Australia Remembers 1945-1995

Australia Remembers 1945-1995

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Australians in Papua

After rapid successes in the early months of the war, the Japanese Naval General Staff wanted to move into Eastern New Guinea, and down the Solomons and New Hebrides to New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa. Admiral Yamamoto and the staff of the Combined Fleet considered Japan's first priority was the destruction of the American Pacific Fleet and instead proposed the seizure of Midway as a preliminary step to the invasion on Hawaii. The Naval General Staff opposition to Yamamoto's Midway operation promptly vanished on 18 April after the Doolittle raid on Tokyo. The Port Moresby thrust had proceeded too far to be called off by the time the order was given for the Midway operation leaving the Japanese with two concurrent strategies which were destined to overextend their forces.

The Coral Sea

The Port Moresby operation, under the overall command of Vice-Admiral Shigeyoshi Inouye, was to be preceded by the capture of Tulagi in the Solomons. The strike group to protect the expedition was commanded by Vice-Admiral Takagi with the powerful aircraft-carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku, two cruisers and six destroyers and was to sweep through the Coral Sea and bomb the airfields at Townsville, Cooktown and Thursday Island. A Cover Group, under Rear-Admiral Goto, consisted of the light aircraft-carrier Shoho, four heavy cruisers and one destroyer. After it covered the Tulagi landing it was to turn back west to protect the Port Moresby Invasion Group of 11 transports, carrying both army troops and a naval landing force, which, screened by destroyers were to steam round the eastern end of Papua, through the Jomard Passage. Inouye thought he could envelop the allied fleet with Goto on the west flank and Takagi on the east, while the Invasion Group slipped through the Jomard Passage to Port Moresby. With the Allied fleet destroyed he could then proceed with the bombing of bases in Queensland.

The Americans had succeeded in completely breaking the Japanese naval code and possessed accurate and fairly detailed intelligence concerning the Japanese plans. However, the US had only limited forces available to take advantage of this knowledge. Only Rear-Admiral Aubrey W Fitch's Task Force 11 with the aircraft-carrier Lexington and Rear-Admiral Frank J Fletcher's Task Force 17 with the aircraft-carrier Yorktown were available. Fletcher was in tactical command of the whole force and ordered to operate in the Coral Sea from 1 May. Task Force 44, under Rear Admiral Crace, RN, with Australian heavy cruisers Australia and Hobart in Sydney and the American heavy cruiser Chicago and destroyer Perkins at Noumea, were ordered to rendezvous with Fletcher in the Coral Sea. Fitch's Lexington force joined Fletcher as planned at 0630 hours on 1 May. Bothaircraft-carriers commenced refuelling. Fitch estimated that his refuelling would not be completed until 4 May whereas Fletcher only required 24 hours. Fletcher decided not wait for Fitch to refuel or Crace to arrive and steamed west on the 2nd, leaving orders for Fitch to rejoin him by daylight on the 4th.

On the evening of the 3rd Fletcher learnt of the landing at Tulagi and set off north to attack next morning. When Yorktown's aircraft arrived over Tulagi early on the 4th they found only small vessels and landing craft there. They attacked and sank some of them for the loss of three aircraft. Fletcher rejoined Fitch and Crace about 0816 on 5 May and spent most of the day refuelling from Neosho. Meanwhile, Takagi's Strike Group had moved down along the outer coast of the Solomons and was well into the Coral Sea by dawn on 6 May. The Port Moresby Invasion Group was on a southerly course for the Jomard Passage, while Goto's Cover Group began refuelling south of Bougainville, completing this task by 0830 the next morning. Inouye not knowing where the Fletcher was, used most of his aircraft on the 5th in a bombing attack on Port Moresby. On the 6th, the oilier Neosho, escorted by the destroyer Sims, was detached at 1755, and told to head south for the next fuelling rendezvous. Fletcher was receiving intelligence reports regarding the movements of Japanese ships and it became fairly obvious that the Japanese invasion force would come through the Jomard Passage on the 7th or 8th. He cut short fuelling operations and headed north-west at 1930 on 6 May, to be within strike distance by daylight on the 7th.

At 1030 hours on 6 May B-17s from Australia located and bombed the Shoho south of Bougainville. The bombs fell wide, but aircraft again spotted the Goto's Cover Group around noon and later located the Port Moresby Invasion force near the Jomard Passage. Estimating that Fletcher was about 500 miles to the south-west, and expecting him to attack the next day, Inouye ordered that all operations should continue according to schedule. At midnight the invasion transports were near Misima Island, ready to slip through the Jomard Passage.

At 0736 on 7 May one of Takagi's reconnaissance aircraft reported sighting an aircraft-carrier and a cruiser. This evaluation was accepted, the distance was closed and an all-out bombing and torpedo attack ordered. In fact, the sighted vessels were the Neosho and the Sims. Both ships were repeatedly attacked by Japanese aircraft, and at about noon, the Sims sank with the loss of 379 lives. The Neosho suffered seven direct hits and drifted until 11 May when 123 men were taken off and the oilier was scuttled.

At 0645, Fletcher ordered Crace's support group to push ahead on a north-westerly course to attack the Port Moresby Invasion Group, while the rest of Task Force 17 turned north. A Japanese seaplane spotted the support group at 0810 and in the afternoon when the ships of Crace's force were south and a little west of Jomard Passage they were successively attacked by land-based single-engined bombers, navy bombers and high-level bombers. A final attack by three bombers flying at 25,000 feet was later discovered to have been American B-26s stationed at Townsville. The support group had beaten off all the attacks and Crace had dispelled the Japanese myth that a naval force could not survive repeated attacks from land-based aircraft.

While Takagi's aircraft were attacking Neosho and Sims, the Shoho of Goto's Cover Group, had turned south-east into the wind to launch four reconnaissance aircraft and to send up other aircraft to protect the Invasion Group 30 miles to the south-west. By 0830 Goto knew exactly where Fletcher was, and ordered Shoho to prepare for an attack. Other aircraft had meanwhile spotted Crace's ships to the west. The result of these reports was to make Inouye anxious for the security of the Invasion Group, and at 0900 he ordered it to turn away instead of entering Jomard Passage, thus keeping it out of harm's way until Fletcher and Crace had been dealt with. In fact, this was the nearest the transports got to their goal.

At 0815 one of Yorktown's reconnaissance aircraft reported two carriers and four heavy cruisers about 225 miles to the north-west, on the other side of the Louisiades. Assuming that this was Takagi's Strike Group, Fletcher launched a total of 93 aircraft between 0926 and 1030. However, no sooner had Yorktown's attack group become airborne than the scout returned and it was immediately discovered that an error in the pilot's coding pad meant the two carriers and four heavy cruisers should have read two heavy cruisers and two destroyers. Fletcher allowed the strike to proceed despite the error in the hope that the invasion force or other profitable targets were in the vicinity. The attack group from Lexington, well ahead of the Yorktown aircraft, was nearing Misima Island in the Louisiades shortly after 1100, when it spotted an aircraft-carrier, two or three cruisers, and some destroyers about 25 miles to the starboard. This was the Shoho with the rest of Goto's Cover Group. As the Shoho was only 35 miles south-east of the original target location, it was a simple matter to redirect the attack groups over the carrier. Under a concentrated attack, the Shoho stood little chance and was soon on fire and dead in the water. The Shoho sank soon after 1135.

After the air groups safely landed, Fletcher set a westerly course during the night of 7/8 May. Both sides expected a decision on the 8th with everything depending on locating the enemy as early as possible in the morning.

One of Lexington's scouts sighted the Japanese carriers at 0815 and reported that Takagi was 175 miles to the north-east of Fletcher's position. At 0930, the Japanese Strike Group was sighted steaming due south in a position 25 miles north-east of the original contact, but about 45 miles north of Takagi's expected position at 0900 as predicted on the strength of the first contact. The discrepancy was to cause trouble for Lexington's attack group, which by this time was airborne. Fitch had begun launching his strike between 0900 and 0925, the Yorktown group of 24 bombers with two fighters, and nine torpedo-bombers with four fighters, departing ten minutes before the Lexington aircraft. The dive-bombers spotted the Japanese first, at 1030, and took cloud cover to await the arrival of the torpedo-bombers. While Shokaku was engaged in launching further combat patrols, Zuikaku disappeared into a rain squall. The attack, which began at 1057, thus fell only on the Shokaku. Although the Yorktown pilots co-ordinated their attack well, only moderate success was achieved. The American torpedoes were either avoided or failed to explode, and only two bomb hits were scored on the Shokaku, one damaging the flight-deck well forward on the starboard bow and setting fire to fuel, while the other destroyed a repair compartment aft. The burning Shokaku could recover but no longer launch aircraft. Only 15 of 37 Lexington aircraft located the target. The torpedoes were again ineffective, but the bombers scored a third hit on the Shokaku. Although 108 of the vessel's crew had been killed, she had not been holed below the water-line, and her fires were soon brought under control. Most of her aircraft were transferred to the Zuikaku before Takagi detached Shokaku at 1300, with orders to proceed to Truk.

The Yorktown and Lexington came under attack in the interval between the strikes of their respective air groups on the Japanese aircraft-carriers. The Japanese had begun launching at about the same time as the Americans, but their attack group of 18 torpedo-bombers, 33 bombers, and 18 fighters was larger, better balanced, and more accurately directed to the target. Although the American radar picked them up 70 miles away, Fitch had far too few fighters to intercept successfully, and was forced to rely mainly on his AA gunners for protection. At 1118 hours the Japanese aircraft commenced their attack. The Yorktown, with a smaller turning circle than the Lexington, successfully avoided eight torpedoes launched on her port quarter. Five minutes later she came under dive-bomber attack but escaped unscathed until 1127 when she received her only hit, an 800-pound bomb which penetrated to the fourth deck, but did not impair flight operations. During this time, the evasive manoeuvres gradually drew the American aircraft-carriers apart and, although the screening vessels divided fairly evenly between them, the breaking of their defensive circle contributed to Japanese success.

The Lexington had a larger turning circle than the Yorktown and despite valiant manoeuvres received one torpedo hit on the port side at 1120, quickly followed by a second opposite the bridge. At the same time a dive-bombing attack commenced from 17,000 feet, the Lexington receiving two hits from small bombs. A list of 7 degrees caused by the torpedo hits was corrected by shifting oil ballast, while her engines remained unharmed. To her returning pilots she did not appear to be seriously damaged, and the recovery of the air group went ahead. At 1247, a tremendous internal explosion, caused by the ignition of fuel vapours by a motor generator which had been left running, shook the whole ship. A series of further violent explosions seriously disrupted internal communications. Yet another major detonation occurred at 1445, and the fires soon passed beyond control. The destroyer Morris came alongside to help fight the blaze but the need for evacuation became increasingly apparent. At 1630 hours the Lexington had come to a dead stop, and all hands prepared to abandon ship. At 1710 the Minneapolis, Hammann, Morris, and Anderson moved to evacuate the crew. The destroyer Phelps fired five torpedoes at 1956 and the Lexington sank at 2000.

The Battle of the Coral Sea was now over. The Japanese pilots had reported sinking both American aircraft-carriers, and the acceptance of this evaluation influenced Takagi's decision to detach the Shokaku for repairs, as well as Inouye's order that the Strike Group should be withdrawn. Even though he thought that both American aircraft-carriers had been destroyed, the cautious Inouye still deemed it necessary to postpone the invasion, apparently because he felt unable to protect the landing units against Allied land-based aircraft. Yamamoto did not agree with this decision and, at 2400 hours, countermanded the order, detailing Takagi to locate and annihilate the remaining American ships. But, by the time Takagi made his search to the south and east, Fletcher was out of reach.

Although the Japanese lost 43 aircraft on 8 May to the 33 lost by the Americans, the sinking of the Lexington, Neosho, and Sims far outweighed the loss of the Shoho and the various minor craft sunk at Tulagi. The Japanese had achieved a material victory but despite their losses, the Americans were able to repair the Yorktown in time for Midway less than one month later where the war decisively turned against Japan. The Coral Sea was a decisive strategic American victory. The Japanese operation to capture Port Moresby was thwarted and the Australian eastern coast was not attacked and the only serious bombing threat during the 1939-45 War to major towns on the Queensland coast was eliminated. The battle was of great significance in the development of naval warfare since, for the first time, fleets had fought one another without direct visual contact. The aircraft carrier had replaced the battleship as the backbone of the fleet.