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Miracles
Does God at times miraculously intervene in earthly affairs? That is, do some events occur because God has entered our space-time continuum and directly modified or circumvented the relevant natural laws? Few philosophers today deny that this is possible. But many question whether we could ever justifiably maintain that such intervention has taken place.
According to some philosophers, it is not even necessary to grant that the types of events believers label miracles - for instance, healings or resurrections - actually occur as reported. Since the evidence supporting the occurrence of such events is the personal testimony of a few, possibly biased, individuals, while the basis for doubt is the massive amount of objective research upon which the relevant laws are based, it is always justifiable, according to this view, to conclude that such reports are erroneous. Others contend, however, that the presence of some forms of evidence - for instance, independent confirmation from reputable sources - could make it most reasonable in some cases to acknowledge that even the most unexpected of events had actually occurred.
Some philosophers also deny that we could ever justifiablyconclude that an event could not have been produced by natural causes alone. Since we will never be in a position to identify all that nature can produce,they declare, it will always be most reasonable for the scientist facing a currently unexplainable counterinstance to a natural law to continue to look for a natural explanation. Many believers, however, are quite willing to grant that nature could in principle produce any event, since what they wish to maintain is only that nature does not do so in the case of miraculous interventions.
Finally, while many philosophers acknowledge that belief in direct divine intervention may at times be justifiable for those who already believe that God exists, some also argue that no single event or series of events could ever compel all thoughtful individuals to acknowledge the existence of a perfectly good supernatural causal agent, given all we experience - for instance, the tremendous amount of horrific evil in our world. Many believers, though, are also willing to grant this point.
1 Definition
The term ‘miracle’ is sometimes used in ordinary discussions to refer to the occurrence of any unexpected event - from the sudden discovery of a lost possession to the unanticipated passing of an exam. Within philosophical circles, however, ‘miracle’ is almost always discussed in its more restricted sense: as a designation for an unusual event that is the result of direct divine
circumvention or modification of the natural order.
Philosophers, as well as religious believers, differ on the exact nature of the conceptual relationship between miraculous divine interventions and the natural order. For those who understand miracles to be violations of natural laws, a miracle is not simply an event that nature did not alone produce. It is an event that nature could not have produced on its own - an event that will always be incompatible with the relevant natural laws (see Laws, natural). For example, as proponents of the violation model understand it, to maintain that someone has miraculously been healed, it is not sufficient to maintain simply that God was directly involved. It is also necessary to maintain that the state of affairs in question could not have occurred naturally (that no totally natural
explanation could be forthcoming).
Other philosophers, and many believers, however, deny that a miraculous divine intervention must be defined as an event for which no plausible natural explanation is, or could be, available. It is sufficient, they believe, to maintain that God was directly involved. For example, to maintain that someone’s cancer has miraculously entered remission, it is not necessary to hold that nature alone could not have brought it about (to maintain that it could not have happened naturally). It is sufficient to maintain that nature alone did not do so in this case.
2 The possibility of miracles
Some philosophers (for example, McKinnon 1967) have claimed that the concept of a miracle, if defined as a violation of a natural law, is incoherent. Natural laws, they point out, are really only generalized descriptions of what does in fact happen. That is, these laws summarize for us the actual course of events. Accordingly, to claim that an occurrence is a violation of a natural law is to claim that the event in question is a suspension of the actual course of events and this is, of course, impossible. Events may well occur, they acknowledge, that seem at present to be incompatible with how we believe things normally happen. But a true counterinstance to what we now believe to be a natural law only shows the law to be inadequate. Since natural laws, by
definition, only summarize what actually occurs, we must always be willing in principle to expand our laws to accommodate any occurrence, no matter how unusual. We can never have both the exception and the rule.
Others, however, take this line of reasoning to be based on a confusion. To maintain that a natural law accurately describes the natural order, they point out, is to say only that it correctly identifies that which will occur under a specific set of natural conditions. But to maintain that an event is a miraculous counterinstance to a natural law is not to maintain that some event has occurred under the exact set of natural conditions covered by this law and nothing more. To say that water has miraculously turned into wine, for example, is not to say that water has turned into wine only under the exact set of natural conditions under which the relevant laws tell us this will not occur. It is to maintain that an additional non-natural causal factor, namely direct divine activity, was also present in this case. Accordingly, these philosophers contend, unless it is assumed that supernatural activity is impossible, it cannot be assumed that a miraculous counterinstance to a natural law - a counterinstance produced in part by divine circumvention or modification of the natural order - is conceptually impossible. That is, unless it is assumed that supernatural intervention is impossible, we can have both the exception and the rule./
Of course, many individuals do in fact deny the existence of any type of supernatural being. And even some who affirm the existence of such a being - for example, process theists (see Process theism) - deny that this being can unilaterally intervene in earthly affairs in the sense necessary to produce miraculous events. However, few philosophers today maintain that the existence of a supernatural being, or the ability of such a being (if it exists) to intervene, can be demonstrated to be impossible. That is, while most philosophers agree that the existence of a supernatural being who intervenes in earthly affairs can justifiably be denied, most also agree that it is possible to maintain justifiably that such a being does exist. Consequently, few deny that miracles, even if defined as violations of natural laws, could occur. Since the time of David Hume (§2), however, philosophers have continued to debate vigorously a number of questions related to our ability to identify miraculous events.
3 The credibility of personal testimony
One such question is whether we need even acknowledge that alleged counterinstances to well-confirmed natural laws actually occur. Most philosophers agree that reports of repeatable counterinstances - counterinstances that can in principle be produced by anyone under a specified set of natural conditions - cannot justifiably be dismissed. But there are a number of philosophers (mostnotably Flew 1961) who believe that if the events in question are nonrepeatable - if they cannot be reproduced under specifiable natural conditions - the situation is quite different. It is clearly possible, they acknowledge, that nonrepeatable counterinstances to well confirmed natural laws have occurred (or will occur). They acknowledge, for instance, that nonrepeatable counterinstances to our current laws describing the properties of water or human tissue may have occurred (or might occur). However, the evidence supporting the adequacy of laws of this type, they point out, is very strong. These laws not only can be, but are, tested and reconfirmed daily by people with no vested interest in the outcome.
On the other hand, they are quick to add, reports of presently nonrepeatable counterinstances to such laws - a claim, for instance, that water has turned into wine or that someone has been raised from the dead - will be supported at best only by the personal testimony of a few people who may well have a vested interest in the outcome. Consequently, as long as alleged counterinstances remain nonrepeatable, we can never possess better reasons for believing that the events in question have actually occurred as reported than for believing that they have not. And therefore, following the Humean maxim that the wise person proportions belief to the evidence, these philosophers conclude that it is always justifiable to deny the accuracy of such reports.
However, there are those (for instance, Swinburne 1967) who believe that this conclusion is much too strong. They acknowledge that reports of seemingly nonrepeatable counterinstances to well-established laws must be approached with appropriate scepticism, since deception or misperception is always possible. But from their perspective it is unreasonable to assume that theevidence supporting even the most highly confirmed laws would always furnish a sufficient basis for dismissing reports of counterinstances to them.
First and foremost, they argue that to make this assumption fails to take into account the prima facie reliability of our visual belief-forming faculties. We all rely on these faculties daily and, in general, they serve us quite well. In fact, the general reliability of such faculties must be presupposed by those formulating our natural laws. Thus, in cases where we had no reason to doubt the reliability of these belief-forming faculties - for instance, if we were to observe a seeming counterinstance ourselves or if it were directly observed by a friend whose character and objectivity were beyond question - it is not clear, they maintain, that it would always be justifiable to decide in favour of the natural laws in question, even if they were very well established.
Moreover, these philosophers add, we might in some cases have compelling physical traces to consider. In the case of an alleged healing that runs counter to well-established laws, for instance, we might have more than personal testimony. We might have objective data - photographs or videotapes or X-rays or medical records - that would stand as strong evidence for the occurrence of the event in question, evidence so convincing that it would be unreasonable to reject it. Thus they conclude that decisions concerning the accuracy of reports of alleged counterinstances - even if the events in question are nonrepeatable - must be made on a case-by-case basis.
4 Miracles as events unexplainable by natural causes Even if some occurrences can justifiably be labelled counterinstances to our current laws, could we ever be in a position to maintain justifiably that any such event is permanently unexplainable scientifically? That is, could we ever be in a position to maintain that an acknowledged counterinstance is a state of affairs that nature could never produce on its own?
In addressing this question, it is important to clarify a potential ambiguity that has been glossed over so far in this entry. By definition, no specific state of affairs produced even in part by direct supernatural activity (by direct circumvention or modification of the natural cause/effect patterns) could ever be given a totally natural explanation. Accordingly, if we were ever in a position to maintain justifiably that some event was actually a direct act of God, we would automatically be in a position to maintain justifiably that this specific occurrence was, itself, permanently unexplainable scientifically.
As currently understood by most philosophers, however, the primary purpose of natural science is not to determine what nature has in fact produced. The main objective of science, rather, is to determine what nature is capable of producing - what can occur under solely natural conditions. For instance, the primary purpose of natural science is not to determine whether natural factors
alone actually did cause any specific person’s cancer to enter remission. The primary purpose of science is to determine whether natural factors alone could have done so.
Hence, when philosophers ask whether we could ever be in a position to maintain justifiably that an event is permanently unexplainable scientifically, they are not asking whether we could ever be in a position to maintain justifiably that a specific state of affairs was not produced by nature alone. They are asking, rather, whether we could ever be in a position to maintain justifiably that a specific event could not have been produced by nature alone.
In considering this question, it should first be noted that no philosopher believes that we as human beings are in a position to state with absolute certainty what nature could or could not produce on its own. All acknowledge that the scientific enterprise is continually discovering new, often startling and unexpected, information about the causal relationships that obtain in our universe.
And all freely admit that the annals of science record numerous instances in which supposed counterinstances to natural laws were later demonstrated to be consistent with such laws or revisions of them.