Supreme Court of the United States of America

No. 02-2793

In the

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SAINT TAMMANY PARISH SCHOOL CORPORATION, et al.

Petitioners,

v.

Patrick and Melissa AMENDOLA, on behalf of their minor child, Danny

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTEENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

TEAM 15

Counsel for the Petitioners

1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT PROPERLY DECIDED THAT THE HAIRCUT POLICY, WHICH PROMOTES TEAM UNITY AND PROVIDES A REASONABLE INTEREST, VIOLATES RESPONDENT’S DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS.

1. WHETHER THE BASEBALL RULE, WHICH CAREFULLY BALANCES SPECTATOR INTEREST AND SAFETY TO MAINTAIN BASEBALL’S STATUS AS A SPECTATOR SPORT, SHOULD DEFINE A STADIUM OPERATOR’S DUTY TO SPECTATORS IN TULANIA.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

TABLES OF CONTENTS...... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

OPINIONS BELOW

STANDARD OF REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Statement of Facts

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Courts Below

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

ARGUMENT

I.THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE HAIRCUT POLICY VIOLATES RESPONDENT’S DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS.

A.The Circuit Court Incorrectly Decided that the Enforcement of the Haircut

Policy Infringed on Respondent’s Substantive Due Process Rights.

i. The circuit court should have applied a rational basis standard to the haircut policy ……………………………………………………………………………………...

ii. The School Corporation’s interest in promoting team unity outweighs the liberty interest in hairstyles.

B. The Circuit Court Improperly Relied on the Equal Protection Clause to Negate the Haircut Policy.

II. THE WIDELY ACCEPTED AND UTILIZED BASEBALL RULE PROPERLY DEFINES SCHOOL CORPORATION’S DUTY TO ITS SPECTATORS BY BALANCING SPECTATOR DESIRE AND SAFETY

A.The Baseball Rule Guides School Corporation’s Duty to Spectators Under General Negligence Standards Due to Circumstances Surrounding the Game of Baseball

B.Preserving Baseball as a Spectator Sport Compels Adoption of the Baseball Rule

C.The Baseball Rule Sets Stadium Operator’s Duty to Spectators in an Overwhelming Majority of Jurisdictions Without Need of Legislative Action

CONCLUSION

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) …………………………………11

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)……………………………………………...7, 8, 9

Hazelwood School Dist. V. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)…………………………..….11

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396-97 (2007)…………………………………….…….11, 12

Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)…………………...... 7, 8, 9

United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)………………………………………….….7

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)……………………………………..5

Williamsonv. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)……………………………...9

STATE SUPREME COURT CASES

Akins v. Glens Falls City Sch. Dist., 53 N.Y.2d 325, 300 (N.Y. 1981)………………….…passim

Arnold v. City of Cedar Rapids, 443 N.W.2d 332 (Iowa 1989)………………………………...21

Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass’n, 185 Minn. 507 (Minn. 1932)………...……21

Cincinnati Baseball Club Co. v. Eno, 112 Ohio St. 175 (Ohio 1925)…………………………..21

Erickson v. Lexington Baseball Club, 233 N.C. 627 (N.C. 1951)………………………………21

Haymon v. Pettit, 9 N.Y.3d 324, 328 (N.Y. 2007)……………………………………………...19

Hunt v. Portland Baseball Club, 207 Or. 337 (Or. 1956) …………………………………….…21

Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club Ass’n, 105 Wash. 215 (Wash. 1919)……………………..…21

Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 901 P.2d 1013 (Utah 1995)………………………….……21

Maisonave v. Newark Bears Prof’l Baseball Club, Inc., 185 N.J. 70, 81 (N.J. 2005)…...…15, 21

Powless v. Milwaukee County, 6 Wis.2d 78 (Wis. 1959)…………………………………….…21

Rountree v. Boise Baseball, LLC, 154 Idaho 167, 172 (Idaho 2013)…………………………...22

Thurmond v. Prince William Prof’l Baseball Club, Inc., 265 Va. 59 (Va. 2003)………..…21, 22

Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entm’t, LLC, 180 P.3d 1172, 1175-76 (Nev. 2008)………...…16, 18

UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS CASES

Blau v. Fort Thomas Public Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 394 (6th Cir. 2005)………….………9, 10

Karr v. Schmidt, 480 F.2d 609, 615-16 (5th Cir.1972)…………………………….………passim

King v. Saddleback Jr. Coll. Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 1971)………………...……13, 14

Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1252 (7th Cir. 1990)………………………………..……5, 9, 10

Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1992)……………………………...9, 10

STATE APPELLATE COURT CASES

Alwin v. St. Paul Saints Baseball Club, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)……...

………………………………..………………………………………………………..…17, 18, 20

Bellezzo v. Arizona, 174 Ariz. 548, 554 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)…………………..…………16, 21

Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 246 Mich. App. 645, 649 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001)………...passim

Costa v. Boston Red Sox Baseball Club,81 Mass. App. Ct. 299 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) ………21

Crane v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 168 Mo. App. 301 (Mo. Ct. App. 1913)……21

Crespin v. Albuquerque Baseball Club, LLC, 216 P.3d 827, 838 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009)………18

Friedman v. Houston Sports Ass’n, 731 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)…………………….21

Hunt v. Thomasville Baseball Co., 80 Ga. App. 572 (Ga. Ct. App. 1949)……………………...21

Lorino v. New Orleans Baseball & Amusement Co., 16 La. App. 85 (La. Ct. App. 1931)…..…21

Reed-Jennings v. Baseball Club of Seattle, L.P., 188 Wash. App. 320, 331 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015)……………………………………………………………………………………….……16

Rudnick v. Golden W. Broadcasters, 156 Cal. App. 3d 793, 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)…….15, 21

Wade-Keszey v. Town of Niskayuna, 4 A.D.3d 732 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)………………..17, 18

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Gil Fried & Robin Ammon, Baseball Spectators' Assumption of Risk: Is It “Fair” or “Foul”?, 13 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 39, 60 (2002)………………………………………………………..19

Wex S. Malone, Contributory Negligence and the Landowner Cases, 29 Minn. L. Rev. 61, 77 (1945)……………………………………………………………………………………………19

Robert J. Thorpe, Way Out in Left Field: Crespin v. Albuquerque Baseball Club Rejects Nearly One Hundred Years of American Jurisprudence By Declining to Adopt the Baseball Rule in New Mexico, 17 Sports Law. J. 267, 279 (2010)……………………………………………………19

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm §6 cmt. b (2010)…..16

1

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit is unreported and set forth in the Record on Appeal. (R. at 3-31.) The opinion of the District Court for the Southern District of Tulania is also unreported and set forth in the Record on Appeal. (R. at 32-54.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

For the purposes of this hypothetical, the Supreme Court of the United States will review the case at hand de novo.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Petitioners, Saint Tammany Parish School Corporation and St. Tammany Parish School Board Members, were the appellees in the circuit court and the defendants in the district court and will be referred to as “School Corporation”. The Respondents, Patrick and Melissa Amendola, on behalf of their minor child, Danny, will be referred to as “Respondent”. The record will be noted by reference to then page number of the Record on Appeal.

Statement of Facts

Respondent soughtto play baseball onSchool Corporation’s St. Paul High Schoolbaseball teams during the 2010-2011, 2011-2012, and 2012-2013 school years.(R. at 34-37.) During tryouts in October 2010 for the 2010-2011 school year, School Corporation informed Respondentof a pre-existing Haircut Policy (“Policy”), which Respondent was violating at that time. (R. at 33-34.) The Policy calls for an acceptable length of hair, which is above the ears, eyebrows, and collar. (R. at 34.) The Policy stems from hair and dress policies for all members of extracurricular school activities in accordance with St. Paul’s High School Athletic Code of Conduct. (R. at 33-34.) The St. Paul’sHigh School Athletic Code of Conduct governs student athletes and grants Coach Belichick the authority to establish the Policy. (R. at 21, 34.) Before Respondent was accepted on the team, Coach Belichick explained to Respondent that the purpose of the Policy was to promote an image of clean-cut boys and establish uniformity. (R. at 34.)

After Respondent was accepted on the team, in November 2010,the coaches informed the baseball team that any student that did not comply with the Policy would be removed from the team. (R. at 35.) After failing to comply with the Policy, Respondent and another player were removed from the team. (R. at 35.) Respondenttransferred schools from School Corporation to Caddo Magnet School Corporation and did not play baseball for the remainder of the 2010-2011 school year. (R. at 35.)

Respondent transferred back to School Corporation for the 2011-2012 school year. (R. at 36.)Throughout the entire baseball season, Respondent complied with the Policy and played on the team. (R. at 37.) During a baseball game at School Corporation’s stadium,Respondent Melissa Amendola, was injured by a foul ball towards the end of a game. (R. at 36.) She was injured by a foul ball while returning to her seat. (R. at 36.) At the time of the injury, she was locatedclose to a concession stand area on the third-base side of the field and was not paying attention to the game. (R. at 36.) Shealso could not see the batter and did not see the foul ball as it was coming at her. (R. at 36.) Yet, she had a general admission ticket that warned her that she assumed the risks and dangers incident to the game. (R. at 36-37.) The admission ticket explicitly alerted against the risk of being struck by a foul ball. (R. at 36-37.)She concedes she did not read the warning on the ticket. (R. at 37.)

The School Corporation provides other various safety precautions for its spectators in its stadium, which had precluded any previous serious foul ball injury in numerous baseball games over a span of least seven seasons.(R. at 28, 36.) For example, School Corporation provides seats behind home plate that are shielded by a protective net and displays several, large posted warning signs that cautionspectators they could be injured by a foul ball. (R. at 36-37.)There were no spectators that wanted seating behind the net and could not be accommodated (R. at 53.)Furthermore, before the baseball game begins, a loudspeaker announcement warns spectators to be alert for foul balls during the game. (R. at 37.)

After Respondent played in the 2011-2012 baseball season, Respondent wore his hair longer than the Policy allowed, including in November 2012 during tryouts for the 2012-2013 school year.(R. at 37.) At that time, School Corporation informed Respondent that he could not participate on the team until he complied with the Policy. (R. at 37.) Instead of observing the Policy, Respondent transferred schools. (R. at 37.)

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Courts Below

Following Respondent’s refusal to cut his hair and subsequent exclusion from participating on the baseball team and Respondent Melissa Amendola’s injury from an inherent spectator risk at School Corporation’s stadium, Respondent filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Tulania. (R. at 32, 38, 47.) Respondent alleged Due Process and Equal Protection violations in addition tonegligence against protection from foul balls. (R. at 32, 38, 47.) The United States District Court for the Southern District of Tulania ruled in favor of School Corporation on all alleged counts. (R. at 54.) More specifically, the district court found that when a grooming policy has a reasonable basis beyond the subjective preference of the decision maker, no constitutional violation could be found.The district court also agreed with School Corporation and an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that the Baseball Rule should define the limited duty stadium operators owe to spectators with respect to the inherent risk of injury of a foul ball.

Respondent appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit, challenging the ruling by the district court. (R. at 3-4.) The circuit court reversed the district court’s ruling on all claims, finding in favor of the Respondent. (R. at 31.)The circuit court adopted the view that choosing a hairstyle is a fundamental right and found the Policy violates the Due Process rights of Respondent. Furthermore, the Policy deprived Respondent of equal protection because it discriminates on the basis of sex.Regarding the Baseball Rule, the circuit court declined to observe the Baseball Rule, a long-standing guidance for a stadium operator’s duty to spectators.

This Court granted certiorari to address the important claims at issue.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This Court should reverse the circuit court’s decision. The circuit court erred in reversing the district court’s decision and in finding that Respondenthad a liberty interest in his hair length. School Corporation’s interest in ensuring team unity and uniformity is a reasonable interest that outweighs the Respondent’s harmless liberty interest. This Court has previously noted that the personal hair styling and grooming is considered a harmless liberty. In fact, such “harmless liberties” are only protected against arbitrary infringements, which is not the case here. Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1252 (7th Cir. 1990).School Corporation’s dress and grooming policy expressed a reasonable basis for the Policy and the circuit courtdecision should be reversed.

Additionally, the Equal Protection clause protects individuals against intentional, arbitrary discrimination by state officials. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Although the right is used in the school setting, the right is rarely used to invalidate hair length regulations. Karr v. Schmidt, 480 F.2d 609, 615-16 (5th Cir.1972). When a school regulation implicates a fundamental right, courts are quick to intervene, yet, as is the case here, when the rights are merely harmless liberties, courts generally practice restraint. Id. at 15. Respondent contends that the Policy unequally applies to boys yet have no standing in the issue since it is stipulated that female athletic teams are in fact subject to their own grooming policies.

Moreover, the circuit courtalso struck out when it declined to recognize the Baseball Rule in Tulania. Under the Baseball Rule, a stadium operator must adopt reasonable safety measures to fulfill its duty of care to spectators in order to address the inherent risk of errant balls leaving the field of play. Once a stadium operator complies with these requirements, the stadium operator has satisfied its legal duty owed to spectators from the known and obvious risk of foul balls.

Notably, the Baseball Rule serves the interests and safety of spectators while limiting expensive and excessivesafety guesswork and litigation that could greatly alter American’s greatest pastime as a spectator sport. The circuit courtrejected over one hundred years of American jurisprudence that is adopted and utilized in an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions when it failed to recognize the district court’s adoption of the Baseball Rule.The safety rules required by the Baseball Rule were necessarily in play in School Corporation’s Stadium at the time of Respondent’s injury. This Court should reverse the circuit courtbecause the Baseball Rule should apply in Tulania.

ARGUMENT

I.THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE HAIRCUT POLICY VIOLATES RESPONDENT’S DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS

A.The Circuit Court Incorrectly Decided That the Enforcement of the Haircut Policy Infringed on Respondent’s Substantive Due Process Rights

The circuit court broadened constitutional protections by determining that the application of the Policy violated Respondent substantive Due Process rights. It has been determined, however, that the First and Fourteenth Amendment do not provide constitutionalprotection for hair length. Karr, 480 F.2d at 613-14. Additionally, this Court has refused to accept that a limitless variety of conduct can be labeled as speech. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).

In Karr, a student brought suit against the school, seeking remove a dress code regulation relating to length of hair for boys. Karr, 480 F.2d at 610. The court in Karr held, inter alia, that it was clear error for the district court to determine that the Policy failed to meet the minimum test of rationality that was properly applicable. Id. at 617. The court refused to accept that hair length was a sufficient communication that entitled it First Amendment protections. Id. at 613. Karr further discussed substantive Due Process in the area of individual liberties and that they should be ranked in a spectrum of importance. Id. at 615.

Karr pointed to two cases, Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), to provide a basis for this spectrum. Karr, 480 F.2d at 614. Through Tinker, the court in Karr establishes the difference between grooming regulations and other First Amendment rights. Id. “The problem posed by the present case does not relate to regulation of the length of skirts or the type of clothing, to hairstyle, or deportment. * * * Our problem involves direct, primary First Amendment rights akin to ‘pure speech.’”Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 614 (5th Cir. 1972)(quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507-08).The court in Karr determines that the court in Tinker intended to indicate that the right to groom one’s hair in public schools does not merit the protection of the First Amendment. Id. The court follows with Griswold and a substantive Due Process analysis. Id.Griswold involved protection of marital privacy rights, which was deemed a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.Karr refused to rely narrowly Griswold because marital privacy affords a greater protection than hair length. Id.

The spectrum of importance ranking individualliberties would place the most obvious, great liberties such as speech and religion at one end, along with marital privacies. Id. at 615. At the other end would be lesser liberties such as the right to wear one’s hair a certain length in a public school. Id.Karr further stands for the proposition that multiple, “lesser” liberties are restricted in the school setting for reasonable interests and courts should practice restraint. Id. at 616.

In the instant case, the circuit courtincorrectly groups the liberty interest in hairstyle with greater liberties. In doing so, the circuit courtestablished that subjective intent is enough to decide that hair length has sufficient communicative content to inherit First Amendment protection. This is not only incorrect, but it opens the door for the management of public schools to be subject to Federal intervention, a fear the court in Karr warned of. Id.Multiple jurisdictions, including the Fifth Circuit in Karr, have held that the First Amendment does not protect hair length and as such the protections should not be extended in this case.

Subjective intent of hairstyles is not the turning point in deciding whether or not a regulation is valid or not. Id.at 614. Respondentand the district court contend that the Policyviolates a fundamental liberty interest by deciding the grooming choices of Danny. As previously mentioned, however, the subjective intent of one’s hairstyle does not decide whether there is constitutional protection or not. These liberties differ greatly from those at issue in Tinker and Griswold. An armband, like the one worn in Tinker, can be used to support a religion or political stance, while freedom to make marital choices expresses stances on social issues. Such is not the case with the length of one’s hair. Long hair can simply show that one chooses to get haircuts less frequently, or not at all. It expresses no religion, no pure speech, and it does not involve private aspects of one’s life. It is merely a matter of taste rather than expression.

It can be determined that hair length is a lesser liberty—if one at all—and is therefore regulations relating to hair length are not subject to a high level of scrutiny. The circuit courtfailed to make this determination and this Court should find as such and subsequently apply a rational basis standard of review.