State-By-State Survey of School Finance Litigation

Updated: 2/6/2006

State-by-State Survey of School Finance Litigation

ALABAMA

Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 2002)

The Court in this case entered an order sua sponte to dismiss the state’s school funding litigation started over 10 years earlier and withdraw from involvement in school funding matters on the ground that its involvement is an intrusion into legislative affairs. The Court noted the state constitutional provision stating that theCourt "shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men," Ala. Const. 1901, § 43 (emphasis added by Court), noted that “[c]oncerns regarding judicial restraint and the separation of powers have constituted a repeated refrain in this litigation,” and concluded, “[W]e now recognize that any specific remedy that the judiciary could impose would, in order to be effective, necessarily involve a usurpation of that power entrusted exclusively to the Legislature. Accordingly, compelled by the authorities discussed above -- primarilyby our duty under § 43 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 -- we complete our judicially prudent retreat from this province of the legislative branch in order that we may remain obedient to the command of the people of the State of Alabama that we "never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men." 836 So.2d at 814, 815, 819.

Ex parte James, 713 So.2d 869 (Ala. 1997).

The Court vacated in part, as premature, the remedial order entered by the trial court following a ruling that the state’s public school system failed to satisfy the constitutional mandate, stating that it did not disapprove of the remedial plan ordered by the trial court, it only disapproved of the plan’s timing. The Court stated: “[T]he judiciary should not presume at the outset of litigation of this nature that legislative and executive officials will be derelict in their duties. Indeed, it must assume the contrary. The best approach for the judiciary, having invalidated the present public education system, would be to stay further action in the case--but retaining jurisdiction--for a reasonable time, thus affording the legislative and executive officials the first opportunity to devise a constitutional public education system. In other words, the judiciary should--upon its first encounter with this species of litigation--forgo specific remedial action until the coordinate branches of government have had a reasonable opportunity to discharge their constitutional responsibilities consistent with its holding of liability.” 713 So.2d at 882 (emphasis in original).

Pinto v. Alabama Coal. for Equity, 662 So. 2d 894 (Ala. 1995).

Several groups brought class action lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of Alabama's system of public elementary and secondary education, which they contended did not offer equitable and adequate opportunities to the schoolchildren of the state, including children with disabilities. The class actions were consolidated and divided into a liability phase and a remedy phase. The trial court found that the system of public schools violated the statutory and constitutional rights of schoolchildren, and it ordered various state officers to establish and maintain a public school system that provided adequate and equitable opportunities for all children. Two days before a fairness hearing set to assess the reasonableness of a remedy plan, the intervenors sought to intervene as of right, and the trial court denied their motions. The court held that they were entitled to intervene in the remedy phase as a matter of right because of the unique nature of the litigation and the fact that the intervenors purported to represent individuals that were not already represented.

Opinion of the Justices, No. 338, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1993)

After the CircuitCourtofMontgomeryCounty (Alabama) held that the state’s public school system failed to comply with the mandate of Ala. Const. art. XIV, § 256, legislation was introduced in the state senate, including a finding (based on a finding of the trial court) that the Legislature was required “to provide schoolchildren with substantially equitable and adequate educational opportunities.”The senate sought an advisory opinion as to whether that finding was correct, and the Alabama Supreme Court advised that it was.

Alabama Coal. for Equity (ACE) v. Hunt, 1993 WL 204083 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1993), appendix to Opinion of the Justices, No. 338, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1993).

The Circuit Court determined that plaintiffs were entitled to a declaratory judgment that the state’s system of public schools violated the constitutional mandate of article XIV, § 256, and the provisions of article I §§ 1, 6, 13, and 22 of the Alabama Constitution (due process and equal protection clauses), because it failed to provide “equitable and adequate educational opportunities to all schoolchildren” and failed to provide “appropriate instruction and special services” to children with disabilities.

ALASKA

Moore v. State of Alaska, 3AN-04-9756 CIV (Superior Court of AlaskaSept. 16, 2004).

The charge is that the current system of education in Alaska is unconstitutional because the constitutionally guaranteed education is not being adequately funded, and because the money that is being provided is not being distributed fairly. More information, including an order denying the State's motion to dismiss the case, is available at .

Kasayulie v. State of Alaska, 3AN-97-3782 CIV (Superior Court of Alaska Sept. 1, 1999).

Plaintiffs in this case alleged constitutional violations on the basis of equity and adequacy, and the court decided in their favor, ruling that the state’s system of funding school facilities violated the equal protection and education clauses of the state constitution and the implementing regulations of Title VI of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.More information is available at .

ARIZONA

Roosevelt Elementary Sch.Dist. No. 66 v. State of Arizona, 74 P.3d 258, review denied2004 Ariz. LEXIS 8 (2004).

Eight school districts brought this action, claiming that the legislature’s failure to fund the Building Renewal Fund authorized in the state school funding statute resulted in a constitutional violation. The Court disagreed, and found no constitutional violation since the districts had failed to show any unmet needs relating to academic achievement caused by the legislature’s failure to fund the program.

Crane Elementary School District v. State of Arizona, Superior Court of Arizona, order dated November 27, 2003

Seven school districts bring an action claiming that the State’s school finance system is in violation of the education clause of theArizona Constitution (Article XI, Section 1) because it fails to provide programs needed by at-risk students to meet the State’s academic standards.More information is available at .

Flores v. Arizona, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23177 (D. Ariz.June 12, 2002).

In 1999, plaintiff parents filed an action seeking declaratory relief against the State of Arizona and various school districts alleging that the State failed to provide limited English proficient children with a uniform program of instruction. Flores v. Arizona, 48 F. Supp. 2d 937 (D. Ariz. 1999). As a result, in 2000, the court ordered the state to conduct a cost study to determine a level of funding that would effectively implement English language acquisition programs in the state. Flores v. Arizona, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1043(D. Ariz. 2000). After the study was completed, the parents claimed, inter alia, that the amount of moneyappropriated by the legislature was insufficient. After further review, upon the State’s motion for reconsideration, the Court dismissed the parents’ claims, finding that the funding levels appropriated by the legislaturebore a rational relationship to the estimated cost of the school district’s language acquisition program.

Hull v. Albrecht,960 P.2d 634 (1998) ("Albrecht II").

The Arizona Supreme Court ruled that a state school funding statute was unconstitutional on the ground that it failed to provide for the establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school system, since it provided that school district participation in the plan was optional. The Court stated, “Differentially enabling two classes of districts to access their respective property bases results in systemic, structural differences in the ability of districts to exceed state minimums through local funding. Because of these structural differences, the Act as a whole continues to formalize and perpetuate a structure that fails the general and uniform test.”960 P.2d at 639.

Hull v. Albrecht, 950 P.2d 1141 (1997) ("Albrecht I").

The legislature amended the state’s school financing system to include the Assistance to Build Classrooms (ABC) fund, which attempted to remedy funding disparities among districts by providing need-based income to poor districts. The Supreme Court held that the legislation failed to meet the constitutional requirement of a uniform system of schools, because it caused continued substantial disparities among districts, it impermissibly delegated to local districts the responsibility to provide adequate capital facilities, and it failed to satisfy the constitutional mandate of adequate capital facilities throughout the state.

Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (1994).

The Arizona Supreme Court ruled that the state's school funding system did not satisfy the constitutional requirement for the establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school system, since it caused substantial “capital facility disparities.”877 P.2d at 815.

ARKANSAS

Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 2005 Ark. LEXIS 649 (Ark. Oct. 27, 2005).

On October 3, 2005, two court-appointed special masters reported to the Arkansas Supreme Court that Arkansas's 2005 school funding legislation did not provide sufficient funding to the schools. 2005 Ark. LEXIS 577 (Ark.Oct. 4, 2005). Then, on October 27, 2005, pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2), the State served written comments and objections to the Master’s Report, which the Court will consider once briefs are filed on both sides.

LakeView Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, _ S.W.3d _ (2005), 2005 WL 1358308 (Ark.June 9, 2005).

In April 2005, the RogersSchool District filed a motion with the Arkansas Supreme Court seeking to have the Court reopen the LakeView school funding case, arguing the state legislature failed to follow the court's mandate to fund public education adequately. Forty-eight other school districts joined in the motion as third-party intervenors or amici curiae. In a brief opinion issued in June 2005, the Supreme Court reopened jurisdiction and recalled its mandate in Lake View III. The Court reappointed the two special masters who had previously reviewed the legislature’s 2003 and 2004 enactments to make findings of fact on plaintiffs’ allegation that the state’s 2005 enactments failed to satisfy the Lake View III ruling. The Court gave the special masters until September 1, 2005 to issue a report, unless they need additional time. The Court rejected the state’s argument that plaintiffs must file a new lawsuit. The Court pointed to the need for a speedy resolution of plaintiffs’ claims and cited its constitutional duty to ensure that the state meets its "goal of an adequate and substantially equal education for all Arkansasstudents."

LakeView Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, _ S.W.3d _, 2004 WL 1406270, 2004 Ark. LEXIS 425 (Ark.June 18, 2004). (Lake View IV).

The Supreme Court issued a decision ending its jurisdiction over the LakeView case. The Court reviewed the special masters’ report, noted the legislature’s progress in reforming the school finance system and released jurisdiction of the case citing the separation of powers doctrine. The Court did not rule on a specific definition of an adequate system for funding education.

LakeView Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002).

The Court rejected plaintiffs’ claim that the state equal protection clause required the state to provide equal access to preschool education, if the state either directly or indirectly funds some school districts that are providing early childhood education. The Court also rejected the argument of school district intervenors that the state must provide preschool education under the education clause as an essential component of an adequate education. The Court concluded that it lacked the authority to order the state to implement any specific programmatic remedy, including state-funded preschool, since such programs were a matter of public policy left to the authority of the state legislature.

Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark.1983).

The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the state’s system of allocating funds among school districts violated the state constitution's guarantee of equal protection and its requirement that the state provide a “general, suitable, efficient system” of education, ruling that the state’s property tax system, on which the state’s system of school funding was based, had no “rational relationship to the educational needs of the individual districts….”651 S.W.2d at 93.

CALIFORNIA

Williams v. State, Super. Ct. San Francisco County (settled August 2004).

Several advocacy organizations filed this class action in May 1999, alleging inadequate conditions in schools throughout the state and seeking an order requiring the state to ensure the provision of educational basics such as qualified teachers, safe facilities, and textbooks. The case was settled in August 2004. The terms require the state to (1) provide $800 million for school repairs and $139 million for instructional materials, (2) create a school facilities needs assessment program, (3) create standards for instructional materials and facilities, and (4) eliminate the staggered and shortened school year by 2012. Notice of Settlement and other information available online at the California Department of Education Website @ .

Butt v. State of California, 842 P.2d 1240 (Cal.1992).

The California Supreme Court ruled that the state was responsible for the fundamental educational rights of students and that the state must take action to address a local district's inability to provide an education basically equivalent to that provided by other districts in the state. In so ruling, the Court stated that the California State Constitution makes public education “afundamental concernof the State and prohibits maintenance and operation of the common public school system in a way which denies basic educational equality to the students of particular districts. The State itself bears the ultimate authority and responsibility to ensure that its district-based system of common schools provides basic equality of educational opportunity.” 842 P.2d at 1251.

California Teachers Ass’n v. Hayes, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1992), review denied 1992 Cal. LEXIS 3957.

The Court upheld the state legislative action to include child care funding in the calculation of minimum education funding, rejecting the claim that such action was beyond the Legislature's constitutional authority. The Court noted that the Legislature had "explained its purpose for including child care and development funds in the . . . funding guarantee," by stating, among other things, "the Legislature has stated its intent that early childhood education and child development programs be a 'concomitant part of the educational system' by providing young children an equal opportunity for later school success." 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703 n.3.

Serrano v. Priest, 200 Cal. App. 3d 897 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1986).

The California appellate court upheld the state school funding system under an equal protection challenge, finding that wealth-related disparities between school districts had been reduced to insignificance.

Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal.1971) (“Serrano I”).

The California Supreme Court ruled that the state’s property-tax-based school finance system was unconstitutional, stating that “[T]he California public school financing system, … as presently constituted is not necessary to the attainment of any compelling state interest. Since it does not withstand the requisite ‘strict scrutiny,’ it denies to the plaintiffs and others similarly situated the equal protection of the laws.”5 Cal. 3d at 614-15, 487 P.2d at 1263.

Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal.3d 728, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal.1976) (“Serrano II”).

The California Supreme Court ruled that “the school financing system…has been shown … to involve a suspect classification … and … that classification affects the fundamental interest of the students of this state in education.” It stated, “the system denied state equal protection provisions under the state constitution.”18 Cal. 3d at 766, 557 P.2d at 951.

COLORADO

Haley v. Colorado Dept. of Educ., District Court of Colorado, City and County of Denver, Case No. 02CV5149 (filed July 3, 2002).

Plaintiffs in this case allege that the state’s system of school finance results in “dramatic disparities” in districts’ abilities to provide for the education of disabled students and therefore denies those students of the state constitutional guarantees of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools, equal protection and due process. Complaint available @ .

Lujan v. ColoradoState Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005(Colo. 1982).

The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the state Public School Finance Act of 1973, rejecting plaintiffs’ claims that the statute violated the state constitutional right to equal protection and the requirement of a thorough and uniform system of public schools.

CONNECTICUT

Sheff v. O'Neill, 238 Conn. 1, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).

Plaintiffs, children in the school district of the City of Hartford, claimed that the state’s school districting scheme, which placed district lines at town boundaries, resulted in racial and ethnic isolation and failed to provide them with the resources necessary to obtain a minimally adequate education, and therefore violated their rights under the equal protection and education clauses of the state constitution. The Supreme Court of Connecticut ruled that the state’s system deprived those children of their rights to substantially equal educational opportunity, and that the state legislature was required to take affirmative responsibility to remedy segregation in the public schools, regardless of whether that segregation had occurred de jure or de facto. The Court also determined that the claim regarding a minimally adequate education did not implicate the constitutional right to a substantially equal educational opportunity, and found that it unnecessary to reach the merits of this claim under the education clause of the constitution.

Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359(Conn.1977).

The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the state’s school finance system, which was dependent primarily on the local tax base without regard to disparity in districts’ financial ability to finance an educational program and with no significant equalizing state support, violated the state constitution, as it was not "appropriate legislation" implementing the constitutional requirement that the state provide a substantially equal educational opportunity to its youth in its free public elementary and secondary schools.