NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT -- CCPC COMPENDIUM from 7November 2005
1.PURPOSE.
2.GENERAL INTRODUCTION
2.1.NATO’s Political Goals and Basic Tasks
2.2.Decision Making in NATO
2.3.NATO’s Strategic Concept
2.4.CEP Structure
2.5.CCPC Functions
3.ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST
3.1.Risks and Threats to Civil Communications
3.2.Critical Infrastructure
3.3.Information Society
3.4.Support For Crisis Response Operations (CROs)to be done
3.5.Weapons of Mass Destruction
3.6.CCPC-NC3O Relationto be done
4.ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
4.1.Effect of Glob. and Lib. of Electronic COMS
4.2.Definitions.
4.3.Technology
4.3.1. Liberalization and Globalization
4.3.2. Cellular Systems
4.3.3. Satellites.
4.3.4. certs / internet
4.3.5. broadcasting
5.ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS ORGANISATION
6.NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR CEP
7.GUIDANCE FOR THE CONT. AVAILABILITY OF CIVIL ELEC. COMS
7.1.General
7.2.Need for Coordination
7.3.Coordination in Emergency, Crisis and War
7.4.Measures to be Considered
7.5.Staffing and Management
7.6.Network and Services Planning
7.7.Electronic Coms Installations and Equipment
7.8.Support Services
7.9.Maintenance and Operations
7.10.Network Management
7.11.Preferential Access
7.12.Restoration of International Transmission
7.13.Electronic Coms with Non-Alliance Nations
7.14. National Emergency Tel. Networks
7.15.Electronic Coms for Essential Users
7.16.Functions Supported by Electronic Coms
7.17.International Standards
8.POSTAL SERVICES
8.1.Introduction
8.2.Scope of Postal Services
8.3.Provision of Postal Services
9.TRAINING AND EXERCISE
9.1.Training
9.2.Exercises
9.3.Objective
9.4.Exercise Planning
10.DETAILED INFORMATION ON CCPC CRISIS MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND POSTAL MATTERS
10.1.Introduction
10.2.Co-ordination
10.3.Article 5 and non-article 5 crisis arrangements
10.4.Peacetime arrangements
10.5. CCPC responsibilities in time of crisis
10.6.Use of civil experts
10.7.Nominations of experts
10.8.Electronic Communications Liaison Officers (ECLO)
10.9.Postal Services Liaison Officers (PSLO)
10.10.The Tampere Convention.
11.ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS
12.LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTSto be done
13. CCPC TOR’s to be done
1.PURPOSE
1.1.The purpose of this Compendium is to assist NATO HQ bodies, member nations, and EAPC nations coordinate and harmonize the continued availability of communications during peacetime, crisis, and emergencies by providing designated industrial experts and civil emergency planners at national and international levels with appropriate documentation and guidance for the planning and implementation of measures and arrangements needed for such circumstances.
2.GENERAL INTRODUCTION
2.1.NATO’s Political Goals and Basic Tasks
2.1.1.The North Atlantic Alliance embodies the transatlantic partnership between the European members of NATO and the United States and Canada, designed to bring about peace and stability throughout Europe. The objectives of the Partnership between the European and North American members of the Alliance are primarily political, underpinned by a shared defence planning and military co-operation and by co-operation and consultation in the economic, scientific, environmental and other relevant fields. Through the years of the Cold War, however, NATO focused above all on the development and maintenance of collective defence and on overcoming the fundamental political issues dividing Europe. Today its focus has expanded to include promoting stability throughout Europe as well as outside traditional NATO boundaries through co-operation and by developing the means for collective crisis management and for operations in response to crisis situations.
2.1.2. NATO is an Alliance based on political and military co-operation among independent member nations, established in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. As stated in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty, Alliance members are committed to safeguarding the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.
2.1.3.Article 4 of the Treaty provides for consultations among the Allies whenever any of them believes that their territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened. NATO member states are committed to the defence of one another by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This stipulates that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered as an attack against them all. Other missions, such as peace support operations, humanitarian aid, and disaster relief, are referred to as non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CROs).
2.2.Decision Making in NATO
2.2.1.NATO decisions are made on the basis of consensus, after discussion and consultation among the member nations. As a multinational, inter-governmental association of free and independent states, NATO has no supranational authority or policy-making function independent of its members. Decisions taken by NATO are therefore decisions taken by all its member countries. In the same manner, NATO can only implement a course of action if all the member countries are in agreement.
2.3.NATO’s Strategic Concept
2.3.1.The Strategic Concept adopted at the 1991 Rome Summit meeting combined a broad approach to security based on dialogue and co-operation with the maintenance of NATO’s collective defence capability. The Strategic Concept was notable for setting out the road map by which NATO would evolve in the future. There were three key areas of new emphasis:
- a broad approach to security, in which co-operation and dialogue would play a prominent part;
- military capabilities, which would be reduced but restructured for crisis management missions, as well as for collective defence; and
- the European Allies, who would assume a greater responsibility for their own security.
2.3.2.The Concept provided for reduced dependence on nuclear weapons and introduced major changes in NATO’s integrated military forces, including: substantial reductions in their size and readiness; improvements in their mobility, flexibility and adaptability to different contingencies; increased use of multinational formation; the creation of a multinational Rapid Reaction Corps; and the adaptation of defence planning arrangements and procedures.
2.3.3.NATO’s military command structure was streamlined and the Alliance’s defence planning arrangements were adapted in order to take into account future requirements for crisis management and crisis response.
2.3.4.The direction set by the Strategic Concept was intensified by subsequent decisions. Partnership for Peace (PfP) created permanent mechanisms for close military co-operation. The concept of Combined Joint Task forces (CJTF) was introduced at the 1994 Brussels summit, designed to make NATO’s joint military assets available for wider operations by NATO nations. The European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) has been undergoing development within NATO since 1996.
2.3.5.Following the Washington Summit of 1999, a new Strategic Concept was adopted, recognizing the changed strategic environment which faces NATO, and was published as Military Committee (MC) Document 400/2, MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of Alliance Strategy. The approach of this updated document is very direct in establishing the relationship between the Strategic Concept’s guidance and the missions of the Alliance military forces in supporting the Alliance’s fundamental security tasks as agreed in Washington.
2.4.CEP Structure
2.4.1The aim of Civil Emergency Planning in NATO is to coordinate national planning activity to ensure the most effective use of civil resources in collective support of Alliance strategic objectives. Civil Emergency Planning is a national responsibility and civil assets remain under national control at all times.
2.4.2 However, at the NATO level, national intentions and capabilities are harmonized to ensure that jointly developed plans and procedures will work and that necessary assets are available. These assets include ships, aircraft, trains, medical facilities, communications, disaster response capabilities and other civil resources.
2.4.3The main roles of Civil Emergency Planning in NATO reflect the fundamental security tasks of the Alliance and consist of civil support for the military under Article 5 and non-Article 5 crisis response operations, support for nationalauthorities in civil emergencies and the protection of civilian populations.
2.4.4Beneath these very broad headings, Civil Emergency Planning has a role to play in managing the availability of civil assets and facilities and the maintenance of normal life during emergency situations such as war, crises and disasters. Increasingly, this work is carried out in close cooperation with Partner countries, who now play an active part in Civil Emergency Planning in NATO.
2.4.5Following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, renewed efforts have been made to assist member nations in protecting civilian populations against the consequences of attacks from chemical, biological and nuclear agents.
2.4.6All of this is brought together by the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC), which reports directly to the North Atlantic Council. The SCEPC meets at least twice a year in plenary session and eight times a year in Permanent session. The secretary General is Chairman of plenary sessions, but in practice these are chaired by the Assistant Secretary General for Security Investment, Logistics and Civil Emergency Planning while Permanent sessions are chaired by the Director of Civil Emergency Planning.
2.4.7Country representation at plenary level is drawn from heads of national Civil Emergency Planning organizations in capitals. At Permanent level, members of national delegations at NATO Headquarters normally attend but may be reinforced from capitals. Reflecting the deep involvement of Civil Emergency Planning in PfP activities, SCEPC's twice-yearly Plenary meetings are also held in EAPC format, with attendance open to all Partner nations, and Permanent meetings with Partners are held at least four times a year.
2.4.8Under the direction of the SCEPC, a number of technical Planning Boards and Committees (PB&Cs) bring together national government and industry experts and military representatives to coordinate planning in several areas of civil activity, namely:
- Planning Board for Inland Surface Transport (PBIST)
- Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS)
- Civil Aviation Planning Committee (CAPC)
- Food and Agriculture Planning Committee (FAPC)
- Industrial Planning Committee (IPC)
- Civil Communications Planning Committee (CCPC)
- Civil Protection Committee (CPC)
- Joint Medical Committee (JMC)
2.4.9These bodies meet regularly and provide the vital link between NATO policy and the means to carry it out. They are supported in their work by smaller, flexible working groups or specialized technical committees.
2.4.10Overall direction of Civil Emergency Planning, at NATO and national level, is by Foreign Ministers, who decide priorities. However, the very wide range of Civil Emergency Planning requires careful coordination in capitals of contributions from the many ministries and national agencies involved in Civil Emergency Planning today.
2.4.11As NATO adapted itself to the requirements of the changed security environment in Europe; it became clear that the role played by Civil Emergency Planning within the Alliance's overall strategic concept would also need to be examined. The principal tasks resulting from this review can be summarized as follows:
- Supporting Alliance military operations under Article 5;
- Supporting non-Article 5 crisis response operations;
- Supporting national authorities in civil emergencies;
- Supporting national authorities in the protection of their populations against the effects of weapons of mass destruction; and
- Cooperation with Partners in the Civil Emergency Planning field.
These priorities are reflected in the activities of the SCEPC and in the work program of its eight Planning Boards and committees.
2.5.CCPC Functions
2.5.1The Civil Communications Planning Committee (CCPC) was established by the North Atlantic Council in 1957. It is one of the eight civil Planning Boards and Committees (PB&C).
2.5.2CCPC is responsible for civil communication matters under NATO civil emergency arrangements. Civil communication planning provides for the maintenance of communication services for political, economic and military purposes; in this context the term "civil communications" is seen as all electronic public and non-public communications networks, services, associated facilities, postal services and any other related services.
2.5.3CCPC is required to maintain a pool of civil experts prepared, in an evolving crisis and in the planning for military operations, to provide advice on the use of civil electronic communications and postal resources to the Council, the SCEPC (in NATO or EAPC format), NATO military Authorities (NMAs), nations or other appropriate bodies as agreed by the Council/SCEPC. There may also be a need for civil experts to support nations and international organizations in case of large-scale emergencies.
2.5.4CCPC must keep under review the existing civil communications with a view to determining their suitability to meet the requirements of crisis and war and to make recommendations thereon as appropriate, taking into consideration new and emerging technologies, the role of international organizations in the civil communications fields and national legislation and arrangements.
2.5.5CCPC must co-ordinate with the appropriate NATO electronic and postal communications bodies any civil communications plans or measure which, in the opinion of the CCPC and/or the above mentioned bodies, may influence military communications plans.
2.5.6CCPC must review its activities with the aim of ensuring economic use of resources available to the Committee and avoiding duplication of the product of other international organizations.
2.5.7The CCPC is composed of senior members representing national electronic communications and postal authorities that are responsible in each NATO country for matter pertaining to civil communications. CCPC in Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) format is also represented by senior EAPC members representing their national electronic communications and postal authorities. CCPC and EAPC members can be accompanied by national experts.
2.5.8CCPC, in which all nations are entitled to participate, will generally meet twice a year, as required.
2.5.9CCPC must direct its efforts to the fulfillment of a two years work programme approved by the SCEPC and prepare every two years a progress report to the SCEPC on the attainment of the objectives.
2.5.10CCPC and the Working Groups are supported by a CEP Staff Officer.
3.ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST
3.1.Risks and Threats to Civil Communications
3.1.1Threats to communication networks can manifest themselves in numerous ways, but two broad categories are accidental and intentional.
3.1.2.Physical threats to communication networks include natural causes, accidents and intentional acts. Natural causes and accidents are by far the most common source of communications outages. Telecommunication cables are regularly damaged by construction activities, but the results of the outages are effectively managed.
3.1.3.Intentional acts are far less common, but could have the potential to be far more costly to repair, could have a greater impact on the network, and could be much more difficult to prevent. The trend towards the physical consolidation/co-location of telecommunication providers means that a single attack could have an even greater impact.
3.1.4.Electromagnetic attacks are designed to disrupt radio signals, or destroy or upset electronic systems and components. For the most part, telecommunications providers are continuing to migrate away from metallic cables and radio-based systems for backbone transmission in favour of electromagnetic resistant fibre optics. However, mobile networks and broadcasting are heavily reliant on radio signals that can be disrupted or jammed.
3.1.5.When using electromagnetic jamming, strong electromagnetic signals are directed towards or from radio-based transmitters overlapping the transmitted radio frequencies that can destroy the information being transmitted. Normally, jamming will not physically destroy the components. In order to jam modern public radio-based telecommunication systems e.g. cellular telephony, information about particular radio frequencies and modulation techniques employed is readily available and jamming is not very difficult.
3.1.6.Numerous studies have been conducted on the vulnerability of telecommunications equipment to electromagnetic pulse (EMP). EMP can occur naturally as a consequence of lightning, and on a more limited basis by radio transmitters, non-solid state thermostats and power connections. It is also a by-product of a nuclear blast and this form of EMP can be extremely damaging to electronics. However, measures can be taken to protect critical systems against the effects of EMP.
3.1.7.High Power Microwaves (HPM) is a relatively new type of radiation weapon that uses modern radar technology to generate a very short and intense pulse similar to EMP. Although not widely documented, there is reason to believe that disruption or damage of electronic equipment without any protection can be accomplished up to a range of a few kilometres. HPM weapons, in contrast to EMP weapons, are relatively inexpensive and can be built from readily available technology. Protection against the effect of HPM may differ from that of EMP.
3.1.8.Cyber attacks are those directed at computer based functions that are used for example to operate the various network management control systems of a communication network. Cyber attackers take advantage of flaws in software used throughout a corporation to carry out a wide variety of actions, typically delivered in the form of viruses, worms, Trojans, back doors and distributed denial of service attacks. Hacker activities can range from simple defacement of Web pages, to theft of proprietary information, and disrupting the smooth operation of critical infrastructure assets.
3.1.9.The range of activities a hacker could conduct once inside a network is disturbing, in that essential systems, such as national emergency services could be significantly affected, law enforcement surveillance could be compromised and phone numbers re-routed. Additionally, the impact of such an attack could be dramatically increased if it were carried out in conjunction with a physical attack, or during a national crisis.
3.1.10. Another significant threat posed to telecommunication networks comes from the insider. The typical insider is a disgruntled employee (or agency support staff) who may have a number of reasons for causing damage to an employer’s network or providing critical information to others who would do harm to the network. The insider is able to carry out his or her actions from within more easily, because they would have fewer security features to bypass and may have an intimate knowledge of the specific systems attacked. The insider might be from foreign origin and could have a different point of view in a crisis.
3.1.11.Telecommunication networks are dimensioned to permit the maximum availability at an economically efficient level. During exceptional circumstance, congestion could arise locally or regionally whenever the number of calls made exceed the capacity of any part of the network or the capability of the receiving party to handle the calls received.