1.1CAP HISTORY

The charter and development of the aircraft life cycle system (ALS)for the P-3 and P-2V aircraft was strongly recommended by the NTSB and developed by the USFS service to support the development and initial implementation of continuous airworthiness programs (CAP) for the P-3 and P2V aircraft. Lockheed refused to initiate and commit to the program although Lockheed developed similar models for the Navy P-3 aircraft. These program are required by DoD when an aircraft is released from service and available to other federal agencies or governments. The USFS committed staff and funding to facilitate the development, testing, and validation of the programs. The Avenger Aircraft Services Company (James Burd) was selected to develop a fatigue analysis and damage tolerance model, known as the continuous airworthiness program (CAP), and onboard loads monitoring system (OLM) for both aircraft.

The model included instructions for comprehensive inspection and part replacement to support continuous airworthiness (ICA) and an onboard loads monitoring data collection system. Additionally, the USFS developed and sustains OLM data collection center in Missoula Montana and provides conversion and translation of the OLM data for access by the operators for independent analysis and updates to the aircraft CAP. Each aircraft owner is responsible for signing into the secure system and uploading OLM data on a weekly and monthly basis. Once the data is translated, it is the owners’ responsibility to review and update the CAP as required. The owner can utilize in-house FAA designated engineering representatives (DERs) or external engineering groups for this function. The collection center is solely funded and staffed by the USFS. The original CAP (Rev. A) is available through the USFS and is public domain. The generic CAP/ALS was completed in 2008.

1.1.1AUC COMPLIANCE HISTORY

Aero Union Corporation (AUC) provided the aircraft and staffing to conduct the instrumentation of the P-3 aircraft and flight-testing to validate the engineering concepts and aircraft fatigue analysis and damage tolerance modeling. AUC was re-reimbursed by the USFS for all staff and aircraft time utilized during the installation, testing, and validation of the model and total CAP. The AUC Quality Assurance Director and proponent of the program and was heavily involved with the installation, testing, and validation.

AUC executive management was opposed to the newly developed CAP and advocated for the NAVAIR program. During this period of discussion, the P-3 aircraft were on USFS contracts and flying. AUC and the USFS agreed upon a compromise that would facilitate a phased installation and monitoring of the AUC fleet. The phased installation would be facilitated by a series of AUC generated service bulletins (SB) that deferred the required inspection and maintenance over a long period of time. The service bulletins were generated, but never implemented.

The issues came into focus when AUC acquired a P-3 from Spain. The aircraft logbooks and service history were not included in the sale and transfer of the aircraft. The AUC Quality Assurance Director resolved the logbook issues and moved the aircraft under the AUC Type Certificate (TC), applied the CAP to the aircraft, and received the airworthiness certificate (AC). The CAP was blocked by AUC executive management and never implemented on the aircraft from Spain. The aircraft received many replacement parts in accordance with the NAVAIR program and the removed and damaged parts were placed in a scrap area. The damaged parts supported the need for the CAP. The USFS stated that the P-3 aircraft had cracks in the wing structure that could not be been seen with exterior inspections and that everyone in the industry was concerned about the catastrophic potential. The USFS responded to this situation by asking the FAA to assume greater responsibility and authority in enforcing AUC to fully implement the CAP on all AUC P-3 aircraft.

USFS assumed the responsibility for funding and development of the CAP; AUC could not, and would not fund the initial development and testing of a CAP.

The OLM is a critical secondary process in the CAP that provides the basis for verification and modification of the specific inspection and maintenance requirements of the CAP. The OLM system utilizes numerous sensors (accelerometers in N,X,Y,Z ) placed in key areas of the aircraft structure to measure loads. AUC installed robust OLM systems (Apario) on two aircraft ( T21 and T27) for test and validation. The reminder of the AUC aircraft received smaller (less sensors) Apario systems (paid for by the USFS). The USFS CAP agreement required AUC to download the data from the onboard OLM system, send the data to the USFS Missoula Research center (translation and upload to operator accessible system), down load the translated data, conduct an engineering review (DER function), and modify the CAP as appropriate (DER function). AUC never implemented the system and required audit process.

The AUC fleet CAP implementation and sustainment developed into a contentious relationship between AUC, USFS, and the FAA. AUC refused to implement the program; the USFS urged Avenger to place the CAP under a STC and the FAA created and implemented federal aviation regulation (FARs) to force AUC to either implement the CAP or ground all P-3 aircraft in their fleet. The STC became a key element in the requirements of the AUC P-3 TC (AUC never purchased the STC from Avenger). The USFS and the FAA developed a new USFS TC to include the CAP. The FAA moved six of the eight AUC P-3 aircraft to the new TC in anticipation of AUC CAP compliance. AUC refused to implement the CAP and the FAA grounded the aircraft and the USFS cancelled the AUC Airtanker contract.

The FAA requires complete and immediate compliance with the CAP and an approved maintenance program before they will approve any applications for airworthiness.

The USFS and the FAA have questions regarding the intent and integrity of AUC and will not accept any negotiations regarding the CAP or aircraft maintenance.

The FAA will not accept any phase-in solutions.

2AIRWORTHINESS STATUS

The AUC P-3 aircraft fleet is approved for civilian missions under the FAA Restricted Category Certificate (TC) and available for agricultural and forestry fire missions. The aircraft must be maintained under an FAA approved maintenance program provided by the original equipment manufacturer or civilian hybrid program using NAVAIR and civilian maintenance methods and must adhere to the requirements of FAA 14CFR Part 25, Airworthiness Standards; Transport Category Aircraft and FAA 14CFR Part 25.571, Damage-Tolerance and Fatigue Evaluation of Structure.

The AUC P-3 aircraft fleet is maintained under the NAVAIR aircraft maintenance instructions for Phased Depot Maintenance (NA P-3 PDM), Airframe Bulletin 356 for Damage-Tolerance and Fatigue Evaluation of Structure (AFB 356), and FAA approved supplemental and or modified NAVAIR maintenance instructions as part of the military to civilian aircraft transition. The AUC P-3 Fleet maintenance programs and procedures are in partial compliance with the FAA approved and required CAP.

2.1Maintenance Programs

The P-3A baseline maintenance program is supported by the Navy and incorporates the maintenance guidance in accordance with NAVIAR 01-75PAA-3-1, Aero Union Corporation FAA approved practices and procedures, and when necessary, FAA Advisory Circular 43.13.

The maintenance program focuses on inspection and repair based upon flight hours, landings, and the calendar (airworthiness limitations). The maintenance program facilitates field maintenance, depot level maintenance, phased depot level maintenance, storage maintenance, and special structural inspections.

The structural inspections include special structural inspection (SSI), enhanced special structural inspection (ESSI), and special structural inspection kit (SSIK).

The maintenance and instructions are updated by the Navy through the issuance of service bulletins and airframe bulletins. AUC was FAA approved to issue service bulletins for the P-3A.

The USFS Continuous Airworthiness Program was integrated into the federal aviation regulations ( 14CFR 25.571, amendment 96 and 14 CFR 25.1529, amendment 54) to provide enhanced structural inspection and repair. Credit is given for similar structural inspection and repair conducted under the NAVAIR maintenance program.

The integrated maintenance program provides guidance for inspection and maintenance in two categories of flight; baseline life limitations and aerial dispensing of liquids during a flight.

The airworthiness limitations are expanded to include the number of flights and hours of flights per category.

In addition, guidance from NAVAIR 01-75PAA-3-1 and Advisory Circular 43.03 and any other military structural repair documents are no longer acceptable for compliance with the FAA 14CFR 25.571.

2.2AIRWORTHINESS compliance:

For compliance and continued airworthiness, the aircraft must be maintained in accordance with the following requirements per the latest revision of the Airworthiness Limitations contained in the following listed documents;

  • Airworthiness Limitations certified to the requirements of FAA 14 CFR 25.571 and
    25.1529.
  • The aircraft must be maintained to the latest revision of theAirworthiness Limitations contained in the documentAAS-ALS-07-001 USFS P3A Airworthiness Limitations Section
  • All maintenance, structural repair, alteration andmodification to those areas specified in AAS-ALS-07-001 must be performed to the requirements of FAA 14 CFR 25.571 and
    25.1529.
  • Incorporation of all applicable NAVAIR Technical Directives which affect airworthiness and which arenot already covered by AAS-ALS-07-001.
  • Inspect all wing joints between planks for sealant deterioration and repair as necessary

For all other maintenance, the aircraft must be serviced in accordance with the following documents:

  • NAVAIR 01-75PAA-2-1 thru 01-75PAA-2-20
  • Aero Union Corporation FAA approved Inspection and Maintenance Program

.

  • FAA airworthiness directives for all Lockheed L-188 series aircraft and Hamilton Standard 54H60 seriespropellers must be reviewed for applicability and complied with accordingly.
  • Compliance with applicableTime Compliance Technical Orders for the aircraft and engines must be shown.

3Special flight permit:

A Special Flight Permit (commonly referred to as a Ferry Permit) may be issuedto any
U.S. registered aircraft that may not currently meet applicable Airworthiness Requirements
but is capable for safe flight. The following condition include;

  • A Special Flight Permit is not an authorization to deviate from the requirements of 14 CFR Part 91.
  • Special Flight Permits will be issued by the FSDO/IFO having jurisdiction over the geographical area in which the flight is to originate, this does not apply to 121 or 135 certificate holders.
  • If an AD requires compliance before further flight and does not have a provision for issuance of a Special Flight Permits, the operation of the aircraft to which it applies would not be appropriate,and a Special Flight Permit will not be issued.

The following is not all inclusive (refer to 14 CFR Part 21.197), but lists the most common request for Special Flight Permits.

  • Flying the aircraft to a base where repairs, alterations, or maintenance are to be performed, or to a point of salvage.
  • Flying an aircraft whose annual inspection has expired to a base where an annual inspection can be accomplished.

An applicant for a Special Flight Permit must submit a statement in a form (FAAForm 8130-6 (Application for Airworthiness Certificate) and manner prescribed by the Administrator indicating:

  • Purpose of the flight.
  • Proposed itinerary.
  • Essential crew required to operate the aircraft.
  • The ways, if any, in which the aircraft does not comply with the applicable airworthiness requirements.

Additional Items requested by the FSDO to be included with the application Form 8130-6 are:

  • A current copy of the aircraft Airworthiness Certificate.
  • A current copy of the aircraft Registration.
  • Date of the last annual inspection (copy of that log book page)
  • A copy of the last Aircraft Log Book entry, stating that this aircraft has been inspected and is in a safe condition to fly/ferry and that all applicable AD's have been complied with and or a listing f the AD's that have not been complied with, signed by an FAA certificated, A&P Mechanic or Part 145 Repair Station.

Additional items that may be requested:

  • A current copy of the front page of the aircraft and engine/s log book, with all entries completed, (i.e. Aircraft / Engine/s / Propeller/s
  • Manufacture, Model, serial number, etc.).
  • A current copy of the Aircraft/Engine/Propeller/Appliance ADcompliance status.

The Administrator may request to inspect the aircraft, in question, before approving or issuing a Ferry Flight Permit.

The Administrator may require the applicant to make appropriate inspections or test necessary for safety. (This means an FAA certificated Airframe and Power Mechanic or Part 145 Repair Station will need to inspect the aircraft prior to flight).

4Assumptions:

The assumptions are based on the need to present the aircraft and related support data to perspective buyers in accurate and precise manner. The supporting assumptions include which includes:

  • The aircraft have been properly maintained through the FAA approved AUC baseline maintenance program.
  • The fatigue analysis and damage tolerance maintenance requirements are have been accommodated through the baseline maintenance program, supplemental structural inspection programs (SSI and more), and the partial competition of the USFS/Avenger Airworthiness limitations Section (AAS-ALS-07-001).
  • The aircraft records have been reviewed by a reputable DER and are found to be in excellent condition and accurately represent the maintenance activities for each aircraft.
  • An aircraft inspection preparation Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) is available by labor hours.
  • A ROM is available for yearly maintenance requirements through 2022.
  • The USFS projects the P-3 availability through 2027.

5Constraints:

The constraints are based on the current regulatory and political environment, and include:

  • The perspective buyer must have a USFS approved aircraft operations maintenance program or be able to partner with an entity that does.
  • Aircraft airworthiness assessment I the responsibility of the buyer.
  • Aircraft airworthiness is the responsibility of the buyer
  • Special Flight Permits are the responsibility of the buyer