Exclusively China CounterplanSLUDL/NAUDL 2016-2017
JV & Varsity Only
Exclusively China CP
Exclusively China CP
Summary
Exclusively China CP – SCS 1NC (1/1)
Exclusively China CP – SCS Solvency Extensions
Exclusively China CP – Climate Chng 1NC (1/1)
Exclusively China CP – Climate Chng Solv Ext
Exclusively China CP – Clmat Chng – AT: Perm
Exclusively China CP – N Korea – Solvency Ext
Exclusively China CP – N Korea – AT: Perm
Exclusively China CP – Human Rts – Solv Ext
Exclusively China CP – Human Rts – AT: Perm
Exclusively China CP – AT: Cooperation Add On
Summary
The Negative
This file is a generic counterplan that can be read against almost any affirmative on the topic. Instead of having the United States and China cooperate over the action of the plan, the counterplan would have China do it unilaterally
To win the counterplan, one needs to focus on three important issues –
First, the plan and counterplan are different. If the 1ac plan text says United States federal government and with China then it is obviously a different action. Winning that argument distinguishes the plan from the counterplan.
Second, the counterplan has the same effect as the plan. This is what is often called the “solvency deficit” debate. Does the counterplan solve all of the same advantages, to the same degree, as the affirmative? The main arguments against the counterplan will be discussed below. However, the focus of debating the counterplan should be on winning that the China acting alone (or unilaterally) is sufficient to solve the specific advantages the affirmative isolates.
Third, the counterplan needs to have a net benefit. The Japan disad would be the most common net benefit. By acting alone, the counterplan would be able to avoid the US angering Japan and hurting their alliance. Sometimes there will be an internal net benefit that says that absent the counterplan, the AFF solve their advantages. These are specific to each AFF.
The Affirmative
Beating the counterplan consists of winning one of the three arguments that are discussed above: the counterplan is no different than the plan, the counterplan doesn’t solve one or more of the advantages of the 1ac, or there is no net benefit to the counterplan.
The main “solvency deficit” arguments for the counterplan will center around cooperation being key. With large issues like global warming, China alone isn’t enough and we need to share technology to have more effective solutions.
1
Exclusively China CounterplanSLUDL/NAUDL 2016-2017
JV & Varsity Only
Exclusively China CP – SCS 1NC (1/1)
Text: The People’s Republic of China should abandon military expansionism in the South China Seas.
1. Counterplan solves – it opens up space for cooperation with China’s constituents
AP 2014 (Associated Press, US admiral urges China to show leadership, find compromise, in South China Sea disputes,
HONOLULU – The head of American forces in Asia and the Pacific says China should exercise its role as a regional leader and help resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Adm. Samuel Locklear said Thursday that China should abandon its recent actions to assert its claim to virtually the entire strategically important region, which he called provocative. Locklear said that while Beijing feels it has a strong historical claim, other parties to the dispute feel equally strongly. He told a group of journalists at the Honolulu-based East-West Center that China may have convincing arguments to make, but that it needs to put those in a modern legal framework. He said all claimants must avoid provocative actions and then find a resolution that rules out coercion.
2. US involvement crushes relations with China – Only the counterplan stops war
Kastner, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Politics, 16
(Scott L, University of Maryland-College Park, Author of Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond and Co-Editor of Globalization and Security Relations across the Taiwan Strait: In the Shadow of China, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2015/2016 (“Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan,” International Security, Volume 40, Number 3)
For similar reasons, U.S. policymakers should be skeptical of calls to dramatically increase the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security or to more visibly incorporate Taiwan into rebalancing initiatives.104 Such moves would be viewed as inflammatory in Beijing and could generate renewed pessimism about long-term trends in the strait. Perhaps more fundamentally, a much stronger U.S. commitment to Taiwan would stoke increased tensions in the U.S.-China relationship. As alluded to earlier, a key component of China’s expected costs of a Taiwan Strait conflict—regardless of whether the United States intervened—is the damage such a conflict would likely inflict on the broader U.S.-China relationship. But if the U.S.-China relationship is in tatters to begin with, then Beijing has less to lose in a cross-strait war. In essence, policies that increase U.S. support for Taiwan at a cost of a much worse U.S.-China relationship risk being self-defeating, as the increased stability generated by slowing the cross-strait power shift is canceled out by decreasing expected costs of war for China.
Exclusively China CP – SCS Solvency Extensions
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(__) Expansionism violates the Law of the Sea – China legally can’t expand
Fravel, associate professor of political science, et al 2016
(taylor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “What Is the Future of the South China Sea?”,
On July 12, a court based at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague rejected China’s sweeping claims over much of the South China Sea. The Philippines filed the case against China in 2013, arguing that some of China’s claims and activities violated the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The court ruled that a scattering of rocks and reefs in the contested South China Sea does not qualify for exclusive economic zones (EEZ), and stated that the nine-dash line, an imprecise demarcation including most the South China Sea, could not serve as the historical basis of China’s sovereignty claims. China refused to participate in the arbitration and has repeatedly declared that it will not accept the court’s ruling. In this ChinaFileconversation, experts share their reactions to the decision and thoughts about Beijing’s rejection of the ruling. — The Editors M. Taylor Fravel, Associate Professor of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology: My initial reaction is that the tribunal’s award overwhelmingly favors the Philippines — a huge win for Manila. China’s only lawful claims in the South China Sea would be 12 nautical miles of territorial seas from the land features in the Spratly Islands deemed to be rocks above high tide. China cannot claim an EEZ from any of the land features of the Spratlys Islands, including the largest, Itu Aba. Nor can it claim any historic rights to resources within the nine-dash line. In particular, the tribunal ruled as follows: China cannot lawfully claim historic rights to resources within the nine-dash line. China (and others) cannot claim an EEZ from land features above high tide in the Spratlys, which were all judged to be “rocks” entitled only to a 12 nautical mile (nm) territorial sea. Mischief Reef was determined to be a low-tide elevation on the Philippines’ continental shelf. China’s construction of artificial installations on the reef violates the Philippines’ sovereign rights. The Spratly Islands as a group cannot generate any maritime zones as a unit. This appears to be an effort to pre-empt a Chinese claim to any maritime zones based on straight baselines that could be drawn around the Spratlys as a whole. What does this mean?
Exclusively China CP – SCS Solvency Extensions
(__) The counterplan ensures negotiations happen constructively – military engagement fails
Ruwitch, Policy analyst, 2016
(John, “South China Sea: Chinese General Says U.S. and China Should Resolve Differences ByDiplomacy”,
China and the United States should manage their differences over disputed waters in the South China Sea constructively, one of China’s top military officials has said. Fang Fenghui, a member of China’s Central Military Commission, told General Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the two sides should “refrain from actions detrimental to the relations between the two countries and the two militaries”, state news agency Xinhua reported on Friday. Fang and Dunford discussed the South China Sea in a video link-up on Thursday, it said. The discussion comes at a time of heightened tension between China and the United States, which have traded accusations of militarizing the South China Sea as China implements large-scale land reclamation and construction on disputed features while the United States has increased its patrols and exercises. On Tuesday, China scrambled fighter jets as a U.S. navy guided missile destroyer sailed close to a disputed reef in the South China Sea and denounced the patrol as an illegal threat to peace. The U.S. defense department said the latest “freedom of navigation” operation was undertaken to “challenge excessive maritime claims” by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam that were seeking to restrict navigation rights in the South China Sea. China claims most of the South China Sea, through which $5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes every year. The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei have overlapping claims. Fang said China was not to blame for tensions with the United States in the South China Sea and urged the two sides “to bear the overall situation in mind and manage their differences in a constructive way”, Xinhua reported early on Friday. Xinhua quoted Dunford as calling for restraint in the South China Sea, and saying the United States was willing to work with China to establish “an effective mechanism on risk control so as to maintain stability in the South China Sea by peaceful means”.
Exclusively China CP – SCS – AT: Permutation
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(__) It’s not the United State’s business – they actively alienate China
Freedberg deputy editor of Breaking Defense 2016
(sydney, “Chinese Ambassador Blasts South China Sea Tribunal,”
From China’s perspective, however, America — and the UN tribunal for that matter — are meddling in what’s none of their affair. The territorial disputes should be handled bilaterally by the parties involved, one-on-one between China and its (much weaker) neighbors. “For issues like territorial disputes, it’s only natural that the parties concerned should have direct talks with each other, (because) if you’re not a claimant, if you have no stakes there, real stakes there, how can you negotiate with other parties?” Cui said. “This case of arbitration itself is also something that could have the consequences of destabilizing the region, because it undermines the diplomatic efforts.” “Diplomatic efforts should not be blocked and will not be blocked by a scrap of paper (i.e. the UN tribunal ruling) or by a fleet of aircraft carriers,” Cui said. “China remains committed to negotiations and consultation with other parties, this position has never changed and will not change.”
Exclusively China CP – SCS – Net Benefit Extensions)
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(__) The plan escalates tensions with China, risking war – the counterplan ensures peaceful withdrawal
Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, 11
(Charles L. Glaser, at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2011 (“Glaser Replies,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 90, Issue 4, July/August, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Elite)
Shyu-tuLee's argument hinges on two key claims: that China does not feel threatened by the United States and that China has essentially unlimited geopolitical aims. Both are quite unlikely. First, major powers tend to see the military capabilities of their peers as threatening, unless they share excellent political relations. Although China and the United States are not enemies, they do not have confidence that each other's motives are benign. This is reflected in China's concern about U.S. ballistic missile defense systems, the survivability of its nuclear force in the event of a war, and the threat posed to its sea-based commerce and energy imports by U.S. naval forces—which could sever China's access to critical resources and render the country vulnerable to coercion during a crisis over Taiwan. Second, although experts disagree on China's motives, the most common assessment is that China places great value on Taiwan, some value on its ability to prevail in regional maritime disputes in the East China and South China seas, and little value on gaining other territory. Given these judgments, U.S. policies that simply seek to increase its ability to project power in the Pacific could needlessly spark tensions with China, heightening the possibility of conflict. Of course, this forecast of China's goals could prove wrong. Consequently, the United States must implement political concessions and military restraint with caution, maintaining its alliances with Japan and South Korea to provide a successful counterbalance. Lastly, Lee's argument about the increasing danger posed by China implies that maintaining the U.S. commitment to Taiwan will be ever more costly and perilous. This bolsters the case for a U.S. pullback.
1
Exclusively China CounterplanSLUDL/NAUDL 2016-2017
JV & Varsity Only
Exclusively China CP – Climate Chng 1NC (1/1)
Text: The People’s Republic of China should substantially increase its decarbonization.
1. The counterplan competes – It is plan minus which means only China is working on solutions to warming – the AFF ensures cooperation which links to the Japan DA
2. Solves the AFF – it mitigates Chinese emissions
Tenget al 2015 (fei, Alun GU, Xi YANG, Xin WANG, Qiang LIU, Yi CHEN, Chuan TIAN, Xiaoqi ZHENG, This report was written by a group of independent experts who have not been nominated by their governments. Any views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of any government or organization, agency or program of the United Nations., Pathways to deep decarbonization in China, SDSN – IDDRI,
Promote the transition from carbon intensity control to total carbon emissions control gradually. As China has set the goal of peaking around 2030, setting carbon-intensity reduction targets for each year and for every five years is inadequate for controlling carbon emission as the economy continues to grow. A transition to total carbon emissions control is necessary in order to realize absolute carbon emissions reduction. In the short- and medium term, when the focus is on reversing the rapid increase in carbon emissions by 2020, it would be useful to set mandatory national carbon emissions standards for key products, industries, and sectors to pilot carbon emissions control in these areas. Meanwhile, aiming at peaking around 2030, it will be necessary to establish an allocation of allowance management system in order to set up the total carbon emissions control scheme by2030, and the allowance of each province, autonomous region, and municipality must be determined accordingly. In the long term, focused on achieving a steady decrease of carbon emissions before 2050, an economy-wide total-carbon-emission-control regulatory system and implementing scheme must be established. Rely more on market-based measures by developing a reasonable pricing system based on GHG emissions. Market-based mechanisms can be more effective than administrative measures in reducing GHG emissions and lowering emissions-reduction costs in some sectors, and are positioned as important measures in some sectors in EU’s GHG emissions-reduction strategy. Considering China’s process of marketization, it is necessary to build a national carbon market during the 13th Five-Year Period, based on current carbon cap-and-trade pilots; to establish detailed and effective regulations of enforcement; and to continue to improve it afterwards. The population, GDP, and total energy consumption in these seven pilots are 18%, 27%, and 23% of that of China respectively in 2010, covering more than 20 industries and with total allowances of 1.2GtCO2 per year. In order to realize the transformation from pilots to a national carbon market, a series of national administrative measures and rules should be launched and national allowance allocation method should be developed. In parallel, the optimization of policy designs will have to be continued, notably through the use of fiscal subsidies and pollutant discharge fees. In light of sources of pollution that are difficult to regulate with a carbon market, such as private vehicles existing fossil fuel subsidies, such as the oil consumption subsidy, should be gradually eliminated, and a sectorial carbon tax mechanism should be established to realize GHG reduction for these sources. Along with modernization of energy production and consumption, it is necessary for government to extend energy system reforms, especially electricity market reform, so as to let the market play the dominant role in resource allocation and build an energy-pricing system that reflects the environmental costs of their externalities, which is also crucial for the effective and efficient implementation of a carbon market in China.
Exclusively China CP – Climate Chng Solv Ext
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(__) China is committed to reducing emissions – they get modelled and the US is NOT key
Henderson et al. 16 (Geoffrey Henderson, ChinaFAQs Project Specialist at the World Resources Institute, Student Researcher at California-Santa Barbara, holds a B.A. in Political Science from Haverford College, holds a J.D. from Yale Law School, 2016, “5 Questions: What Does China’s New Five-Year Plan Mean for Climate Action?,” World Resources Institute, March 18th, Available Online at