EUSA Ninth Biennial International Conference

EUSA Ninth Biennial International Conference

March 31 – April 2, 2005

Austin, USA

The Visegrád Group in the Expanded European Union: From Pre-accession to Post-accession Cooperation*

Martin DANGERFIELD

History and Governance Research Institute

University of Wolverhampton

Wolverhampton WV1 1SB

United Kingdom

Telephone: (00 44) 1902 322730

Fax: (00 44) 1902 322739

E-mail:

*This paper draws on the findings of a BritishAcademy funded research project Subregional Cooperation and the European Union which has been investigating the impact of the 5th EU expansion on various Central European subregional associations. The author is most grateful both to the BritishAcademy and also to the many government and non-government officials, and scholars in Bulgaria, Croatia, CzechRepublic, Hungary, Italy and Slovakia who kindly provided crucial assistance to this research.

The paper is work in progress – please do not cite without author’ permission.

PRELIMINARIES

The various subregional groupings which emerged onto the European scene after 1989 have played useful, albeit low profile, roles in the interrelated processes of constructing the post-Cold War security order and enlarging the EU eastward. For certain subregional associations the 5th EU enlargement was therefore somewhat of a crossroads since they had been created specifically to assist their participants’ NATO and EU entry. Could or should such groupings continue to exist in the post-accession phase? If so, what should the purpose of cooperation be, what forms should it take and, most crucially, how would it serve requirements and challenges of actual rather than prospective EU membership? So far the actual EU enlargement of May 2004 has not as yet been followed by dissolution of any subregional associations raising the possibility that certain of them at least - even ones with the closest links to the EU pre-accession process - may be evolving into viable post-accession groupings. This paper discusses the transition from pre-accession to post-accession cooperation in the Visegrád Group (VG). VG, which consists of the CzechRepublic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, was one of the first subregional groupings to emerge in the post-Cold war environment. After some 13 years of cooperation, NATO membership for all four countries followed by their EU accession on 1 May 2004 meant that the (Czech VG Presidency Report 2004) “fulfilment of the intentions set out in the (February 1991) Visegrád Declaration put the participating countries before the question of how to go on”.

The first part of the paper provides a theoretical/analytical context by identifying the alternative ways in which subregional cooperation experiences have interacted with EU integration. It locates VG within this framework and briefly compares its EU pre-accession role with that of other types of subregional cooperation initiatives that have been active in post-communist Central Europe. The next section briefly reviews the origins of the VG and the main phases in its development, covering the period from its formation to the May 2004 EU enlargement. This is followed by a description of the nature and scope of VG cooperation as it developed during the EU pre-accession period. The final part of the paper discusses the nature and role of post-accession VG cooperation, with particular focus on the issue of the VG’s potential as a vehicle for promoting its’ members’ interests in the EU.

1. EU ENLARGEMENT AND SUBREGIONAL COOPERATION PROCESSES IN CENTRAL EUROPE

Alternative types of subregional cooperation

Four categories of interplay between subregional cooperation experiences and EU integration can be distinguished as follows: pioneer; substitute; complement/pre-accession instrument and involuntary alternative/ substitute. Where groupings act as pioneers (Inotai, 1997) it means that they not only achieve a more advanced level of integration than other larger regional integration projects but also exert a major influence on the integration agenda of the latter. The pioneer category is exemplified by the Benelux Group, which reached the higher stages of economic integration well before the larger entity it became subsumed in – the European Economic Community – and in so doing acted as an important precursor for the latter. The second type, that of substitute, occurs whenstates establish the subregional cooperation project as an alternative to other integration options with an integration agenda which could be either more or less far-reaching than that of other contemporary regional associations. In post-Cold War Europe examples of substitutes include the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and its ‘offspring’ the European Economic Area (EEA), though the cold war context of the former CMEA leaves EFTA and the EEA as bona fide alternative integration projects for those countries staying out of, or excluded from the EU.

In the third category, the complement/pre-accession instrument, the participating states aspire to join a larger and more developed regional integration exercise and target a level of mutual integration up to limits that are both politically and practically defined.[1] In the European context this kind of cooperation has been exemplified by the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and the Baltic Free Trade Area (BFTA) meaning that this model is specific to the post-1990 period and to candidates from post-communist Europe. A significant feature of this type of cooperation is that it has been the least spontaneous and has in fact needed EU pressure in order to get off the ground. Initial reluctance to engage in subregional (re)integration seems to have been based on perceptions that it would impact negatively on ambitions for early EU membership. The fourth and final category, as yet hypothetical, is that of involuntary alternative/substitute. This scenario concerns those European states with the potential to become condemned to a ‘limbo’ of semi-permanent association with the EU. In Eastern Europe this applies most obviously to Ukraine and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) currently denied an EU membership perspective but earmarked for associate status under the terms of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of the EU, and also certain South East European states covered by the EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP).[2] In the case of the SAP states, since they do have an EU membership perspective and, like Turkey, lie within the limits prescribed by the ENP, the involuntary alternative/substitute would rest not on a deliberate policy on behalf of the EU members but on SAP countries’ failure to progress with the accession conditions.[3]

Where does the Visegrád Group fit?

Looking at which of the above categories are most apt for VG, the pioneer, substitute and involuntary alternative/substitute models can be excluded with minimum discussion. The days of pioneer groups, at least outside of the EU, are over and VG is obviously not a substitute. Its official status as an entity to supportand promote the process of EU accession rather than an alternative organisation has been consistently stressed throughout its lifespan. The fact that these days the VG, like other of its subregional contemporaries (for example the Central European Initiative (CEI) which has always combined EU members, candidates and non-candidates), is an organisation for states who are also EU members, is further evidence that it was never in any sense conceived of as a substitute body.

VG clearly falls clearly into the category of complement/ pre-accession instrument though there have been key differences in the ways in which it has supported the EU membership endeavour compared with other subregional groupings.[4] VG cooperation has three basic dimensions which are: first, intergovernmental cooperation at the highest levels which has been used, strategically and selectively, as a collective front in dealings with the EU and also to achieve the ‘catch-up’ needed by Slovakia after the delays in the latter’s Euro-Atlantic integration prospects caused by the Mečiar era; second to project an image of an ‘avant garde’ group of post-communist countries mainly as device to support the EU and NATO membership drives and justify earliest accession for the VG group; third, and particularly relevant in the most recent phase of the VG, concrete, including project-based, intra-VG cooperation in various spheres including culture, education, environment, tourism etc. (see section 3). CEFTA, the ‘close relative’ of VG, has on the other hand been exclusively focused on economic cooperation meaning that its pre-accession role has been clearly functional based on trade liberalisation to achieve mutual market integration in advance of the more intensive integration now under way in the setting of EU membership. In fact, VG probably bears closer connection to CEI than CEFTA. Top level political dialogue/cooperation (which includes annual summits of the CEI states’ Prime Ministers and regular Ministerial-level meetings) has been and continues to be a key dimension of CEI cooperation though the current emphasis of the CEI is to change the balance of the ‘switchboard’/talking shop functions and its concrete project-based dimension of activities more towards the latter.[5] VG has, however, avoided the open membership and greater dilution of purpose often associated with the CEI. As a club of (until May 2004) of exclusively EU associates/candidates VG has been far less constrained than CEI in terms of its ability to focus and concentrate energies on EU pre-accession tasks.[6]

2. THE VISEGRÁD GROUP PRIOR TO THE 5TH EU ENLARGEMENT

Origins And Evolution

The inaugural VG meeting took place in Bratislava in April 1990 when, at the instigation of Vaclav Havel, the Presidents of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland held informal discussions around the themes of (Cottey, 1999, 70) “the ‘coordination of policies’ and ‘synchronisation of steps’ on the road to Europe”. Notwithstanding the vital importance of this initial move, various issues, including retention of office by communists which compromised the Hungarian and Polish delegations, held up substantive progress until the second half of 1990 when ministerial cooperation and further Presidential dialogue began to gather pace. Soviet actions in the Baltic states in January 1991 accelerated the process and V3 Presidents, Foreign Ministers and Parliamentarians met in Budapest on 15 February for the signing of the original Visegrád Declaration which stressed that (Vaduchova, 1993, 39) “(t)he similarity of the situation which arose in the course of the past decades compels the three states to work toward the achievement of identical goals”.

In 1992 the present Czech President famously described the VG as an ‘artificial creation of the West’. However, it is in fact more accurate to view the emergence of the VG as more of an autonomous development instigated by the first post-communist leaderships of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland but necessitated and propelled by the realities and uncertainties of the external economic and political dimensions of the impending transformation.[7] The three ‘avant garde’ post-communist states found that a common agenda was thrust upon them which consisted of: disentangling themselves from the CMEA, Warsaw Pact and Soviet tutelage generally amid signs, especially in 1991, that the window for doing so may not be open for long; the corresponding need to establish new pan-European security structures or joining existing Western ones and also the pursuit of EU membership; dealing with the fact that even the new regimes in central and eastern Europe were not initially wholeheartedly embraced by the West. In this environment then, when it came to the external sphere of their affairs, the Visegrád 3 (V3) had, as Vaduchova (1993) put it simply “no alternative to cooperation”.

The essential mission of the VG was focused on cooperation around the two key foreign policy goals – dissolution of the Soviet-era security and integration structures and accession to the EU and NATO. The V3 effectively pursued common policies around a range of issues connected to these two goals and by the end of 1992 the VG brand was well established within and outside the region. Yet 1992 was also the year of developments which brought about the onset of decline of the VG. A major part was played by the process of the division of Czechoslovakia and coming to power of two leaders who were both - for different reasons – counterproductive for VG cooperation. The advent of CEFTA, the growing tendency for competition to replace cooperation in EU relations and Slovakia’s progressive loss of ground in the EU and NATO enlargement process further undermined the VG. The invitations to begin EU and NATO membership negotiations received by the three in 1997 was for many the event which signalled the ‘clinical death’ of the VG. The period 1993-98 is usually characterised as, at best, a time of ‘weak’ VG cooperation with the internal strains compounded by the fact that even the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland came to lose their monopoly of ‘avant garde’ status of post-communist states. Estonia and Slovenia, for example, also got their invitations to begin EU membership negotiations in 1997.

VG cooperation took off again in 1998 in the context of governmental changes in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In the Czech republic an anti-VG leadership was replaced with a pro-VG one in a context where the evidence (especially in the realm of economic performance) for the Czech superiority complex that pervaded the Klaus government had evaporated. In Slovakia, a government with credentials acceptable to the West and the other VG members was elected. The renewal of VG was also connected to the NATO accession process of Poland, Hungary and Poland, which had been stimulating considerable cooperative activity between the three regardless of any official attitudes at the top political level. The VG revival was further underwritten by the fact that the move to the EU membership negotiation stage was also beginning to throw out some issues of common interest, which fuelled cooperation for pragmatic reasons. Though what was probably the major theme of the revived VG – assisting Slovakia to ‘catch-up’ in the NATO and EU accession process - was consistent with the new spirit of cooperation, this had a pragmatic dimension for the other VG members and especially the Czech Republic and Hungary for which separate Slovak entry to the EU posed considerable problems. For the Czech Republic, entering the EU before Slovakia was bound to cause unwelcome disruptions to the high level of integration between the two. This not only included the customs union established upon division but more importantly the free mobility of people between the two territories. For Hungary the issue of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia was relevant and accession of Slovakia to NATO was also in the Hungarian interest because (Fawn, 2001, 62) “its strategic position, left physically isolated from other NATO members, would be improved”.

By end 2002, of course, the aim of securing Slovakia’s catch-up, and with it the original objectives of the VG, were fulfilled (though not without occasional crises along the way – see below). During the period between the close of the EU accession negotiations and May 2004 debates about the future role of the VG – including, at least in some circles, discussions about whether it was actually going to be needed in the post enlargement era - were conducted at official, expert and even media levels. The aim was to conclude the period of reflection and agree a new framework document for cooperation by the end of the 2004 Czech Presidency of the VG.[8] Before moving on to examine the results of this period of reflection and factors which will feed into the VG’s future it is necessary to give an overview of the character and scope of VG cooperation in the period up to the ‘turning point’ (if indeed it is so) of its members’ EU accession.

Nature and Scope of Visegrád Cooperation

One important way in which the VG cooperation has differed from its two main Central European counterparts has been its apparent instability over the years, oscillating between relatively high visibility/resonance and virtual extinction. Ongoing uncertainty about the value and viability of the VG in part reflects divergent views of whether the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia genuinely share a common heritage and a sufficiently common future agenda now that the ‘return to Europe’ is a reality. For some VG is now a permanent feature of the new Europe, not always clear to pin down, based on an inescapable bond between the four countries and dense networks across them. Paradoxically, given its often precarious existence, the VG has also been seen by some as having most claim to a contemporary representation of ‘Central Europe’ (see Fawn, 2001) and indeed as a manifestation of Central European identity, a goal which has official backing according to the May 2004 Declaration of VG Prime Ministers which states that VG activities are (2004 VG Declaration, 1) “aimed at strengthening the identity of the Central European region”. For others the VG is an unstable and unreliable phenomenon, beset by internal contradictions that will come increasingly to the fore now that the common purpose of EU and NATO accession has been achieved, and insufficiently embedded either in compatible national interests or in elite or popular consciousness to guarantee that it will endure as an exclusive entity. The alternative perspectives on VG’s outlook are also a consequence of its own history of ups and downs since its emergence in 1990, which not only represent phases of relative activity and inactivity but also mark different stages in the content of VG cooperation. In this section the focus is on three distinct phases in the period up to the EU enlargement of May 2004 – 1990-1992, 1993-1998 and 1999-2004.