdo,2011)too,forliberalismasadominantideologyofcapitalismneedstopre-sentitselfinthemostfavourablelight.Theattitudeofliberalthinkerstowardstheslavishconditionsoftheworkingclassishiddendeepundertheclothsof‘universalfreedom’whichliberalismclaimstopromoteandprotect.AsLosurdo(2011)notes,thehatedPoorLawthatallowedfortheexpansionofworkhouseswaspassedinthesameyearthatslaverywasabolishedofficiallyinBritishcolonies.Engelswashorrifiedbytheconditionoftheseworkhousesinwhichfamilies(men,womenandchildren)wereseparatedandbasedindifferentquarters,forcedtowearuniforms,subjectedtovariousformsofabuseandviolence,andtheinmatesweretreatedas‘objectsofdisgustandhorrorplacedoutsidethelawandthehumancommunity’.LosurdoshowsthatwhatEngelsnamed‘totalinstitution’wasatrivialmatterforliberalthinkers.ForMill,themainlossthatanunemployedpersoncouldsufferwasthelossof‘thedisciplineofworkhouse’.Benthamwasagreatadmirerofworkhousesandtheirbenefits.Hewrote:‘Soldierswearuniforms,whynotpaupers?–thosewhosavethecountry,whynotthosewhoaresavedbyit?’Herecommendedthatuniformsshouldbewornbypermanentaswellastemporaryinmates‘fororder,distinction,andrecognition,aswellasfortidiness’.Healsoadvocatedseparatingchildrenfromtheirparents,whileLockesawclearbenefitsofworkingforchildrenasyoungasthree.ForLocke‘thereisagreaterdistancebetweensomemenandothers…thanbetweensomeMenandsomeBeasts’(Losurdo,2011:67–93).Slaverycontinuedbyothermeans,inboththecoloniesandinthemetropolis.

The ideology of superiority and difference which underpins this barbarism isliberal initsoriginandinitsmakeup.Contemporaryversionsofthisthinkingaboutfreedom anddemocracycontinuetoevinceasenseofsuperiorityinwhichtheliberalclass enforces ‘democracy’ upon the ‘less enlightened’, and this continues to beinextricably linkedtoquestionsofraceandclass.AnneNorton(2013),inarecentcontributionwhich has been heralded as ‘brave’ tellsus:

Muslimshaveindeedbeenshowntobedemocracy’sothers.Theylackdemocracy,anditmust besuppliedtothem,albeitbyundemocraticmeans.Theadvancementofliberaldemocratic institutionsinthepoliticalrealminhabitedbyMuslims,likeneo-liberalinstitutionsintheir economicrealms,issoughtwithinaregimeofconditionality.Democracy,likeeconomic development,canbeaidedonlyundercertainconditions.Theobjectsofeffortsto‘democratize’ theMiddleEastarerequirednotmerelytowintheconsentandsatisfythedemandsoftheirown electoral constituencies; they must conform to the will of the European Union and theUnited States.TheelectedgovernmentofPalestinemustrecognizeIsrael,whateveritsconstituents may say; the elected government of Iraq must forgo its choice of prime minister. (p.11)

Such commentaries, worryingly, have become increasingly common inacademia andmedia.Yettheirpopularitydoesnotmakesuchanalysesof‘theMuslimQuestion’ less appalling. Such forms of ‘knowledge’ about the essential and exceptionalcharacterofMuslimsbypoliticalscientistssuchasNorton,nottomentionscoresof sociologist,anthropologist,geographersandsooncannotbeseparatedfromthehistoricalcontextandinstitutionalframeworksthatfund,commission,demand,produceandcirculatethem.Thisotheringof‘democracy’sother’isinturnusedto justify crushing the Iraqis and Palestinians democratic rights and the rightsof Muslimsinthewest.However,thereisnothingnewaboutsuchanapproach,aswe have seen. Muslims are only the latest ‘samples’ in the long history of suchmethods of spreading democracy among the designated others. A very cursory look atEurope and the United States (to which all Muslims are supposed to submit their will) canbe illuminating. As Aijaz Ahmad has suggested the ‘important connection’between capitalism and democracy that many try to present as given and as natural isanything but. He assertsthat

it might have been altogether possible to lose sight of this ‘connection’ if you were anEnglish womantryingtoelectaMemberofParliamentin1913,oraGermanCommunisttryingtoraise yourvoicein1933,oranAfro-Americantrying,in1953,tobuyacupofcoffeeacrossmost counters in the lovely Carolinas, North or South. In other words, there is a connectionbetween metropolitancapitalismandmetropolitandemocracy,thougheventhatconnectionseemsto have worked, through most of the history of capital, only for those who were male, whiteand Tory. (Ahmad, 1996:30)

Liberalism and irrationalism

‘Supplying democracy’ by undemocratic means, however, not only sits uneasilywith the so-called enlightened values that Muslims are accused of lacking, butdestroys them.Eagleton(2009)hassuggested,‘Thisvitalcontradictioncannotbegraspedas

longasirrationalismisalwaysseenasafeatureoftheOther.Dividingtheworld betweenthereasonableandunreasonable,whichtendsnowadaystocoinciderather conveniently with the axis of West and East, overlooks the fact that capitalismbreeds irrationalism as predictably as extraterrestrial aliens turn out to be grotesque buteas-ilyrecognizable versions of ourselves’ (Eagleton, 2009: 74). The very same systemis based on ‘values’ that cannot but produce the most irrational system ofaccumulation, corruption, wreaking havoc in the market and then rewarding the culprits evenmore, horrendous levels of poverty, inequality, environmental catastrophe and so on.This irrationalism takes an even more violent turn at the international level. The historyof capitalistaccumulation,arguedRosaLuxemburg,alwayshastwoaspects.Theone thatisusuallyhighlighted,themostrecognizedaspect,isthenarrativeofcapitalist accumulation defined purely in economic terms, where the exchange between capital-istandwage-labourerisseenasoneofequivalenceandassessedwithinthelimitsof commodityexchange.This,wearealwaystold,isconductedwithinasystemoffair competition, peace and equality (hiding the reality of exploitation). The otheraspect is accumulation at the international level. Luxemburg demonstrates that it isprecisely onthisstagethataccumulationbecomesmoreviolent,andaggressionagainstcolo-niesand rivals, not to mention war, genocide and looting, are committed withoutany attempt at concealment. Shesays,

Bourgeoisliberaltheorytakesintoaccountonlytheformeraspect:therealmof‘peaceful competition,’ the marvels of technology and pure commodity exchange; it separates itstrictly from the other aspect: the realm of capital’s blustering violence which is regarded as moreor lessincidentaltoforeignpolicyandquiteindependentoftheeconomicsphereofcapital. (Luxemburg, 1951:452–453)

Democracy, as Ahmad (1996) argues, rather than being the Siamese twin ofcapital- ism,infacthasbeenanexceptionalandveryrecentreality,eveninlargepartsofEurope.

He writes that

evenifwegrant,forthesakeofargument,thatWesterndemocracyisnowirreversible,this experienceofthirty-fiveyearsinasmallcornerofglobalcapitalismisinsufficienttopostulate a fundamental connection between capitalism and democracy as such. (Ahmad, 1996: 31)

Thesocialdemocraticexperienceandtheperiodthatismarkedbyithasbeenan exception rather than the norm in capitalism. As Ranciere (2006) argues, capital has no needfora‘mythicalhoneymoonbetweencommongood’(p.82)anditself.Butitis importanttostressthateventheexceptionwastheresultofpressurefrombelow.The challengefordemocracyinthecoloniesandmetropoliscamefromtheoutsideofliberal- ism. India became free not because of liberalism but in fierce opposition to it. Thechallenge for liberation and modernization also came as part of broader strugglefor independence.Therighttovote,welfarereformsandpublicservicesweregainedthrough organized working class movements in the metropolis. It was not liberals butemerging radical movements that made those gains after forcing the liberals to retreat fromtheir position which saw the law of the market as the ‘divine’law.

Liberalism today: Back to the future

Contemporary(neo-)liberalismhasnotretreatedfromitsfoundingprinciples,butratherhasspentthepastfourdecadesreturningtoitsorigins,byattackingthedemocraticadvancesmadeinthepost-warstrugglesforsocialdemocracy.‘Freedom’ mustbeplacedinthiscontext,asacontestedidea.JustastheFrenchconstitutiondeclaredfreedomofthepress,theperson,ofassociation,ofreligion,asanunalienablerightwhichitthennullifiedbylaw,sotootodayarefreedomscrushedbythelawswhichpurporttoprotectthem.AsWendyBrown(1995)hasargued,freedomisnota‘philosophicalabsolute’ buta‘relationalandcontextualpractice’ (p.6)and‘“freedom”hasshownitselftobeeasilyappropriatedinliberalregimesforthemostcynicalandunemancipatoryofends’(p.5).Inthe160oddyearssincetheestablishmentofthoseliberalconstitutions,therehavebeencontinualstrugglesfrombelowtorealizethe rightsandfreedomspromisedbut‘nullified’,andeventoextendthem.So,unlikethe 19thcentury,inwhichthelegislaturewasextendedandfortifiedinordertoconsolidatethepowerofpoliticalandeconomicliberalelites,today,instead,isthelastactinthere-consolidationofpowerthatwaschallenged,firstbytheinsurrectionarymoodoftheinterwarandwarperiodwhichresultedinwelfaresystemsacrossWesternEurope,andthen by the revolutions and social movements of the 1960s which once again shookthe world.Bothpushedthelegislativecapacityofstatestooperateinsocialinterestsratherthaneconomicones–orrather,insistingthatsocialissuesareeconomicones,bothopenedupthepossibilitiesoffreeexpression(anditslegalbasisbyrelaxingcensor-shiplaws),andproducedwidespreadacceptanceofalternativevalues,andofdifferentconceptualizationsoffreedom.Whatwehaveseenfromthemid-tolate-70sonisanattemptbycapitaltoregainthatlostground.AspartofthatprojectinBritain,wehaveseenareturnto19thcenturypoliticallanguageonthepartoftheConservativepartyand the coalition government.

In two senses, have we returned to a mid-19th century conceptualization offreedom: thefirstisthatwehavereturnedtotheideathata‘free’mediaisdefinedprimarilyasthe freedomtomakeprofit,attheexpenseofallothervalues.Thesecondisareturntoa19th centuryconceptualizationofthestate.Usingaphrasethatiseerilyresonanttoday, Engels,inalettertoMarx,writesofthe‘bargain-rate’formationofthestateinEngland. The British state, wanting to operate on the cheap, produced legislation whichreduced its capacities in relation to its obligations to citizens and the population and furtherproducedlegislationwhichincreasedtherightsoffreemarketpracticesandownership.The Lib/Con coalition’s proclamations about ‘small government – big society’ steal thelanguage of Palmerstone in its attempt to reconfigure a new state legitimacy in thecontext of attacks on the post-WWII welfare state and cuts in public spending. It is necessary to point out, however, that the idea of reducing the size of the state is ideological(British capitalismneedsabigstatetofunction)–theonlypartsofthestatethatthecoalition wantstoreduceinsizearethosearenasdealingwithpublicwelfareandobligationstothe social rights of citizens. In the battle to reintroduce ‘individual responsibilities’ andto endtherelianceofthecitizensonstate,the‘dependency’ofcitizensonthestatefor security (not the social one) is emphasized by wholehearted attack on individualliberty itself. Ranciere (2006) points out that

in struggling against this mythical State, it is precisely non-State institutions of solidaritythat areattacked,institutionsthatwerealsositeswheredifferentcapacitieswereformedand exercised, capacities for taking care of common and the common future that were differentto those of the government elites. (p. 83)

The converse side of this ‘bargain-rate’ state is an increase in legislation aimed atfacilitatingbigbusinessontheonehand,andcurtailingcivillibertiesontheother(inthe shapeofthenewcriminaljusticelawsandtheanti-terrorlegislation).Thesizeofthe stateinthe‘smallstate–bigsociety’thesisisnothingbutareformulationoftheretreatof thestatefromsocialobligations.However,thestate,inthisformulation,isonlysmallin relationtoensuringunfetteredcapital,butnotinrelationto‘security’.AsAhmad(1995) trenchantly remarks in relation to the global south, ‘the new national bourgeoisies,like imperialist capital itself, want a weak nation-state in relation to capital and a strongone in relation to labour’ (p.12).

Thedemocraticswindleisinoperationheretoo;thepopulation,whoareexcluded from the activities and interests of the state (which is in the process of dismantlingthe onlyareasofthestatethataddresstheirneeds),areencouragedtofeelasiftheyareconnected and participating through the twin bogeymen of our era, the immigrant andthe Muslim. However, ‘what is an immigrant’, asks Ranciere (2007), but ‘a worker whohas losthisname,aworkerwhoisnolongerperceptibleassuch…atoncetheperpetratorof aninexpiablewrongandthecauseofaproblemcallingfortheround-tabletreatment’(p. 105). Flag waving and appeals to national identity have long been the means bywhich thepopulationisencouragedtofeelboundtotheBritishstateanditiscertainlyinopera- tiontoday,thistimewiththesignificantassistanceofthenewsmedia.Inassertingthe returnofthe‘individualresponsibilities’theneo-liberalstatedownsizesnotthestate,but the spaces for and the possibility of politics. Individuals bereft of any collectiveidentity losetheirindividualitytoo.Theneo-liberalstateisnotinfavourofthewithdrawalofthe statebuttheincreasedinterventiontoforcethewithdrawalofcitizensfrompolitics. Liberalism shows its utter contempt for its servants, Black and White, native as wellas foreign.Thesystemwhichbreaksdownthenationalbordersforthefreeandunrestricted circulation and movement of capital erects the biggest barrier to prevent the entry ofthe victimsofitsoperation(Balibar,2010;Ranciere,2007).Inthisbraveneo-liberaltime,an ‘enlightened trust in dispassionate reason has declined the hiring of scholars andexperts to disseminate state and corporate propaganda. Freedom of cultural expression hasculminated in the schlock, ideological rhetoric, and politically managed news of the profit- driven mass media’ (Eagleton, 2009:71).