Cajetanus: Commentaria In Praedicamenta Aristotelis[1]
[...] The intention of the present work is to unite all the dispersed things of infinite multitude under the ten genera, to distinguish them systematically, and to manifest them each by their properties, so that in this way it can regulate the first operation of the intellect.[2] And since incomplex things do not get united, nor are they distinguished with the conditions that they have in the nature of things, but only as so conceived by the intellect, that is, as they stand under the simple apprehension of the intellect, or, in other words, as objects of this simple apprehension; and the things so conceived are nothing but the things distinguished by interior verbs, or (which is the same) things conceived by simple concepts; and things such as these are none else but things signified by incomplex words, for words are the signs of concepts and concepts are the signs of things, even some distinguished men say that the intention of this book is to treat of incomplex words insofar as they signify incomplex things. For to treat of things as conceived by simple apprehension is the same as to treat of words that signify the things so conceived, for whatever is attributed to the one is attributed to the other—but proportionally, because to the thing so conceived and signified something is attributed as to a thing, but to the word [it is attributed] as to a sign; for man is posited in the category of substance as a thing placed there, the word 'man', however, as the sign of the thing that is a man.
And even if we have to maintain this interpretation of the intention of this book, we must not forget what Avicenna so aptly says at the beginning of his Logic, namely, that to treat of words does not pertain to logical discussions on purpose, but it is only a sort of necessity that forces this on us, because the things so conceived we cannot express, teach, unite and arrange, but by the help of words. For if we were able to carry out all these things without the use of external words, satisfied by the use of internal speech alone, or if by other signs would these things be achieved, it would be pointless to treat of words. So if one were to ask whether it is words or things which are principally treated of here, we have to say that it is things, though not absolutely, but insofar as they are conceived in an incomplex manner, and, by consequent necessity, insofar as signified by words.
Things are called 'equivocals' when only their name is common, but their substantial concept [substantiae ratio] with respect to this name is different, as when we call [both] a real man, and a painted man an animal. For of these only the name is common, but according to this name their substantial concepts are different. For if somebody were to assign what they are insofar as animals, he would assign their proper concepts differently.
Here we would have to state first why [Aristotle] began with these definitions, divisions, and the subsequent rules of the Antepredicamenta, and what is their order to each other, but since the reason of order cannot be perceived without the cognition of those which are ordered, and we are speaking to freshmen, let us postpone these [considerations] till the end of this first part. Meanwhile, the exposition of the single parts will be sufficient. And since these definitions are given by such a great philosopher, every single word should be annotated, following the example of ancient expositors.
Both names and things are said to be equivocals, but in different respects. For a name is said to be equivocal because it signifies many according to different concepts, as the word 'canis' signifies the constellation [Dog], the terrestrial animal [dog] and the marine beast [seal].
Therefore, the name itself would be called aequivocum aequivocans, the things however, aequivoca aequivocata. And since Aristotle is to unite things as they stand under simple concepts, as we have said, here he began with the things, by 'equivocals' meaning aequivoca aequivocata. So he had to define equivocals in the plural form, since no single thing is capable of equivocation without another, for there should be at least two things signified by one name so that there can be equivocation.
And it is significant that he said 'are called' and not 'are', because things are not equivocals as they exist in the nature of things, but as they are in our words. For equivocation presupposes vocation, i.e., being called something, which is a property things have as a result of our activity.
The word 'name' is not taken here as a name is a part of propositions in contradistinction to a verb, a participle, etc., because we find equivocation even among verbs, participles, etc., but 'name' here refers to any sort of word signifying by convention, which is said to be a 'nomen', quasi 'notamen', a note or sign, that is, 'mentis nota', a note of the mind, that is, something that signifies something to the mind. For a verb, indeed, any word of this sort, insofar as it signifies a thing in an absolute manner, is called a name by Aristotle in the first book of his Perihermeneias.
The word 'only' in this definition does not exclude everything which is different from the name, but only its concept, concerning which Aristotle adds that it should be different. For nothing prevents things from being equivocals, if they have a name in common, and they share also many other things, as long as the concept of this name is not common to them.
Although the word 'ratio' can be taken in a number of different ways, here it is not taken for 'definition', for in that case the most general things could not be taken as equivocals (for the reason that they lack definition) but it is taken for the concept signified by the name. And [this concept] in the case of things which have definition is the definition itself. But in the case of those things that do not have definition [this concept] is called the 'ratio' signified by the name, and is nothing else, but what is directly signified by the name.
The word 'substance' is taken for quiddity, so that it is the same if we say 'the concept of substance' or 'the concept of quiddity'.
The expression 'with respect to that name' determines the expression 'substantial concept', for it is not just any kind of substantial concept of equivocals that Aristotle is speaking about here, but that substantial concept which is signified by the name in which they equivocate. And since this [concept] answers the question 'what is it?' concerning any of these things as signified by that common name (e.g., what is the barking animal insofar as it is a dog, and what is that "fish" insofar as a dog, etc.), this concept is said to be their substantial, that is, quidditative concept, not absolutely, but with respect to that name. For an answer to the question 'What is it?' is duly called the ratio of quiddity.
The word 'different' is not restricted to absolute difference, but it is taken commonly, as it comprises both absolute and relative, and both total and partial diversity, so that equivocals are said to be both those of which the substantial concept according to that common name is completely different and those of which the concept according to that common name is different in some respect.
Therefore, you must not say that here only pure equivocals are defined, which are also called aequivoca a casu, that is, equivocals by mere chance, but you must say that equivocals are defined here in general, as they comprise also analogicals, which are aequivoca a consilio, that is, equivocals on purpose, and that pure equivocals have totally different substantial concepts, while analogicals have substantial concepts differing only in some respect from each other.
That this is Aristotle's real intention is shown by his subsequent example, because a real and a painted man are not called animals purely equivocally, but analogically, as is evident from their definitions according to that name. For if one were to ask: 'what is a man insofar as an animal?', the answer would be: 'sensible animated substance'. If, however, one asked: 'what is a painted man insofar as an animal?', the answer would be: 'a picture of a sensible animated substance'. Here it is evident that these definitions are not totally different, but only in some respect.
But the same is clear also from the intention of the whole work, for it is commonly asserted that, for whatever end, [Aristotle] intends to define here things as they are united under the transcendental words, which are evidently not purely equivocal, but analogical.
'Things are called univocals when their name is common and according to this name they have the same substantial concept, as a man and an ox are called animals, for they are called animals by the same common name and their substantial concept is the same. For if one were to assign their definition, stating what both of them are insofar as animals, he would give the same definition.'
This whole definition is to be understood as the preceding one except for its last particle. For there are two kinds of univocals, namely, univocans univocum, etc. The definition concerns things, and in plural number, etc., as we have explained this above. The last particle, to wit, 'the same', however, does not mean identity either absolutely or with respect to something, but only absolute identity. So although for equivocation any diversity of concepts according to that name is sufficient, for univocity it does not suffice to have just any sort of identity of the concept according to that name, but it is required that the concept of univocal things which is considered in relation to the name according to which they are univocals be totally the same, and that it should include neither more nor less in relation to the one thing than to the other with respect to that name. [...]
We should also pay attention to the fact that, maintaining all the things we have said thus far, this definition can still be understood in two different ways, depending on how we understand the relationship between the univocals and the term 'substantial' posited in their definition.
For it may be understood, first, so that the word 'substantial' denotes the substance, that is, the quiddity of the univocals itself, so that univocity requires that the concept signified by that name should not be a concept of anything which is outside their quiddities, but it should be a concept of their quiddities. so the term 'concept' is conditioned from two sides: from the side of the name, for it should be signified directly and primarily by that common name, and this is why the phrase 'according to that name' is added to this definition; and from the side of the things, because it has to be intrinsic or essential to them, and this is why 'substantial' is added.
In the other way it may be understood so that the phrase 'substantial' does not denote the quiddity of the univocals in itself, but insofar as they have what is signified by that name, whether it is substantial or accidental to the univocals themselves. In this way not only the word 'concept', but the whole phrase 'substantial concept' is conditioned by the phrase 'according to that name'. And it suffices for univocity that two things have a common name and that, insofar as they take on that name, they have entirely the same concept, whether this concept is essential or accidental to them.
This second sense extends this definition to all sorts of univocation, so that in this sense 'animal', and also, in the same way, 'colored', 'big', 'beautiful', 'visible', 'audible', etc. are all univocal to both lion and ox. So, all in all, this definition comprises both essential and accidental, per se and per accidens, and intrinsic as well as extrinsic univocation. But the first sense does not extend this definition beyond univocals essentially, such as genera, differentiae and species. So the second sense seems to be more befitting Aristotle's intention, for it comprises univocals universally.
Things are called denominatives, if they have their appellation from something different only in case with respect to their name, as literate from literacy, or strong from strength.
There are three factors in denomination, namely the denominating form, the denominated thing, and the denominative itself. The form, by which the thing is denominated, is something like whiteness, by which a thing is denominated white, and literacy, by which a man is denominated literate, and the like. The denominated thing is the subject which by that form is said to be such, as a man, or a piece of wood, etc. The denominative is the very same thing as the denominating form, but as signified by the name deriving from the proper name of the denominating form, as white, strong, literate. Leaving the denominating form and the denominated thing aside, he defined denominatives, and in plural form, not that denomination is not saved in one thing, but to indicate the multitude of denominatives deriving from one denominating form, like 'justus', 'justum', 'justi' [masculine, neuter, and plural forms of the same adjective meaning 'just'] from justice, etc.
He added 'are called' instead of 'are' for the same reason as above, for beings are not denominatives in themselves, but they are said to be such. [That is, a thing is not denominative in itself, but as conceived and named by us.]
He defined denominatives by three conditions. The first is that they have appellation from something according to a name. The second is that they differ from it in case. The third is that they differ from it only in the above-mentioned case.
The first [condition] says nothing else but that the denominative should be derived from the denominating form according to that name, but not so that the denominative name should be formed as to its vocal form from the name of the denominating form, because this would often be false, for 'justice' comes from 'just' as to its formation and not conversely (indeed, it is the task of grammar to discuss such derivations of names, say that by adding 'tia' to the genitive of 'justum' we get 'justitia' and the like), but so that the denominative name should be derived from the name of the denominating form according to nature, for just as the thing that is adjacent to another is naturally prior in itself to its adjacency (because what is nothing in itself cannot be adjacent to something), so the name of the denominating form, say the name 'whiteness', which signifies whiteness in itself, is naturally prior to the denominative name, say 'white', which signifies whiteness as put in a subject. And just as its proper effect naturally derives from the cause, so does the denominative, which signifies its effect, naturally derive from the name of the denominating form, which signifies the cause. For whiteness is the formal cause of what it is to be white: for whiteness is not caused by what is white (as something is and is said to be white, because it has whiteness) and for this reason it [i.e. the thing's whiteness qua signified by the term 'white'] may rightly be called a denominative. For the name has it that it denominates its substratum as such from none else, but from the denominating form itself, of which this is the proper effect, because [the fact] that it is such arises according to the order of nature.
The second condition, sc. that they should differ in case, says that denominatives should differ from the name of the denominating form according to their case in the end, that is in the inflection of the word, as the word 'white' differs from the word 'whiteness' and 'literate' differs from 'literacy', etc.
The third condition, namely, that they should differ in no other way but in their case, shows that the denominative name should not differ from the name of the denominating form in signification. For this would be for them to differ not only in their inflection but also in their signification and consequently in their definition and essence. But 'white' and 'whiteness' signify the same, for (as Aristotle says later) 'white' signifies pure quality.
But the difference in the mode of signification that is found between the denominative and the denominating [form] is not excluded by the phrase 'only in their case', for this difference is concomitant to the difference in case. And the general rule is that the exclusive phrase does not exclude the concomitants, for by saying: 'only Socrates is running', this risible thing [which is Socrates] is not excluded from running. [...]
And lest you should be misled when you hear that the denominative derives from the denominating form and, for hearing the word 'form', believe that the denominating thing should be the form of what is denominated, you have to know that in this context by the name of 'form' we mean anything by which something is said to be such, whether it be really an accident or substance or matter or form. For this: 'triangulus est ligneus' ['a triangle is made of wood'] or this: 'vas est terreum' ['a pot is made of clay', or 'earth', literally] is no less a denominative predication than this: 'homo est albus' ['a man is white']; for 'ligneum' ['of wood', 'wooden'] is derived from 'lignum' ['wood'] or 'terreum' ['of earth', or 'earthen', as in 'earthenware'] is derived from 'terra' ['earth'] in the same way as 'album' ['white'] from 'albedo' ['whiteness'].