Initiating co-ordination platforms for Forest Management in the Terai.
June, 2003, by Frank van Schoubroeck[1] and A.L. Karna[2]
Published in:
Banko Jankari, Volume 13 Number 1
Department of Forest Research and Survey, Babar Mahal, Kathmandu, Nepal
Abstract
Over the last two decades, promising models for Terai forest management (parks, community forestry, scientific) were designed, proposed, and then failed to develop into modalities powerful enough to halt deforestation. Yet, the area is full of opportunities for synergy between ecological, economic and equity agendas. In the present Nepali socio-political reality, one needs the support of essential stakeholders for any management model to become successful. An open and democratic debate for forestry sector planning and credible monitoring are essential to build support and trust needed to start forestry sector development. In this end, the Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation is piloting so-called District Forestry Co-ordination Committees through two innovative programmes in eleven Terai districts, under legal provisions in the Local Self-Governance Act.
1 The forests with the golden fruits
1.1 Large forest resources are not managed wisely by default
Forest management in the Terai could provide livelihood to tens of thousands of households of Terai dwellers and provide substantial income for Nepal. Sustainable timber harvesting could yield around US$ 150 m annually (Hill, 1999; Khadka, 2000). Harvesting and processing of non-timber forest products (NTFPs), the prevention of losses by mitigating natural disasters, biodiversity and ecotourism represent a wealth of potential livelihood opportunities and revenue generation in the Terai forestry sector. Yet, these opportunities are presently being utilised in a hap-hazard and opportunistic fashion. MFSC (2000) and Hill (1999) calculate annual losses due to unsustainable harvesting in the Terai forests around 100 m US$; and forests deplete at around 1.3 % annually (DFRS, 1998).
The Terai forestry situation has been described in detail. For example, in NFA, 2000, analyses of the forestry situation are presented, and a variety of authors proposes as many solutions to the problems in the Terai forestry sector. So far, all proposed solutions suffered from the lack of support of one or the other essential stakeholder. Solutions take into account the technical reality, some proposals include some social considerations; but none gets sufficient support in the socio-political spectrum that started developing in the 1990’s. This article argues that Terai forestry sector problems can only be solved if essential stakeholders systematically interact, negotiate, and agree on a way to organise the management of forest resources. For that, it proposes the establishment of District Forestry Co-ordination Committees (DFCCs) where major stakeholders plan and monitor the developments in the local forestry sector.
1.2 Historically, Terai Forestry practices reflect society at large
Prior to 1950, forests of Nepal were regarded as an unlimited source of revenue for the state. The rules encouraged the farmers to convert forests into agricultural land to increase the tax base (Regmi, 1978). The government exported valuable timber and other forests products from the Terai region to the neighbouring state of India (Mahat et al., 1986). At the end of the Rana rule in 1951, at least one third of the forests of Nepal were under ‘birta’ tenure and three quarters of this land belonged to the Rana family (Regmi, 1978).
The practice of converting forestlands into farmlands continued even after the democracy of 1951. According to Joshi (1993) between 1951 and 1988 the government distributed 116,648 hectares of forested lands to about 100,658 families for farming, while an unofficial record estimated that an equal amount of forestlands was encroached. Active migration from hills to the Terai added to the existing Terai population. The government nationalised all the forests that were owned by de facto private owners in the form of ‘Birta’ and ‘Jagir’ by bringing the "Private Forest Nationalisation Act 1957", and vested the forest protection responsibility in the forest department (Joshi, 1993).
Following the then popular central planning development paradigm, two Forest Acts were passed in 1961 and 1967 which attributed the power of policing and licensing to the forest department staff. This created an atmosphere of fear, distrust and conflict between local people and forestry staff (Karna, 1998). In addition, several others Acts such as Land Grant Abolition Act, of 1959, Land Reform Act of 1964, and Pasture Land Nationalisation Act of 1974, all increased the power of forest department (Hobley and Malla, 1996). However, the Forest Department was not able to stop the trend of deforestation and encroachment. The policies of various Panchayat regimes did not stop illegal forestry activities, and the democratic movement blamed the governments for over-using the national forest resources for unspecified purposes.
A 20 years master plan for forestry sector MPFS published in 1989 focused on decentralisation, participation of local people in decision making, meeting basic needs, sustainable utilisation, equity and social peace. The political changes of early 1990, which abolished the party-less panchayat political system have had an impact on forest policy. The democratic process was initiated and people's rights were recognised. This resulted in the development of a variety of interest groups around Terai forests, as we will see in the following sections.
2 Stakes and interests in Terai Forest Management
2.1 Major jungle agendas
A resource such as the Terai forests naturally draws the interests of a wide range of stakeholder. One could grossly distinguish three major agendas concerning Terai forests: the open resource, the ecological, and the sustainable use agenda.
2.1.1 The “open resource” agenda
The open resource agenda is in fact a continuation of the policies of the 1950s and 1960s. At a time when forests are plenty, elite groups manage to get privileges to exploit common resources such as Terai forests. The Nepali situation of weak governance, poor checks and balances, and a poor arrangements between stakeholders, a strong conservation or management policy has not yet been enforced all over the forest areas. Groups of timber poachers, traders and smugglers are active, with occasional links to both legal and illegal political parties and bureaucrats, and with Indian traders. Other "illegal" users include large groups of poverty-stricken people who often came to the area under the patronage of individual Panchayat authorities, or have been marginalised under the flow of immigration from the hills. They harvest products for daily use or petty sale. In some areas they encroach forest and turn it into agriculture land. The Department of Forests has the official mandate to limit such activities. There is anecdotal evidence that a variety of arrangements between DoF-staff and local communities exist to limit poaching of timber and wildlife in the Terai, although they are not formalised by law or common practice.
2.1.2 The “ecological” agenda
A well-organised group of national ecologists and INGOs put forward the "ecological agenda": the Terai forests should be protected, so that its wealth of grasslands, wetlands and wildlife can thrive. The movement seems to be successful since the 1970s, when the Royal Chitwan National Park was declared. Now five major parks have been declared in the Terai and their expansion is an on-going process. Around parks bufferzones have been established in which participatory conservation strategies are being developed and implemented at sizeable scale. Declaration of protected areas has been quite successful in terms of biodiversity conservation, although the discussion on park management for biodiversity conservation (rather than protection alone) is yet to be initiated.
The ecologist lobby bases its agenda on a steady flow if international funds for nature conservation and apparently has good links with the policy-making elite. For example, in 1999 the Prime Minister declared a ban on green tree felling in the production forests of the Terai, showing his commitment to keeping the Terai forests intact, reportedly to build a greener image than the earlier Panchayat regimes. Another such example was the declaration of an extension of Bardia National Park as a "Gift to the Earth" by another Prime Minister during an International Conference on Biodiversity Conservation in November 2000. In the same spirit, the WWF proposed an agenda to connect major parks for the viability of large mammal populations: the Terai Arc Landscapes concept that MFSC readily accepted as a policy principle when it was presented.
It is difficult to say where the limits of the modality lays: at some point, the loss of revenues and livelihood opportunities of the local populace must limit the expansion of parks. However, unlike when productive management is proposed, activist NGOs never oppose expansion of protected areas. They could argue that in park areas people are deprived from the opportunity to participate in active forest management and producing an array of products for local and national interest.
2.1.3 The “sustainable use” agenda
The "sustainable use agenda” aims to turn present use into a legal and transparent productive management system. It aims to establish a forest management system for production of forest products, livelihood, employment, and protection of (downstream) productive landscape. With a legal “scientific” forest management mode, large groups of people can be employed in productive and protection activities, while local governments and the state levy royalties on timber and other products.
An interesting example of the “sustainable use” school of thought is the idea of so-called “scientific forest management”. Rooted in Nepal’s foresters’ dreams in the 1960s, in the early 1990s a Finnish-funded project developed a technical forest management scheme for Terai Sal forests. The project did extensive research resulting in the formulation of operational forest management plans. When implemented, the system would have led to increased forest production on a sustainable basis and improved protection of the forests (FMUDP-team, 1995). Friend and foe hailed the technical quality of the Finnish plans. The Bara OFMP comprised of a detailed plan for implementation by a Finnish-Nepali joint venture that was approved by the government. However, a few NGOs got the news that part of the revenue would be channeled back to the executing company, and mobilised the Bara population against the idea. DoF and FMUD were apparently not in a position to clarify the intentions and opportunities to the local policy makers and people, and the plans were dropped. Until now, Bara forests are not being seriously managed, resulting in an on-going degradation of ecological quality and loss of opportunities for employment and economic benefits. One could argue that, rather than the Finnish, Indian traders are now reaping the fruits of Bara forests, but in a largely uncontrollable and unsustainable fashion, and without paying royalties to the Nepali state.
The Community Forestry lobby represents a particular "branch" of the “sustainable use” school of thought. Its proponents argue that so far CF has been successful and therefore all forests must be handed over to local users as Community Forests. In the Terai some Community Forests were better protected than nearby government managed forest. Donors and donor-funded NGOs thus advocate the extension of CF (or its variant Leasehold Forestry) to the Terai, and turn down alternatives (e.g., Shresta, 1996, Mahapatra, 2001). On the other hand, MFSC and local leaders stress that the “CF or not CF”-discussion blurs the discussion on the real needs of the Terai forestry sector (e.g., Baral and Subedi, 1999; Baral, 2002; Rai, 2002). If CF in its present form will be applied widely in the Terai, elite groups get control over large forest resources excluding traditional users (at times resulting in open violence); different taxation for CF will distort the timber market; and the state will miss vast amounts of revenues resulting in further dependence on foreign donors for the development agenda.
Many authors proposed alternative approaches (e.g., Kanel, 2000; Baral and Subedi, 2000; Khadka, 2000). These culminated in MFSC proposing an alternative approach for Terai forestry, so-called Collaborative Forest Management (CFM) (MFSC, 2000), in which the Department of Forests was to collaborate with local forest users to meet the forest management objectives. At the time of its proposal, the concept was not detailed, but the tagging of a different label opened the opportunity to take a fresh look at the situation and design a “best-informed” forest management model for piloting. Rather than with individual households, a participatory model will have to work with institutions, such as VDCs and DDCs, NGOs, business associations, etc., representing the people. (Re-)distribution of resources then must be organised through trade and taxing rather than an individual relationships with the forest. CFM is now in the process of being elaborated as a third option next to both CF and National management, or could possibly be utilised as an umbrella model where each modality is applied in the area most appropriate within delineated blocks.
The various modalities that can be grouped under the “sustainable use” tag aim to address the on-going trend of deforestation by making forest resources productive. The biodiversity value of actively managed forests is likely to be high. Active management will create various succession habitats under developed harvesting schemes, and allow the forests to fulfil corridor and soil conservation functions.
2.2 Major jungle stakeholders
In the Terai, generally, the forests stretch out in the northern Terai up to the Churia hills range. Typically around half a million people live in the south towards the Indian border. A sizeable part of the district population traditionally has forest use rights, though not necessarily over remaining forest. In the Community Forestry model, individual houses are associated with particular patches of forest. In the Terai such associations are impossible (or at least impractical) to define, not only because of the large numbers of households involved, but also because there are conflicting claims over access rights. This suggests that in the Terai a different organisation model of users’ participation in forest management is needed.
Considering the various agendas, it is essential to know the major stakeholders in the forestry sector. Figure 1 shows a schematic sketch of Bara, a “typical” Terai district with the Churia range in the north, Terai block forests just south of that, and densely populated areas towards the Indian border. Even if Terai districts vary geographically, with regard to forests’ access rights, districts have the same pattern of large block forests and a complicated socio-economic lay-out.
Figure 1. Picture of a “typical” Terai district; loosely shaped after Bara.
2.3 Towards developing win-win situations
The image of major agendas is summarised in Table 1. The table shows a complicated set of interests and stakeholders. Traditionally, there is little communication between stakeholders, and agendas are not, or are hap-hazardly streamlined. There are “clashes” between stakeholders with a similar agenda. For example, both the Department of Forests and Community Forestry NGOs favour sustainable forest management, but they stumble over vocabulary and in the public arena they are fierce opponents. There are also occasional coalitions, often around a single rally point. For example, the wildlife lobby has links with the tourism industry (to show that wildlife conservation does have positive socio-economic impact); the community forestry lobby links with the wildlife lobby (as to show that CF is an ecologically better alternative than government managed forest); the timber industry links with DFO and user groups (as they supply raw materials) etc.