CIVIL SOCIETY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Conference Paper by Richard Crook (IDS)
The case-studies from Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa reveal the rich variety and historical embeddedness of civil society in Africa. They also demonstrate once again the inadequacy of a normative conception of civil society which seeks to restrict the analysis to voluntary associations which are self-consciously in opposition to the state and can represent more than parochial, communal or economic interests (Bayart, 1986). In the African context, within each state there are many civil societies and a multiplicity of publics.
Four main themes which are of wider interest emerge from a comparison of the African cases:
(1) The importance of variations in the degree of historical rootedness and social embeddedness amongst different civil society organisations (CSOs) and in the configuration of each civil society. But whilst embeddedness is a critical dimension of state-civil society relations, and of CSO strategies, it does not necessarily explain all outcomes.
(2) The significance of the regime context and of conjunctural factors such as the processes of liberalisation and democratisation which accompanied the revival of civil society in the 1990s. Even though particular to each country, such factors illustrate the deeper and more general importance of state action in determining the character of CSOs and the framework within which they operate.
(3) The extent to which the strategies and outcomes of CSO action are determined by their membership basis (class, status, ethnic or social interest group) and level of operation. In the African context, the differences between elite, policy-oriented CSOs on the one hand, and grassroots CBOs or socially rooted CSOs on the other are so great that one may raise doubts as to whether the former in particular are best analysed through a ‘civil society’ perspective.
(4) The general concern with the role of foreign donors in setting agendas, and acting as patrons and sometimes even as participants in CSO activity.
1. The historical roots of civil society
In all five countries civil society organisations have a long history dating from the marketisation of their economies during the colonial (and in Nigeria precolonial) periods. Thus the commercialisation of peasant agriculture in Uganda, Tanzania and Nigeria, settler capitalism in Kenya, industrialisation in South Africa and external trade and urbanisation in all five interacted with pre-existing societies to produce the characteristic forms of civil society found in each country. By the end of the colonial period (excepting South Africa) two of the most deeply rooted kinds of CSO found in these African states were the community-based development association -- often overlapping with the leadership of local churches -- and ethnic cultural and economic associations.
Since the 1950s in Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria, competitive, politicized ethnic and communal associations have dominated relations between the state and civil society, underpinning years of violent contestation over state power and authoritarian patronage politics. In Kenya, business and political elites consolidated around ethnicized channels of state patronage (e.g. GEMA). In Tanzania, by contrast, local and ethnic associations were successfully coopted (including those of Zanzibar) into a different form of national elite- dominated state -civil society relations , whilst permitting very localised forms of organisation and public life. In South Africa the state repressed at an early date all forms of legitimate association, particularly class-based; but was unable to prevent the emergence of church-based democratic movements and urban community associations of a semi-legal kind.
In all five states, however, there has been since the 1960s a common experience of cooptation, repression and indeed destruction of civil society, particularly of class or economic groups which had any capacity for an autonomous existence. But the long term significance of the ‘multiple publics’ characteristic of civil society in these countries was dramatically demonstrated during the democratisation and liberalisation period which began in the 1990s. Side by side with the new generations of ‘civic’ pro-democracy, human rights and women’s associations, the old community-based and ethnic CSOs have re-emerged as strongly as ever -- more dominant, in fact, as the older ‘class’- type groups such as trade unions and farmers movements seem to have been permanently weakened.
Civil society -governance processes in these African states are therefore structured in fundamental ways -- for good or ill -- by these deeply embedded and economically powerful communal and ethnic forms of association. It is for this reason that so many of the researchers report only weak or limited outcomes from the activities of CSOs which have little or no ‘constituency’ in society, few resources and limited ‘political’ weight (e.g. human rights, professional associations and land reform alliances in Uganda and Kenya; the NCEC constitutional reform lobby in Kenya; the Trade Unions Federation in Tanzania). But being deeply embedded does not guarantee success or influence; some CSOs developed mutually beneficial relations with the state because they formed part of the regime’s attempt to establish a ‘hegemonic alliance’.
2. Regime context and state determination of civil society activity.
In general terms, the re-emergence of civil society in the 1990s is undoubtedly linked to the various kinds of democratisation/liberalisation processes which were initiated in this period. But it is by no means clear that the impetus for democratisation came from civil society. In Tanzania and Kenya, single party regimes initiated reforms which were to some extent geared to accommodating the threat from both internal and external critics, but which at the same time enabled the regime to keep control of the process itself. Openings, or ‘new political spaces’ have been created, but very much on the regimes’ terms.
The new regime in Uganda, for instance, took power by force of arms in 1986 and then ‘permitted’ (and manipulated) a process of opening up which benefited chosen groups. In Nigeria, by contrast, civil society organisations did emerge (or re-emerge) in the context of the struggle against an extremely repressive and violent military regime; but at the same time, many were also created by the military itself in an attempt to legitimise a ‘pacted transition’. The realm of civil society in Nigeria therefore remains highly contested and conflictual, particularly as ethno-regional formations are especially strong. In South Africa, the struggle against apartheid was so long and violent and civil society so thoroughly repressed or co-opted into one or other of the political sides, that it is difficult to accept much of the optimism that surrounds the subject under the post-1994 ANC regime. Although undoubtedly a democratic regime in spirit, the ANC like the NRM is suspicious of groups outside of its fold. It is even less comfortable with the legacy of the urban ‘civic associations’ many of which (unlike the rural ‘small town’ or urban associations of East and West Africa) have degenerated from their original role as grassroots ANC front organisations into semi-criminal rackets.
Beyond the ‘conjunctural’ factors provided by the context of 1990s reform and transition, the specific political composition, ideology and support base of each regime had a determining effect both on the kinds of CSOs which emerged and on the outcomes of CSO-government interaction. Old habits die hard, and all of the new or reformed regimes in the African cases continued to approach civil society in a spirit of control, cooptation and politicisation.
In Uganda, the NRM’s ‘no-party’ system permitted it build alliances with ‘chosen’ groups which suited its purposes. Thus the women’s movement and the disabled achieved considerable success and influence because, according to one analyst, they were seen as non-threatening and useful for supplying loyal cadres in national and local political bodies. [1]At the same time, shifting alliances with the different ethnic political movements have been used to strengthen presidential power. In Kenya, by contrast, women’s movements at the national level achieved much less success since the regime had little interest in playing to their agenda. The clearest example of the ‘regime’ factor is to be seen in Nigeria and Tanzania, where ‘official’ women’s organisations approved by the regime were lavishly funded and given powerful positions (NCWS in Nigeria, TAMWA in Tanzania) whereas women’s groups which challenged the regime politically e.g. even by taking up ‘political’ issues, or siding with the opposition were harassed, closed down by deregistration or (as in the case of Women in Nigeria) subjected to violent harassment and detentions.
In both Nigeria and Kenya, analysts note the ‘parallel civil society’ phenomenon; in whatever sector of society a CSO emerges, the regime creates a pro-government organisation to rival it, or funds factional conflict within the original CSO. Trade unions, women’s groups, human rights and civic education groups, even religious associations have been particularly subjected to this tactic
Particularly where civil society is weak, therefore, and does not have autonomous economic resources, regimes can easily set a framework of rules, incentives and sanctions which will determine the shape and outcomes of CSO activity. (Only in a few African states have concentrations of economic and political power been constructed which suggest the existence of a bourgeois class with the power to make and unmake regimes rather than vice versa).
3. The character of CSOs and their modes of operation
The case studies reveal a range of CSOs which differ radically in terms of their membership basis and levels of operation; these factors clearly determine the kinds of strategies and goals which they pursue. Three main types can be identified:
- Elite groups (nearly always organised as NGOs) with a ‘policy orientation’ -- i.e. they seek to influence legislation or general policy outcomes. They form part of what might be called the policy elite or ‘policy community’ of the state, a community which includes foreign donors as well as national politicians and officials. Their success depends very much on the balance of internal ‘elite factions’, and regime politics. Hence, as noted, the success of women’s groups such as ACFODE in Uganda, or NCWS in Nigeria, and the mixed record of human rights groups, NGOs and professional associations interested in law reform. The media form part of this world --- and, as the Nigerian case shows, can suffer terrible repression if they challenge the political elite at its core.
- Locally organised, grassroots, community based groups (in Kenya, called ‘Green’ movements) such as the Landlord/Tenant Association Vigilante Committees in Ibadan, the local environmental/ethnic community movements of the Niger Delta, social clubs of the marginalised groups and ‘free women’ in Zaria, and the women’s community groups in the urban slum areas of Mombasa and Nairobi. These attempts by poor and disadvantaged social groups to develop collective representation of their interests -- and hence to act in the public realm -- evince little interest in abstract ‘policy’ issues or ‘better governance’. They interact with state agencies in very specific, localised ways in order to protect themselves and their livelihoods and to improve their social/economic position. Their tactics are informal, usually non-confrontational and rely on bargaining and self empowerment in relations with officials. They illustrate very vividly the conception of civil society as an integral part of the ‘public realm’ of the state, as in the ‘unequal partnerships’ developed between the police and vigilante groups, or between police, local bureaucrats and the women of the northern Nigerian social clubs. Their relationship in some ways is that of an ‘exchange’ -- protection, or withholding of abusive or oppressive behaviour by state officials, in return for ‘services’ or co-production of welfare. But the state retains its power to close down or destroy, and seeks always to maintain their dependence.
- Socially embedded groups with large memberships, such as the ethnic and business associations, trade unions, churches, farmers’ unions; these have formed the basis of political campaigns or national coalitions surrounding constitutional and legal reforms. They also interact with political parties (particularly Kenya, Nigeria) and are the best example of the idea of ‘political society’ in action. As noted under (1), they possess the greatest potential for determining governance outcomes given the dependence of African regimes on balancing the interests which they represent. But, as the studies show, they may have less interest in ‘democracy’ than in maintaining existing, well-established systems of power and patronage distribution. Both in Kenya and Nigeria, it might be argued that the best one can hope for from democratic competition is a more open and peacefully ordered set of bargaining relations for such distributions.
In studying the elite, policy-oriented organisations as examples of ‘civil society’ in action we may well be forgetting that they resemble more the lobbyists, pressure groups and policy networkers who have long been studied by political scientists. The leaders of organisations such as ACFODE, NCWS, TAMWA. or the Uganda Law Society are already ‘insiders’, members of the national political and social elite who know how to directly access Ministers, high officials and decision makers. Indeed, in some cases their members are themselves Ministers and officials (particularly women’s groups in Nigeria, Uganda-- the so-called ‘femocrats’). In this respect it may be more illuminating to analyse their operations through the lens of concepts such as ‘policy community’ or ‘policy network’ than that of civil society.
4. The role of donors and the ‘donor agenda’
The African cases show a particular concern with the role of donors, both as agenda setters and as patrons and funders. This is perhaps because in many African countries (in this set, particularly Uganda and Tanzania), aid has come to form a significant proportion of the development budget and both official international funding agencies and NGOs are significant players in the domestic policy community. How far can donor encouragement and funding go before we can talk of ‘fake’ CSOs and real loss of legitimacy, ideological imperialism or lack of domestic constituency? One Kenyan analyst talks of a new donor ‘regime of truths’ constructed by northern ‘knowledge industries’ -- ideological hoops through which African CSOs jump in order to get funding. In the case of human rights organisations, for instance, some argue that they have no domestic constituency when they campaign against the death penalty (Uganda); and that their campaigns are only permitted because they confine themselves to issues acceptable to the donors and the government. In the area of gender equality, women’s groups have been criticised for campaigns to bring in land law reforms which change local custom or culture and do not necessarily benefit poor rural women: for instance, compulsory joint ownership by spouses, which may make it more difficult for women to own land in their own right!
While it is true that many recent CSOs in the gender and human rights fields are almost wholly dependent on donor funding or foreign NGO organisation, the anti-donor case can be overstated. It is argued that the national state, CSOs and donors form a tri-partite set of political relationships, with alliances changing according to circumstances. The support of foreign NGOs against repressive dictatorship has been extremely important in sustaining the media for instance, and it is not always true that the donors only support ‘comfortable’ human rights issues or elites. Some e.g. in Kenya, are active in helping ‘green’ movements to organise, and the Kenyan regime in fact regards many donors as part of the radical opposition-- an unfortunate and probably illegitimate role which enables the government to smear its opponents as ‘foreign stooges’.
Conclusion
The fact remains that a sustainable and socially rooted civil society cannot remain dependent on donor funding; and in Africa, organisations which collapse or disappear as soon as the donors lose interest clearly have little local constituency. The most powerful and deeply rooted elements of civil society remain those associations most disliked by many donors -- communal and ethnic, cultural or religious collectivities. But any progress towards more democratic forms of governance has to devise ways of acknowledging these social realities whilst at the same time creating structures which can accommodate ‘benign’ forms of competition -- or cross-cutting forms of association. Only perhaps in South Africa are there equally powerful, alternative forms of state-civil society structuration available, deriving from a long history of class and party organisation. Tanzania remains one of the few tropical African states which managed to prevent a strong tradition of ethnic mobilisation from establishing itself -- but then other elements of a genuinely embedded civil society in that country, above the local level, are equally weak.
[1]The women’s movement in South Africa, although not one of our cases, seems to have achieved a similarly favoured position within the political elite.