Dutch identity as confused identity

1.1Introduction

Through this article I aim to give the reader insightin a proposed research project. This proposed research deals with potential feelings of disidentification among Islamic youth in large urban areas. In contemporary society social exclusion can be the cause for these feelings of disbelonging towards mainstream society. In a social context which is ethnically and religiously very diverse, processes of exclusion could have a multi-dimensional logic. So exclusion in all the different dimensions is, as we will see, a very complex phenomenon in an urban context which is characterized by a great ethnic and religious diversity.

Furthermore, my aim here is not to only focus on the causes of these feelings of disidentification but also to pay attention to the social consequences. Ethnic diversity and exclusion could produce different reactions, different modus operandi, different cultural and social repertoires which will not always conform mainstreamsocial behaviour.

All these issues will be discussed in this article. In paragraph 1.2 I will put forth a sociological analysis of the societal context in which the described phenomena take place. In paragraph 1.3 a theoretical framework will be put forth and research questions will be formulated. In paragraph 1.4 the method of research will be explained. Paragraph 1.5 explains the innovative character of the proposed research and paragraph 1.6 goes into the societal and scientific relevance of the proposed research. Finally, Paragraph 1.7 consists of a short summary.

1.2Sociological analysis of the societal context

Anno 2006Dutch society is situated in a societal context which could be defined as ‘multicultural’. This societal landscape has changed drastically in the last decades and variety and diversity of colour, taste and lifestyle have become definite characteristics which will determine and shape this new landscape, from now on. The street corners, the public discourse and all kinds of institutions are in continuous interaction with the relatively ‘new presence’ of all sorts of cultural groups who are derived from all parts of the world.

The process of globalization, at first an economic logic which connects different parts of the world as a result of economic relations between those parts, has established the foundations for other type of relations. Hence, the political process in the Netherlands is, more than ever, dependent on international political events and phenomena. However, more manifest is the process of cultural globalization, I assume. Never before in the history of mankind,have humans been confronted with a social dynamism which brings together the most diverse cultures on a global scale in such a frequent and powerful way (Holton, 1998).

This ‘confrontation of cultures’ does not only take place at a distance. It is not limited to a process whereby via ultra technological means of communication individuals and cultures from all parts of the world, on condition that they are connected to the actual global communication network (‘The Net’), are able to know about cultural expressions which are dominant in other parts of the world (Castells, 2000). Nowadays it is also a physical matter. The process of globalization has opened the doors for massive migration movements in which migration chains cover more and more geographical space (Castels & Miller, 1993). Due to this process Dutch society, and especially the more urban areas, has become a mosaic of cultural heterogeneity, with population segments that are derived from the periphery of the globalizing world. Inhabitants of cities such as Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Den Haag and Utrecht are observers of a ‘world of cultures’ in their own city, day after day.

For a long time political discourse in the Netherlands has reacted on this heterogeneity of the population with the idea of multiculturalism. The essence of this ideological movement is that the presence of a variety of cultures is inherently an enrichment for society. Intellectual pliability, knowledge of ones own identity, being truly interested in and having respect for other cultures are the points of departure in this ideological reflection. This ideology demands a lot of individual citizens in a multicultural society. They have to know who they are themselves and at the same time they have to be open to other cultures, and in the ideal situation they will also participate in this diverse system. These citizens have the freedom – even the constitutional right – to be who they would like to be, to fight for their own values and source of inspiration, but this all has to develop within a societal context - and this statement is very important – in which citizens strive for respect for other values, sources of inspiration, cultures and a harmonious structure, even though other cultural expressions seem to be strange and queer.

However, multiculturalism has been carried to the grave in the Netherlands. Due to all kinds of international events (9/11, the war in Iraq, the attacks in Madrid and London) and national events (the rise of Pim Fortuyn, the murder on Theo van Gogh) the Dutch dikes seemed not enough anymore to save the polder. Debates about the multicultural society, about the position of ethnic minorities and about the position of Islam in the composition of Dutch society flared up. While certain themes were taboo in public and political discourse during the hegemony of multiculturalism, now all brakes came loose and everything had to be discussed. Of body circumcision among Somalian women till deviant behaviour among certain Moroccan youths, of the murder of some Turkish girls by family members till the overrepresentation of Antillean youths in crime. These phenomena, and many others, were discussed thoroughly and the dominant voice in public and political discourse declared that multiculturalism was found lacking because it paid too little attention on all kinds of social problems which were related to the Dutch multicultural society, as we know it.

If an ideological movement is defined as insufficient because it is not able to formulate founded answers on social problems, experienced by citizens, then discontent arises, people start to become restless and find themselves searching for alternative views, for ideologies and ‘moral entrepreneurs’ who distinguish themselves as establishers of prosperous times. The Netherlands after 9/11 did this intensively, and if uncertainty about the future dominates, people tend to choose for decisiveness, big words and tough solutions.

The alternative for multiculturalism was found very fast. It was the ideology of assimilation. This ideological movement rejects the idea of a harmonious multicultural society and stresses the big social problems experienced by ethnic minorities, day in day out. These social problems – we can think of overrepresentation in crime, high unemployment rates and forms of modern poverty –are mainly caused by a lack of integration in the social-cultural structure of their new society, according to assimilationist scholars. Migrants should therefore, according to these scholars, distance themselves rapidly from the cultural heritage derived from the countries of origin in order to become absorbed in the new culture. A society can be defined as successful if migrants are incorporated in the system in such a way that differences in social behaviour between migrants and the dominant group in society whither away after a while, according to these scholars.

As pointed out earlier, in the 1980s, during the hegemony of multiculturalism, the focus was on bringing citizens with different ethnic and religious backgrounds to live together in a harmonious way on the basis of mutual respect for ones cultural and religious identity (Entzinger, 2003). In accordance with this aim the policy objective was formulated as ‘integration with retention of identity’ in the Minderhedennota (Entzinger, 2003:63).

Subsequently, in the 1990s political discourse took leave of this stress on cultural singularity of ethnic minorities and it was replaced by the focus on overcoming social deprivation of ethnic minorities. No longer did the government have the opinion that it should actively facilitate all kinds of services for ethnic minorities in order to enable them to preserve the culture derived from the countries of origin. This new discourse became manifest in the way ‘integration’ was defined in the 1994 Contourennota:

“Integration is a process leading to the full and equal participation of individuals and groups in society for which mutual respect for identity is seen as a necessary condition” (Entzinger, 2003:72).

So “Full and equal participation” of ethnic minorities in society became the new adage and dominant elements in politics thought that the best way to achieve this was to stimulate ethnic minorities to find their way on the labour market or in the educational system.

Round the millennium change political discourse turned over again. More and more the question of citizenship emerged. It became a ‘hot issue’ in public and political discourse to ask and define what it means to be a citizen of this country, and more important, what rights and duties are related to this citizenship. Paul Scheffer (2000) triggered this debate with his article “The Multicultural Tragedy” (Het multiculturele drama) in which he states that Dutch society is on the way to produce an ‘ethnic underclass’ in which the members lack affinity with Dutch society and at the same time do not want to integrate. From that moment on, and partly due to all kinds of national and international events, the focus in public and political discourse was again on the position of ethnic minorities – and especially on citizens with an Islamic background – as social-cultural and religious groups. Again, culture and religion became important. Only this time the conclusion was not that ethnic minorities should be facilitated to preserve their own identity. On the contrary, dominant elements in politics came to the conclusion that the Dutch government should create facilities to enable ethnic minorities, as much as possible, to arrogate ‘the’ Dutch culture. From their perspective Dutch culture was defined as the cultural repertoire of the dominant, white, mainstream group. Indeed, in contemporary public and political discourse, more and more, a loud call for assimilation can be heard (Snel, 2003:24).

Taking everything in account, we may conclude that a fundamental change – or as Snel (2003:27) states a ‘paradigma shift’ – has taken place in Dutch society and politics with regard to the position of ethnic minorities. Indeed, it consists of a shift from the one extremity, that of multiculturalism with its focus on cultural diversity, to another extremity, that of an assimilation politics, of a clear and loud call for adaptation of ethnic minorities. Entzinger (2003:80) too comes with this conclusion in his “The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism”:

“The debate has generated a respectable non-racist assimilationist view that can be opposed to the long existing multiculturalist option. It is therefore highly illustrative for the shift in Dutch immigration discourse”.

The relevant question here is, of course, to examine the consequences of this shift in a multicultural urban context. We need to know in which way different aspects of urban life (integration, diversity, exclusion etc.) are related to each other. To find this out we need to construct an overarching theoretical framework in order to understand the complexity of interrelated social phenomena. The next paragraph is an attempt to do so.

1.3Theoretical framework and research questions

Sociological literature about ‘integration’ often deals with different dimensions of integration (Engbersen & Gabriels, 1995). Peters (1993) proposes a three-dimensional model of integration. Engbersen and Gabriels (1995) have applied this model to the Dutch multicultural society. They assume that integration has been successful when migrants are able to acquire a good socio-economic position in society (the functional dimension of integration), keep themselves to the written and unwritten rules of mainstream society (the moral dimension) and are able to develop and express their own or shared cultural identity in society (the expressive dimension).

Until 1994 the so-called ‘minority policy’ was effective in the Netherlands, a policy directed at “integration with retention of identity” (Entzinger, 2003:63). The public discourse was one of multiculturalism and the expressive dimension of integration was focus of attention. Between 1994 and 2002 a policy called ‘Integration policy’ was in place, in which the focus was on creating equal starting positions for minorities (Entzinger, 2003:63-72). There was a vigorous investment in the functional dimension of integration. Since 2002 there has been a ‘paradigm shift’ (Snel, 2003:27) in Dutch immigrant incorporation policies. Currently the emphasis is on citizenship (moral dimension) and on cultural assimilation (Entzinger, 2003:80). Investments are made (via courses for civic integration) to stimulate ethnic minorities to adapt to the moral standards of Dutch society. Assimilation politics sends the message to ethnic minorities that they have to adjust in cultural aspect to ‘the’ Dutch culture (Snel, 2003).

Just when there appears to be less attention for the socio-economic integration (functional dimension) there seems to be a high level of structural exclusion of migrants on the labour market: 39% of Turkish and Moroccan youth between 15 and 24 year is unemployed! (Dagevos, 2006:11). Also, research shows that young Moroccans are more often refused for an internship than other minorities (Dolfing and Van Tubergen, 2005:407). Finally, the vast majority of Turkish and Moroccan youth are still concentrated in the lower parts of educational system and labour market and they are characterized by the highest relative ‘drop-out’ rate (ISEO, 2004).

While Turkish and Moroccan youths are busy finding a place for an internship (especially students of MBO and HBO), the assimilation politics demands them to focus on cultural adaptation to the moral order (moral dimension). Besides the fact that Turkish and Moroccan youth seem to have unequal chances in education / labour market (functional dimension), they are also confronted with a political and public discourse in which they receive ‘insufficient space’ to develop their own cultural identity (expressive dimension), according to Snel (2003). The current focus on cultural assimilation thus leaves two domains of integration unattended. While these youths are raised with Western ideals of equal opportunities, this can have undesirable consequences such as disidentification with Dutch society.I define disidentification as a structural feeling of disbelonging towards mainstream society. I use and expand the concept of De Swaan (1999:213) who states that “denying and projection can summon feelings of detachment and being different, a feeling of disidentification”. In my theoretical framework these feelings of detachment and being different are analyzed in terms of the attitudes of Turkish and Moroccan youths when they experience exclusion from mainstream society on a structural basis. This leads to the following research questions.

1 To what extent do Turkish and Moroccan youth develop feelings of disidentification?

2To what extent does (a) functional exclusion and (b) expressive exclusion lead to feelings of disidentification among Turkish and Moroccan youth?

In order to answer these questions we need to include native Dutch youth in the analysis as a ‘control group’ with which comparisons can be made.

The first hypothesis is that exclusion on the functional and expressive dimension of integration by Turkish and Moroccan youths (between the ages of 18 to 22 years in Rotterdam), combined with an ‘essentialist' (Baumann, 1997) policy with regard to the moral dimension of integration, produces feelings of disidentification towards Dutch society

Concerning exclusion on the functional level (education, internships and labour market) I operationalize Merton’s ‘strain-theory’ (1938) in which he argues that the prescribed goals (culture) can not be realized by every member of society due to unequal allocation of available means (structure) and that, as reaction to this, people will no longer adhere to the legitimate means and goals. Turkish and Moroccan youth could turn to the use of deviant means as a reaction to functional exclusion, while having been socialized by the cultural values of mainstream society (like equal chances for all). Young (2002) also refers to this combination of cultural inclusion (internalization of ‘mainstream ideals’ by migrants) and structural exclusion (unequal chances in the area of education and labour) as a source for the development of feelings of resentment. Finally, Scheler (1992:120) claims that “Resentment must therefore be strongest in a society like ours, where approximately equal rights … go hand in hand with wide factual differences in power, property, and education…. a potent charge of resentment is here accumulated by the very structure of society”.

Disidentification is also nourished by the feeling that one ‘can not be him or herself’ on the cultural (or religious) level. The resulting feeling of alienation could lead to an attitude of resistance towards mainstream society. This reaction is similar to that suggested by the above mentioned theory, only this time it does not deal with the impossibility on a functional level to obtain an internship or a job but with the ‘strain’ one experiences while developing one’s cultural identity.

Merton (1938) claims that there are different types of reaction to ‘strain’. Despite frustration, some youth will keep on conforming to mainstream norms (conformists). An example would be unemployed youth trying even harder to gain employment. A second group will go out in search of illegitimate means, like criminal behaviour, to realize the same cultural goals (innovation). Examples are the urban riots in French suburbs where migrant youth burned cars (illegitimate means) as a statement to draw attention to their marginal social-economic position (legitimate goals). A third group will use legitimate means without supporting prescribed goals (ritualists). Here, one can think of an individual who goes to school and applies for a job without acknowledging ‘mainstream goals’ (in the context of capitalism and democracy). A fourth group does not adhere to legitimate means nor to legitimate goals (retreatists). Here we can think of someone who does not work, refuses to vote and does not support the dominant beliefs. Finally, there is a group who replaces the means as well as the goals (rebellions). Here we can think of someone who is radicalized and uses violence to change the status quo. Relevant questions are:

3What are the social consequences of these feelings of disidentification in terms of attitudes and behaviour of these youth?