Edmund McWilliams
Edmund McWilliamsis a retired senior Foreign Service Officer. He served as Deputy Chief of Mission and periodically as Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Kabul (1986-88) and as the first "Special Envoy to Afghanistan" (1988-89). He subsequently served as Deputy Chief of Mission and periodically as Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Dushanbe, 1992-94, where he reported on developments in Afghanistan. McWilliams retired in 2001 after a 26-year career.
Below, McWilliams summarizes the main points from an article he wrote in the July/August 2008 edition of the Foreign Service Journal, “Salvaging the Afghanistan Venture”. The full article can be found on the CPC website at cpc.grijalva.house.gov
Afghanistan is a failing, but not a failed state.A growing security threat posed by the Taliban and their allies has combined with ineffective international assistance and feckless Afghan governance to create the prospect of a collapse of the Karzai regime. To salvage the US and NATO investment in Afghanistan it will be necessary to provide for Afghansa minimal level of security so as toafford an environment for development and improved governance. The 2001 Bonn Conference that laid the groundwork for governance in Afghanistan set up a highly centralized statethat relied heavily on the political power of former Mujahiddin parties and commanders. This arrangement reflected neither Afghanistan's history nor its current reality.For much of the 20th century Afghanistan was a successful, modernizing and largely democratic state operating under a de-centralized national government. Moreover, many Mujahiddin were and are corrupt warlords dependent on foreign support and have little backing from Afghans.
While the challenges confronting the US and NATO are daunting, it would be wrong to
argue, as some have, that the US and NATO should confine their efforts to minimalist goals of
rooting out al Qaeda and eschew "nation-building" in Afghanistan. The US and NATO should
recognize that four decades of successful Afghan governance provide precedent and basis for hope for a successful Afghan state in the future. It will be essential to address firstly the security
threat, recognizing that much of it is posed from the South in the Taliban Shura's Quetta
sanctuary and not simply in the FATA and NWFP. A fundamental reform of Afghan governance,including a transition to a more de-centralized government, and more
effective international development assistance is equally essential.
A US decision to abandon efforts in Afghanistan once al Qaeda's threat is removed or diminished would repeat the US mistake of two decades ago when the US ended involvement in Afghanistan once the Soviet forces left. The ensuing chaos there was the crucible in which the al Qaeda threat metastasized. Our goal must be a stable and democratic Afghan state at peace with its neighbors and posing no threat to the international community.