Soc: 18 Now then , assume that within The Soul Itself there is the expectation of these feelings/affections ;
c
on the one hand , the expectation felt prior in the sweet , confident hope of the pleasant things to come ,
and on the other hand , the expectation felt prior in the fearful suffering of the painful things to come .
Pro: This is indeed then , another species of pleasure and pain , that arises by the expectation
’
of the soul itself separate from that of the body .
.
Soc: You understand correctly , For I think that in these , in my opinion of course , the doubt about pleasure
will be made clear , for as it appears , each of these arise pure and unmixed with the actual pain or pleasure .
,,
For we question if the whole genusof pleasure is desirable , or rather , must we attribute this desirability ,
d
to some other one of the genera mentioned before . Whereas pleasure and pain just as the hot and the cold
,
and all such things , are themselves sometimes desirable , but at other times not desirable , by on the one hand ,
, ,
not being good , but on the other hand , some of them are at times also receptive of The Nature of The Good .
.
Pro: You are quite correct in saying that we must now track what we are pursuing in some way as this .
Soc: Now then on the one hand , let us first agree on the following point ; if indeed what we said is truly so ,
:
e that on the one hand , their destruction gave rise to suffering , while on the other hand , their preservation
,
gave rise to pleasure , let us now bring to mindthe case of those neither undergoing decay nor restoration .
:
In whatstatemust each of these living beings be at the time whenever this state is thus maintained . Now then ,
.
earnestly offer up your mind to what I say . Is it not necessarily the case that at this time every living being
neither feels any pain nor feels any pleasure at all neither small nor great ?
Pro: This is necessarily the case . ( .)
Soc: Is it not the case then , that there is for us a certain third disposition such as this besides either the one
of feeling pleasure and besides the one of feeling pain ?
ProCertainly , what then ? ( ;)
Soc: Come along then , and now do your best to remember this . For to remember this judgment or not
will be of no small importance for us in the matter concerning pleasure . Thus , if you are willing ,
'
we should follow through with a few brief words concerning this matter.
Pro: Words about what ? ( .)
Soc: You know that there is nothing to hinder one from living the life of mindfulness in this way ?
'
Pro: You mean The One that feels neither joy nor pain ?
b
Soc: Yes , for it was said in the comparison of the (3) lives , that the person who chose The Life of Intellect
and Mindfulness should at that time not to feel any joy , neither great nor small .
Pro: And to be sure it was said in this way .
.
Soc: Is it not the case then , that That Life would indeed thus be The Hyparxis , and perhaps it is
by no means absurd to say , that of all the lives It is The Most Divine Life .
Pro: It would not be reasonable indeed that The Divine feels either pleasure or its opposite .
Soc: Thus on the one hand , it is not very likely . But at any rate , either one of these are inconsistent
:
with the Divine Nature . But let us consider this further at another time , in so far as it may pertain
c
in any way to the account and to The Life of Intellect , surely then we shall apply it to
winning second place , if we can not apply it to winning first place .
.
Pro: Quite justly said . ( .
Soc: 19 And certainly the other species of pleasures , which we indeed said belong to The Soul Herself ,
, ,
is entirely generated through Memory .
Pro: How (
Soc: In a reasonable way . And so before we even take-up what in the world Memory is , let us dare ask
, '
in turn what perception is before seeking after Memory , if we intend to bring forth these matters in a clear way .
, '.
Pro: What do you mean ? (
Soc: Assume on the one hand , that in each case of the affections concerned with our body , some are extinguished
d
within the body before they penetrate into the soul , thus leaving the soul unaffected , whereas on the other hand ,
,
other feelings penetrate through both the body and the soul , and produces a certain kind of ‘seismic tremor’
'
through both conjointly and also in each one individually .
’.
Pro: Let it be assumed . ( .)
A note from Thomas Taylor's translation of The Philebus (P471 Prometheus Press):
"Memory , says Olympiodorus , is Triple : Irrational , rational , and intellectual .
Each of these likewise is Twofold : Phantastic , sensitive , dianoetic , doxastic , essential , Divine ."]
1 Intellect
Intellectual
Essential-Divine
Revealed-TruthAPRIORISelf-Evident Truths
The Fullness - The Pleroma
The Preservation of
‘Seismic Tremors’/Feelings/Affections/Experiences/Perceptions
3 body Soul 2
irrational Rational
sensitive-fantastic opinionative-Dianoetic
Sub-conscious Conscious
Un-aware/Automatic Perceptible Awareness
imperceptible>emptiness>‘seismic tremors’>filling/pleasant> Perception
The Mind in the Living Being is The One that is Aware since the body is in itself oblivious/empty .
Soc: Take notice then , would we be absolutely correct if we said that those affections that do not pass
'
through both , thus escape the notice of our soul , whereas we affirm that our soul does not fail to notice ’
those that penetrate through both ?
’
Pro: How could we not ? (
Soc: Now then , we should in no way misunderstand me as saying that this obliviousness has somehow
e
generated the state of forgetfulness in the soul ; for forgetfulness is the departure/exit/loss of memory , ; ,
but in the case of which I am now speaking , memory has not yet arisen . Surely then it would be absurd
’
to speak of losing something that neither exists nor has yet come into existence . Is this not so ?
Pro: Certainly , what then ? (
Soc: Now then , simply alternate the terms .
.
Pro: How ? (
Soc: On the one hand , instead of saying that the soul ‘fails to notice’ , when it remains unaffected
,
by the seismic tremors of the body which you now call forgetfulness , apply the term “imperceptible” .
,
Pro: I understand . (E
Soc: Then on the other hand , you would say nothing out of the way by naming the one common experience
'
of the soul and the body and their common movement ‘perception’ , when they are moved by these occurrences .
.
Pro: You speak most truly .
Soc: Is it not the case then , that we already understand what we intend to say by the word perception .
Pro: Certainly what next ? (
Soc: So then Memory would be correctly called the Preservation of perception , of course , in my opinion .
b,
Pro: Correctly so indeed . (
Soc: But do we not also say that Memory is different from Recollection ?
’ ;
Pro: Perhaps . ( .
Soc: Take notice then , is not the following the case ?
Pro: In what manner ? (
Soc: Whenever The Soul Itself In-itself , without the body , remembers in this way , by taking into account
’
how it was affected , by which longing/desire in company with the body ; then at that time we especially say
that it recollects .Is thisso ?
Pro: Quite so . (
Soc: And certainly ,when it has lost the memory of either a perception or of something it has learned
c , '
and again in turn it restores this , Itself In-itself , we also call everything such as these recollection .
.
Pro: You speak correctly . (
Soc: Surely then , that for the sake of which we have been saying all these thingsis the following .
’
Pro: For the sake of what ?
Soc: In order that we may already grasp as completely and clearly as possible , the pleasure and at the same time
the desire of the soul separate from the body ; for the nature of both these is likely to be made clear to some degree
by showing the nature of these (memory and recollection) .
Pro : 20 Now then , O Socrates , let us discuss what follows by showing the nature of these .
.
Soc: It is likely that we must indeed consider many points in our discussion about the origin of pleasure
d
and about the many forms of pleasure herself . But for now it looks like we must first take-up what in the world
. '
desire is and how it arises
Pro: Let us now consider this then , for we have nothing to lose .
Soc: We shall then indeed lose one thing , O Protarchus , concerning which we are now at a loss .
For by finding the object of our search , we shall lose the perplexity concerning these very questions .
,
Pro: That is a fair counter ; but let us try to take-up these next points .
'
Soc: Is it not the case then , that we just now said that hunger and thirst and all other such things e’
are certain desires ?
Pro: Very much so indeed ! (
Soc: What is the same element then ,that we have in view , in respect to which we call all these by one name ,
’
which are also at the same time quite different ;
Pro: By God , O Socrates , perhaps it is not to say , but nevertheless one must answer .
' , , '
Soc: Surely then , we should begin again from that same place .
Pro: From where then ? (
Soc: When we mention ‘thirst’ do we have some particular instance in mind ?
Pro: How could we not ? ('
Soc: Whereas this is indeed to be empty ?
'
Pro: Certainly , what then ? (
Soc: Take notice then , is the thirst a desire ?
Pro : Yes indeed , of the drink . ( , .)
Soc: Of the drink , or of being filled-full/replenished of the drink ?
Pro: In that case , of being filled-full , I suppose .
Soc: Then , whoever among us is empty , as it is likely , desires the opposite condition
,
from the one which they experience . For by being empty he longs to be filled .
. .
Pro: That is most clear indeed . (.
Soc: What then ? From what source could the one who is empty perceive fullness for the first time ?
Could they either apprehend or remember that fullness which they have neither experienced
' ' '
at the present time nor have ever experienced in the past
’’
Pro: And how could they ? (
Soc: But certainly , we say that the one who desires , indeed desires something .
b , , ’ .
Pro: How could this not be the case ? (
Soc: Do they not indeed desire that which they feel , for they are thirsty . But this is the emptiness .
Thus they desire The Fullness .
.
Pro: Yes ( .
Soc: Accordingly then , some part of them that thirsts can indeed in some way apprehend The Fullness .
'
Pro: Necessarily ( .
Soc: Surely then on the one hand , the body is unable , for it is quite empty
, .
Pro: Yes (
Soc: Accordingly then , it is clear that the only remaining possibility is that The Soul apprehends The Fullness ,
c
in its Memory , for what other possibilitycould yet remain thatcould apprehend The Fullness ?
'
Pro: Nothing else but this . (
Soc: 21 Therefore , do we understand which consequences follow from this reasoning of ours ?
'
Pro: What consequences ? (
Soc: According to our reasoning this very conclusion declares that the body does not generate desire .
.
Pro: How (
Soc: Because desire reveals the intention of every living being is always to experience the opposite one to that .
Pro: And very much so . (
Soc: Thus the impulse which indeed draws towards the opposite of those experiences reveals how there exists
' H
a Memory that is opposite to those conditions .
.
Pro: By all means indeed (
Soc: Accordingly then Reason reveals that Memory is that which has led us towards the objects of desire
d
by showing that every single impulse and desire and The Leading Cause/Principle of every living-being
belong to the soul .
Pro: Most correct. (
Soc: Accordingly then , Reason proves that our body in no way experiences thirst or hunger or any such feeling .
Pro: Most True
.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~The Proof of Reason~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Appeal to Life Experience~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Soc: Surely thenthere still remains the following aspect that we have to understand in connection with these
same conditionsFor it appears to me that Reason wishes to make clear to us , a species of life that exists in
these same conditions
.
Pro: 35eIn what conditions and about what kind of life are you speaking .
?
Soc: In the affections of being filled and being emptied and all such processes that exist in relation to
the preservation and the dissolution of living beings , and if one of us undergoes the latter one of these conditions,
then one suffers , but later-on one feels joy , according to the process of transformation .
.
Pro: This is the case ( .
Soc: What then , of the condition that arises in the middle of these two ?
' ;
Pro: What condition arises in the middle ? (
Soc: On the one hand , they suffer because of their condition , but on the other hand , they remember the pleasures
, ,
which will eventuality bring the suffering to an end , but are not yet being-filled . What about that condition ?
'
Shall we say that the same person is in the middle of those conditions or not ?
Pro: Let us say so then ( .
Soc: Which one , that they are wholly suffering or that they are wholly pleased ?
’
Pro: By Zeus , then they are suffering pain in a double way , for on the one hand , they suffer bodily pain ,
' ,
from their senses , and on the other hand , according to some expectation which the soul longs for .
, .
Soc: How can you say that their pain is double , O Protarchus , or is it not the case that sometimes , one of us
, '
who is empty rests in the clear hope of becoming filled , whereas at other times , they are quite hopeless ?
b
Pro: Most certainly indeed .(
Soc: Certainly then on the one hand , does it not appear to you that when they are hoping to be filled ,
they then feel joy in remembering , whereas on the other hand , they feel pain at the same time by being empty ?
,
Pro: Necessarily (.
Soc: Accordingly then , at that time does not man and all other living creatures feel pain and joy at the same time?
’ ,
Pro: Quite likely (
SocWhat about the case then , of the person who is empty and is also hopeless of being filled ? Is it not then
’ '
that they would experience the double pain , which you were just observing , and was thus making you believe
c ’
that it was simply/solely/only double .
.
Pro: Most true , O Socrates .
Soc: Now then , let us apply these feelings of ours to the following consideration .
.
Pro: Which one ? (
Soc: Which of these two do we say is true or false , pain or pleasure ? Or do we say that some are true ,
, ,
while on the other hand , some are not ?
'
Pro: How then , O Socrates , can false pleasure or false pain exist ?
' , ,
Soc: How then , O Protarchus , can either true or false fears exist , or true or false expectations ,
, ,
or true or false opinions
Is all pain-pleasure True ?
Is some pleasure/pain false ? Is some pleasure/pain true ?
Is all pain-pleasure false ?
pleasure/pain/opinion : Truth
: :
hope/fear/expectation : Truth
Pro: 36d For my part , I will agree that true and false opinions exist , but not as far as the others are concerned .
’ ’' .
Soc: What are you saying ? Surely you know that we risk awakening a discussion of no small importance .
Pro: What you say is true . (
Soc: Then let us see if this subject has any relation to the subjects that have preceded it , O son of that man ,
', '.
Pro: Perhaps it does indeed . (
Soc: Now then , we should dismiss all other subjects that are in any way either tedious or unimportant .
Pro: Rightly so .
Soc: Tell me then , for I have indeed always been in a state of wonder about these same difficulties which
e , ’
we were just now proposing .
Pro: To what then are you referring ?
Soc: Are there not false pleasures , while others are true ?
'
Pro: How could that be ? (
Soc: Then , as you say , no one , whether in dreams nor while awake nor while insane or while being deranged ,
, , ’ , ' ' ,
ever thinks that they feel joy whenever they do not feel joy , then in turn , neither do they ever think that
'’; ’
they suffer pain , when they do not feel pain .
’
Pro: We have always assumed all this to be in this way , O Socrates .
'() ' , .
Soc: Take notice then , have you done so correctly ? Shall we then consider whether it is in this way or not ?
, ’