Starting Points:
-1. Driedger: "Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament."
A. Whole context.
B. Grammatical and ordinary sense.
C. Harmonious with:
i. Scheme of the Act
ii. Object of the Act
iii. Intentions of Parliament.
-2. The Interpretation Act, s. 8: "Every enactment must be construed as being remedial, and must be given such fair, large and liberal construction as to best ensure the attainment of its objects."
Approaches
Contextual:
A. Entire Act
i. Purpose/Object of the Act
ii. Meaning & internal consistency
B. Specific section of the Act
i. Meaning & internal consistency
C. Other statutes and regulatory schemes (pari materia)
D. Area-specific legal principles.
E. Economic & social realities.
i. At present.
ii. At the time the act was passed.
F. Policy considerations.
Purposive:
A. The 'Mischief' rule: statutes are enacted to deal with a mischief, and should be read in that light.
B. Rules relating to absurd, anomalous, irrational etc. results.
C. Interpretation Act s. 8
Tools
1. Type of Statute
A. Benefits-conferring: give broad, generous interpretation.
B. Penal: construe narrowly. (Though nowadays we tend to interpret 'remedially' - only construe narrowly if there is real ambiguity.)
C: Regulatory statutes: may impose penalties, but not automatically the same as a penal statute.
2. Ambiguity
-Determined after applying the contextual approach.
-Gives court latitude for interpretation.
3. Anomalous Results
-Grounds for rejecting an interpretation
A. Irrationality: 'irrational results are to be avoided.'
-e.g. The worst offenders get the best treatment, or vice versa.
-MacLachlin: 'We should impute a rational intent to parliament unless we have a strong reason not to.'
4. Absurdity
A. Cote's four-part test:
i. Ridiculous or frivolous consequences
ii. Extremely unreasonable or inequitable
iii. Illogical or incoherent
iv. Incompatibility with another provision.
5. Change in Wording
A. Common law: a change in wording indicates a change in legal effect.
B. Interpretation Act s. 37: Change in wording does not indicate a change in legal effect.
6. Legislative History
A. Transitional provisions
B. Hansard: frail, but can play a limited role.
C. Marginal notes: of limited use.
D. Redrafting: allowed where:
i. Manifest absurdity
ii. Traceable error
iii. Obvious correction
E. Originalist: interpret the statute as the writers would have understood it at the time.
F. Dynamic: interpret the statute as we would read it today. (Interpretation act s. 7: statutes are 'always speaking', unless there appears to be contrary intent.)
G: Types of Parlimentary Intent:
i. Actual: what they would say it is if you asked them.
ii. Express: what the document itself says it is.
iii. Implied: what we can infer indirectly.
iv. Imputed: imposing the intents of today's parliament on previous parliaments.
H. Contrary intent: don't want to import common law principles where Parliament appears to have expressly wanted to override them.
7. Determining the Meaning of Words
-Order of definition priority:
1. Definitions section
2. Ordinary meaning
3. Is there a reason to doubt the ordinary meaning? (I.e. technical context.)
A. Check definitions section:
i. of the act
ii. of the interpretation act (s. 29)
B. Dictionaries: of limited use.
C. Bilingual versions: apply the narrower meaning
D. Audience: usually general, but for a technical audience, could have a technical definition.
E. Plain meaning: discredited
F. Ejusdem generis: in a string of terms, you can interpret a term in light of the other terms.
G. Effectivity: every word in the statute must have its own meaning; no redundancy.
H. Consistent expression: unless otherwise indicated, the same word has the same meaning throughout the statute. (Interpretation Act s. 12: definitions apply throughout statute, unless contrary intent is found.)
I. Interpretation Act s. 28:
i. Variant forms of a word (e.g. burgle/burglar) refer to the same meaning.
ii. Singular includes plural and vice-versa.
iii. Gendered pronouns include both genders.
J. Interpretation Act s. 13: an expression used in a regulation has the same meaning as in the statute authorizing that regulation.
K. Interpretation Act s. 36: An act referring to another statute can borrow its terms. Where that definition changes:
i. If the new enactment has a new definition, it carries over to the primary statute.
ii. If no replacement definition is added or if secondary statute is repealed, primary statute retains original definition.
L. 'Means' is exhaustive, 'includes' is not.
8. Determining Time Periods
-Found in interpretation act, s. 25:
(2) if expiry is on a holiday, it moves to the next non-holiday day.
(3) if the deadline involves a public office that isn't open for normal office hours on the last day, deadline moves to the next day that isn't a holiday.
(4) Time expressed in 'days', 'weeks', 'months', 'years', or 'not less than' excludes both the first and last day.
(5) Otherwise, exclude the first day but include the last day.
(6) If the calculation ends on a day of a month, but the month doesn't have that day, deadline is the last day of that month.
(8) You reach a particular age at the start of the anniversary of your birth.
9. Sections of an Act:
A. Title: part of an act, can be used.
B. Purpose: More useful than preamble as it is part of the act itself, but doesn't trump clear language in another section.