Dr Clare Birchall, Phd

Dr Clare Birchall, PhD

Cultural Studies <=> Critical Methodologies, Jan 2013 forthcoming.

‘Radical Transparency?’

Keywords:

E-transparency, narrative-interpretivedisclosure, data, societies of control, WikiLeaks

Abstract

This article considers the cultural positioning of transparency as a superior form of disclosure through a comparative analysis with other forms. One, as yet under-examined appeal of transparency lies in its promise tocircumvent the need for, and usurp the role of,narrative-interpretive forms of disclosure such as scandal, gossip, and conspiracy theories. This growing preference for transparency as a more enlightening, honorablemode of disclosure is not just a result of the positive qualities that are seen to be intrinsic to transparency (particularly e-transparency) itself, but a response to the perceived negative characteristics of other forms of disclosure. It is also an ideological predilection: transparency reinforcesneoliberal tenets as much as democratic ideals.WikiLeaks is invoked in this article as a case which draws on both e-transparency and narrative-interpretive forms of disclosure. This hybridform helps us to explore the possibility and implications of non-ascendant, radical forms of transparency.

Radical Transparency?

Many reasons lie behind the appeal of transparency. It is an apparently simplesolution to complex problems – such as how to fight corruption, promote trust in government, supportcorporate social responsibility, and foster state accountability. Moreover, transparency seems to span the political divide;but it is thought of as a "pan-ideological good" (Triplett, 2010)primarily because it depoliticizes what are essentially political decisions. Transparency, in other words, is presented as a technical rather than political settlement (Ruppert, 2012).As a proactive implementation at moments of crisis or moral failure, a visible response to public disquiet, transparency has attractive, palliative qualities for politicians and CEOs who want to be seen to be doing rather than reflecting. It also chimes with a (Western) culture that favors, at least on the surface, confession and disclosure over secrecy as a general modus operandi. If secrecy has come to signifystate oppression or personal repression, transparency accumulates more positive associations. As such, transparency bestows both cultural and moral capital on those who promote and implement it. Elsewhere, I have examined the rise of transparency and the assumptions behind it in these terms(Birchall, 2011a; 2011b; 2011c). In this article, however, I want to consider the cultural positioning of transparency through a comparative analysis with other formsof disclosurein order to raise the question of what kind(s) of transparency we need today.

Transparency has been largely conceived as a trust-building alternative to secrecy, but another, as yet under-examined appeal, lies in its promise tocircumvent the need for, and usurp the role of other forms of disclosure such as scandal, gossip, and conspiracy theories.[1]These, what I will be calling in this article "narrative-interpretiveforms of disclosure" because of their speculative, embellishing, creative, causal, iterative, and fictionalizingtendencies,are apparentlyrendered redundant by transparency. Why gossip about a colleague’s salary if your company publishes every employee’slevel of remuneration? Another UK MP’s expenses scandal is pre-empted by the publication of accounts by the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority(IPSA). A report from UK think tank Demos suggests that open government will reduce conspiracy theories (Bartlett & Miller, 2010). Transparency pledges to shed light when narrative-interpretive forms seem to obfuscate as much as they might reveal.

This growing preference for transparency as a more enlightening, honorablemode of disclosure isas mucha response to the perceived negative characteristics of other forms of disclosure as it is a result of the positive qualities seen to be intrinsic to transparency itself.Narrative-interpretive forms of disclosureare seen to operate on the margins of lawful behavior (scandal and gossip can be litigious, and conspiracy theory has the whiff of sedition), and are "contaminated" by human needs and desires, as well as moral and political positions.If transparency, particularly when implemented by ICTs (i.e."e-transparency"),is considered a primary, neutral, automated, systematic, efficient, lawful and regulatory mode of disclosure, narrative-interpretivedisclosures are classed as secondary, manipulated re-tellings. Such a configuration shores up the presentation of e-transparency as the democratic tool par excellence, not only because it is seen to disseminate pre-interpretive or non-interpretive information and data in an efficientfashion, but also because it can reduce the sphere of these other forms of disclosure which might "pollute" the rationality and knowledge necessary for citizens to be counted as "well-informed" and capable of making a valuable contribution to the public sphere.Indeed, as I will show, narrative-interpretive forms present a number of epistemological problems. It should be noted at the outset that while these epistemological problems become a central focus for critics rather than any feature of narrative per se, the root of the term "narrative" draws on both knowing (gnārus) and telling (narrō) (White, 1987, p.215 fn.2). Questions of epistemology are, then, central to the life cycle of narrative-interpretive forms.

By widening the lens to consider the forms of disclosure transparency is intended to improve upon or free us from, we can gain a better understanding of what prejudices, anxieties and preferences, as well as ideological paradigms, fuel transparency advocacy. This article, therefore, seeks to consider the negative characterization of narrative-interpretive forms of disclosure and the consequences of this for our conception of the democratic socius; question the opposition between narrative-interpretive disclosure and transparency;and lastly, consider the case of WikiLeaks which operationalizes a form of "narrative-interpretive transparency": a hybrid to rival the dominant vision of transparencyqua objectivity.

Although we do not yet live in transparent times, we do live in an age of transparency advocacy.[2] With choices to be made, taxpayers’ money to invest, information infrastructure to build, code to write, "apps" to develop, economic, political and corporate models and policies to be established, promises of accountability and responsibility to fulfill, and cynicism and mistrust to counter, it is certainly importantto consider whether transparency policies work in practice.[3] But it is alsonecessary to examine which cultural and moral codes are being enlisted to shore up transparency as the ascendant paradigm for government, industry and finance. It is pertinentto ask not only if transparency can fulfill its promise, but also how that promise is constructed and what its implications are.[4]What can such discursive preferences tell us? Is there any room for a rival, potentially radical transparency?

Transparency as attitude

First, a definition.While many official accounts of transparency present it as a form of mere ‘information provision’ (see Flyverbom et al’s discussion, 2011,pp.10-11), corporate and state transparency is perhaps better described as an attitude: a commitment to operating in the open, under the scrutiny of customers, stakeholders, citizens and other interested partiesthrough the publication of any or all of the following: datasets; minutes, transcripts or live feeds of meetings; accounts; policies; decision-making procedures as well as the decisions themselves; records of actions taken.Transparency is a doctrine of governance that includes “decisions governed by clearly established and published rules and procedures rather than by ad hoc judgments or processes; methods of accounting or public reporting that clarify who gains from and who pays for any public measure;and governance that is intelligible and accessible to the ‘general public’”(Hood, 2006,p.5).There is, of course, always a limit to such a commitment – a limit primarily determined by security issues for the state and market competition for the corporation. State and trade secrets have to be considered in any equation made concerning transparency.

Increasingly, the implementation of transparency policies is reliant upon and mediated by ICTs. Though its future is somewhat uncertain due to funding cuts, the US site, data.gov, and the UK equivalent, data.gov.uk, are exemplary in this respect. These sites are citizen-government interfaces that represent commitment to transparency through the availability of government datasets, processes and decision-making online. The increased processing and storage capacities of ICTs, as well as the development of apps to repackage data,have madee-transparencypossible and will no doubt continue to make openness more efficient, timely and widespread. Crucially, this form of transparency relies on citizen auditors – or in EvelynRuppert’s terms, "citizen witnesses" (2012). The data, that is, must be transparent to a body of external onlookers who are able to monitor and assess it. Once the transparency system is reliant upon these citizen auditors, it matters a great deal how good their skills of analysis and interpretation are. This might be dependent on adequate education, to be sure, but also what other messages and forms of disclosure are clogging the airwaves. Citizens should not be distracted if they are to have any hope of tackling the official "data tsunami" coming from government. Rival forms of disclosure become a very pressing issue for a transparency system which outsources monitoring roles.

Understanding the relationship between transparency and narrative-interpretive forms of disclosure matters, then, for two main reasons. First, because other forms of disclosuremight be seen to interfere with the transmission of messages and data that transparency promises.[5]Second,because transparencygains some of its democratic credibility and general kudos not only from the extent to which it enables participation, debate and legitimacy (consider the way in which low-scoring countries on Transparency International’s indices are seen as undemocratic [Torfing et al., 2012, p. 226]), but also through its relationship with what it avoids and trumps (secrecy and corruption, to be sure, but also forms of disclosure it is thought to supersede or provide an alternative to).In light of this, it is vital to consider whether discursive configurations of the relationship between transparency and other forms of disclosure are sustainable. Does a distinction hold up?

Cultural anxiety anddisclosure

I am arguing that the promotion of transparency as a superior form of disclosure – as a neutral form of information provision or "new objectivity" (Weinberger, 2009) – relies partly on a cultural desire to free disclosure of the moral, legal and epistemological problemsassociated with more denigrated forms. On occasion this desire is clearly expressed. For example, one of the strategies for tackling conspiracy theories advocated by Demos (Bartlett Miller, 2010)and the historian Kathryn S. Olmsted (2011)is more transparency. Bartlett and Miller write, "Conspiracy theories are a reaction to the lack of transparency and openness in many of our institutions. The more open our institutions, the less likely we are to believe we are living in a conspiring world"(Bartlett & Miller, 2010,p. 39).In terms of the specific transparency policies Bartlett and Miller think the government should implement to tackle conspiracy theories, they suggest "annual public intelligence reports produced by the new National Security Council, more maximum disclosure policing, increased openness in court proceedings in major terrorism cases, and continued focus on good community relationships in counter-terrorism policing" (Bartlett & Miller, 2010,p. 5).In Bartlett and Miller’s account, an explicit causal link is drawn between conspiracy theory and extremist violence, but associations of a subtler nature, as well as other assumptions and prejudices, inform the cultural anxiety that attends narrative-interpretive forms of disclosure. In this section, I will examine some of these connotations and assumptions, though it should be noted that not all of them pertain equally to each of the narrative-interpretive forms (gossip, scandal, conspiracy theory)invoked in this article. In addition, these assumptions do not necessarily derive from both terms in the appositional compound "narrative-interpretive". After all, taken alone, "narrative" has few of the following problems and is, rather, consideredto play a fundamental role in human experience and culture (White, 1987). I retain the term, however, because of the storytelling, linear, embellishing, fictionalizing characteristics gossip etc are ascribed.

a)Narrative-interpretive forms of disclosure are morally suspect;

b)They exist on the periphery of legal practice and/or can give rise to illegal practice;

c)They are speculative and subjective and, therefore, unreliable;

d)They lack legitimacy.

I will expand on each of these in turn.

a)Narrative-interpretive forms of disclosureare morally suspect

Though scandals themselves often reinforce "moral ideas of the social good" (Cottle, 2006, p. 411), its mediation, particularly in the most extreme cases,can elicitmoral condemnation.A dismissal of scandal-led TVas "cultural rot" by William Bennet, former US secretary of education,is a common sentiment(quoted in Lull and Hinerman,1997,p. 1).Such an attitude is reinforced by the tactics some tabloids have resorted to in order to secure the details of, and therefore be able to mediate, a scandal.Notably, theNews of the World’s use of phone hacking in the UK has been almost universally criticized on moral and ethical grounds (see Kennedy, 2011). Conspiracy theory, too, can give rise to accusations of immorality particularly in cases where conspiracy theories express prejudice, or involve the denial of important historical events. One only needs to note the disgust that meetsanti-Semitic claimsthat the holocaust was a myth invented by Jews as part of a conspiracy to secure reparations and a homeland.

Yet, the reception of narrative-interpretive forms of disclosure within a moral code is most obviously apparent in the case of gossip.[6]Gossip might, more often than not, be focused on those who violate moral codes of behavior, but, ironically, it is seen to be a moral infringement itself. Nicholas Emler writes, "gossip is not merely a sin of omission – one should have been using one’s time more productively – but also a sin of commission. It is deliberate mischief making" (1994,p. 119). Such beliefs are reinforced through religious texts of many faiths. In the bible,"gossip appears among such serious transgressions as malice, envy, murder, and deceit" (Schein, 1994, p. 140). Evidence can also be found in Talmudic and Rabbinic literature for the moral degeneracy of gossip – directed here against lashon ha-ra (evil tongue, hearsay, gossip), which is tantamount to denying the existence of God.Equally, deterrents are apparent in Islam in which "gossip" is the nearest translation of Al-Gibah.In these traditions, issuing and receiving gossip both represent a severe lapse in conduct. Moralists and moral philosophers from the Middle Agesdraw on this religious register"expanding hints into doctrine", slowly turning gossip "from sin into solecism"(Spacks, 1985, p. 28).

Gossip, as transgression of faith or etiquette was, and still is,adjudicated in moral terms. Indeed, the denigration of contemporary gossip magazinesfollows this line. Recently in the UKGuardiannewspaper, Laura Barton admonished women for their consumption of celebrity gossip magazines: "We need to nourish our minds, we need to recognize that if we continue to feed ourselves with this bilge, this drivel, then we are imprisoning ourselves" (2011). Employing a feminist critique first and foremost, Barton nevertheless draws on a puritanical register (of course, many critics of militant feminism wouldn’t disentangle feminism and puritanism).

Gossip is a concern for moralists because it can contain slander, betray secrets, and penetrate privacy (Spacks, 1985, p. 33). Transparency can also betray secrets and penetrate privacy, but avoids the moralist’s wrath because it is more universally applied. We are all, in theory, equally subject to transparency’s gaze. And so the real transgression on gossip’s part is that its flow is unregulated and inequitable.The content and circulation of gossip is based on a series of individual and subjective decisions. E-transparency, by contrast, is seen as an often automated system which operates according to disclosure rules (decisions) that have been made prior to the encounter with particular forms of data or information.The moral certitude of the transparency movement – illustrated by Patrick Birkinshaw’s claim that transparency constitutes a human right (2006: 47-57) – draws strength from the difference between e-transparency’s apparently morally neutral mode of disclosure and the moral infringements of other forms of disclosure.

b)Narrative-interpretive forms of disclosure exist on the periphery of legal practice and/or can give rise to illegal practice

Legally (and this has ramifications for how they are perceived culturally) narrative-interpretive modes of disclosure present concerns over reliability. In terms of what is permissible in a court of law as evidence, hearsay is hotly contested. In the US, the Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as a statement that "(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement" (2011). It is not permissible to a US court, though there are a number of exceptions. The UK’s Criminal Justice Act 2003, however, established a more flexible and discretionary approach to hearsay, "moving away from the strict common law rule against the admission of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings… [T]he inclusion of relevant hearsay evidence [is promoted] on the basis that justice is not served if important information is excluded for no good reason" (Crown Prosecution Service, no date).[7]The status of hearsay will no doubt go through further transformations in subsequent years, buthistorically, gossip "has been a 'suspect' discourse, in the Anglo-American tradition when brought to court. For, though there is no reason why secondhand utterances are innately less likely to be truthful than those of persons present, this sort of talk is imagined to pervert justice" (Gordon, 2001, p. 203). Of course, narrative-interpretiveforms of disclosure, particularly when presented in printed and published form,also appear as matters warranting trial. Individuals and brands subject to media speculation, slander, gossip and scandal, can sue for libel or defamation.[8]

Though conspiracy theories are often decried as seditious, in fact, in the US, the First Amendment largely protects conspiracy theorists.Besides, the Sedition Act of 1918 was repealed in 1920 (although other legislation, such as the 1940 Alien Registration Act, or "Smith Act", continued to outlaw certain seditious behavior).In the UK, though seldom used,sedition laws were only repealed in 2009. Thus, Jonah Goldberg, writing in the conservative National Review Online, might lament the "seditious dementia of [9/11] conspiracy theories" (2006) but the legal allusion is only wishful thinking. Nevertheless, conspiracy theorizing is seen by some concerned policyadvisors as an incitement to illegal acts of extremist violence; as the expression, that is, of a willingness to commit acts of an unlawful nature (see Sunstein and Vermeule,2008; Bartlett and Miller, 2010). They make a clear link between discourse and action whereby the illegality of the action retroactively colors the legality of the discourse.