"If a man takes a wife…and it comes to pass that she does not find favor in his eyes because he discovers in her a promiscuous matter - he should write her a writ of divorce.”
In this week's parsha we are introduced to the laws of divorce. The Torah specifies the way to end a Jewish marriage. The last Mishneh in Tractate Gittin [90a] cites a difference of opinion as to justifiable grounds for divorce: Bais Shammai rule that a person should not divorce his wife UNLESS HE HAS FOUND HER GUILTY OF SOME UNSEEMLY ('ervas davar'; i.e. - adultery) that is she has been unfaithful to him. Short of that, a person is not allowed to divorce his wife according to Bais Shammai.
Bais Hillel rules that a man may divorce his wife EVEN IF SHE HAS MERELY SPOILT HIS FOOD, i.e. she burns his dinner.
It is usually understood that in the debates between the school of Shammai and the school of Hillel, the school of Shammai tends to be more stringent, while the school of Hillel tends to be more lenient.
If so, why does the school of Hillel (whose view becomes halakhah) hold that a man can divorce his wife for such a trivial reason?
Why did Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel take positions contrary to their usual methods (wherein Beis Shammai was usually machmir and Beis Hillel was usually meikil)?
What would happen to divorced women if the school of Shammai’s opinion had been adopted as halakhah?
If the only permitted ground for divorce was adultery, a divorced woman would never be able to get remarried as she would be forever branded an adulteress, regardless of her acts of teshuva. Every divorced woman would be subject of derision and shame and labeling as "the adulteress" By allowing a husband to give a divorce for more mundane reasons, the woman is no longer obviously an adulteress and she stands a better chance of getting remarried, since the general public will not assume that she has committed any terrible act. As such, Beis Hillel's actions protect the woman's dignity and are in reality more maykil than Beis Shammai.
We see from the ruling of Hillel how careful we must be of other people's dignity even that of a sinner
In last week's parsha, the Torah discusses the exemptions which are available for men who are unable to serve in the army engaged in a milchemes reshus (voluntary war). As enumerated in Devarim 20:5-8, the exceptions include a man who has built a new house but has not begun to live in it, a man who has planted a new vineyard but has not yet brought bikkurim from it or a man who has recently become engaged and has not yet married his wife. The final exemption listed is for a man who is afraid of battle. After the above exemptions have been read to the group of potential soldiers, those with an excuse were permitted to leave.
TheMishna in Sotah 44a which discusses a dispute between R' Akiva and R' Yosi Haglili in relation to the "fear" exemptions. R' Akiva stated that the fear exemption is for one who is afraid of going to war. R' Yosi Haglili said that the exemption is for one who is afraid of potentially being killed in battle as punishment for the sins he has committed. R' Yosi further explained that the reason for the other exceptions is solely to protect this type of person from embarrassment. Indeed, there is no logical explanation for the draft exemption status of one of who built a new house or planted a new vineyard. As R' Yosi explains, the Torah added these categories to protect the man who was afraid of punishment so that it will not be obvious why he is not going to battle.
we should take a lesson from these two scenarios and be more cognizant of other people's dignity when he act or speak about them.