Provisional Observations on the Authority

Provisional Observations on the Authority

of the Civil Magistrate from Romans 13

T. David Gordon

Introduction

I am often surprised to hear students at a Christian institution discuss capital punishment as though it were an open or debated question. Of course, in the strictest sense of the word, the doctrine is debated in our (secular and sentimentalist) culture.[1] Further, in every generation, part of the purpose of education is to consider every question as an open question, in order to assure ourselves that we have considered our tradition carefully and critically. At a minimum, however, our students should be aware that capital punishment has been regarded by the confessing churches not only as permissible, but as a duty. Consider, as an example, the first two sections of the 23rd chapter of the Westminster Confession of Faith:

WCF 23:1 God, the supreme Lord and King of all the world, hath ordained civil magistrates, to be, under him, over the people, for his own glory, and the public good: and, to this end, hath armed them with the power of the sword, for the defense and encouragement of them that are good, and for the punishment of evil doers.

WCF 23:2 It is lawful for Christians to accept and execute the office of a magistrate, when called thereunto: in the managing whereof, as they ought especially to maintain piety, justice, and peace, according to the wholesome laws of each commonwealth; so, for that end, they may lawfully, now under the New Testament, wage war, upon just and necessary occasion.

I only call attention to the fact that Westminster regarded the magistrate as instituted by God, and as given the power of the sword to administer justice and wage war in the Christian era (“now under the New Testament”). Those who regard the matter otherwise should, at a minimum, be aware that they are a minority voice challenging the majority of the Christian tradition, since pacifism has never been more than a minority voice therein.

Further, this was no peculiarity of the (sometimes harsh?) Presbyterians; other ecclesiastical confessions and catechisms have said the same thing:

Luther’s Large Catechism (1530) The Fifth Commandment: Thou shalt not kill.

We have now completed both the spiritual and the temporal government, that is, the divine and the paternal authority and obedience. But here now we go forth from our house among our neighbors to learn how we should live with one another, every one himself toward his neighbor. Therefore God and government are not included in this commandment, nor is the power to kill, which they have, taken away. For God has delegated His authority to punish evil-doers to the government instead of parents, who aforetime (as we read in Moses) were required to bring their own children to judgment and sentence them to death. Therefore, what is here forbidden is forbidden to the individual in his relation to any one else, and not to the government.

Heidelberg Catechism (1563)

Question 105. What does God require in the sixth commandment?

Answer: That neither in thoughts, nor words, nor gestures, much less in deeds, I dishonour, hate, wound, or kill my neighbour, by myself or by another: (a) but that I lay aside all desire of revenge: (b) also, that I hurt not myself, nor wilfully expose myself to any danger. (c) Wherefore also the magistrate is armed with the sword, to prevent murder. (d)

Irish Articles of Religion (1615)

61. The laws of the realm may punish Christian men with death for heinous and grievous offenses.

62. It is lawful for Christian men, at the commandment of the magistrate, to bear arms and to serve in just wars.

Belgic Confession (1618) Article 36: The Civil Government

We believe that because of the depravity of the human race our good God has ordained kings, princes, and civil officers. He wants the world to be governed by laws and policies so that human lawlessness may be restrained and that everything may be conducted in good order among human beings.

For that purpose he has placed the sword in the hands of the government, to punish evil people and protect the good.

Savoy Declaration (Congregational, 1658)

Chapter 24 Of the Civil Magistrate

God the supreme Lord and King of all the world, hath ordained civil magistrates to be under him, over the people for his own glory and the public good; and to this end hath armed them with the power of the sword, for the defence and encouragement of them that do good, and for the punishment of evil-doers.

Philadelphia Baptist Confession (1742)

Chapter 25 Of the Civil Magistrate

1. God, the supreme Lord and King of all the world, hath ordained civil magistrates to be under him, over the people, for his own glory and the public good; and to this end hath armed them with the power of the sword, for defence and encouragement of them that do good, and for the punishment of evil doers.

Each of these confessional statements acknowledges that the civil government is ordained by God to punish evildoers, up to and including punishing them capitally. Their use of “sword” is intentionally an allusion to Paul in Romans 13, and they can mean no less of it than he did (see comments below). The Irish Articles of Religion even expressly say that “Christian men” also are liable to capital punishment; surely others are also.

Human creeds and confessions may err; but when such a number of them say the same thing in different countries in different times, there is prima facie reason to believe their statements were well-grounded. At a minimum, this consensus position satisfies the burden of proof.

The canonical background

I concur with those many scholars who regard Romans 13 to be Paul’s own reflection on the realities of Genesis 9:6-7, about which I offer these very abbreviated comments. Students of Genesis recall that the human race, in its rebellion against God, became remarkably evil. Cain killed his brother (Gen. 4:8); his descendant Lamech was even more blood-thirsty (Gen. 4:23-24). Wickedness spread at such a rate that, by the time of Noah, Moses observed, “The LORD saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every intention of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually” (Gen. 6:5). This is why God judged the earth through the Noahic flood. Genesis 9 records what happened when the floodwaters receded, and when those on the ark re-emerged onto the earth again:

And God blessed Noah and his sons and said to them, “Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth. …And for your lifeblood I will require a reckoning: from every beast I will require it and from man. From his fellow man I will require a reckoning for the life of man. Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed,[2] for God made man in his own image. And you, be fruitful and multiply, teem on the earth and multiply in it.” (Gen. 9:1-7).

We observe that twice here, at the beginning and end of the passage, the language of the original creation mandate from Genesis 1:26-28 is employed (“God blessed them…Be fruitful and multiply…”). But the teeming, multiplying, thriving of the human race is threatened by the violence of people like Cain and Lamech; and those who emerge from the ark must recognize that sin and violence emerge with them and still threaten them. But God will not permit such violence to threaten his created purposes for the human race;[3] to the contrary, God will “require a reckoning” for those who shed blood, and he therefore institutes the duty of such a reckoning: “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed, for God made man in his own image.” Note that God will not send an angel of death to require a reckoning for bloodshed, nor will God himself continue to rid the world of the wicked through a series of floods; he requires that humans execute this reckoning: “by man shall his blood be shed.” Exercising capital punishment justly is now an additional duty in the fallen era for those who bear God’s image.

Paul, trained in the Hebrew scriptures, knew Genesis 9 well, and many scholars regard Romans 13 as Paul’s reflection on the reality of Genesis 9.[4]

The text itself

Rom. 13:1 Let every person be subject to the governing authorities.

For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. 2 Therefore he who resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment.

3 For rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad. Would you have no fear of him who is in authority? Then do what is good, and you will receive his approval, 4 for he is God’s servant for (your) good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword in vain; he is the servant of God to execute (his) wrath on the wrongdoer. 5 Therefore one must be subject, not only to avoid (God’s) wrath but also for the sake of conscience. 6 For the same reason you also pay taxes, for the authorities are ministers of God, attending to this very thing. 7 Pay to all what is owed to them: taxes to whom taxes are owed, revenue to whom revenue is owed, respect to whom respect is owed, honor to whom honor is owed.

This passage divides itself into three parts. The first part (1a) describes a basic duty: “be subject[5] to the governing authorities.” The second part, 1b-2, explains the grounds for this duty, that the civil magistrate is instituted by God. The third part, 3-7, explains God’s purpose for instituting the civil magistrate, and the power given the civil magistrate to effect these purposes. Note the logic in these three parts: There is an imperative (submit to the authorities), a ground for the imperative (because the authorities are ordained by God), and two purposes for the ground. First, God has instituted the magistrate for the purpose of rewarding good and punishing evil. Second, to enforce this, God has given the magistrate the sword. That is, the magistrate is given the power of the sword by God for this limited (and only morally justifiable) purpose of rewarding/promoting good behavior, while punishing/suppressing evil behavior.

A. The civil magistrate is instituted to promote good behavior …

For rulers are not a terror to good conduct

do what is good, and you will receive his approval

for he is God’s servant for (your) good…

and to punish wicked behavior

rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad

But if you do wrong, be afraid

he is the servant of God to execute (his) wrath on the wrongdoer

B. To accomplish this end, the civil magistrate is given the authority to inflict capital punishment (“he does not bear the sword in vain”). This is not merely figurative language; swords were not employed to spank people; the sword (Greek: μάχαιρα) was a weapon designed to kill. Peter used a sword (Σίμων οὖν Πέτρος ἔχων μάχαιραν) to cut off the ear of the high priest’s servant (John 18:10); one may justly assume that, had Peter’s aim been better, he would have cleaved the skull itself and killed Malchus, which was probably his intent. When the Phillipian jailor thought the apostles had escaped, “he drew his sword (σπασάμενος μάχαιραν) and was about to kill himself” (Acts 16:27). And the author of Hebrews, considering the Old Testament martyrs, said, “They were stoned, they were sawn in two, they were killed with the sword (ἐν μαχαίρῃ ἀποκτανθῆναι)” (Heb. 11:37).[6]

C. Both the civil magistrate’s purpose and the means of accomplishing that purpose are contained in the summary in verse 5: “Therefore one must be subject, not only to avoid (God’s) wrath but also for the sake of conscience.” The first part of this summary, obscured by the RSV’s gratuitous insertion of “God’s”,[7] reminds that the civil magistrate is to be obeyed because of his ability to sanction. He may employ the sword to execute “wrath,” and if you wish to avoid this wrath, obey him. The second part summarizes by indicating that conscience itself requires us to be good and do good, and for this reason also the one who enforces good behavior is to be obeyed. That is, “conscience” is invoked because (and insofar as) the magistrate rewards good and punishes evil. Note the ABBA parallel:

A for he is God’s servant for (your) good

B he is the servant of God to execute (his) wrath

“Therefore you are to obey”

B not only to avoid (God’s) wrath (οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ὀργὴν)

A but also for the sake of conscience (καὶ διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν)

Thus, both because the civil magistrate rewards good and because he uses the sword on those who do evil, he is to be obeyed. Insofar as he rewards good, there is a moral reason to obey him; insofar as he has power to kill you, there is a prudential reason to obey him. There are two distinct reasons for our submitting to the civil magistrate; not one. If it were always a conscientious duty to obey the magistrate on every point, why would Paul mention the second reason? Whether the magistrate would punish us or not would be irrelevant, if it were our conscientious duty to obey him. The duties of conscience have nothing to do with the gains/pains associated with such duties.

When one wrestles, then, with the ticklish question of the limitations of our duty to obey the civil magistrate, Romans 13 becomes very helpful. Plainly, the civil magistrate is not to be obeyed implicitly or blindly, because:

a. the apostles do not do so (Acts 4:19 and 5:29);

b. it would be contrary to the nature and duty of conscience to obey anyone but God implicitly (cf. WCF on Liberty of Conscience)

What, then, are the limits of our obedience to the civil magistrate? First, it would be sinful to obey the magistrate when he commands us to omit a positive duty or when he commands us to commit a positive sin. Second, it would be sinful to disobey the civil magistrate in such a flagrant or public manner as to challenge or disregard God’s good purpose in instituting such government (note, for instance, the respectful manner in which the apostles disobey in Acts 5:29). Third, our conscientious responsibility to obey the civil magistrate is itself determined by the magistrate’s adherence to his divinely-established purpose. That is, in circumstances where he neither commands what is evil (in which case we must disobey) nor commands what is morally right (in which case we must obey), but merely commands regarding a matter that is “indifferent” in itself, we are not morally obliged to obey him, because the conscience can never be obliged to implicit obedience, and, indeed, it is the magistrate who has sinned, by stepping beyond his divinely-established role to reward good and punish evil.[8] Fourth, prudence, however, may dispose us to obey the civil magistrate even where conscience does not. If the magistrate, for instance, required us to put whitewall tires on our automobiles, on pain of death, we would obey not for conscience’s sake (since it is not inherently right or wrong, by divine standards, to have white-walls; and the magistrate has stepped beyond his divinely-instituted prerogatives in requiring such), but for the sake of prudence (why surrender life for such a trivial matter as white-wall tires?). It is not immoral to have white-walls, and so conscience does not require us to disobey (not having white-wall tires is not malum in se, it is merely, in this circumstance, malum prohibitum). Similarly, it is not morally necessary to have white-walls, and therefore conscience does not require our obedience. Prudential considerations alone (the power the magistrate has to punish those who disobey him, and the likelihood and consequences of his employing it) govern our behavior in such a circumstance. Of course, the sword is a figurative expression of the remarkable power of the civil magistrate, and he does not always resort to this final expression of his authority. He may choose less extreme measures, such as banishment from his realm and its protection, incarceration, etc.