Zacharias Pieri
Draft Paper – please do not circulate or quote from without author’s permission.
The Fulani of Nigeria
Introduction
This paper presents a brief introduction and background to the Fulaini of Nigeria. Of all the Northern Nigerian ethnic groups, the Fulani have, perhaps, been the most pivotal in bringing about social change and transformation. I say this because it was the Fulani who launched a jihad of religious revival in Northern Nigeria in the early 19th Century, subjugating much of Hausaland, and instituting a new socio-religious and political system whose impact is still felt today. This paper will start through exploring some of the narratives around the origins of the Fulani – who they are and where they came from before advancing to look how and why some Fulani launched their jihad of religious revivalism and military conquest, and finally looking at the impact and continued resonance of this.
Origins of the Fulani
The Fulani need some introduction. They are not a people confined to what is now known as Nigeria, but rather widely dispersed throughout western and Sudanic Africa, roughly along the latitude of contact from Senegal on the Atlantic coast to the border of the former Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. They are the largest people group – cultural, ethnic or tribal – in Africa, with an estimated 15 million Fulani scattered across West Africa.[1] There is however, a large Fulani population in Nigeria, and they had been the ruling class in the Sokoto Empire – the political entity that followed the jihad. The Fulani are not a homogeneous group but rather a tribal entity comprising many cultural and social nuances through a dispersed population. Even though there are important class, status, and cultural subdivisions within the larger group.[2] Following the imposition of Western colonialism in Africa, many of the tribes and ethnic groups that once had trans-regional ties (such as the Fulani) were often forced into new national identities which continued with the establishment of nation states in the post-colonial period. This has often caused feelings of irredentism, raising wider issues around the questions of citizenship and integration.
One of the first historical mentioning of the Fulani peoples is in Tarikh-es-Soudan, written in Arabic in the first part of the 17th Century by Abderrahman Al Said, a scholar from Timbuktu. Al Said notes that there were several Fulani jurists in the Timbuktu area, many of whom served at the mosque at Timbuktu, which shows that Islam had already spread amongst the Fulani of Massina at that time. Al said does not, however, shed light on who the Fulani are, or where they originated from, only that the Fulani were not highly thought of by some of the aristocratic families of Timbuktu. Indeed, much of the historical background as to the origins of the Fulani are vague – often including some fantastical theories, such as the Fulani being decedents of one of the lost tribes of Israel or of a Roman legion that had lost its way in the desert. What does seem to reoccur in the literature, however, is that the Fulani are not indigenous to the areas where they now mainly inhabit, they are a group that migrated from elsewhere, and as such are usually seen as being distinct. Many of the early theories and attempts to categorize the Fulani were collected by Maurice Delafosse, a French ethnographer and colonial official.[3] Delafosse notes that the Fulani migration movement was from east to west, and it is only relatively recently that a few families ‘have migrated from west to east under a conquering impulse, and imposed their rule upon countries where many of their race had long been present, and which they had originally entered from an easterly direction’.
In his essay on the origins of the Fulani, Delafosse refers to the opinions of General Faidherbe. Faidherbe’s account is particularly interesting with regards to the Fulani and their adoption of Islam. The claim is made that ‘the conversion of the Fulani to Islam is relatively recent, and moreover, their conversion is attributable, in part, to the negro Muslims to whom all the Fulani were, in the beginning, tributary.’ Faidherbe purports that the Fulani tribe of Torodo was the first to convert to Islam and to adopt agricultural and sedentary habits, and that the majority of the Fulbe did not convert to Islam en mass until the 18th Century.
The Fulani of course also have their own narratives as to their origins and whilst these may not be scientifically verifiable, they are nonetheless important as they allow for the myths, memories and symbols of the Fulani to emerge. In this regard, H.A.S. Johnston outlines the following origins legend that many Fula cherish:
One version describes the marriage of a Moslem Arab, who is usually identified as Ukuba, to a woman of the Sudan called Bajjo Mangu. One day the mother goes to the well and leaves her youngest child in the care of its brothers. On her return she overhears the brother comforting the child in a strange language. She tells her husband, who predicts that this is a sign that the child will be the founder of a new people who will not speak Arabic, but will nevertheless be the saviours of Islam.[4]
The fundamental importance of this legend, in my opinion, is that Islam emerges as a key feature in Fulani identity. From the Fulani perspective, they were a people of whom great things were prophesied – they were heralded as the saviours of Islam. This indeed can be seen as resonant through the Fulani led jihad of Islamic revivalism in the 19th Century, and also may account for the more conservative religious attributes that are usually ascribed to the Fulani. Another important aspect to the above myth in my opinion is the mentioning of the Fulani as being descendent in part from Arab lineage. Arabic is the language of the Qur’an and the first Muslims were Arabs. For better or worse, Arabs have traditionally been seen (or have seen themselves) as the better Muslims, and closer to the authenticity of the faith. The fact the Fulani see themselves as having descended from Arab lineage may have originally helped to set them apart from the wider black African populations that they came to live amongst, as well as endowing them with a sense of superiority in religious matters. The third key point that I take from the above narrative is that the prophecy foretells that the Fulani will not speak Arabic, yet still be the saviours of Islam. In my mind this speaks to the issue that even though the Fulani will have lost their Arabic heritage, they still regard themselves as a people set apart, a people who are instrumental to God’s will, and a people who will reinvigorate Islam. If this is indeed the case, these are powerful narratives that help explain the Fulanis’ instrumental role in the 19th Century jihad through Hausaland, not to mention the continued resonance of this message in the current period.
For Charles Davis, who investigated identity construction amongst Fulani, the important point is this:
The actual origin of the Fulani is not as important in the employment of identity as the incantation of a unique origin, which Fulani use to reinforce their sense of privileged status in relation to other tribal groups. As Awogbade states, “If there is any bond shared by all Fulani, it is their myth of origin” (1983:1). This unique status adds to the mystery of the Fulani as a people group and is reified in the ascribed declaration of other West African tribes or people groups. The power of liturgy in forming identity and the shaping effect of narrative in one’s understanding of one’s self in relation to the world becomes evident in this embraced identity of mysterious origin.[5]
In an essay[6] written by Lady Lugard, the wife of Northern Nigeria’s first British High Commissioner, and a journalist for the London Times in her own right, she notes that the Fulani have ‘come to be the ruling people, but that the Haussa [the ethnic group that had been prominent throughout Hausaland], who are also for the most part Mohammadan, form a very important industrial and commercial portion of the population’. Lady Lugard continues to say that the population of colonial northern Nigeria could be divided into three parts. These she lists as the Fulani, ‘who are the military and ruling class, fast falling into degradation by the vices which are apt to undermine the despotism of uncurbed power but still representing authority as it has existed in the eyes of three of four generations’. The second group are the Haussa, ‘once themselves the ruling race and now representing the industry, the agriculture and the commerce of the country’. The third section of the population to which she refers to are the tribes – too numerous to name. Interestingly, no mention is made of the Kanuri, the people who form the largest ethnic group of the north eastern region of Nigeria, and who historically had been distinct from the Fulani and Hausa, having their own empire and governing institutions. It is also of further interest that Lady Lugard, and indeed the majority of British officials in Nigeria during the colonial period, saw the Fulani and Hausa as being distinct from each other, whereas today, the two are often grouped together.
In character the Fulani are considered to differ from the Hausas. Where the Hausas are usually tolerant and easy going, the Fulani tended to be passionate and intense. The basic dissimilarity of temperament is reflected in many differences of outlook. The Fulani according to Johnston take life more seriously than the Hausas and are less ready to laugh at themselves. They have a greater reverence for learning. They have more highly developed powers of leadership. They throw themselves with more singleness of purpose into the cases which they adopt. They have a superior faith in their own destiny. In short, though not necessarily abler or more intelligent, they have more fire in their bellies than the genial worldly Hausas. At the beginning of the C.19th the time had arrived when these qualities would be put to the test.
The Fulani and Islam
Time and again, much of the literature on the Fulani outlines that it was not until the 18th Century that the Fulani as a whole started converting to Islam. H.A.S Johnston argues that many of those who had not previously been converted now abandoned pagan beliefs and those who were already Muslim became more strict and aggressive. Whilst Johnston does not state the causes for this move towards Islam, he does note that ‘whatever the causes of this spiritual change, it was to have very important political results’. Even though the Fulani were later converts to Islam than both the Hausa and Karnui peoples, it seems that they were better Islamised, with Islam being a key component of their identity. Fulani were amongst the most prominent religious scholars in the courts of the Hausa chiefs. One account has it that the Fulani religious scholars ‘preached the Shari’a, taught in the palaces of the Hausa rulers, strove to rationalize the actions of the rulers and to moralise their conduct…their leadership qualities, sense of purpose, and religious fervor contrasted strongly with the nature of the Hausa’.[7] Accounts from European explorers to Hausaland and Bornu in 19th Century state that the ‘Fulani as Moslems, moreover, were generally much stricter than the more genial and worldly Hausas and Kanuri’.[8] Robinson argues that Islam had become so deeply rooted as a notion of identity for the Fulani that they began manipulating their genealogies to incorporate prestigious Arab Muslims into their ancestral lines, including the lineage of Muhammad, the clan Quraysh, and the companions of Mecca and Medina who formed the early caliphate.[9]
The argument has been made that the increase in religiosity and adherence to the tenants of Islam as encouraged by the Fulani throughout Hausaland helped to alter the balance of power towards Fulani ideals of governance. According to Spencer Trimingham:
Islam introduced an anarchic element [in Hausa society], that the law of God was absolute. Friction was therefore eminent between the ruling Hausa aristocracy and the ecclesiastic body composed mainly of the Fulani, who claimed to know the divine will of Allah. Fulani ulama and scholars had to stress religion as the new binding force and solicited the cooperation of the ruling Hausa elites to defend the faith.[10]
Adeleye notes that injustices against the Fulani would therefore ‘tend to be seen as injustices not only against their ethnic group but also against the religion of Islam’. Prior to the 19th Century jihad which ushered in the Sokoto Caliphate, the Fulani were largely outside the pale of government, and with Islam playing so prominent a role in their identity, the ‘Fulani were more favourably placed to identify abuses against Islamic tenants than their counterpart indigenous Muslims, many of whom had vested interests in the existing system’.[11] It is therefore not strange that religious reform should have found its staunchest votaries among the Fulani. Further to this, it is interesting to note that it is the identification of grievances against Islam that were motivating factors for social change and reform. A SMT approach to current movements pushing for socio-religious change in Nigeria may very well indeed point to the same factors. Indeed, it is my belief that such grievance/injustice identifications are key to the actions of Boko Haram.
Having identified Islam as a key shaper of identity amongst the Fulani, as well as a resonating factor, it is still important to consider that popularity of a jihad for religious renewal may have been as much of an ethnic solidarity issue for some Fulani as much as anything else. The fortunes of the reformist movement seem to have been identified with those of a people - the Fulani - who filled the role of a chosen people. Fulanis, according to Adeleye ‘were conscious of their separate identity...they seldom had internal feuds and their mallams maintained contact over long distances...’ It should also be noted that it is possible that the call for jihad was made popular with wider and less religiously inclined people because the ‘the evils of society against which the reforming Muslims raved were significant even for the non-Muslims who felt oppression keenly...’ In this sense the argument could be made that similarly today the move towards greater Islamisation in Nigeria may have found increased popularity due to the failure of more secular models, coupled with the sheer corruption of the Nigerian state and local governments.