ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER: ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS:

Jeffrey T. Bennett STEVE CARTER

Steven G. Cracraft ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA

Michael S. Prakel Indianapolis, IN

BINGHAM McHALE LLP

Indianapolis, IN JOEL SCHIFF

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

Indianapolis, IN

CLORIUS LEE LAY

Gary, IN

JOHN ROBERT CANTRELL

Schererville, IN

ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENING RESPONDENTS:

BARTON T. SPRUNGER

DAVID M. MATTINGLY

ICE MILLER

Indianapolis, IN

______

IN THE

INDIANA TAX COURT

______

BP PRODUCTS NORTH AMERICA INC., )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Cause No. 49T10-0203-TA-25

)

DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL )

GOVERNMENT FINANCE; JON LARAMORE, )

Commissioner; PETER BENJAMIN, in his )

official capacity as LAKE COUNTY AUDITOR; )

and PEGGY HOLINGA KATONA, in her official )

capacity as LAKE COUNTY TREASURER, )

)

Respondents, )

)

CITY OF EAST CHICAGO, SCHOOL CITY OF )

EAST CHICAGO, and EAST CHICAGO )

PUBLIC LIBRARY, )

)

Intervening Respondents. )

Order on Motion to Dismiss

FOR PUBLICATION

August 21, 2002

FISHER, J.

BP Products North America Inc. (BP), appeals the Indiana Department of Local Government Finance’s (DLGF) February 15, 2002 certification of the budgets, tax rates, and tax levies (Tax Package) for East Chicago, Lake County, Indiana. The City of East Chicago, School City of East Chicago, and the East Chicago Public Library (City Entities) as intervening respondents have filed a motion to dismiss. They claim that the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide this case because the DLGF’s certification does not constitute a final determination. Therefore, the issue before the Court today is whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to decide BP’s appeal.

For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the City Entities’ motion to dismiss.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

LTV Steel (LTV) conducted business in East Chicago, located in Lake County, Indiana. In late December of 2000, LTV publicly announced that pursuant to its Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Reorganization, it was seeking court approval to shut down its East Chicago plant.

On August 1, 2001, the Lake County Auditor, Peter Benjamin, certified the assessed values of East Chicago for the 2001 tax year payable in 2002. On October 18, 2001, Lake County issued a “Notice to Taxpayers of Lake County of Proposed Tax Rates.” This was published in local newspapers on October 24, 2001.

As of November 21, 2001, LTV had not paid its May and November property tax installments for the 2000 tax year payable in 2001, and it did not appear to the Lake County Auditor that LTV would be paying any future tax bills. Consequently, the Lake County Auditor sought a formal opinion from the State Board of Tax Commissioners (State Board)[1] giving him approval to exclude the assessed value of LTV’s property pursuant to Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-17-0.5[2] and to re-certify the assessed values for the 2001 tax year payable in 2002. The State Board declined to issue an opinion giving its approval, and instead, stated that the statute empowered the county auditor to make the decision as to whether to exclude the assessed value of LTV’s property. On December 31, 2001, the Lake County Auditor excluded the assessed value of LTV’s property and re-certified the assessed values of East Chicago (Auditor’s December Re-certification).

BP owns property in East Chicago. On February 5, 2002, BP sent a letter to the DLGF asserting that the $303,133,613 reduction in assessed value (due to the exclusion of LTV) reflected in the Auditor’s December Re-certification unfairly burdened it and other East Chicago taxpayers by inequitably increasing the effective property tax rate. BP requested that the DLGF invalidate the Auditor’s December Re-certification and reinstate the original August 1, 2001 certification because: 1) the Auditor’s December Re-certification was performed after the statutory deadline;[3] 2) the Auditor improperly excluded LTV from the tax duplicate;[4] and 3) the Auditor’s December Re-certification was in violation of the Indiana and United States constitutions.[5] BP asserted that it would incur an estimated additional $1.7 million in tax liability as a result of the exclusion of LTV’s property.

On February 15, 2002, the Auditor revised and re-certified the Auditor’s December Re-certification (Auditor’s February Re-certification), which reflected an increase in the assessed value of East Chicago.[6] On that same day, the DLGF certified the East Chicago Tax Package including the assessed values re-certified by the Auditor earlier that same day (DLGF February Certification).[7]

On March 4, 2002, BP filed a petition for judicial review of a final determination of the DLGF in this Court claiming that: 1) the DLGF certified the December 31, 2001 and the February 15, 2002 assessed values despite their untimeliness and illegality, and 2) because the DLGF could not rule on the constitutionality of Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-17-0.5(b), BP was forced to seek judicial review on that issue. BP claims that the DLGF’s certification of the East Chicago Tax Package constitutes a final determination.

On May 14, 2002, the City Entities filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(1).[8] The City Entities claimed that this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because there was no final determination from which BP could appeal, and that BP had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. On June 6, 2002, the Lake County Auditor filed a motion to dismiss stating the same reasons for dismissal as the City Entities.

On June 10, 2002, the Court held a hearing on these motions.[9] Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

ANALYSIS, OPINION & ORDER

As mentioned above, the Court must determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over BP’s appeal. “Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine the general class of cases to which the proceedings before it belong.” Whetzel v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 761 N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2002). Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction “depends on whether the type of claim advanced by the petitioner falls within the general scope of authority conferred upon the court by constitution or statute.” Musgrave v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 658 N.E.2d 135, 138 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1995).

“The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction.” State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. Mixmill Mfg. Co., 702 N.E.2d 701, 702 (Ind. 1998); Ind. Code § 33-3-5-2(a). This Court has jurisdiction over:

any case that arises under the tax laws of this state and that is an initial appeal initiated after December 31, 2001, of a final determination made by the [DLGF] if the following apply: (1) The tax court would have had jurisdiction over the case if the appeal had been initiated before January 1, 2002. (2) This act does not provide that the final determination is subject to appeal to the Indiana board of tax review.

P.L. 198-2001, § 116 (emphasis added).[10] A final determination is an order that “determine[s] the rights of, or impose[s] obligations on, the parties as a consummation of the administrative process.” Mills v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 639 N.E.2d 698, 701 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1994); see also Lake County Council v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 706 N.E.2d 270, 275 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1999), rev’d on other grounds by 730 N.E.2d 680 (Ind. 2000).; Matonovich v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 705 N.E.2d 1093, 1095 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1999), review denied. The Court can also be conferred jurisdiction by statute.[11] I.C. § 33-3-5-2(b). The legislature has been clear in providing that “[i]f a taxpayer fails to comply with any statutory requirement for the initiation of an original tax appeal, the tax court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.” Ind. Code § 33-3-5-11(a); Mixmill, 702 N.E.2d at 702.

The parties do not dispute and the Court agrees[12] that this case arises under the Indiana tax laws. Therefore, the Court will look only to whether the DLGF issued a final determination in this case. The Court will analyze BP’s case by looking at whether the DLGF’s February Certification of the East Chicago Tax Package meets the definition of a final determination.

The Court first looks to whether BP was a “party” to the DLGF’s February Certification. As stated earlier, BP sent a letter to the DLGF on February 5, 2002 asking the DLGF to invalidate the Auditor’s December Re-certification. BP requested that the DLGF include LTV’s assessed value in its upcoming certification of East Chicago. BP asserts that by mailing the letter it became a “party to a ‘proceeding.’” (Pet’r Post Hearing Br. at 3.) BP contends that by sending this letter it was “filing its petition with the DLGF” and the DLGF had “a legal duty to act, not just an administrative function to perform.” (Pet’r Post Hearing Br. at 3.) Although the DLGF did not respond to the letter, BP contends that the DLGF’s February Certification of the East Chicago Tax Package constituted a final determination.

BP’s letter to the DLGF did not convert the certification into an adjudicatory process[13] wherein BP could make itself a party. BP cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the Court by sending a letter to the DLGF and insisting that the letter changed the DLGF’s February Certification into an adjudicatory proceeding. C.f. Lake County Council, 706 N.E.2d at 274 (stating that the parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the Court). Moreover, in Board of School Commissioners of City of Indianapolis v. Eakin, the Indiana Supreme Court discussed the State Board’s authority to “revise, reduce, or increase” certain tax packages that it was required to review. Board of School Comm’rs of City of Indianapolis v. Eakin, 444 N.E.2d 1197, 1201 (Ind. 1983). The Court held that in a non-appellate review of tax packages, interested people may submit information for the State Board to consider, but the State Board has the discretion to decide what information is useful and what it will reject as irrelevant or extraneous. Id. at 1202. Accordingly, the DLGF could have considered the information provided in BP’s letter if it found the information useful or could have ignored it. Either way, the letter submitted to the DLGF did not make BP a party to the DLGF February Certification.

Second, the Court looks to whether the DLGF’s February Certification “imposed obligations on” BP. BP contends that the DLGF’s February Certification is a final determination because it imposes obligations on it and other taxpayers to pay higher property taxes in 2002 without having the option of further administrative review. While the certification of every tax package imposes obligations on all taxpayers within the taxing unit, every certification cannot be a final determination giving the taxpayer a right of direct appeal to the Tax Court. BP must show that it suffered direct injury to have standing to bring this case. See Embry v. O’Bannon, 770 N.E.2d 943, 946-47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding a party must demonstrate an interest beyond that of the general public to have standing). It is simply not enough to have a general interest common to all the other taxpayers. See id. BP has not shown that it has more than a general interest common to all the East Chicago taxpayers. Moreover, if the DLGF were required to “conduct full-scale, quasi-judicial proceedings in conjunction with” reviews of all tax packages, its ability to review the large number of tax packages submitted to it in accordance with statutory deadlines would be severely hindered and would make the “property tax disbursement scheme unworkable.” See Eakin, 444 N.E.2d at 1202.

Third, the Court looks to whether the DLGF’s February Certification constituted “a consummation of the administrative process.” BP posits that the DLGF February Certification was a consummation of the administrative process because Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-17-16(f)[14] provides that “[t]he action of the [DLGF] on a budget, tax rate, or tax levy is final.” Ind. Code § 6-1.1-17-16(f). However, this statute does not state that the action is a final determination that would be directly appealable to the Tax Court. See id. BP has other administrative remedies to pursue before the Court will have jurisdiction over its appeal. For example, BP could pay the taxes and then file a claim for refund pursuant to Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-26-1[15], which if denied, constitutes a final determination that would be reviewable by this Court. See State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. Montgomery, 730 N.E.2d 680, 685 (Ind. 2000).

The DLGF February Certification does not meet any of the definitional elements of a “final determination.” BP has not shown that it is a party upon which the DLGF’s February Certification imposed obligations on as a consummation of an administrative process. Therefore, the Court holds that the BP February Certification does not constitute a final determination.

BP raises a number of additional arguments in an attempt to persuade this Court to hear its case today. First, BP contends that direct appeal to the Tax Court is the most efficient method of appealing. BP asserts that waiting to pay the tax and then requesting a refund is not “administratively economical.” Generally, exhaustion of administrative remedies is required before a court may exercise jurisdiction over a matter conferred to an administrative agency. Smith v. State Lottery Comm’n, 701 N.E.2d 926, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. An exception to this general rule exists when administrative remedies are not adequate. Id. As mentioned above, BP has other administrative remedies to pursue before the Court will have jurisdiction over its appeal.