48.02.19(795w)
GEORGE F. KENNAN MEMORANDUMFebruary 19, 1948
OF A CONVERSATIONWashington, DC
Top Secret
Forthcoming Discussions with General MacArthur.
I outlined to the Secretary what I felt to be the background situation in Japan and the general approach which I intended to take in these talks.1
The Secretary said that he thought that in the initial stages of the discussions I should, if possible, let General MacArthur do the talking and should listen to him as long as he cared to talk. When he had said all he had to say, then I could bring forward the considerations which we here had in mind. I should open the conversations by asking for his ideas on the future position of Japan in our world strategy.
The Secretary cautioned me strongly about what I might say to others in Japan, besides General MacArthur. He emphasized that what would be reported to General MacArthur was not what I really said but what people wished to make out that I had said. He felt that I would be on much sounder ground to make directly to General MacArthur any statements I had to make which could possibly be interpreted as critical of SCAP.2 At the same time, I would have to try not to appear to the others to be cryptic or mysterious.
The Secretary questioned whether I need go to Korea and thought that it might be better if I were to go to Nanking. He felt that in my position I ought to have had a glimpse of the Chinese picture, before I proceed to do any more work on Chinese matters. I explained to him that I had not wished to make this situation any more complicated or to give rise to the impression that I was repeating the Wedemeyer mission.3 I said that I had wired to Sebald that my plans when I arrived in Tokyo would be subject to General MacArthur’s convenience.4 The Secretary felt that I should give consideration to making a trip to Nanking although I might not wish to make the final decision until I had arrived in Tokyo.
The Secretary asked me how I was going to handle the matter with the press and I told him that I thought we would make a simple announcement stating the facts, one or two days before I departed.
The Secretary suggested that I consult with General Gruenther regarding certain of the strategic background which I should have before starting on the trip.5
He asked me when I was going, and then observed that we would have a chance to discuss this again before my departure.6
NA/RG 59 (Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Chronological File)
1. For several months, George F. Kennan had been worried about the United States position in the Far East. On October 14, 1947, he presented Marshall with PPS/10, “Results of Planning Staff Study of Questions Involved in the Japanese Peace Settlement,” noting that “the staff sees great risks in an early relinquishment” of United States control over Japan via a peace treaty. If the United States ended its occupation, Communist penetration would be difficult to prevent, because Japan was neither economically nor politically stable enough to be “turned loose and left to its own devices.” Kennan recommended that “some high official of this Department proceed to Japan and discuss in detail with General MacArthur and his assistants the issues involved.” After several conversations between Marshall and Kennan, the secretary decided that Kennan should visit Japan as soon as it could be arranged. (Department of State, The State Department Policy Planning Papers, 1947–1949, 3 vols. [New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1983], 1: 108–9; George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950[Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1967], pp. 375–77.)
2. MacArthur’s title and the name of his Tokyo headquarters was Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Japan—SCAP.
3. Regarding Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer’s fact-finding mission to China and Korea in July and August 1947, see Marshall Memorandum for Mr. Lovett, July 2, 1947, pp. 000–00.
4. William J. Sebald (USNA, 1922) had seen military service in and had practiced law in Japan and spoke the language expertly. He joined the Foreign Service in 1945. A foreign policy advisor to MacArthur, he became chairman of the Allied Control Council of Japan in August 1947.
5. Major General Alfred M. Gruenther was director of the joint staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
6. Kennan arrived in Tokyo in early March. The visit confirmed his worries of the previous autumn concerning Japan’s viability as an independent state. He reported to Marshall upon his return. (See the revised version of his report [PPS/28/2: “Recommendations with Respect to U.S. Policy Toward Japan”] in Policy Planning Papers, 2: 175–243.)
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