Ethical Prudence in Rebuilding Iraq: An Analysis of

Coalition Provisional Authority Leadership

Richard K. Ghere

Abstract. This inquiry assesses the ethical character of leadership in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) amid unfolding events in 2003 that affect its mission to rebuild Iraqi society. Such analysis can inform the study of public sector ethics to the extent it balances moral concerns of leadership with the political complexities of rebuilding a society. This study incorporates J. Patrick Dobel’s treatment of political prudence as a framework for evaluating CPA leadership—especially that of its Administrator, Paul Bremer. Dobel’s seven dimensions of political prudence (openness, foresight, power deployment, timing, means/ends alignment, legitimacy, and community empowerment) in pursuit of political excellence are used as criteria for assessing CPA leadership in reference to particular issues and events. Although tentative, the findings suggest that some specific CPA leadership accomplishments in rebuilding Iraqi institutions are overshadowed by the Administrator’s ideological commitment to a vast scale of privatization—a scale that is disproportionate in reference to the breadth of vital needs and insensitive to core values in Iraqi culture.

In 1947, Harvard University President James Conant hailed George C. Marshall as “An American to whom freedom owes an enduring debt of gratitude, a soldier and statesman whose ability and character brook only one comparison in the history of the nation.” The comparison in Conant’s tribute, delivered in awarding Marshall an honorary doctorate, was to George Washington (Hart and Hart, 1992 85-86). Six years later, Marshall was presented the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to rebuild Europe—one year after Dr. Albert Schweitzer had won that award. In their treatment of George Marshall as a moral exemplar, Hart and Hart elaborate upon his steadfast commitment to the public interest not only in his military career but also in his subsequent civilian roles of as Secretary of State--as architect of the European Recovery Program--and of Defense (1992 91-93). The ethical example of Marshall as leader—especially in rebuilding the institutions and economy of a war adversary—offers an especially salient benchmark in observing current Coalition efforts (between the United States and Great Britain) to rebuild Iraq after the fall of the Ba’athist regime in Spring of 2003. In this vein, an ethical assessment of leadership within the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the entity currently governing Iraq and directing reconstruction efforts, can inform the study of ethical leadership in the public sphere. Such an assessment can be helpful to the extent it reasonably balances the moral qualities of leadership (such as truthfulness, openness, and fairness) with the inherent political complexities of rebuilding a society from outside of its culture.

The tension between ethical performance in leadership and problematic political contexts is by no means unique to the CPA experience in Iraq. Rather, it assumes prominence as a central theme in the study of ethical leadership. In his influential book Leadership of Public Bureaucracies, Larry Terry portrays the administrator as a two-faced Janus figure whose first face looks to virtuosity but whose opposing face peers away toward abusive authority, ostensibly in the “furtherance” of good motives (1993 172-173). And, perhaps with less dramatic flair, particular case studies of ethical administrators characterize the leadership challenge in terms of demonstrable effectiveness in the midst of particularly difficult political circumstances. Sherwood for example recounts how George Hartzog, Jr., Director of the National Park Service from 1964 to 1972, contended with a Congress that had turned its vision toward urban America (1992 146-150). Stivers elaborates on Beverlee Myer’s tenure as California’s Cal-Med (Medicaid) Program that brought her in head-to-head combat with the state’s medical establishment. As Comptroller General, Elmer Staats stood at the fault-line between Congress and a president who impounded appropriated funds and who later engaged in the Watergate cover-up (Frederickson, 1992 22-239). Gloria Flora served as Supervisor at the Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest in Nevada during the “Sagebrush Rebellion,” when local hostilities against the Federal presence in the West had peaked (Frederckson and Newman, 2001 342-362). Pfiffner characterizes the exemplary moral courage of Elliot Richardson, the Attorney General “caught in the middle” between Federal Judge John Sirica--who subpoenaed White House tapes--and Richardson’s boss, Richard Nixon (2003 261-263). And in particular, Patrick Dobel’s treatment of William Ruckelshaus’s administrative leadership as Director of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency during both the Nixon and Reagan administrations graphically illustrates ethical finesse in navigating “divided government” wherein conflict between the legislative and executive branches was intense. Dobel’s work on Ruckelshaus is especially insightful in demonstrating the bureaucratic resources available for strategic managerial responses to challenging political environments. For example, Ruckelshaus relied upon savvy staff appointments, his bureaucratic obligation to enforce environmental laws, and the agency’s information function as supports for maintaining his independence in turbulent political settings (1995 488-503). In essence, the institutional routines within bureaucracy offer some degree of ethical autonomy that can foster effective leadership amid complex political environments.

Yet from an organizational standpoint, the CPA is not a permanent bureaucracy but is instead a temporary coalition team that ultimately reports to the U.S. Secretary of Defense. As Administrator of the Coalition, Paul Bremer exercises his authority as a one-person executive and legislator and imposes strong oversight on a reconstituted Iraqi court system (discussed later). Detailed information about the structure and processes of the CPA is not widely available. The CPA website shows the “top wrung” of an organization chart that places eleven directors under the direct charge of the Administrator.1 Five of these eleven (Directors of—Operations and Infrastructure, Economic Development, International Development, Civil Affairs, and Security Affairs) sit on the CPA Review Board that approves project funding requests from three resource streams: U.S. congressional appropriations, seized Iraqi (property and cash) assets, and Iraqi oil proceeds. It is difficult to document how this top-level apparatus couples with middle-management staffing (if it indeed exists) or with “street level” CPA personnel widely cited in journalistic reports as instrumental in various rebuilding efforts. A London Times article, for example, tells of Steve Wirges, a U.S. Army enlisted man (a stock broker in civilian life), who has assumed key policy responsibility in reforming banking practices and in reopening the Baghdad Stock Exchange and who speaks for the CPA at International Monetary Fund meetings. “One sergeant joked that when Wirges went for a meeting with senior bankers, his commanding officers stood outside guarding his vehicle. Another pointed out that the rank of specialist in the US Army was ‘lower than whale s----.’ He is paid about 15,000 pounds a year” (Beeston 2003).

This inquiry addresses ethical leadership in the Coalition Provisional Authority at a time when “the ground is in motion” (that is, events affecting the mission of the CPA are frequently unfolding) and when much information about how the CPA functions is unavailable. In regard to ethical autonomy, it appears that Administrator Bremer lacks some of the administrative resources for establishing the degree of independence that William Ruckelshaus harnessed in the EPA bureaucracy (Dobel 1995) to cope with a complex political environment. Nonetheless, there is some contextual similarity between Ruckelshaus’s conundrum of “divided government” (between the Congress and Executive Branch) and Bremer’s plight in the center of a widely-reported bureaucratic struggle for policy control between the U.S Departments of Defense and State. Paul Bremer was appointed CPA Administrator in early-May of 2003, in some regards a “compromise candidate” replacing Retired General Jay Garner—Administrator of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Aid (predecessor of the CPA). Garner had been closely allied with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to the extent that “the NGO’s [nongovernmental organizations undertaking relief efforts in Iraq] complained that putting Garner in command made it look like they were working for the Pentagon” (Donnelly 2003). Reports covering Bremer’s appointment contrast his diplomatic image to Garner’s military presence as more palatable to the Department of State, even though Bremer “is known as a hawk and a neocon-servative with close ties to Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz” (Harper 2003). It appears that a series of security problems during the summer of 2003, most notably the bombing of U.N. headquarters in mid-August, weakened Rumsfeld’s influence over Iraqi reconstruction in relation to the State Department (Watson and Hider 2003). And almost two months after the U.N. incident, President Bush authorized his National Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice, to assume an operational role as head of a Stabilization Group (with representatives from Defense, State, Treasury, and the Central Intelligence Agency) that would likely “cut through” some Pentagon red tape as well as buffer CPA leadership from direct Defense Department control. Thus, although Administrator Bremer may not exercise the degree of leadership authority available to an executive in bureaucracy—for example Ruckelshaus, one can trace gradual movement of the CPA in a direction that offers its Administrator a bit more executive latitude since May of 2003.

As mentioned previously, ethical assessment of Coalition Provisional Authority leadership depends upon criteria that temper moral obligation with the political complexity of the reconstruction effort in Iraq. In this regard, Patrick Dobel recommends a moral framework based upon the ethics of political prudence, a virtue that obliges leaders toward “moral self-mastery” in pursuit of lasting political achievement (1998 74-75). For some, the pragmatic character of political prudence may constitute an unreasonably low ethical standard that could offer self-serving justification for most any act of leadership. Dobel addresses such a concern, observing that “virtues alone [and political prudence in particular] cannot sustain a full political ethics” and that they “co-exist in dialogue with norms, principles, and conceptions of the good society” (1998 75; [insertion added]). Yet Dobel’s prudence framework is especially helpful in assessing CPA leadership as it recognizes the legitimate uses of power as essential for accomplishing lasting political achievement—something that moral intentions and behaviors alone cannot insure. Given its timing amid unfolding events, this study can offer only tentative assessments of the ethical character of CPA leadership that align Dobel’s criteria for political prudence with current journalistic accounts of CPA activities in Iraq. Specifically, this case study of Paul Bremer’s leadership of the Coalition Provisional Authority draws upon available media reports2 that speak both to prudent administrative actions and corresponding deficits in regard to each of Dobel’s seven dimensions. This inquiry therefore assesses CPA leadership in rebuilding Iraq by comparing ethical strengths and weaknesses in achieving lasting political accomplishment in the rebuilding process.

Prudence and Coalition Provisional Authority Leadership

Dobel presents political prudence as a leadership virtue that interjects moral actions into “…a world of limited resources and constraints set by circumstances, all morally imperfect” (1998 79). Rather than rescuing it from politics, prudence projects morality as excellent political achievement. Dobel therefore treats prudence as political achievement in reference to seven particular dimensions, each of which stimulates ethically pertinent discussion of Coalition Provisional Authority leadership in Iraq.

Reason and Openness

Dobel maintains that prudence requires disciplined reason and an openness to the complexity of reality. The complexity of the reconstruction task is especially daunting given the multitude of Iraqi expectations on the CPA to restore semblances of normalcy to basic living. Indeed, the Baghdad Bulletin presents numerous articles that address claims citizens make that seek remedies to the fundamental failings of public institutions—students demand the physical restoration of Baghdad University, which was damaged by military actions (Walker and McCaul 2003); power officials call for enforcement of existing contracts with foreign companies to provide power to Iraq; citizens demand an end to the dramatic surge of violent crime, especially assaults on women (Walker 2003b); and ethnic groups—such as Jewish minorities—seek normal passage in and out of Iraq’s borders. Although Coalition officials cannot effectively respond to all claims, those expectations that are directed toward the most visible deficits of existing Iraqi institutions and markets warrant special attention. Openness to expectations that the CPA can “deliver” in fixing existing public institutions appears crucial in maintaining Coalition legitimacy among Iraqis.

Particular attention, for example, needed to be directed toward the inability of public institutions in Iraq to adopt appropriate personnel standards and to offer reasonable compensation for workers (and in some cases, provide back pay for labor rendered). While reports of such demands are widespread (among for example hospital physicians, police officers, and power grid workers), the problem of compensation for city-wide trash pickup in Baghdad is indicative of how the lack of adequate pay incentives leads not only to service ineffectiveness but also to more complex patterns of corruption. One journalistic account relates how a lack of personnel standards and operations procedures has resulted in trash that has accumulated on Baghdad streets for over a decade (McCaul 2003b). The Head of the Department of Cleaning reports that drivers, not having received pay for two months, draw straws on a daily basis for preferred routes in the city’s affluent residential neighborhoods where tipping is generous. A U.S. military officer (a city planner in civilian life) in charge of municipal centers for the CPA reported that $400,000 has been allocated to pay rubbish subcontractors on a performance basis--$1.25 per cubic meter of garbage delivered. Yet this official concedes that this “remedy” simply reconfigures the corruption. He comments on particular on a subcontractor who submitted a bill for $18,000 worth of trash reportedly collected in a single week: “There aren’t enough trucks in the whole country to collect that much garbage in a week.” On October 1 of 2003, Administrator Bremer authorized implementation of Order Thirty—entitled “Reform of Salaries and Employment Conditions of State Employees”—that establishes a civil service-like system—one that would “foster transparency in payments and regularize payments to ensure that individuals are compensated at comparable levels for comparable work across all areas of public service.” (This action also disqualifies those stripped of employment through DeBa’athification from any retirement benefits.) Although the Order does not refer specifically to the issue of back pay, it does suspend any previous salary enactment (outside the limited discretion of the CPA Director of Management and Budget). Thus, Iraqis presumably accrue the institutional benefits of an American-style personnel system, but without consideration of past compensation inequities.

Central to Iraqi reconstruction is the development of a market economy that can sustain trade and attract investment. Understandably, the CPA (through its association with the U.S. Agency for International Development—AID) states these market-oriented goals in macro-economic terms: For example, the U.S. AID web page announces its request for proposals to “facilitate the economic integration of Iraq with its regional and international partners, adopt international standards of production, harmonize economic policy, reinforce traditional trade linkages, develop new trade partnerships, and foster sustainable job creation.” Nonetheless, citizen expectations of a viable market are more likely directed toward micro-level concerns that impact directly upon their lives. As a case in point, the real estate market in Baghdad (as of early July, 2003—see Walker, 2003e) is booming as agents purchase properties of fleeing Ba’athist officials at deep-discount prices and then profit from the high demand created by the resettlement of people (such as Kurds) who had been forced out of Iraq under Saddam Hussein. In some ways, the property market is currently correcting itself from Sadddam’s practice of confiscating the property of those groups out of favor and then reselling it to partisans of the regime. Yet, the question of legal ownership looms over this booming market. One real estate agent comments, “At the moment, everybody is working on a matter of trust. My role now is simple: direct negotiation between landlord and buyer. Deals are struck quickly, but there may be some consequent difficulties in the future” (Walker 2003e). In response, a Committee for the Restoration of Properties works in conjunction with the CPA in an effort to establish rightful ownership in the absence of appropriate institutional controls over real estate transactions. Moreover, the CPA has published some resolutions that govern property sales—one for example temporarily suspends the sale of property owned by Ba’ath party members. Whether these resolutions will prove effective in regulating the real estate market remains to be seen.