Jen Kissoore Thesis Synopsis

Jen Kissoore Thesis Synopsis

Did Stalin win the Battle of Stalingrad or did Hitler lose it?

THESIS: Josef Stalin’s leadership during the Battle of Stalingrad resulted in the Battle of Stalingrad as seen from the implementation of a scorched earth policy, strategic use of the Stavka, and counteroffensive campaigns of 1942 to 1943.

Argument 1: Stalin’s application of a scorched earth policy allowed the Soviets time to regroup and reassess their military strategies while denying the German forces much needed supplies.

Scorched Earth Policy- destroying and burning any supplies or anything that may be useful to an enemy while retreating from an area.[1]

1. By implementing a scorched earth policy, and ordering the Red Army to retreat Stalin bought Soviet forces time to adjust ineffective strategies. Stalin was able to recognize the weaknesses and lack of preparation in the Red Army’s defences and implement a strategy that was best suited for the Soviets.

“In case of a forced retreat of Red Army units, all rolling stock must be evacuated, the enemy must not be left a single engine, a single railway truck, not a single pound of grain or gallon of fuel…valuable property that cannot be withdrawn, must be destroyed without fail…”[2]

1. Through recognizing that the Soviet forces were not adequately prepared to fight, Stalin’s implementation of a scorched earth pokicy proved extremely wise. German forces were left to attck with no way of communicating and receiving supplies.

“While the Axis forces were advancing toward Stalingrad, Stalin deliberately ordered the red Army to withdraw eastward, delay the advancing Germans, and buy time to assemble fresh strategic reserves capable of mounting a counteroffensive.”[3]

-Sixth Army suffered more than 240, 00 losses in men due to the lack of supplies and communication[4]

1. Strong leaders make the nest with the power and capabilities of their forces and Stalin did exactly this in introducing scorched earth tactics. The Red Army was not sufficiently prepared to combat the Sixth Army during the first year of battle. In utilizing a scorched earth policy, Stalin ensured that the Soviets would have enough manpower and supplies to continue to combat the Germans.This decision was the first step in securing the Soviet victory.

“After more than a year of bitter defeats, the Soviet army was exhausted and demoralized but it started to employ a new tactic-the fighting retreat- which put a strain on German supply lines.”[5]

Counter-Argument 1:Hitler severly underestimated the capabilities of Soviet forces, and did not send the Sixth Army with enough supplies to last through the winter making the Germans susceptible to scorched earth tactics.

Argument 2: Premeditated Soviet military planning and execution by the Stavka resulted in stronger Soviet campaigns.

1. Stalin’s Stalin’s use of the Stavka to assign strong generals to the Red Army led to the Soviet victory because this ensured that Soviet forces were under competent control at all times, in all areas. The strategic operations formed by the Stavka built on the scorched earth policy of the previous year and further exposed the weakened state of the Sixth Army.

“…the Red Army could not hope to defeat the Wehrmacht on the battlefield unless and until Stalin, and the Stavka…were able to identify competent command cadre and assign them to command its forces.”[6]

1. The operations planned by the Stavka allowed the Soviets to gain control of the strategic initiative.

-counteroffensive launched in fall of 1942 (operation Uranus=> November 19) Red Army surrounded German forces trapping them in Stalingrad

“Those offensives…quickly and violently shifted the strategic initiative into Red Army hands and signalled the beginning of a distinctly new period of war.”[7]

-Stavka’s strategic operations “produced significant strategic gains but more importantly, paved the way for even larger-scale operations in the future.”[8] giving the Soviets the upper hand in the battle both on the battleground and strategically.

“…the Red Army that the Stavka employed in the spring and summer of 1942 was far more capable than its threadbare predecessors.”[9].

1. The Stavka were able to effectively exploit the weaknesses in the Sixth Army. This made Soviet campaigns very successful.

“By playing that strength against German weaknesses, the Soviets were able to maintain a reasonable correlation of forces and, ultimately, achieve their pre-eminent strategic aim of conducting a viable strategic defence.”[10]

-Stalin was able to use a “seemingly inexhaustible supply of manpower”[11] to the Soviets advantage as two campaigns could be launched without over extending the Red Army.

Counter-Argument 2: It was the commanders of the Stavka, not Stalin who were responsible for planning Soviet military strategies.

Argument 3: The Soviet counteroffensives throughout the winter of 1942 to 1943 overtook the Germans, leading Stalin and the Soviet Union to victory.

1. September 4-December 29, 1942-Red Army launches a series of counterattacks that decimates and isolates the Sixth Army in Stalingrad. These operations were co-ordinated so that the first offensive encircled the Germans in the Northeast of Stalingrad (Sept.21) and then in the Southeast (Oct.1).[12] By Dec. 19 the Sixth Army was isolated in Stalingrad.[13]
2. Soviet counteroffensives constantly forced the Sixth Army to react quickly to the Red Army’s campaigns, resulting in weaker defences. As a result, the Red Army was able to wear down the Sixth Army.
3. The year 1943 “…marked the beginning of the end for the Germans. Never again could they launch a major offensive…the Germans could only defend and delay, relying on scorched earth tactics, overtaxed Soviet logistics and a tenuous defense to erode Soviet combat capability and impede the Soviet advance.”[14]

Counter-Argument 3: Hitler’s poor military decisions and leadership made the Soviet campaigns look more successful

Your thesis isn’t clear.

16/20

[1] David Glantz. Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941-1943. (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005.) 49

[2] Michael, Gibson, Russia Under Stalin. (East Sussex: Wayland (Publishers) Ltd, 1972.) 93

[3] David, Glantz, Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941-1943. (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005.) 29

[4] Michael, Gibson, Russia Under Stalin. (East Sussex: Wayland (Publishers) Ltd, 1972.) 93

[5] Bill, Barry, Stopped Cold at Stalingrad. (Weider History Group.) 99

[6] David Glantz, Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941-1943. (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005.) 617

[7] Ibid.

[8] David Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History. (London: Frank and Cass & Co Ltd, 1992.) 125

[9] David Glantz, Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941-1943. (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005.) 31

[10] Constantine Pleshakov. Stalin’s Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of World War II on the Eastern Front. (Boston: Haughton Mifflin Company, 2005.) 89

[11] Constantine Pleshakov. Stalin’s Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of World War II on the Eastern Front. (Boston: Haughton Mifflin Company, 2005.) 89

[12] Richard Overy. The Soviet-German War. (November 16, 2007)

[13] Ibid.

[14]David, Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History. (London: Frank and Cass & Co Ltd, 1992.) 146.