OUTLINE
SEARCHES
- US v. Jones (2012)
- GPS tracking device on underside of Jeep held to be a SEARCH (needed a warrant)
- 4th Am reflects close connection to property, which is still a valid rational alongside the Katz R.E.P. test
- Concurrence – new tech alters REP, longer use offends this expectation
- Slightly amended by Jardines “physical invasion” – now the standard
- US v. Miller – 4th Am does not protect info willfully revealed to a 3d party
- Katz v. US (1967)
- Listening to convo was 4th Am violation
- Created objective test – reasonable expectation of privacy that society is prep’d to recognize. Consider:
- Likelihood of exposure – what do you expect others to see/hear
- Policy balancing
- Rights to access (institutional)
- How much detail is being observed/found
- Changing tech and circumstances impact R.E.P.
DEFINING THE TEST
- Smith v. Maryland (1979)
- Monitoring numbers dialed on home phone through pen register at phone company
- No REP b/c number dialed are voluntarily conveyed to 3d parties – diff from content
- Also b/c general awareness of common purpose of ability to track #s - advertised that ppl should contact police to track and stop harassing calls.
- US v. Dunn (1987) – CURTILAGE
- Barn is not curtilage of the house, and thus receives no 4th Am protection; once at vantage point not req’d to shield eyes
- Curtilage extends to area immed surrounding home that harbor intimate activity assoc w/ sanctity of home and private life, but not open fields. Factors
- Proximity of area to home
- (subst dist btwn home and barn and not same fencing)
- Nature of uses
- (not being used for intimate activities assoc w/ the home)
- Steps taken to protect from observation
- (Did little to protect from observation – dinky fence for cows)
- California v. Greenwood (1988) – WILLFULLY CONVEYED TO 3d PARTY
- Going through trash not a 4th Am search b/c not an expectation society prep’d to accept
- Rationale applies to person’s physical characteristics
- US v. Kyllo – use of thermal imaging a search b/c could see what was going on inside of house, both illegal AND legal activities.
- Illinois v. Caballes (2005)
- Use of drug dog during routine stop not a search (does not change char of stop)
- Discloses only presence/absence of items – no R.E.P. in contraband
- Florida v. Jardines (2013)
- Taking drug dog to front porch was a trespass, making the search illegal
- Violated curtilage – exceeded implied license to approach house (and knock)
- “Physical Intrusion” is now the standard.
- Models of 4th Am Protection – usually mix and match; lower courts apply by analogy
- Probabilistic Model – chance sensible person predicts he would maintain privacy
- Cases: Bond (luggage squeeze): Olson (overnight guest); Ciraolo (1000ft aerial observation)
- Reject: Caballes (drug dog at traffic stop); Misplaced Confidence cases
- Private Facts – Focus on what info gov’t collects and considers if it is private
- Cases: Jacobsen (field test can only reveal crime or not)
- Positive Law – does some law prohibit/restrict gov’t action
- Cases: Rakas (no property right as passenger); FL v. Riley (FAA regs)
- Reject: Oliver v. US (open field doctrine still a trespass)
- Policy Model – should particular practice be regulated
- Cases: Katz, Kyllo, Hudson v. Palmer (prison cells)
APPLICATIONS OF THE TEST
- Florida v. Riley (1989) – viewing greenhouse from 400ft in air not a violation (assuming FAA regs were followed) b/c anyone could have observed it from that height and did not interfere w/ normal use of property (maybe diff outcome if below 400ft)
- See v. City of Seattle – business and commercial premises covered by the 4th Am
- Hudson v. Palmer – detention facilities not covered by 4th Am – inherent loss of freedom and privacy
- Bond v. US – squeezing bag a search: expected bag might be moved, but not expected it would be felt in an exploratory manner
- Enhancing the senses – not a search if detected with natural senses or means of enhancement commonly available.
- Private areas in public places MAY be covered (see Katz)
- Vehicles
- Cardwell v. Lewis – exam of tires/paint in public lot NOT infringe R.E.P.
- NY v. Class – viewing obscured VIN not a search; reaching in car was.
- Jones – physical invasion a trespss
- Hypos
- Driving to mosques w/ Geiger counter
- USPS photo’s every package and stores data – is mass aggregation and data mining a search?
- Cell phones – usually need court order for intercepting communications
- Hard drives
- Reasonableness Req – many files, mult devices at IP address, mislabeled files
- Personal v. work computer
- Plain view doctrine
- Deleted folders/files (has been held similar to trash in Greenwood v. CA)
- Ability for rummaging
SEIZURES
- Brendlin v. Cali (2007) – Seizure of People
- “Seized” when by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates/restricts freedom of movement.
- Req’s actual submission, but not physical restraint
- What counts as submission depends on activity before show of authority
- Totality of Circumstances test
- Traffic stop also subjects passenger to Seizure b/c norm not feel free to leave
- Cali v. Hodari – pursuit of a fleeing person is not a seizure b/c no physical force or submission to authority.
- Arizona v. Hicks – Seizure of Property
- Meaningful interference in possessory interest in property
- Act of copying serial numbers not a seizure
PROBABLE CAUSE
- Req’s/Definition
- Search – substantial probability certain items fruit, instrumentalities, or evidence, contraband
- Arrest – substantial probability crime committed and person committed it
- Eval of what is now probable – PC may be “stale” or “premature” – US v. Grubbs
- Scope of PC defined by definition of and scope of the law/crime being investigated
- Establishing Probable Cause
- Spinelli v. US (1969) – Overruled by Gates
- 2 prong Aguilar Test to determ if informant’s statements establish PC
- Veracity – enough facts set forth to independently support statement
- Informant shown to otherwise be credible.
- Illinois v. Gates (1983) – TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES
- Elements of Spinell/Aguilar only relevant considerations, not a separate test
- Tip itself inadequate, but corroboration estab sufficient indicia of reliability to constitute reasonable suspicion and thus permit investigative stop
- Here, when did PC attach?
- Got letter, verify Gates’ existence/address, flies to FL, goes to hotel, starts to drive north, arrives home (attaches btwn last 2)
- Standard used for search and arrest warrants, with or without informant
- Florida v. Harris (2013)
- Use “common sense judgment” to determine if dog sniff suffic to estab PC; not req’d to submit exhaustive evidence of dog’s credentials
- Defendant needs opportunity to challenge evidenc/particulars of search.
- Massachusetts v. Upton (1984) – no one piece of evidence is conclusive
- PC still req’s for warrantless search/seizure (Wong Sun v. US) – after the fact hearing
- Maryland v. Pringle (2013) – PARTICULARIZED SUSPICION
- PC deals w/ probabilities by looking at totality of circumstances
- Must be particularized to person being searched/seized.
- Here, entirely reasonable all 3 had knowledge of and control over the drugs – could be one person or all 3.
- Disting from Ybarra – in car, likely to have common enterprise
- Disting from DiRe–here, not singled out/admit ownership until after arrest
SEARCH WARRANT
- If have search warrant, can only be challenged if evidence supporting PC wholly lacking or warrant obtained via fraud
- Conditional anticipatory warrant (US v. Grubbs). Req’s:
- If triggering event occurs, fair probability contraband will be there
- Prob cause triggering event will occur
- Requirements
- Neutral and Detached Magistrate
- Shadwick v. City of Tampa – 2 req’s for auth to issue: 1) neutral and detached; 2) capable of determ PC exists (eg – clerk)
- US v. Master – state judge lacked auth to issue warrant executed in diff cnty
- US v. Davis – improper to go to 2d judge after being denied by first.
- Particular Description of Place to be Searched
- Okay if officer can “w/ reasonable effort ascertain and ID the place” – good faith exception (reasonable effort)
- Necessary level of particularity depends on the place being searched.
- State v. Blackburn – no doubt intended door w/ “ECURB” – couldn’t be confused about that, but could be about “#2”
- MD v. Garrison (1987) – 3d floor had 2apts; overbreadth understandable given bldg. characteristics
- Particular Description of Things to be Searched
- More particularity req’d than “place” – orig left not discretion to officer
- General Principle – prevent vague/exploratory searches – good faith exception (facially deficient)
- US v. Bradley (11th Cir) – pervasive fraud doctrine allows all records search warrant where there is a demonstrated “pattern of illegal conduct”
- Reliance on Affidavit
- Groh v. Ramirez – description needs to be in warrant; reason – so suspect knows limits of search as well
- Situations that may justify reliance on elaborating language – few items on list of many omitted; mis-described few of several items; technical mistake
- Time of Execution
- Most juris have time limit on execution (fed – 10days)
- State v. Miller – violated 10d period, but PC not dissipated, so no suppression
- Most juris allow execution only during daytime – interp broadly (eg: 10pm)
- Gooding v. US – no special showing req’d for nighttime narcotics search
- Gaining Entry Into the Home to Search
- Wilson v. Arkansas – generally have to knock and announce, unless have exigency
- Richard v. Wilson – proving exigency is not a high showing
- US v. Banks – time req’d for wait varies, based on totality of circum (here, 15-20sec)
- Hudson v. Michigan – no suppression remedy if wait time violated
- People on Premises During Search
- To search, need particularized suspicion; mere propinquity does not estab PC (Ybarra)
- Detention of Persons – relevant interests: officer safety, orderly completion of search, concern for flight, destruction of evidence
- Michigan v. Summers – wide authority to detain ppl during search
- Bailey v. US – person must be in immed vicinity of search
- Muehler v. Mena – handcuffing for mult hours reasonable b/c gov’t interest outweighed marginal intrusion.
- Limits to Detention
- If causes pain/discomfort, need to alter
- Remove restraint if reasonably apparent justification no longer exists
- Intensity and Duration of Search
- Can only look in places where items particularly described might be
- Once items found, search must cease
- Preference for Warrants b/c
- After-fact-bias in PC determination (“we found it so clearly there’s PC”)
- Lack of credible opponent leads to false testimony by police about circumstances
- Plain View Exception – Horton v. California
- “Not a search b/c it is a seizure of something already discovered”
- Inadvertence not req’d for plain view seizure – intent doesn’t matter
- Req’d Elements
- 4th Am not violated in leading police to item – intrusion lawful
- Lawful right of access to object itself – w/in permissible scope of intrusion
- Incrim character of item “immediately apparent” – a hunch is not sufficient
ARRESTS
- Warrantless arrest is the rule, and obtaining warrant is the exception.
- Only time warrant actually req’d is for in-home arrest
- If residence of 3d party, need separate search warrant to enter that premises – need PC to believe that suspect is there.
- Warrantless Arrest
- US v. Watson (1976) – no warrant req’d when arrest made in public and there is PC
- Gerstein v. Pugh – need “prompt” review of PC to have extended restraing
- McLaughlin – “prompt” is usually 48hr
- Also may violate promptness if delay was unreasonable – for purpose of gathering more info, motivated by ill-will, delay for dealy’s sake.
- Powell v. Nevada – violation of time does not necessarily mean D must be set free
- Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) – arrest can be for any offense; no misdemeanor/felony distinction as long as it is “arrestible offense”
- Probable Cause Requirement for Warrantless Arrest
- Rosenbaum v. Washoe County – PC must be for a particular offense
- Devenpeck v. Alford – arresting officer’s state of mind irrelevant in determ of PC
- Arrest of Material Witness – Bacon v. US
- Permissible only on need-for-custody showing; based on PC, tested by:
- Testimony that person is material – can be based on statement of official
- May become impractical to secure presence by subpoena
- Excessive Force
- Graham v. Connor – objective balancing, reasonableness standard
- SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
- US v. Robinson (1973) – pat down after arrest valid; found crumbled cig pack w/ heroin
- Policy – Need to disarm and need for add’l evidence
- Even if unlikely to have weapon, danger to officer during extended detainment is greater than that of relatively fleeting contact of Terry
- Gustafson v. FL – doesn’t matter whether may arrest or have to arrest
- Limited by Knowles v. Iowa
- If could arrest, but do not arrest then search NOT ALLOWED
- Threat to officer very low
- Need for add’l evidence doesn’t exist here (speeding violation)
- Search Without Prior Seizure – Cupp v. Murphy
- Voluntarily appeared for questioning; blood under nails, took scraping
- Search valid b/c of exigent circumstances – highly fleeting evidence
- Prison and More Intrusive Searches
- Full search of person/effects usually made at detention centers – upheld on 2 basis: delayed Robinson search incident to arrest; inventory search.
- Florence v. Board of Chase Freeholders – can search anyone brought to prison, even if wrongfully arrested
- US v. Edwards – once arrested, effects in possession at place of arrest may be lawfully searched w/o warrant, even if substantial time has passed
- Strip Search – circuit split:
- Powell v. Barrett (11th Cir) – allowed for all inmates
- Jimeney v. Wood (5th Cir) – minor offense req’s reasonable suspicion of weapons or contrabadn
- Bodily Intrusions
- Missouri v. McNeely – no bright line for when blood draw allowed
- Schmerber v. Cali – need warrant for intrusion of body, unless have emergency (rule for normal intrustions)
- Winston v. Lee – reasonableness of intrusion a case-by-case analysis (rule for major intrusion – remove bullet from body)
- Maryland v. King (2013)
- DNA sampling is a lawful search – recognized social benefits and statute is limited to prevent abuses (violent crimes, only if arraigned, only for police purposes)
- If arrested, proper ID plays a crucial role – a more advanced form of fingerprinting
- Hypo – search of cell phone after arrest
- US v. Finley (5th Cir) – call records/texts found during search admissible
- State v. Smith (Ohio) – high expectation of privacy in cell phone contents
ARREST IN HOME AND SEARCH OF PREMISES
- Roadmap
- Entry into home to arrest
- Payton – general rule – need warrant
- KY v. King – exigent circumstances
- Search once in home
- If warrant, see warrant section above
- Incident to Arrest – Chimel
- Protective Sweep – Buie
- ENTERING HOME
- US v. Payton (1980)
- Combo 2 cases
- PC for murder, knock, hear music, go in – not there but find bullets
- Son opens door, saw father on bed, enter/arrest, search door before allowing him to dress, found drugs
- Entry into home to arrest is a Const Violation – PC not good enough b/c of special importance placed on homes.
- Richards v. Wisconsin – same limits as entry to search (eg: need to announce)
- Vale v. Louisiana – arrest on porch, search home NOT VALID – arrest on street does not create exigency to enter home (no curtilage doctrine for seizure)
- US v. Santana – can attempt warrantless arrest if in doorway
- Calling person out of their home violates Payton. – inside v. outside a tricky line
- EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
- Objectively reasonable evaluation, based on totality of circumstances.
- Lower courts have held there needs to be a belief person there (SCT has not)
- To enter under exigent circumstances, most courts require PC + Exigent Circum
- Relevant Factors:
- Degree of urgency involved
- Reasonable belief suspect armed
- Clear showing (more than PC) suspect committed crime
- Strong belief suspect on premises
- Entry made peaceably
- Time of Entry
- Brigham City v. Stewart – state of mind doesn’t matter (entered to stop fight)
- Kentucky v. King (2011)
- Police created exigency not a valid search (knocked, heard noises)
- Rule – Exigency applies where entry not gained by actual/threatened 4th Am violation
- Knock-and-announce not a police created exigency
- Does no more than ordinary citizen could do.
- Occupants didn’t have to open door – could have relied on 4th Am and not opened
- On Remand – no police-created exigency, but no exigency at all: standard noises
- Mincey v. AZ – seriousness of offense does not create exigency (no homicide scene exigency) – probably an exigency when first happened, but prob not for re-entry
- Welsh v. Wisconsin – arrest in home after drunk driving tip not valid – posed little remaining threat (reason for exigency dissipated)
- Hot Pursuit Rule
- Warden v. Hayden – police not req’d to delay investigation when to do so would gravely endanger others.
- Preservation of Evidence
- US v. Grummel - proper to search premises to extent necessary to preserve evidence while waiting on warrant
- US v. Rubin – must have belief evidence present
- Denial of consent is not an exigent circumstance.
- SEARCH OF HOME AFTER ARREST
- Steagold v. US
- Properly entered home w/ warrant to arrest, then “plain view” drugs
- Need separate warrant to search 3d party’s home.
- Segura v. US –PC to enter house, securing premises in good faith not 4th Am violation
- Illinois v. McArthur
- Wouldn’t let resident back in w/o officer present
- Restriction reasonable b/c believe house had contraband and prevent destruction of that evidence.
- State v. Hendrix – can use subterfuge to get suspect to remove evidence to place warrantless search allowed on showing of PC (eg: car)
- Chimel v. California – SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
- Warrantless search of entire house not justified
- Rule – can search area w/in immediate control of where arrestee could attain weapons or destroy evidence
- Hufnagel – irrelevant whether arrestee can physically reach place being searched
- Courts generally allow a 4 to 6 foot radius – doesn’t consider size of arrestee or whether they are restrained
- Maryland v. Buie – PROTECTIVE SWEEP
- 2 rules
- Cursory inspection of areas near arrest where people might be located
- Extensive limits, but still based in reasonableness (under mattress)
- If reasonable suspicion someone else around, may search other rooms
- Must be based on articulable facts and rational inferences
- Giacalone v. Lucas – can look in dresser drawer arrestee about to open
- Plain View Exception applies to entire in home search scenario
VEHICLES AND CONTAINERS– WARRANT EXCEPTIONS
- Roadmap
- Whren – stop allowed for any traffic violation (allows pretext – racist issues an Equal Protection issue, not 4th Am)
- Atwater – arrest of driver/passenger for any (arrestable) offense
- Knowles v. Iowa – if can arrest, but don’t then not able to search
- Carney – auto exception allows search of car w/o warrant if have PC
- Acevedo – no container/vehicle distinction during search
- Gant – search incident to arrest
- FL v. Wells – inventory search, pretext not allowed
- Traffic Stops and Arrests
- US v. Whren (1996) – can stop auto when have reasonable suspicion traffic violation or other crime is occurring (same standard as Terry)
- Motive never used to invalidate a search.
- Takes very little to uphold traffic stop (Robinson – improper lane change; Lee – straddled center line for 1 second)
- US v. Watson – can arrest for violation if PC it occurred
- Robinson – allows search (of person) incident to arrest
- Virginia v. Moore – even if statute doesn’t allow arrest, not a 4th Am violation (assuming still have reasonable suspicion to pull over)
- Search of Vehicle
- California v. Carney – AUTO EXCEPTION
- Rationale for exception
- Ready mobility justifies lesser degree of protection – focus on potential for movement, not likelihood
- Lesser expectation of privacy – can easily see passenger area; pervasive regulations
- Is RV a vehicle? – YES: licensed to operate as a vehicle, and positioned such that reasonable observer would believe it is operating as a vehicle
- “Objectively mobile” test
- Applies to any car, does not depend on if crime is actually committed.
- Chambers v. Maroney – PC of warrantless search req’d to ascertain whether search properly lmt’d in scope/intensity.
- Moving truck w/ home possessions gets auto exception.
- Arizona v. Gant – INCIDENT TO ARREST
- Can search car when
- Arrestee unsecured and w/in reaching distance; OR
- Reasonable to believe evidence of crime might be found in car
- Circumstances eval’d at time of search
- Holding – search not allowed; was handcuffed and in squad car for driving with a suspended license
- If have separate PC for vehicle/container – see Acevedo/Carney
- Chamberlain – driving under restraint offense necessarily req’s proof of awareness, making documentary evidence potential object of search (allows search of car)
- Florida v. Wells – INVENTORY SEARCH
- Req’s for inventory search:
- Need standardized criteria or established routine (through statute/admin rules)
- If follow guidelines, subjective intent of officer doesn’t matter
- Discretion allowed only if exercised according to standard criteria and based on something more than suspicion
- Holding – did not have sufficient regulations
- Containers
- California v. Acevedo (1991) – VEHICLE/CONTAINER DISTINCTION
- No distinction btwn PC for car and PC for package in the car
- Determinant is if it breaks “plane of the car” – in car no warrant req’d
- Limited only by reasonableness of where items of search may be hidden
- Wyoming v. Houghton (1991) – no ownership distinction
- If have PC for entire vehicle, no need to show individualized suspicion to search belongings of each occupant
- Passenger, as well as driver, have decreased expectation of privacy.
- Holding – doesn’t matter that officer should have known purse belonged to passenger, and not to driver.
- Illinois v. Andreas (1983)
- Privacy interest in container diminishes after container opened by police
- Resealing container does not restore privacy
- Interruption in surveillance re-estab privacy interest when there is a “subst. likelihood contents of container have been changed” based on a workable, reasonable, and objective standard
- State v. Brereton (WI 2013) – install of GPS (as in Jones) is disting from typical search under auto exception b/c concern is not w/ contents of the vehicle.
- Some containers – by their very nature – cannot hold a R.E.P. – eg: gun case
- Hypo – does Acevedo apply to all types of containers? Computer hard drive? – issue raised but not resolved by US v. Burgess.
STOP AND FRISK (WARRANT EXCEPTION)