Call for Papers
Topoi Special Issue Empathy, Fiction and Imagination
Guest Editors:
Susanne Schmetkamp and ÍngridVendrellFerran (University of Basel)
Deadline for Submission: 1 August 2018
The concept of empathy has been central to many recent debates in the humanities and neurosciences. Since the discovery of “mirror neurons” in the 1990s (e.g. Rizzolatti et al. 2006), there has been much discussion about the process, the outcome, and the function of empathy. For instance, there is still some controversy over whether empathy – broadly understood as the understanding of mental states (such as emotions, beliefs, and desires) of others – implies a kind of theoretical inference (Theory Theory), imaginative simulation (Simulation Theory), or direct perception (Direct Perception Approach) (for an overview, see Batson 2009; Coplan 2011; Stueber 2017). Whereas cognitivist approaches from the Theory of Mind – such as Theory Theory (Carruthers 1996) and especially Simulation Theory (Goldman 2006) – took prominence for a while, more recently attention has also been given to phenomenological accounts, which take the direct intersubjectiveencounter and the embeddedness of the self more seriously (Gallagher/Hutto 2008; Gallagher 2012; Zahavi 2001; Zahavi/Overgaard 2012). In drawing on historical phenomenologists like Max Scheler and Edith Stein, as well as current theories of embodiment, such phenomenological approaches to empathy argue that we have an unmediated and experiential access to the mental states, especially emotions, of other persons (Zahavi 2014). According to this view, we see immediately in the expressions of others what they experience. For this to happen, face-to-face and intersubjective interaction is necessary. However, this seems problematic in relation to fictions – such as narrative films or literature – for there is no real encounter, nor are any real persons involved. Rather, imagination and narrative frames seem necessary to become empathetically engaged with fiction and the emotional situations of the characters. This is why some authors, especially from film and literary studies, emphasize the imaginative impact of empathic processes (Carroll 1990; Currie 1995; Gaut 2010; Grodal 1997), or argue for an additional contextual, narrative approach (Gallagher 2012). But in order to better understand the mental states of fictional characters, we must use our capacity of imagination, broadly understood as the ability to represent entities which are not present or do not exist. But is imagining fictional worlds therefore an appropriate or sufficient basis for our experience with various forms of fiction – be it a text or a film? Surely, insofar as there is no real encounter, we have to fill in the gap via our imaginative capacity and comprehend the perspectives of characters by way of a particular form of perspective-taking (Goldie 1999). Of course, the question then arises as to what extent these aspects are interrelated and even compatible: direct perception, narrative comprehension, and imaginative perspective-taking.
The issue contains a selection of invited contributions, including: Robert Blanchet, Fritz Breithaupt, Thiemo Breyer, Marco Caracciolo, Jens Eder, Shaun Gallagher, Suzanne Keen, CatrinMisselhorn, Jan Müller, Matthias Schloßberger, Thomas Szanto, Christiana Werner.
The Special Issue is also open to two or three other contributions. Contributions should meet the scientific standards of philosophical articles and address one of the following set of interrelated questions.
1. Concerning the nature of the process of empathy and the ontological status of the fictional character as target of empathetic engagement:
a) Is empathy with fictional characters different from empathy with real persons?
b) Is empathy with fictional characters an indirect, mediated process insofar as the ontological status of the characters substantially differs from the ontology of real others?
c) What does it mean to take over the other’s perspective if the other is a fictional character?
2. Concerning the role of imagination in empathy with fictional characters:
a) Is imagination an integral part of our empathic engagement with fictional characters?
b) If so, do these examples, on the contrary, show that imagination is always an important part of the overall empathic experience?
c) What role does imagination then play in the empathic process?
3. Concerning direct perception based theories of empathy:
a) If imagination plays an integral role in empathy, does this mean that the direct perception accounts of empathy are unable to explain empathy with fictional characters?
b) Is an account of empathy that involves imagination still at least compatible with the direct perception proposal, even in lieu of the thesis that imagination plays no role in empathy?
Submission Process
Please consider that there are only two or three free slots for further contributions.
All paper will be subject to double-blind peer-review.
To submit go to Topoi´s online editorial manager:
After logging in, click on Submit New Manuscript and select the item “S.I. Empathy, fiction and imagination (Schmetkamp/VendrellFerran)” from the menu Article Type.
Submitted papers should not exceed 6500 words.
For questions please contact:
Susanne
Íngrid Vendrell Ferran: