Document No. / Security Classification / Date
/pSHIELD/THYIA/ ID3.2.1/A / Confidential / 08.06.2011
Project no: 100204
pSHIELD
pilot embedded Systems arcHItecturE for multi-Layer Dependable solutions
Instrument type: Capability Project
Priority name: Embedded Systems / Rail Transportation Scenarios
SPD nano, micro/personal node technologies prototype report
For the
pSHIELD-project
Deliverables ID3.2.1 Revision A
Partners contributed to the work:
THYIA, Slovenia
CWIN. Norway
ACORDE, SPAIN
CS, Portugal
ISD, Greece (TBA)
Project co-funded by the European Commission within the Seventh Framework Programme (2007-2012)Dissemination Level
PU / Public
PP / Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services)
RE / Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services)
CO / Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services) / X
Document Authors and Approvals
Authors / Date / Signature
Name / Company
Ljiljana Mijic / THYIA
Reviewed by
Name / Company
Approved by
Name / Company
Modification History
Issue / Date / Description
Draft A / 08.06.2011 / First issue for comments
Issue 1 / Incorporates comments from Draft A review
Issue 2 / Incorporates comments from issue 1 review
Contents
1 Introduction 7
1.1 D3.2 time schedule 7
1.2 Commitments 8
2 Nano nodes 8
2.1 Pervasive computing 8
2.2 Attacks 8
2.3 Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) 8
2.4 Wireless Node architectures 8
2.4.1 Computation subsystem 9
2.4.2 Communication subsystem 9
2.4.3 Sensing subsystem 9
2.4.4 Power supply subsystem 9
3 Wireless Sensor Nodes for Prototype Development 9
3.1 The Contiki prototype (THYIA) 9
3.2 The Sun SPOT prototype (CWIN) 10
4 Intrinsically secure embedded systems firmware 10
4.1 Firmware 10
4.2 STATE OF THE ART: Security issues in firmware 10
4.2.1 Verifying the Firmware 10
4.2.2 Security Enhanced Firmware Update System 10
4.3 The Secure Boot of the Nano Node 10
4.4 Integrity protection of the ES firmware based on hardware “hooks” 10
4.5 Secure key installation at manufacturing or at deployment 10
4.6 Novel methods and Tools for Nano Node 10
4.7 Secure firmware upgrade mechanisms design and verification 11
5 Power Supply Protections (AS, THYIA) 11
5.1 Continuous Power Supply Source 11
5.2 External power supply 11
5.3 Microgenerators, 11
5.4 Supercapacitors 11
5.5 Secondary Power Sources in Nano and Micro Nodes. 11
5.6 Different Operative Modes to plug or unplug critical and non-critical sections of the nodes 11
5.7 User Monitor the Power Consumption 11
6 Mobile Trusted Module (THYIA) 11
7 TCG Trusted Platform Module (THYIA) 12
7.1 TPM Overview 12
7.2 TPM Commands 12
7.3 Software-based Trusted Platform Module 12
7.3.1 SW-TPM Implementation 12
7.3.2 Hardware and software experimental set-up 12
7.3.3 Trusted Boot 12
8 Micro/personal node (?) 12
8.1 Design of Trusted Boot based on TCG Technologies 12
8.2 Software Upgrade for Micro/Personal Nodes based on TCG Technologies. 12
8.3 Secure Boot 12
8.4 Secure Software Upgrade Methods 12
8.5 Interoperability with the Nano Node Secure Firmware Upgrade Principles 12
9 Prototypes (All) 13
9.1 Interfaces for the Nano Node 13
9.2 Interfaces for Micro/Personal node 13
9.3 Interoperation with SHIELD platform 13
10 Conclusions (All) 13
11 References (All) 13
Figures
No table of figures entries found.
Tables
No table of figures entries found.
Glossary
Executive Summary [THYIA]
%------notes (Josef)
critical software (CS)
* no real work in this area, needs to adopt
*
Work from CWIN and Movation:
nano
* Thyia -> update of TA
* attacks on nano nodes (state of the art description)
micro and personal nodes
* control of nano nodes
mobile phone tech
* future sim
* NFC (RFID)
*
others:
phone conf. every 2nd Tuesday…phone con.
1 Introduction
1.1 D3.2 time schedule
Due to delay start up of the D3.2
The futher documentary milestones are aligned with time scheduledand resumed as follows:
· 10.06.2011 ToC and allocation of the work –proposal
· 15.06.2011 first review of D3.2
· 30.06.2011 deadline for contribution
· 01.07.2011 review of the 1st version
· 01.08.2011 review of the final version
· 01.09.2011 D3.2 ready for delivery
1.2 Commitments
The commitements in terms of man/month assigned to the partners are those already agreed during the initial TA.
Section 1.1
Section 2
.....
2 Nano nodes
Here comes a the definition of a nano node, as identified in D3.1. The main characteristics are
2.1 Pervasive computing
2.2 Attacks
2.3 Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)
2.4 Wireless Node architectures
A basic sensor node is comprised of four main components (as shown in Figure 2.1)
that are discussed in the following sections.
2.4.1 Computation subsystem
The computation subsystem is the core of a wireless sensor node. It gathers data from
the sensors, processes this data, decides when and where to send it, receives data from
other sensor nodes, and activates the actuator accordingly. It has to execute various
programs, ranging from time-critical signal processing and communication protocol
stack to application programs. It can very-well be called the Central Processing Unit
(CPU) of the node.
2.4.2 Communication subsystem
For wireless communication subsystem of a node the usual choices include Radio Frequency
(RF), optical communication, and ultrasound. Of these choices, RF-based
communication is by far the most extensively used as it best _ts the requirements of
most WSN applications.
2.4.3 Sensing subsystem
WSN nodes may consist of many di_erent types of sensors such as seismic, low sampling
rate magnetic, thermal, visual, infrared, acoustic and radar which are able to sense a
wide variety of environmental conditions.
2.4.4 Power supply subsystem
3 Wireless Sensor Nodes for Prototype Development
Within this project UWB in cooperation with STM/CZ and other partners will develop a
universal wireless node of sensor network. The node is composed from low power
microcontroller, TPM module, non-volatile memory, receiver and transmitter and also the
internal sensor interface. A part of the development will be the design and implementation of
modular control program that contains modules for data aggregation and compression,
routing, encryption, etc.
The developed structures and prototypes will be verified using experimental facilities of
ELIS.
3.1 The Contiki prototype (THYIA)
3.2 The Sun SPOT prototype (CWIN)
4 Intrinsically secure embedded systems firmware
4.1 Firmware
Firmware typically contains the program code that controls the underlying hardware of the system. Retrieving and analyzing firmware can allow the attacker to gain a detailed understanding of the product and possibly modify code to bypass failure detection or authentication routines. This section provides some recommendations that can be implemented in firmware to help increase the security of the overall product.
4.2 STATE OF THE ART: Security issues in firmware
4.2.1 Verifying the Firmware
4.2.2 Security Enhanced Firmware Update System
4.3 The Secure Boot of the Nano Node
4.4 Integrity protection of the ES firmware based on hardware “hooks”
4.5 Secure key installation at manufacturing or at deployment
4.6 Novel methods and Tools for Nano Node
4.7 Secure firmware upgrade mechanisms design and verification
5 Power Supply Protections (AS, THYIA)
5.1 Continuous Power Supply Source
5.2 External power supply
5.3 Microgenerators,
5.4 Supercapacitors
5.5 Secondary Power Sources in Nano and Micro Nodes.
5.6 Different Operative Modes to plug or unplug critical and non-critical sections of the nodes
5.7 User Monitor the Power Consumption
6 Mobile Trusted Module (THYIA)
7 TCG Trusted Platform Module (THYIA)
7.1 TPM Overview
7.2 TPM Commands
7.3 Software-based Trusted Platform Module
7.3.1 SW-TPM Implementation
7.3.2 Hardware and software experimental set-up
7.3.3 Trusted Boot
8 Micro/personal node (?)
8.1 Design of Trusted Boot based on TCG Technologies
8.2 Software Upgrade for Micro/Personal Nodes based on TCG Technologies.
8.3 Secure Boot
8.4 Secure Software Upgrade Methods
8.5 Interoperability with the Nano Node Secure Firmware Upgrade Principles
9 Prototypes (All)
9.1 Interfaces for the Nano Node
9.2 Interfaces for Micro/Personal node
9.3 Interoperation with SHIELD platform
10 Conclusions (All)
11 References (All)
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