ESDP and Energy Security: How Dependence on Russian Natural Gas Undermines Europe’s Attempt at Political Cooperation
By Zachary Dunnam
Center for European Studies
12/9/2008
Supervised by Eugene Gholz
Abstract
The purpose of this paper will be to examine Europe’s energy dependence on Russian natural resources and how it is affecting the European Union’s development of the common defense project. European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was institutionalized after the lack of political coordination among EU member states during the Yugoslav wars and the war in Kosovo. Since its conception, ESDP has made significant progress by participating in several small-scale military operations but has yet to evolve into a capable military force able to respond to international crises as the EU has envisaged. After reviewing two theories of European integration (neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism) and how they relate to the ambition of a common European defense, this paper will provide an analysis of Europe’s current energy security challenges and the response from EU institutions and member states. This paper will assert that states’ energy security interests, in particular their energy relations with Russia, are undermining Europe’s attempt at political cooperation and inhibiting significant development in ESDP. After then examining three member states’ energy relations with Russia (Germany, Italy, and Poland) and their consequent contribution to ESDP, this paper will conclude that the intergovernmental theory is most appropriate for viewing European integration and that member states remain the main actors behind ESDP development.
Table of Contents
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………1
From CFSP to ESDP: A Brief History of a Common Defense Project…………2
European Integration Theories……………………………………………………5
Neofunctionalism…………………………………………………………….6
Intergovernmentalism………………………………………………………..8
Energy Security Challenges and the EU Response………………………………11
European Energy Security and the EU Member States…………………………14
Germany – Energy Security, Russia and ESDP………………………………….17
Italy – Energy Security, Russia, and ESDP………………………………………21
Poland – Energy Security, Russia, and ESDP……………………………………24
Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………29
ESDP and Energy Security: How Dependence on Russian Natural Gas Undermines Europe’s Attempt at Political Cooperation
By Zachary Dunnam
Fall 2008
The continent of Europe has made remarkable strides in its integration process over the past five decades. Economically, the European Union is at the forefront of global power and influence with perhaps its most prosperous years to come. Regarding the global political arena however, the EU remains minimally influential in guiding policy for international issues of the day. With the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) since the early 1990’s and its evolution into European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the last decade, Europe has arrived at a pivotal point in its political development.
The development of a common European defense policy has been a highly contentious and slow process because the issues involve a substantial sacrifice of state sovereignty. Inherent in its construct, the state’s need to protect its interests will remain ahead of its desire to cooperate on a supranational level despite even the best intentions of the supranational governing institution.
One issue most dear to a state’s sovereignty is energy security. Geographic fortune and the global economy’s reliance on fossil fuel and natural gas have forced most Europeans to rely on foreign sources for energy, most notably on the resources of their former Soviet counterparts. Due to several European states’ dependence on Russian natural resources, and Russia’s ardent antagonism towards an EU “collective defense,” many member states struggle with a tension between their vital energy needs and their desire to proceed with the goal of greater European political cooperation. This paper will examine this tension through a case study of three European nations: Germany, Italy, and Poland. How these European states choose to manage this tension will affect not only the security of Europe but also the world at large.
From CFSP to ESDP: A Brief History of a Common Defense Project
The introduction of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) came after the failures of European political cooperation during the Yugoslav wars and called for the EU to strengthen its foreign policy ambitions. The Cold War had finally come to a close and former Soviet Union member states began realigning with the West. As these new states began to seek membership, and the EU’s borders stretched to unstable regions such as the Middle East, Russia, and the Caucasus, the future of European security became a necessary and practical consideration. It was at this point that the European Union left the comfort of economic arrangements that clearly benefited all members and entered the political arena to produce a common foreign and security policy. Until this point, national defense and foreign relations were issues designated solely to the participating states. Now, despite the competing interests and histories behind each nation, the creation of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) will further test the power arrangement between individual states and supranational institutions.
The notion of an EU common foreign policy first emerged in the early 1970's under the European Political Cooperation (EPC) initiative, but there was no attempt to coordinate security policy. Even throughout the 1990's, the idea of "an autonomous EU role in the field of security (let alone defense) was virtually unthinkable.”[1] After the Cold War ended and the future security of Europe’s periphery was uncertain, it became necessary to begin a discussion on the EU’s capabilities of handling a crisis on European soil.
The break-up of Yugoslavia offered just such a test as the country divided into violent ethnic factions. Unfortunately, several attempts at European peacekeeping failed – notably, Dutch soldiers literally watched as Serbian forces rounded up Bosnians in Srebrenica, an area designated a “safe zone” – and the “hour of Europe” failed to convey a strong sense of EU military capabilities. But even preceding the troubles on the ground of the Yugoslav wars was the debilitating failure of coordination and decisive action among member states. Germany preemptively and unilaterally recognized Croatia’s independence declaration, while the United Kingdom strongly opposed sending British troops to the area. The ultimate result of this European dissension required US intervention and deployment of NATO forces to finally halt Serbian aggression and reach a deal with Milosevic in Dayton, Ohio. The Yugoslav wars were a pivotal example of Europe’s inability to mobilize political agreement and implement a coordinated plan of action in the event of a crisis outside the auspices of NATO. The recognition of these failures did produce a positive response however, highlighting the need for progress in EU crisis management. Around 1998, EU leaders began the transformation of CFSP to ESDP, adding some momentum to the idea of an EU "collective defense." In December of 1998, the Franco-British St. Malo accord created the agreement in which EU governments later launched ESDP in June of 1999 stating that the European Union “must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”.[2] The agreement also led to the Helsinki Headline Goals, which “envisaged 60,000 troops, 100 ships and 400 aircraft, deployable within 60 days and sustainable for one year.”[3]
Since then, the EU has made some important strides in crisis management capabilities. The autonomous “Operation Artemis” in the Congo deployed 2,200 European troops to a geographically distant region, and the transfer of responsibility in NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina to EU commanders has demonstrated the EU’s military capabilities.[4] But ten years after St. Malo the Helsinki Headline Goals have not been met. Dan Keohane and Jolyon Howorth both assert there are three main problems inhibiting the Headline Goals to be met: First, though the EU states have the raw numbers to create a large force (1.7 million), the actual number capable of being used in serious military operations like a conflict in Iraq is only 20,000.[5] Second, the EU has yet to define a division of labor system that would strengthen the EU’s planning capacity to carry out large operations.[6] Third, there still seems to be an absence of clearly defined ambitions of military operations, which complicates a coordinated EU response to international crises such as terrorist attacks, conflict prevention, and post-conflict stabilization.[7] In order for the EU to become a capable military actor, these main issues will have to be addressed, debated, and resolved. For reasons such as these progress has been limited and the EU is still far from a “collective defense” system. The divisions over the US’s decision to invade Iraq and more recent disagreements over Kosovo’s independence reflect EU member states’ reluctance to forge their national foreign policy positions into a unified European stance.
Of course, in order for the EU to carry out joint military activities on a large scale and in places outside of European borders, like the US does, European governments will have to sacrifice some sovereignty. And with Russia’s recent aggression towards Georgia and the weakening NATO alliance, Europe’s need to handle its own defense and security is becoming all the more prominent. The next US president almost certainly will require EU states to play a more active role in crisis management and the war on terrorism, but the EU’s ability to accept this responsibility will be determined by the progress of ESDP.[8]
European Integration
The introduction of CFSP and the evolution to ESDP clearly announces the intentions of EU institutions to further integrate member states within the political realm. But in order to predict how states will respond to political issues so dear to their sovereignty, one must first look at EU integration as a whole to determine whether such institutions are capable of implementing ESDP goals, or if progress will only result from direct decisions by member states.
The process of European integration has been extraordinary but also highly contentious. Because the European project is in a continuous state of development, there are many dissenting opinions of the driving force behind integration. There are many theories of European integration that attempt to explain the root cause of Europe’s growth and development, but this paper will focus on the two that most relate to the development of ESDP: neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism.
Neofunctionalism
The neofunctionalist theory derives from the early European Union framers such as Jean Monnet, but was defined and developed by Ernst Hass and Philipe Schmitter. They viewed European integration as a peace process that would lead to a diminished importance of the nation-state and consequently calm the tides of nationalism that had divided Europe for centuries. Through supranational institutions, state executives and interested parties could pursue their economic goals in a collaborative effort, strengthening members’ economies while promoting cooperation. The more that cooperation and integration was pursued, the theory goes, the safer Europe would become. As these institutions become the best outlet for achieving economic goals, nation-states are more likely to utilize these institutions for integrating other economic sectors. Neofunctionalists have termed this concept as the “positive spillover effect.”[9] The transformation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to the European Economic Community (EEC) is a prime example of this concept: the success of the earlier arrangement spread into other economic sectors with the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which called for a common agricultural policy, a nuclear energy agreement, and freedom of movement for labor and capital. In addition, a neofunctionalist view would assert that supranational actors (i.e., European Commission political entrepreneurs) are the main catalyst for promoting negotiation and ensuring a cooperative outcome. Due to the EC entrepreneurs’ “neutrality, political skill, and technical expertise,” they are in a better position to achieve an efficient outcome.[10] Neofunctionalism suggests that the positive spillover effect produces an incentive for interest groups to transfer their allegiance away from national institutions and into these new European institutions, as the supranational institutions prove to be a more viable means for achieving their interests. With this increased allegiance and decline in national importance, neofunctionalists suggest that these supranational institutions themselves will become the new driving force behind integration.
In regards to ESDP, the neofunctionalist theory would describe its development as a result of the positive spillover effect. Since the initial institution of the ECSC, Europe’s supranational institutions have continuously built upon the framework of economic integration. Neofunctionalists would suggest that it was only natural for these institutions to now move into the political realm and attempt to integrate the member states into a common foreign policy. Jolyon Howorth describes the first positive defense spillover to be when the Western European Union (WEU), which “informally acted as a security and defense liaison mechanism both between France and NATO and between the UK and the EU”, reasserted the role of its Ministerial Council in 1987 by relocating to Brussels in order to coordinate more closely with NATO.[11] The post-Cold War period and US-Jihad war have brought significant challenges and complexities to the global order and have raised new security concerns, thus fostering institutional action in the security field. This process of institution building in the security field continued throughout the 1990’s and the turn of the century as Europe witnessed the transition of CFSP to ESDP and the increasing responsibility of EU defense structures discussed in the earlier section. Compared with the limited coordination that took place during the Yugoslav wars, Howorth describes the period from 1998-2004 as revolutionary in the “concept and operation of a European foreign policy” and that “the process is worth keeping under review.”[12]
But even the EU’s most ardent supporters acknowledge the sobering events of 2006, which presented a major problem to the future prospects of security and defense coordination. Due to a price dispute with Ukraine, Russia turned off its gas pipes in the country (which eventually lead to Germany) and the reality of Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas struck. Accompanied with the history of Europe’s relations with the former USSR, and the need for a common European foreign policy approach to Russia’s resurgent assertiveness, energy security became the most important new field of discussion to make further development of ESDP possible. Many proponents of the EU now believe this organization should play a greater role in securing the continent’s energy supplies and suppliers. Thus EU institutional spillover ensues as more tasks are added on to the agenda to confront the prospect of political cooperation.
Intergovernmentalism
The intergovernmental theory of integration rejects the neofunctionalist’s view that supranational institutions are the driving force behind integration and that European Commission (EC) entrepreneurs have a comparative advantage over national governments in their ability to reach consensus. Instead, intergovernmentalism suggests that any progress or increase in power of supranational institutions is a direct result of national governments’ decision-making. Intergovernmentalism is related to the decision-making process of international organizations such as NATO or the UN Security Council. Though it is not always the case, member states of these organizations possess all the power and decisions are made unanimously. Though voting rules within EU decision-making institutions vary, unanimity is required for ESDP decisions. With unanimous decision-making comes a state’s ability to veto any “agreement that would leave them worse off than unilateral policies,” and conversely, an incentive to cooperate if a collapse in negotiations would leave all the members worse off. Additionally, intergovernmentalism asserts that since states have an incentive to cooperate, it is plausible that they would use their resources to “generate extensive technical, political, and legal information,” thus rejecting the notion of an EC comparative advantage.[13] Andrew Moravcsik’s extensive study of the integration process during several important European Community negotiations concludes with this assertion: “European integration has been not a preordained movement toward federal union but a series of pragmatic bargains among national governments based on concrete national interests, relative power, and carefully calculated transfers of sovereignty.”[14]
When crafting a common foreign policy for the EU, the intergovernmental theory is best observed during negotiations. Throughout the 1990’s, the varying foreign policy positions between member states led to dismal coordination during the Yugoslav wars, resulting in US intervention. However, the failures provided an incentive for member states to cooperate in CFSP and ESDP in order to ensure a safer Europe. Since the development of ESDP remains an important project for the European Commission, national governments continue to cooperate during ESDP negotiations, defining goals and coordinating resources.