[EMBARGOED FOR: 6 May 2008]Public
amnesty international
Routinely Targeted
Attacks on Civilians in Somalia
INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, 1 EASTON STREET, LONDONWC1X 0DW, UNITED KINGDOM
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
Background
AMISOM and peacekeeping operations in Somalia
Applicable International Law
International humanitarian law
Human rights law
Violations by TFG and Ethiopian Forces and Abuses by Non-State Actors
Searches and house to house raids: unlawful killing, rape, theft and looting
Violations by TFG Forces
Violations by Ethiopian Forces
Abuses by Armed Groups
Violations against journalists
Shelling civilian populated areas
Violations against Displaced Somalis on the Road
Conditions for Displaced Somalis, Lack of Access to Humanitarian Assistance in Southern and Central Somalia
Conditions
Lack of access to humanitarian assistance
Who is responsible for human rights in Somalia?
Conclusion: A Human Rights Crisis in Southern and Central Somalia
Recommendations
For the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG)
For the Government of Ethiopia and Ethiopian armed forces based in Somalia
For armed groups opposing TFG and Ethiopian Forces in Somalia
For the International Community, including the UN Security Council and UNSC member states, the Somalia Contact Group, donors, and international organizations
For the UN Security Council
For the International Community
Abbreviations
Map of Somalia
Amnesty International AI Index: AFR 52/006/2008
Routinely Targeted: Attacks on Civilians in Somalia / 1Routinely Targeted
Attacks on Civilians in Somalia
Introduction
Amnesty International is deeply concerned about ongoing human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict in Somalia, specifically torture and other ill-treatment, rape, extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detention, and attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure. Some 6,000 civilians were reportedly killed in fighting in the capital Mogadishu and across southern and central Somalia in 2007,[1] and over 600,000 Somali civilians were internally displaced from and around Mogadishu.[2] In addition, an estimated 335,000 displaced Somali refugees fled Somalia in 2007,[3] despite enormous obstacles to their movement, including Kenya’s closure of its border with Somalia,[4] armed combatants and bandits on the roads, and perilous travel across the Gulf of Aden. Somali civilians suffered violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the conflict areas of southern and central Somalia, on the roads as they fled conflict areas, and in camps and settlements to which they fled. UNICEF announced on 14 February 2008 that some 90,000 children could die in Somalia in the next few months due to a lack of adequate funding for nutrition, water and sanitation programmes.
This report includes information obtained by Amnesty International representatives visiting Nairobi, Kenya and Hargeisa, Somaliland in November 2007 from displaced persons who had fled the conflict in southern and central Somalia, particularly Mogadishu. In addition to interviews with more than 75 displaced persons, Amnesty International interviewed or met with scores of local and international non governmental organisations (NGO) representatives. Names and affiliations of all of these individuals have been withheld in order to ensure the protection of our sources still living and working in a volatile and insecure environment. Both displaced persons and organizational representatives interviewed reported frequent incidents of rape and pillaging by Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces, an upsurge in violent abuses on the part of Ethiopian armed forces in Somalia, and the targeting of Somali journalists and human rights defenders by all parties to the conflict. House to house searches and raids by TFG or Ethiopian forces escalated since October 2007 in and around Mogadishu and were accompanied by violent actions taken against individuals, including unlawful killings in violation of international humanitarian law.
There is no safety for civilians wherever they run. Those fleeing violence in Mogadishu still face violence on the roads north toward Puntland and west toward Afgooye and Baidoa, including theft, rape and shootings. Once they arrive in both Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and refugee settlements, they face further violence, and lack of access to services essential for the realization of human rights, including clean water, medical care, and adequate food supplies, because humanitarian operations are frequently impeded by parties to the conflict and armed criminal groups; the overall high levels of insecurity in these areas; or the lack of capacity among humanitarian organizations.
The humanitarian crisis in southern and central Somalia is largely caused by widespread violation of human rights and international humanitarian law requiring immediate and effective action by the international community, including particularly the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), League of Arab States (LAS), and governments in the International Contact Group for Somalia (ICGS).
The report concludes with recommendations to the TFG, the Government of Ethiopia, armed groups in Somalia, and the international community to strengthen the observance of human rights and ensure the protection of civilians.
The conflict in Somalia is legally characterized as non-international, requiring parties to the conflict to comply with international humanitarian law governing such intra-state conflict. Ethiopian troops, as well as African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces with contingents from Uganda and Burundi, must also comply with international human rights and international humanitarian law. Groups of militia attached to, or acting as proxies for, TFG and Ethiopian forces fall under similar restrictions.
It is important to note that “armed groups” in Somalia include a range of actors – including remnants of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), supporters of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), and various factions of the Shabab militia (“youth” – formerly young ICU fighters). To the extent to which and for as long as members of these armed groups are taking direct part in the conflict, they do not maintain civilian status. Sub-clan and other local political leaders have also acted outside of domestic criminal law, as have bandits and clan militia conducting raids, robberies and violent attacks on civilians. Some of these latter non-state actors, while not acting as combatants in the armed conflict of the TFG and Ethiopian forces against armed opposition groups, are nevertheless committing acts of robbery, extortion, rape and beatings, against civilians throughout southern and central Somalia. The TFG has provided virtually no protection from such acts.
Background
The Horn of Africa nation of Somalia, almost entirely Sunni Muslim and majority ethnic Somali, comprising four main clan-families and minority groups, is home to nearly nine million people. Somalia’s population has been subjected to decades of intensive inter-clan violence, and it is vulnerable to severe droughts and floods which contribute to widespread malnutrition and poverty. Humanitarian and human rights conditions have been adverse and dire.
Since the overthrow of Siad Barre’s 21-year rule in 1991, civil conflict based on clan rivalries, competition over scarce resources, and criminal activity has torn the country apart. Following 13 failed peace conferences to resolve one of the world’s longest crises of state collapse (mostly attended by leaders of militia groups affiliated with specific clans and sub-clans, and held outside the country), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) organized the Somali Peace Process in Nairobi, Kenya. After two years of difficult negotiations, the process culminated in the development of a Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) and the selection of 275 members of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) to form a Transitional Federal Government. In October 2004 Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was selected president of the TFG. This interim government, while supported by the UN, the United States (U.S.) and other countries in the International Contact Group forSomalia, and international donors, has since been unable to effectively establish control, including by setting up functioning institutions and managing security in Mogadishu.
By 2006 the ICU, later the Council of Somali Islamic Courts (COSIC) emerged from numerous local Islamic courts in Mogadishu, which had been functioning for a number of years in the absence of a central justice system. After some months of armed fighting[5] against a coalition of armed groups calling themselves the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism and reported to have received covert U.S. backing,[6] the Islamic Courts (as they are commonly known) captured Mogadishu. They began to provide basic security services in Mogadishu, such as policing the streets to stop violent crime. In late 2006, the ICU began to further extend their control to much of southern and central Somalia, challenging the TFG which remained in Baidoa. TheLeague of Arab States sponsored-attempts to broker reconciliation and power-sharing between the TFG and Islamic Courts failed.
In December 2006 the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 1725, expressing its support for a regional peacekeeping operation in Somalia.[7] The ICU then launched attacks around Baidoa, and Ethiopia (whose forces were already in Baidoa providing support to the TFG) launched a military response in conjunction with and at the request of the TFG, to forcibly expel the ICU from power in Somalia. By the end of December the ICU had folded before an Ethiopian-led TFG advance, with some ICU leaders and troops retreating south from Mogadishu, and others melting back into the city’s population. This retreat occurred in the midst of a humanitarian emergency due to a combination of severe drought followed by devastating floods. This emergency was exacerbated by the armed conflict, creating more internally displaced people and greater obstructions to delivery of humanitarian assistance.
U.S. aircraft bombed fleeing ICU forces in southwestern Somalia twice in January 2007, with the stated intention of targeting what U.S. government officials described as specific “terrorist suspects.” Ethiopia also conducted aerial bombings in the area. Total bombings reportedly killed some 70 individuals, all civilians. The U.S. government later acknowledged that they failed to kill the suspects they targeted. With Ethiopian military support, the TFG President and other leaders officially moved to Mogadishu in January 2007, but most government ministers and the Transitional Federal Parliament remained in Baidoa. The TFG faced increasing armed opposition from remnants of the Islamic Courts and was unable to establish control or security in the capital. The insurgency escalated as members of Mogadishu’s Hawiye sub-clans opposed Ethiopia’s military intervention to support a TFG which they perceived as being controlled primarily by the Darod clan. In Mogadishu the insurgency was met by Ethiopian-led counter-insurgency operations in March and April, and there was additional fierce fighting in the final months of 2007. Some 6,000 Somali civilians were reported killed and 600,000 were newly displaced from southern and central Somalia, while hundreds of thousands more fled outside of Somalia.
A National Reconciliation Conference, called by the TFG in response to significant international pressure, was held in Mogadishu from July to September 2007, but was boycotted by government opponents and former Islamic Courts leaders, some of whom formed the ARS in Eritrea in September, declaring their support for Somalia’s insurgents, and calling for an immediate Ethiopian withdrawal from Somalia. Meanwhile, steps necessary to implement the agreed five-year transition to an elected democratic government, expected in 2009, have repeatedly been delayed.
On 29 October 2007, Ali Mohamed Gedi resigned as Prime Minister. Shortly thereafter, TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf appointed Nur Hassan Hussein, former director of the Somali Red Crescent, as the new Prime Minister.
Although Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has announced repeatedly that Ethiopia would withdraw from Somalia completely, no real move to do so has occurred. The reason most often cited for prolonged Ethiopian military presence in Somalia is the need to allow time for the formation of a regional African peacekeeping force. To date, Uganda, the initial troop contributor, has contributed some 1,600 troops and Burundi has committed some 1,700 troops (some of which arrived in late December 2007). Nigeria and Ghana are reported to be considering troop contributions to AMISOM, which has not received the funding or personnel necessary to fulfil its stated mandate, or to expand that mandate to include civilian protection.[8]
On 14 March 2008 the UN Secretary General presented his report to the UN Security Council, outlining the status of contingency planning for the possible deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation to take over from AMISOM.
The humanitarian and human rights situation in Somalia has only grown worse. Security in many parts of Mogadishu is non-existent. The situation is characterized by growing numbers of IDPs and refugees. Clan militias, remnants of the former ICU, Shabab militia, and armed bandits, as well as TFG and Ethiopian security forces, have all perpetrated abuses against civilians. Death threats and deadly violence against journalists, other media workers, and human rights defenders escalated in late 2007.
While the people of Somalia desperately need humanitarian assistance, they also require action to address wide scale human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. In 2006 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts in which it reaffirmed provisions of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from war crimes and crimes against humanity. The World Summit Outcome Document noted that,
“Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity…We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it…. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from… war crimes… and crimes against humanity.”[9]
AMISOM and peacekeeping operations in Somalia
Under UNSC Resolution 1725, adopted in December 2006, the Security Council decided,
“… to authorize IGAD and Member States of the AU to establish a protection and training mission in Somalia,” with the following mandate: “(a) to monitor progress by the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) and the Union of Islamic Courts in implementing agreements reached in their dialogue; (b) to ensure free movement and safe passage of all those involved with the dialogue process; (c) to maintain and monitor security in Baidoa; (d) to protect members of the Transitional Federal Institutions and Government as well as their key infrastructure; and (e) to train the Transitional Federal Institutions’ security forces to enable them to provide their own security and to help facilitate the re-establishment of national security forces of Somalia.”
In February 2007 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 1744, which authorized the establishment and deployment of an African Union Mission to Somalia, an AU “peace-support” force (known as AMISOM) of some 8,000 troops. Since that time Uganda has provided 1,600 troops, less than one-fifth of those authorized. The Ugandans have been joined by a small Burundian advance team. The AU and UN had envisaged a UN peacekeeping operation replacing AMISOM and Ethiopian troops in Somalia, but in November 2007 the UN Security Council again delayed consideration of this step because of ongoing security considerations. Very little if any progress has been made in strengthening AMISOM, with only US$32 million of a total annual budget of US$622 million contributed by the EU, Italy, Sweden, China and the League of Arab States as of March 2008.[10] The United Nations has deployed a team of military and civilian experts, and the U.S. has provided logistical support to the Ugandan contingent and pledged to facilitate transportation assistance for troop contributing countries. Deployment of 350 Ghanaian and 850 Nigerian troops has not yet been scheduled.[11] In January 2008 the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) extended AMISOM’s mandate for another six months.
Due to a severe lack of capacity, the AMISOM mission has been limited to providing VIP escort, “confidence-building patrols” within its area of operations, protection of the Mogadishu airport, seaport and Villa Somalia (presidential office), and providing some security during the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC). It has neither the mandate nor the capacity to protect civilians in Somalia.
Applicable International Law
International humanitarian law
All parties to the armed conflict must comply with provisions of international law applicable to them. International humanitarian law governs the conduct of war, and seeks to protect civilians, others not participating in the hostilities and civilian objects. Ethiopia and Somalia are party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Ethiopia is party to the two Additional Protocols of 1977.[12] In addition, all parties to the armed conflict, including armed groups that are not part of the forces of a state, must respect certain fundamental rules of international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflict, including those applicable to the conduct of hostilities under customary international law.
Provisions governing the conduct of hostilities in non-international armed conflict are found in Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II contains rules applicable to non-international conflict. Many of the rules on the conduct of hostilities in international armed conflict contained in Additional Protocol I (including all those cited in this report) are rules of customary international law that are also applicable in non-international armed conflict.[13]
Civilians and others not participating in the hostilities must be protected. The principle of distinction is the cornerstone of the laws of war. All parties to armed conflict, including armed groups that are not part of the state armed forces, have a responsibility to distinguish between civilians and civilian objects, which may not be attacked, and military objectives, which, subject to certain conditions, may be attacked. Civilian objects include homes, mosques, schools, hospitals and clinics.