BUSINESS HISTORY NEWS
The Newsletter of the Association of Business Historians
Spring 2009
No.37
ISSN 9062-9440
This issue of the newsletter sees David Bricknell and Niall Mackenzie, the 2008 Colman prize finalists, contributing their presentations to the 2008 ABH conference, on (respectively) ‘Intuition: the case for historical research’ and ‘Chucking buns across the fence? Government-Sponsored Industry Development in the Scottish Highlands, 1945-82’.
Mike Anson, of the Bank of England and the Business Archives Council, offers some timely reflections on ‘Joined up Thinking: Business Historians and Business Archives’.
There are also various items of news and announcements. In addition, Boydell & Brewer are offering ABH members a 25 % discount on selected titles, while Palgrave / Macmillan are announcing a new journal.
The 2009 ABH conference programme, abstracts, registration and other details are now available on-line, at http://www.liv.ac.uk/ulms/abh/ The programme and registration form are also included in this newsletter. The conference, on the theme of ‘Cities of Business, the Business of Cities’, will be held at the University of Liverpool Management School on 3 – 4 July 2009.
Last but certainly not least, the Association of Business Historians is delighted to announce the Tony Slaven Grant. The aim of the Grant, named in honour of Tony Slaven, Emeritus Professor of Business History at the University of Glasgow, is to further the future growth and development of the discipline of business history by supporting emerging scholars to attend and present their work at the Association’s annual conference: full details can be found at the end of this newsletter.
If you have any event or new publication you would like to see included in the next edition of the newsletter (due out in October 2009), please do e-mail details to the address below by the end of September. And do let me have any feedback and / or suggestions about future editions of the newsletter. Please note also that the ABH has a new web-address, hosted by the Centre for Evolution of Global Business and Institutions (CEGBI) at the University of York: http://www.abh-net.org/ If you have any news you would like to have uploaded on the ABH website to share with the membership, please e-mail the webmaster - Teresa da Silva Lopes ().
Laura Ugolini, University of Wolverhampton
HAGRI/HLSS, MC 233, Millennium City Building
Wolverhampton, WV1 1LY, UK
E-mail:
CONTENTS
FEATURES
Colman Prize 2008 finalists
David Bricknell, Intuition: the case for historical research p. 3
Niall G MacKenzie, ‘Chucking buns across the fence?’:
Government-Sponsored Industry Development in the
Scottish Highlands, 1945-82 p. 8
Mike Anson, ‘Joined up Thinking: Business Historians
and Business Archives’ p. 15
OBITUARY
John H. Dunning, Emeritus Professor of International Business
at the University of Reading p. 18
SPECIAL OFFERS AND PUBLICATIONS
Boydell & Brewer p.19
Palgrave / Macmillan p. 20
INFORMATION AND NEWS
Accounting, Business & Financial History conference and cfp p. 21
‘Beyond Chandler – Intellectual Impulses for Business
and Management History Tomorrow’ workshop p. 22
Business Archives: Reflections and Speculations p. 23
Business and Labour History Group, The University of Sydney
Call for papers: Social Democratic Parties and Business:
An Historical Analysis p. 25
CHORD workshop: Retailing History: Texts and Images p. 26
CHORD Conference cfp p. 27
2009 CHORD New Research Prize p. 28
EBHA Doctoral Summer School, call for applications p. 29
Economics Network of the European Social Science
History Conference cfp p. 30
‘Fashions: Business Practices in Historical Perspective’ conference p. 32
Harvard Business School grants and fellowships in history p. 33
The Japan Business History Society (JBHS) p. 35
Kodak donates business archive to the British Library p. 36
Management History Conference cfp p. 38
‘Sheer dead loss’? The Business of Health, Safety & Risk symposium p. 39
2009 ABH CONFERENCE AND TONY SLAVEN GRANT
Programme p. 40
Registration form p. 51
Tony Slaven Grant p. 52
FEATURES
‘Colman prize finalists, 2008
David Bricknell, Visiting Fellow, University of Manchester
Intuition: the case for historical research
[David Bricknell was shortlisted for the 2008 Coleman prize for his PhD thesis reporting research into the exploitation of the Pilkington float glass process. At the core of his presentation at the 2008 ABH Conference was his emphasis on the impact of intuition in the strategic process. Set out below is a more detailed account of how historical analysis can be used to explore intuition, a concept which raised a few eyebrows at the Conference]
There is nothing particularly novel, at least for the historian, in examining the silences. In a different context Stephen J. Gould summarised the case perfectly as; “A cardinal rule of scholarly detection: Don’t only weigh what you have; ask why you don’t see what you ought to find. Negative evidence is important-especially when the record is sufficiently complete to indicate that an absence may be genuine” (1993 p.450). Gould was talking in the context of palaeontology, but for the sake of the current argument his synopsis applies; an archival record, like the fossil record, comprises all of our evidence and we must interpret it as best we can, including explaining the silences. A classic example for historians is the absence of references to women in the Victorian Hansard and the conclusions we can draw as to the Victorian attitude to women (Marwick, 2001).
A significant silence, which is now emerging from the shadows in organizational research, is human intuition and its role in strategic decision making. For many years rational analysis has been dominant in the study and prescription of strategic decision making. This is despite the fact that influential authors such as Barnard (1938/70) and Simon (1945/76) recognised that it was impossible for the analytical decision makers to have all the relevant knowledge and that therefore the decisions would be largely non-logical or, at best, boundedly rational. The non-logical process, or intuition, has had a chequered history. Whilst its role was recognised by the ancient Greeks (Osbeck, 1999) and intuition was always at the core of any philosophy of mind, there was a mystical quality to it which excluded it from the top table of rationality. “In our culture, the legacy of intuition is less than inspiring. Intuition is seen as something mysterious and unexplainable at best and as something inaccurate, hokey, or epiphenomenal at worst.” (Lieberman, 2000 p.109)
The recognition by psychologists that most of what we do is intuitive (e.g. Bargh and Chartrand, 1999) and the counter cultural finding (e.g. Miller and Ireland, 2005) that successful executives rely on ‘gut reaction’ (which was more macho than the whimsy of intuition) prompted the call in the organizational literature for more research into the precise role of intuition in the strategic process. Despite these calls there is relatively little empirical research into intuition, and this is mainly confined to the psychological literature (Dane and Pratt, 2007, Hodgkinson et al., 2008).
Whilst the psychologists can base their research on behavioural observations and interrogation in the controlled environment of the laboratory, research in the outside world of the organizational researcher is more problematic. Most of the research relies on the decision maker reporting on whether he uses intuition or analysis when making a decision. The dangers of relying on such evidence are well recognised (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977, Goldman, 2004). It is hardly reliable to ask the subject to report consciously on a unconscious process, especially as some aspects of intuitive knowledge are so deep seated that they are not capable of vocalisation or recall. It has been suggested that methods such as cognitive mapping or critical incidence research may produce more accurate reports (Hodgkinson et al., 2008, Clarke and Mackaness, 2001), but such techniques still require introspection by the subject of the research, and therefore involve some doubt about the accuracy of the response. Observational techniques are also inhibited by the difficulty of getting sufficient access to the course of the strategic process, which is not necessarily confined to the boardroom, and the complexity of the real world situations compared with the relatively straightforward tests and experiments utilised in the psychological research.
It is suggested that historical analysis may provide strong prima facie evidence of the use and content of intuitive thought in the strategic process; evidence which could then be reinforced with the use of participant observation and in depth interviews.
Many organizations preserve the record of their strategic process. Typically the minutes of the decision making boards or committees are carefully prepared and preserved, together with the folders of papers circulated in advance or tabled at the meetings as part of the briefing process for the directors. The minutes record the decisions and an outline of the debate. This outline may be very brief or quite extensive, depending on the style of the organization. The minutes are obviously a record of the conscious processes of the discussion. In addition it can be assumed that the papers circulated in advance or tabled at the meeting are in the conscious minds of the participants in the course of the discussion. The combination of the papers and the minutes represent the conscious analysis of the participants. It is possible that there some conscious elements which are not reflected in the paperwork, but for major decisions it is reasonable to expect that the papers are comprehensive and that the gaps in reporting are minimal.
Despite the emphasis on logical analysis in the strategic process the decisions researched did not necessarily follow logically from the recorded discussion and the papers. There were other, unrecorded, factors coming into play. The silences require explanation. If the organization is relatively large and successful, as it is likely to be if it has an archive worthy of research, then it is not sensible to explain the unvoiced factors as merely random flaws in the process. A decision making system strongly influenced by a random element is unlikely to survive for long. It is more reasonable to explain the silences as matters which the participants, whether the decision makers or the administrators recording the events, take for granted; the intuitive input to the process.
Given that intuition is based in experience (Epstein and Pacini, 1999), and the relevant experience is that gained in the business environment in general and the subject organization in particular, the researcher can return the archive to explore the business experience of the decision makers and uncover those factors which were both relevant to the decision and in the probable knowledge of the decision makers, even if they were not voiced. It is reasonable to assume that important decisions or outcomes in the past will not be forgotten by the directors and will form part of their intuitive expertise. If the directors have worked together over a period of years, even in more junior roles, it can be assumed that the experience forms part of their shared expertise and that they share the same assumptions. If a shared event in the past had been significant enough to be reported in the archive, it would have been a material part of the directors’ experience and can therefore be imputed into their intuitive expertise. The more frequently something is mentioned in the past the more probable it is that that matter has become ingrained.
My own researches were in the archives of Pilkington plc over the period 1947-1987, and in particular the single strategy of the development and exploitation of the float glass process. This process revolutionised the production of flat glass for both architectural and automotive use and allowed Pilkington to grow from a family owned company into the biggest and most widely based glass manufacturer in the world. The company was a good subject for the research for a number of reasons. It had a well preserved and comprehensive archive with not only the minutes and papers for all the relevant meetings, but also a wide collection of correspondence and other papers to provide background material. The strategy for the exploitation of the technology was central to the company’s performance and therefore was prominent in all of the strategic discussions. The directors at all of the relevant times had been with the company for the whole, or a significant part, of their careers and therefore their business experience was reflected in the archives of the company. The research was supported by interviews with surviving managers involved in the strategic process and my own observations in over 20 years with the company.
Using historical analysis of the archive it is therefore possible to both identify gaps in the reasoning for strategic outcomes and to fill those gaps by
uncovering the relevant factors which explain the difference between the recorded decision and the recorded discussion. The research into Pilkington, (Bricknell, 2009, forthcoming), revealed the very powerful influence of intuition.
One of the most fundamental decisions, whether to licence the technology to third parties, was never discussed. From the outset it was assumed that licences would be granted. To whom they would be granted and on what terms was discussed in great detail, but the decision to licence was intuitive. The directors shared enough knowledge of the relevant factors to take the outcome for granted, with no dissenting voice recorded at any time, even in retrospect.
Acquisitions were a core part of the strategy and the two largest took place in 1979 and 1982. In both cases the explicit, economic analysis was against the acquisitions and yet the board approved them. There were factors, significant but difficult to quantify, which were ingrained in the directors’ minds and which overruled the analysis. Admittedly in both cases the analysis was finely balanced, but nevertheless intuition had a significant impact on two decisions which proved to be very successful and essential to the company’s success.
A third example was the debate as to whether the technology should be made available outside the established glass making circle. The logical, economic argument (which was in favour of enlarging the circle) was repeatedly presented over a period of twelve months, yet the board could not be persuaded. Their intuitive response was to stick with the status quo which was based on all of their experience. Logic could not overcome the unvoiced, inbuilt prejudice against an outsider. It was only overcome when an external threat made the economic argument overwhelming. In each of the cases cited intuition was highly influential, despite the company priding itself on the quality of its analysis.
The emphasis in the research is on shared intuition. The board was composed of articulate, intelligent, ambitious men of differing professional training (although the majority were engineers) and motivation. The corporate record rarely reflects these differences. The board was firmly consensual, differing opinions were only occasionally reflected in the record as part of the debate. By the time the individuals had reached the board there was little scope for personal ambition; the chairmanship was largely preordained through the research period. The ambitions of the individuals were almost synonymous with their ambitions for the company, and therefore the intuitive input was to drive the business forward as a group rather than as an individual.