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Edmund’s Husserl’s basic theory: Intentionality via Sinn

1.1. Husserl’s major thesis is an act is directed towards its object by virtue of its content. The question is how does the content confer intentionality on an act? In answering this question we note that Husserl played with two possibilities. At first he takes the content of an act to be an “ideal essence” (or what we might call a “prototype”), later he takes the content of be an “abstract particular”.

At the time he considered a content to be an “ideal essence,” Husserl takes this essence to be the basis of an act as an intentional experience. For example, the intentional essence of ‘my seeing this black crow’ is simply the phenomenological experience of the property of ‘a seeing of a black crow’. Husserl identifies this property of ‘a seeing of a black crow” as the ideal essence of an act. Hence, this kind of content theory of intentionality is simply to claim that an act is intentional by virtue of having an ideal essence. So that the relation between an act’s real content (later “noesis”) to its ideal essence (later, “noema”) is one of exemplification or instantiation. An act is directed at an object if it has the property (in having a certain ideal essence) of being directed in a certain way to an object. Today we would call this an adverbial theory of meaning. For example, to see this black crow is to intent “(seeing this black crow)-ly” and so to have an experience of a certain kind, namely, a “seeing-this-black-crow” kind of experience.

The problem with an adverbial theory is that the content is not relational. In fact, it is this kind of theory that is characteristic of contemporary representational (cognitive) theories of mind. It is not trivial but it is simply not analyzable in relational terms (as intentionality requires).

Husserl’s later view takes the ideal essence (content) to be a noema conceived as a kind of abstract particular rather than an essence. He writes: “…every intentional experience is noetic; that is to say its essence is to harbor in itself something like a Sinn or noema.” This claim suggests that an experience is intentional just insofar as it harbors noema, and so my experience of ‘seeing this black crow’ is enabled in having a certain noema. This is Husserl’s mature theory wherein he analyzes the intentionality of an act in terms of real and ideal content: noesis and noema.

By virtue of its noesis, each act bears a characteristic relation to a unique noema (to the Sinn of the noema). This noema is the correlate of the noesis and it is the noesis that bestows the Sinn of a noema on an act. That is, an act’s noesis (content in real time) entertains a noema (the Sinn of the noema) and the noema (Sinn of noema) prescribes (or presents/points to) the object. So that the intentional relation of an act is decomposed into two relations: (1) the relation of an act’s noesis to its noematic Sinn (entertaining relation) and (2) the relation of the noematic Sinn to its object (prescribing relation). Therefore, an act intents an object if, and only if, (1) the act’s noesis entertains a certain noematic Sinn, and (2) the noematic Sinn prescribes that object. In this way a noematic Sinn mediates intention and therefore an act is directed to its object by virtue of its Sinn.

Husserl’s analysis of intentionality then is in terms of two entities: a noesis which is the temporal phase of experience, and a noema which is an abstract particular entity correlated with the experience, and in terms of two relations: entertaining and prescribing. Obviously, the object itself is not part of the intentional experience as it is “bracketed” in phenomenological reflection.

Now Husserl says little about the entertaining relation (between noesis and noema). However, the noema is not another mental/brain “object” (like Frege intensional objects are), as representational theories claim, that stand between the world and consciousness. Rather noemata (or the Sinne of noemata) come to consciousness only in acts of reflection (on the meaning of experience) as mediating our relation to (pointing to) the object in the world.

1.2Can Husserl’s theory account for the peculiarities of (1) directedness of acts to objects, (2) existence independence of intentional relations, (3) the conception dependence of intentional relations, and (4) the transcendence of what is intended?

Let me summarize the adequacy of theory in point form.

  1. Every act includes as a constituent phase a noema (real time) which consists of a thetic and a meaning-giving (Sinn) part.
  2. The noesis entertains exactly one noema (abstract particular) which consists of a thetic and a meaning-giving (Sinn) part.

So that every act by virtue of a noesis, entertains a noema (Sinn of noema) and this entertaining relation is many-to-one functional relation:

  1. Different noeses, different acts, may entertain the same (Sinn of) noema. Hence different experience may share the same noema.

Since Husserl rejects that noemata (Sinne) are psychological (are not in real time), this transcendental status of noemata is ensured by two principles.

  1. Noemata or the Sinne of noemata are abstract entities.
  2. Noemata (their Sinne) are grasped only in transcendental phenomenological reflection (and these as we will see below can be expressed in language).

Husserl as we have seen distinguishes between the content and object (bracketed) of an act, and identified the noesis with the real and noema with the ideal content.

  1. The noesis and noema (their Sinne) are distinct from the intended object (bracketed). Yet there is an intimate relation between the noema and the object owing to the prescriptive character of the noema (its Sinn).
  2. Each noematic Sinn prescribes exactly, or at most, one object. Furthermore, the relation of prescribing is many-to-one (functional) and hence the following holds.
  3. Different Noema (Sinne) may prescribe the same object, and it is through the prescriptive character of an act’s noema (Sinn) that an act is intentionally related to its object.
  4. The object of an act is the object prescribed in the noema (Sinn) of the act.

Hence the principle of intentionality can be stated as follows.

  1. An act intends, or is intentionally related or directed towards, an object if, and only if, the act entertains a certain noema (Sinn) and this noema (Sinn) prescribes that object.

We can now also specify the peculiarities of EI, CD, and transcendence of the object.

  1. An act is intentional only if it entertains a noema (Sinn).
  2. An act is intentional even if it has no object – that is, noema (Sinn) prescribes no object. Presumably this achieves the EI criterion.

But first Point 12 (EI) requires some elaboration. Even is there is no object (EI) to what the Sinn of the noema prescribes, Husserl maintains that the act is directed towards something insofar as the act is intentional. We then say that the act presents AS IF it had a corresponding object. Whether an act is successfully directed to an object or not, the act has a noema (Sinn) and so the act is intentional as if it were successfully directed to an object. The problem here is of course that if the act is directed to an AS IF object, what is it directed to? Here Husserl suggests that it is directed towards a “possible” object (possible world semantics).

The conception dependence (CD) of an intentional relation is explained by the role that the noema (Sinn) plays in mediating intention. From point 8 and 9 above it follows that acts may intend the same object through different noemata (Sinne). So that intentional is relative to Sinn. The Sinn reflects just those aspects/features/properties of the object is prescribes in a particular way (namely, the way the object is propertied).

Husserl can also account for the fact that objects transcend the experiences in which they are intended. The Sinn of a transcendent object is limited relative to the object prescribed, and the transcendence of the object is itself given in the Sinn of the act.That is, the Sinn always prescribes, in addition to the properties of the object is prescribed as having), that the object always exceeds those properties prescribed (we always mean to allow for more possibilities the object as having than we prescribe of the object).

When I see a tree (intentional act), some of its properties are explicitly presented in the perception –some with intuitional fullness such as the color of its leaves and the trunk of the tree on its front side, some without intuitional fullness suchas the color of its leaves and trunk on the back side. My seeing the tree also presents properties not specified such as it having been seeded thirty years earlier and my having sat underneath it with my first girlfriend, Penelope.The object is transcendent insofar as it can only be given in one aspect, namely the aspect prescribed by the Sinn of the act of seeing. Now Husserl extends this principle of transcendence (the object is intended as transcendent) to the whole natural world as it is part of what Husserl means by the notion of “objectivity” (anyone person can only prescribe the object in one aspect – obviously an aspect in which s/he is interested/has a stake in.

Another way to understand objectivity of an object is that the object may be intended in very different acts (by the same person over time) resulting in a synthesis (of meanings/properties) or constitution of the object as an object of consciousness.

Similarly, the object may be constituted “inter-subjectively” by acts of different people (over time). This co-directedness of the object by different people means that objectivity is established communally (by a community of speakers).

2.1. Husserl’s theory of noematic Sinn. My interpretation of Husserl’s notion of noema (and noematic Sinn) makes two claims.

  1. Noemata and their Sinne are the contents of consciousness: the noema is the act’s ideal content (an abstract particular), and the Sinn is that component of the noema which determines the act’s intentional relation to its object.
  2. Noematic Sinne are conceived of as meanings, specifically meanings that can be expressed in language and when they do they also mediate the relation between words and referents.

To understand Husserl’s noemata as contents is to understand that he rejects the object-theory approach to intentionality (Sinne are not objects – like Frege’s intensional objects but meanings are mediators internal to consciousness). Next, if Sinne can be expressed in language, then a phenomenological analysis of Sinne must necessarily make contact with a semantic analysis of meaning.

We have also seen that Husserl abandons the notion that Sinne are ideal essences (prototypes) in favor of their being conceived as abstract particulars. Sinne as abstract particularsprescribethe object as having certain properties but these properties are exemplified as essences of the object. Recall, that essences are the result of imaginative variation and discerned in eidetic reduction (the 3rd stage of phenomenological reflection) whereas Sinne (abstract particulars) are discernedin phenomenological (including transcendental) reflection. For example, when I see a red ball, the noematic Sinn of the act of seeing includes the senses ‘red’ and ‘ball’ which as part of the Sinn of the noema prescribe the object as ‘being red’ and being a ball’. But these senses (of the Sinn of the noema) and the corresponding properties or essences of the object (‘ball’, ‘red’) are not the same in that they do not stand in the same relation to the object. “Senses” of the Sinn of the noema prescribe; whereas properties/essences are exemplified in the object.

Husserl also held that the study of noemata and the study of essences are distinct. Noemata are studied in phenomenological reflection whereas the essences of object belong to the domain of eidetic variation (and are bracketed in phenomenological reflection).

2.2 Husserl and linguistic meaning. Husserl uses the German word Bedeutung in deliberately setting himself apart from Frege terminology. In common parlance, the German Bedeutung means “meaning” or “significance” (as Sinn does in one of its senses). Frege (somewhat unusually) used Bedeutung for the referent of a linguistic expression, reserving Sinn for meaning or sense. Husserl uses Bedeutung where Frege uses Sinn but he does so specifically for linguistic meaning or expression (which Frege did not). When it cam to referents, Husserl used the German Gegenstand (object) or Gegenstandlichkeit (objectivity). Sinn refers to an act’s noema (noematic Sinn) which becomes when it is expressed linguistically Bedeutung. Bedeutung is the linguistic expression of Sinn and so in the domain of language Husserl distinguishes Bedeutung from Gegenstand.So that Husserl distinguishes among content or noema (Sinn), objects (usually bracketed), and Bedeutungen (Sinne expressed in language).

Linguistic meaning stands in close relationship to consciousness, for language is used to make public what is part of mind.Husserl writes:

“All expressions in communicative speech function as indicators. They serve the here as signs of the thoughts of the speaker (that is the speaker’s meaning-giving mental acts).”

The meanings expressed by words are the noematic Sinne of meaning-giving accts of consciousness underlying the words of speech. So linguistic meanings are act meanings.

Now linguistic behavior is rather complicated. To express meaning in words is to perform an action, a bit of behavior, which is related to the underlying process (act) of consciousness. Acts of speech consist of producing sound/graphic signs but the meaningful utterance of a linguistic expression also has an intentional aspect. Husserl claims that the meaning given the utterance (as an activity of speech), is just the noematic Sinn of the meaning-giving act that underlies the speech act. This noematic Sinn prescribes a certain state of affairs/object which is presumably intended in the speech act. If communication succeeds we will convey a meaning through which the hearer will come to prescribe the same state of affairs/object. The reason is that Husserl maintains the meaning expressed as the Bedeutung of the words in the speech act is the meaning, noematic Sinn, of the underlying speech act. Linguistic expressions serve to express publicly the Sinn of an act of consciousness. Of course, if Sinne were intensional entities (as object-theories hold) as Frege held the all Sinne should be in principle expressible in language.

But for Husserl acts and their meanings are not intrinsically linguistic in nature. Sinn is a more general notion than Bedeutung (which Sinn expressed in language). When a Sinn is expressed, it is the Bedeutungen of words which express it. So whether a Sinn is expressed or not, there is in principle some utterance whose Bedeutung is that Sinn. This is what Husserl calls his “expressibility” thesis and makes good the notion that noematic Sinn is an intension. So where we first saw that every Bedeutung is a Sinn expressed in language, wenow see that every Sinn is expressible and hence potentially a Bedeutung.

It is important to appreciate that Husserl does not claim that every Sinn is actually expressed in language. Nor does he claim that all languages are rich enough to express every Sinn. Thus, he notes that there is no intrinsic connection between ideal entities (noemata and their Sinne) and the signs to which they are tied (Bedeutungen). There may be countless meanings which are never expressed.

The expressibility thesis applies only to the noematic Sinn and not to an act’s complete noema. As we saw, the noema also includes a thetic component (a “way of givenness” or in German Gegebenheitsweise) which is not expressed as part of the Bedeutung.

The reason is that meanings expressed are intended to be invariant with respect to the more particular or individual aspects of acts (clarity, distinctiveness, and attentiveness). Similarly the intuitional element (sensory or hyletic element) is not part of the expressible Sinn. And again the thetic component (whether the act is an act of seeing, judging, imagining, remembering) is not expressed. It is only the Sinn component of a noema which can be expressed.

Of course, the thetic component can be expressed in more indirect ways. For example, when I judge that p and then say “p”, I express only the Sinn and not the thetic component of the noema.

When I say, “I judge that p”, I then express the Sinn of another judgment about my first judgment. This second Sinn includes both the Sinn and thetic component of the noema of my first judgment.

2.3 Noematic description. Husserl’s expressibility thesis, namely that Sinne and other noematic components are expressible in language, either directly or indirectly, are closely related to what he calls “noematic descriptions”.

Let’s call an act sentence that expresses the noema of the act it describes a phenomenological description of that act (from a person’s point of view). Such phenomenological descriptions are normally very rich but let’s consider a simple example.

I clearly see hat hovering black crow

Here the expression ‘that hovering black crow’ expresses as its meaning (i.e., Bedeutung) the noematic Sinn of the perception. ‘I clearly see’ expresses the way-of-givenness of the perception. So that the act sentence as a whole expresses the act’s whole noema (of course, it does so only if the words are appropriately chosen). In particular, the object phrase ‘that hovering black crow’ must not merely describe the object that is perceived but it must do so in exactly the way it is perceived.

Now a noematic description is an expression that describes an act in a “structure revealing” way. There is then a close relation between a noematic description and a phenomenological one. However, the phenomenological description expresses an act’s noema, it does not describe/name the noema. What the phenomenological description describes is the act. The object phrase of the phenomenological description does not describe the noematic Sinn; rather, it describes the act’s object as intended in the act (and given by way of the Sinn).