Darnell/USH

Early Cold War Activity:/35 pts

DBQ Essay Directions:

PROMPT:

“Throughout the Cold War the United States acted more like an arm of empire than a beacon of hope.” Support, refute or modify this statement as you analyze the causes, course and consequences of the Cold War.

Step 1:DBQ Plan

  1. AVMS each document on a separate sheet of paper.
  2. Complete the planning chart below on a separate sheet of paper.

Evidence / Origins / Course / Consequences
Document Evidence
Outside Knowledge
Historical Context or Contrarian Evidence

Step 2: Essay Writing

Write a cohesive essay response to the prompt above.

In your response do the following:

  1. Make a relevant claim that directly answers all parts of the prompt below
  2. Include supportive arguments in your claim that inform the reader as to the direction of your essay
  3. Support your claim and arguments with evidence from a significant majority of the documents
  4. Include analysis of a significant majority of the documents into your argument
  5. Focus your document analysis on at least one of the following: intended audience, purpose, point of view or historical context
  6. Support your argument with analysis of historical evidence outside the documents
  7. Extend your argument by connecting it to different historical contexts and/or account for contrarian evidence/perspectives

Specifications:

  1. Times New Roman 12 font
  2. 1 inch margins all around
  3. Title page, page numbers required
  4. MLA format Works Cited page required for all outside knowledge beyond the documents provided
  5. Minimum 2 pages maximum 3 pages

DBQ Scoring:35 pts

  1. Doc AVMS & DBQ Plan 5 pts
  2. Claim and Arguments3 pts
  3. Evidence (Doc and Outside)10 pts
/
  1. Analysis10pts
  2. Historical Context/Contrarian5 pts
  3. Conventions Quality2 pts

Presentation Directions:

  1. Groups must create a Presentation Plan
  2. revealing the content and slide responsibilities of each member, including formatting, title page and works cited page
  3. showing the order of the presentation material
  4. displaying how the content will be placed on the slides (space management)
  5. All members must participate equally in terms of preparation and presentation time to earn satisfactory score on presentation quality/equality section
  6. Your presentation must answer the following prompt:

“Throughout the Cold War the United States acted more like an arm of empire than a beacon of hope.” Support, refute or modify this statement as you analyze the causes, course and consequences of the Cold War.

  1. Your presentation must make a relevant claim that directly answers all parts of the prompt
  2. Include supportive arguments in your claim that inform the listener as to the direction of your presentation
  3. Support your claim and arguments with evidence from a significant majority of the documents
  4. Include analysis of a significant majority of the documents into your argument
  5. Focus your document analysis on at least one of the following: intended audience, purpose, point of view or historical context
  6. Support your argument with analysis of historical evidence outside the documents
  7. Extend your argument by connecting it to different historical contexts and/or account for contrarian evidence/perspectives

Specifications:

  1. 12-15 minute presentation
  2. Team members must speak at least 3 consecutive minutes to receive satisfactory group and individual scores
  3. Text should be limited to no more than 10 words per slide
  4. Text should be key words, names, phrases, etc. that presenters amplify the significance of
  5. Images such as photos, charts, graphs, political cartoons, etc. should be focus on slides, not text

Presentation Scoring:35 pts

  1. Presentation Plan5 pts
  2. Individual Contribution20 pts
  3. Presentation Quality/Equality8 pts
  4. Brag Sheet2 pts

Document A: The Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1940

The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister,Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self -government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security;

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measure which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

Signed:Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill

Document B:Gar Alperovitz, Author, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, as quoted in the New York Times: Upfront Magazine, March 16, 2015

“When General Dwight D. Eisenhower, then Supreme Allied Commander, was informed by the U.S. Secretary of War that the atomic bomb was going to be used, . . . Eisenhower said the bomb was ‘no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives.’ After the war as president . . . he even stated publicly: ‘It wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing’. . . .

Even Admiral William Leahy, President Truman’s chief of staff, later called the bomb a ‘barbarous weapon’ that should not have been used. Leahy wrote, ‘The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender. . . . In being the first to use it, we . . . adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages.’”

Document C:Andrew Cayton, America: Pathways to the Present, Pearson Prentice Hall: Boston, MA 2007

“There were a number of alternative possibilities for ending the war: massive invasion of Japan, naval blockade to starve Japan,demonstration of the weapon to pressure Japan to surrender, a softening of demands for an unconditional surrender. . . .

Heavy American casualties at Iwo Jima and Okinawa were a factor in . . . support for using the bomb. . .

Truman had no difficulty making up his mind. He considered the bomb to be a military weapon and had no doubt that is should be used. Truman never regretted his decision, as indicated in his August 6, 1945 press release, the day the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima: ‘We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city. . . . Let there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan’s power to make war.’ To his critics in 1963 Truman said, ‘You should do your weeping at Pearl Harbor.’”

Document D:President Harry S. Truman, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947

To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations, The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States. . . .

The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of theCharter of the United Nationsby such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of theCharter of the United Nations. . . .

I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds, I have taken into consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the $350,000,000 which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war.

Document E:Bloomberg Businessweek, September 2, 2014

Document F:Thank you note from a German child living in 1948 Berlin

Document G:Cleveland News Headline, September 28 1956

Document H:Herblock, The Washington Post, 1949

Document I:Washington, June 27, 1950--The text of President Truman's statement today on Korea:

“. . . In Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the Thirty-eighth Parallel. This they have not done, but on the contrary have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution. . . .

In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support. . . .

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. . . .”

Document J:Herblock, “I’ts okay . . . We’re Hunting Communists”, The Washington Post, 1947

Document K:U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, U2 Overflights and the Capture of Francis Gary Powers, 1960:

On May 1, 1960, Francis Gary Powers, the pilot of an American U-2 spyplane, was shot down while flying though Soviet airspace. The fallout over the incident resulted in the cancellation of the Paris Summit scheduled to discuss the ongoing situation in divided Germany, the possibility of an arms control or test ban treaty, and the relaxation of tensions between the USSR and the United States.

. . . before they had confirmation that Powers had survived, U.S. officials claimed that the U-2 had been conducting a routine weather flight but experienced a malfunction of its oxygen delivery system that had caused the pilot to black out and drift over Soviet air space. On May 7, however, Khrushchev revealed that Powers was alive and uninjured, and clearly had not blacked out from oxygen deprivation. Moreover, the Soviets recovered the plane mostly intact, including the aerial camera system. It became instantly apparent that the weather survey story was a cover-up for a spy program. . . . Eisenhower, however, refused to issue a formal apology to the Soviet Union; . . . On May 11, Eisenhower finally acknowledged his full awareness of the entire program and of the Powers flight in particular. Moreover, he explained that in the absence of an “open skies” agreement, such spy flights were a necessary element in maintaining national defense, and that he planned to continue them.

. . . Ultimately, (Khrushchev) demanded that Eisenhower apologize for the past flights and promise to discontinue them as a precondition for entering into the planned negotiations on Germany. Eisenhower’s refusal led the Soviet delegation to leave Paris just as the summit was about to begin.

Document L:Logos of departments created by the National Security Act, 1947

Document M:National Security Council Paper #68 Overview, April 1950, Department of the Sate, Office of the Historian

National Security Council Paper NSC-68 (entitled “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security” and frequently referred to as NSC-68) was a Top-Secret report completed by the U.S. Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff on April 7, 1950. The 58-page memorandum is among the most influential documents composed by the U.S. Government during the Cold War, and was not declassified until 1975. Its authors argued that one of the most pressing threats confronting the United States was the “hostile design” of the Soviet Union. The authors concluded that the Soviet threat would soon be greatly augmented by the addition of more weapons, including nuclear weapons, to the Soviet arsenal. They argued that the best course of action was to respond in kind with a massive build-up of the U.S. military and its weaponry

Document N:Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, as quoted in Life Magazine, 1956

“The ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art. If you cannot master it, you inevitably get into war. If you try to run away from it, if you are scared to go to the brink, you are lost.”

Document O:President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address, 1961

“Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action. . . . We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. . . . [in] government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”

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