PS 132:
FORMAL THEORIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Fall 2010
Marina Agranov
Overview
The aim of this course is to introduce you to theoretical and experimental research in political economy. We will cover several central topics which were studied and advanced through a combination of formal theoretical analysis and laboratory experiments. We will talk about the basics of social choice theory, elections and candidates competition (role of uncertainty, what happens when candidates differ in the exogenous non-policy characteristics, what happens when citizens can nominate themselves as candidates), why people vote in the elections (voting calculus and the role of information), multilateral bargaining (how does the group of people decide on allocation of budget between their members when people have conflicting interests) and, finally, political accountability. In most of these topics we will explore in details the interplay between the theoretical predictions and behavior observed in the laboratory experiments.
Class time
Tuesday and Thursday from 2:30pm to 4pm
Prerequisites
Basic knowledge of probability and game theory are necessary.
Requirements
Formal requirements will include several problem sets (20%), a mid-term (40%)and a final exam (40%).
Contacting me
Office: 301E Baxter Hall.
Feel free to e-mail me at to schedule a time to talk about class material or about your research interests.
Course website
The syllabus, problem sets, and announcements will be posted on the class website:
Tentative outline of the course and reading list
- Introduction
What does Formal Theories in Political Science mean? How can laboratory experiments inform us about real world phenomena? The history and philosophy of the laboratory experiments in Political Science.
- Basics of Social Choice Theory and Median Voter Theorem.
Part A:Social Preferences. Special case of two alternatives. General case – Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. Restricted domain: single peaked preferences. Median Voter Theorem. Wittman Model.
Mas-Collel, A., M. Whinston, and J. Green (1995) Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, chapter 21.
Part B: Experimental study of median voter theorem in the absence of complete information. Do candidates converge to the median when voters are poorly informed about their own preferences and candidates’ positions?
Collier, K., R. McKelvey, P. Ordeshook, and K. Williams (1987) “Retrospective Voting: an Experimental Study.” Public Choice, 53:101-130.
Survey chapter by McKelver, R. and P. Ordeshook “Information and Elections: Retrospective Voting and Rational Expectations” in Kinder and Palfrey (1993) “Experimental Foundations of Political Science”, the University of Michigan Press, chapter 4.
- Elections with Incomplete Information
Probabilistic voting models – individual and aggregate uncertainty. Dixit and Londregan model. How can we obtain divergence of party platforms in the equilibrium? Experimental study of divergence of candidates.
Dixit, A. and J. Londregan (1996) “The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics.” Journal of Politics, 58(4): 1132-1155
Morton, R. (1993) “Incomplete Information and Ideological Explanations of Platform Divergence.” American Political Science Review, 87(2): 382-392
- Spatial Competition with Asymmetric Candidates
What happens when candidates differ in the exogenous non-policy characteristics? How does it affect the policy positioning of the candidates in the equilibrium? Are theoretical predictions confirmed by the behavior in the experiments?
Grosclose, T. (2001) “A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage.” American Journal of Political Science 45:862-886.
Aragones, E. and T. Palfrey (2004) “The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study.” American Political Science Review 98:77-90.
- Citizen Candidates
Endogenous set of candidates – each voter is a potential candidate. Moreover, candidates are not able to make binding commitments. Two versions of the model: sincere voting and strategic voting. Citizen Candidates under Uncertainty.
Besley, T. and S. Coate(1997)“An Economic Model of Representative Democracy."Quarterly Journal of Economics 112:85-114.
Osborne, M. and A. Slivinski (1996)“A Model of Political Competition with CitizenCandidates." Quarterly Journal of Economics 111:65-96.
Equia, J. (2007) “Citizen Candidates under Uncertainty. ” Social Choice and Welfare 29(2):317-331.
Cadigan, J. (2005) “The Citizen Candidate Model: An Experimental Analysis.” Public
Choice 123:197-216.
- Paradox of (not) Voting
Why people vote? Calculus of voting. Regret theory of Ferejohn and Fiorina. Game theoretic approach to voting. Swing Voter’s Curse model by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996). Experimental studies.
Feddersen, T. (2004) “Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting.” Journal of Economic Perspective 18:99-112
Ferejohn, J. and M. Fiorina (1974) “The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysys.”American Political Science Review 68:525-536.
Levine, D. and T. Palfrey (2007) “The Paradoxof Voter Participation? A Laboratory study. ” American Political Science Review 101:143-158.
Feddersen, T. and W. Pesendorfer (1996) “The Swing Voter’s Curse.” American
Economic Review. 86:408–24.
Battaglini, M., R. Morton and T. Palfrey “The Swing Voter’s Curse in the Laboratory” forthcoming Review of Economic Studies.
- Multilateral Bargaining
How does the group of people (committee) decide on allocation of budget between their members when members of the committee have conflicting interests? How does the rules that govern bargaining process affect the final allocation of resources?
Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989)“Bargaining in Legislatures.”American Political Science Review. 83:1181-1206.
Frechette, G., J. Kagel and S. Lehrer (2003) “Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules.”American Political Science Review97:221-232.
- Political Agency
Elections as a means of holding politicians accountable to voters. Models of pure retrospective voting (Barro/Ferejohn). Models of prospective voting.
Ferejohn, J. (1986) “Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control.” Public Choice 50:5-26.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000) “Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy.” Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chapters 4 and 8.