Baseline on conflict sensitivity & peacebuilding for C-Somalia
Rachel Goldwyn, CIUK
October 2007
Executive Summary
As part of a wider effort to mainstream conflict sensitivity and identify potential future roles in peacebuilding, C-Somalia and CIUK developed a strategic agreement on conflict. One element of this agreement is to conduct a baseline of current capacity and competency for conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding, to enable the CO develop capacity building and other action plans to improve conflict sensitive and peacebuilding practice. The baseline involved interviews with 20 staff, and draws on observations from workshops in 2006-7. This baseline report is organised according to the enquiry areas, ranging from strategic directions through to staff competencies, with comments by staff and observations in normal text, and analysis and recommendations in underline to clearly separate the two. The recommendations are organised in a chart to give a suggested phasing of actions for C-Somalia to improve conflict sensitive and peacebuilding practice over the coming long range strategic plan.
Strategic directions – the existing LRSP goal and strategic direction on conflict gives C-Somalia a broad mandate for peacebuilding programming – from working on the enabling environment through to individual attitudinal change. There have been problems with implementing these, including the goal & directions being developed as a lowest common denominator between two completely separate sets of programmes in different locations, having no mechanism to operationalise them, a lack of awareness amongst staff of the strategic direction, and a continuous onslaught of emergencies that have diverted attention from the strategic plan. Should the new LRSP include a strategic direction on conflict it could be more specific, articulating the peaceful future C-Somalia is working towards (a ‘vision of peace’) which could then provide practical decision making parameters for what sort of peacebuilding programme to pursue/integrate as cross cutting work. This could be further elaborated for the three regions and the different programming sectors. Further, it appears that the strategic direction ought to be equally relevant and workable in crisis as well as ‘normal’ situations in Somalia, and to be widely communicated to staff.
Leadership – staff felt there was not sufficient leadership on conflict in the CO, although champions had emerged. There was a positive request for leadership to be demonstrated at the SMT level, and from the ACD in particular. Possible opportunities for demonstrating leadership include the LRSP, developing mandatory actions such as compulsory conflict analysis at project proposal and start up phases, and clarity on and implementation of a clear capacity building plan.
Project goals – only 3 of C-Somalia’s very large project portfolio have goals relating to peace – CSMT, GFSP & ELMT. These all treat conflict/peace as cross cutting, and were described as designed ‘reactively’ to a RfA or CfP, rather than fitting within a clear peacebuilding strategy. However there does appear to be an emerging consensus on good governance as the focus of potential peacebuilding work.The lack of a strategy risks peacebuilding activities being disconnected, unsustainable and consequently having limited impact. Having a conflict analysis as a peacebuilding needs assessment, and a clear vision of the peace we want to construct, would help guide C-Somalia in determining what sort of peacebuilding to pursue overall. It would be useful to review whether keeping peacebuilding as cross-cutting is sufficiently robust, or whether stand alone programming ought also be pursued.
Conflict analysis in project design – no staff interviewed could identify a documented conflict analysis that informed project design. Various undocumented approaches were described for the proposal writing stage, with local staff knowledge being key to this. However no conflict analysis tools were used, and most processes described were rushed and unsystematic, if applied at all. Analysis conducted with communities was heavily reliant on elders as our informants. Conflict analysis is the absolute foundation of conflict sensitivity, we cannot determine what is conflict sensitive or conflict blind behaviour without it. Different depths of analysis can be undertaken at different stages of the project cycle, as it is hard to undertake robust analysis when rushing to develop a proposal. Conflict analysis tools are not a panacea, but they can help us be structured and systematic in our analysis. Wide consultation also helps make these analyses more robust. Documenting our analysis, and the decisions we make based on that analysis, enables us to later review the efficacy of those decisions and build our body of knowledge on good conflict sensitive practice. Developing papers that capture our experience on particular conflict flashpoints (such as constructing water points) can help share experience across all projects. New projects will need time and resources in their timelines and budgets to enable sufficient analysis to be undertaken.
Conflict analysis/sensitivity in project implementation– staff should be commended for the wide variety of efforts made to understand conflict during implementation, however these are undertaken without any clear CO guidance, and remain largely undocumented. There appears to be insufficient orientation of new Project Managers on in-house knowledge on conflict in their operational areas. Staff described a lack of confidence in their understanding of power relations in the community. A number of participatory processes are used by staff to prevent conflict, however there are several very large challenges, notably resources getting into the hands of the militia and challenges over targeting that are not easily resolved through such participatory processes with beneficiaries. No tipping point for when the human cost of an intervention outweighs its benefits has been articulated, nor are there any indicators for any such cost benefit analysis being applied to any programming. Conflict analysis does not appear in any M&E plans, even those with peacebuilding components. Although the innovations on the ground are commendable, a more systematic approach to conflict analysiswould be helpful, and tools would assist this. These should work with enhanced power relations analysis, should involve wide consultations beyond project beneficiaries, and be documented. Despite the wide range of approaches to understand and prevent conflict described by staff, a ‘fire fighting’ mindset does appear to still exist amongst some staff, conceptualising conflict as a problem that happens to our projects, rather than our projects having a two-way interaction with conflict. While participatory processes can enable conflict sensitivity, they are not synonymous – some problems cannot be identified and addressed through participatory processes with target groups and require additional research and analysis by C-Somalia. Research into resource transfers should be prioritised, as well as new efforts in targeting. Identifying a ‘tipping point’ and monitoring interventions against it would be valuable. Stronger orientation for new Project Managers would help knowledge transfer at project start up.
Policies – fair competition and transparency in subcontracting and procurement has sometime proved unworkable in the field, as it can create safety and security issues for staff, and can encourage a ‘spoils of development’ mentality as clans seek to maximise the security contracts from projects. Occasionally contractors behave inappropriately, and hide this from C-Somalia. Open advertisements of posts also does not work in some situations as staff in sub offices usethe distribution of support roles, such as cleaners and security, as a means to enable acceptance by different clans. A review of policies would be useful, as there appears a significant divergence between policy and practice. Efforts could be made to monitor and correct inappropriate contractor behaviour.
Systems – monitoring of conflict focuses on short run crises, and not on the long run interaction of a project with its context. No specific indicators of conflict impact were identified by staff interviewed, including those with peacebuilding objectives. Reporting on conflict is undertaken as case studies for donors, or as explanations to donors regarding changed/interrupted implementation. Conflict generally appears as a footnote in proposals, not in the log frame, and is thus given little if any attention in reporting. Monitoring systems for conflict ought to track changes in the conflict itself, and of how our programming interacts with it, including how peacebuilding programming is contributing to peace. Staff suggested mandatory actions to ensure conflict sensitivity, including a mandatory step at project design stage involving a point person to ‘pass’ a proposal, and mandatory reporting. Enhanced induction/orientation is also suggested, in particular for new Project Managers.
Accountability– there do not appear to be any accountability mechanisms for conflict blind programming, despite the experiences that show that conflict-blind actions by one project can affect the ability to operate of other projects in the same geographical area. Incentive systems for conflict sensitivity were recommended by staff.
Reflective practices and learning – a number of trainings and workshops on conflict have been undertaken, however these have been disconnected and not part of a wider capacity building plan. There is some evidence of practice change as a result of some of these events. No linkage has been made between conflict sensitivity and other programme quality initiatives such as RBA. There are very high expectations of CSMT as a ‘learning project’ for C-Somalia, however it does not appear to have a clear learning agenda nor sufficient resources to make this learning available to other projects. Staff demonstrate varying degrees of openness to discussing conflict blind practice, which affects the ability of the CO to understand and learn from its own experiences. Evaluations have not included conflict sensitivity, except for the tsunami mid-term review which was not robust in this area. A clear capacity building plan could usefully frame future learning activities, as well as efforts to create a ‘safe space’ for staff to discuss conflict-blind practice. The last section on staff competencies will be a useful source of information in the development of such a capacity building plan. Evaluations are powerful opportunities for learning, and should include analysis of the conflict sensitivity of the intervention. The up coming final evaluation of the tsunami project ought to be a prime candidate for piloting evaluation methods to examine conflict impacts, and the food interventions ought also be prioritised for such analysis. A clear learning agenda for CSMT would be useful, as well as efforts to enable learning within and between sectors, such as discussion forums, newsletters or staff secondment.
Partnerships – Partners may be weak in conflict sensitivity, undermining our own conflict sensitivity. Sometimes we are forced to take on additional partners as clans claim they are not adequately represented in existing partners. However in emergency response in new areas partners may be very helpful in knowing the local context. Emergency response partners are told they must do conflict analysis and be conflict sensitive, although C-Somalia is not yet clear how to support them in this should they request assistance. Some staff question whether to use partners at all.
Advocacy–Donors to C-Somalia have been resistant to budgets and timelines that include conflict analysis and conflict sensitive practice. There appears a need to develop an evidence base about the value of conflict sensitivity to be able to advocate for the finances and time to do sufficient analysis and revise programming as appropriate. Staff in C-Somalia give very polarised views concerning advocacy to the donors of the TFG – some find it too risky, others want to engage in it. C-Somalia could consider quiet advocacy that does not include public statements.
Dedicated staff – There are two dedicated conflict staff in the CO – one in CSMT and one in GFSP. Both have full job descriptions implementing their projects, and little capacity for broader CO capacity building. Staff suggested recruiting a conflict advisor position that sits within a programme quality unit. This post could develop and implement a conflict strategy for C-Somalia, undertake staff capacity building, support the design of M&E systems that track interaction with conflict, and gather an evidence base for advocacy.
Staff competency – While some staff are fully conversant in the terms and concepts of conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding, some demonstrate a limited approach to working in conflict. This was evidenced by conceptualisation of dealing with conflict only reactively (i.e. when it erupted) rather than preventatively, by considering only overt conflict and ignoring latent conflict, and by seeing conflict as a something that affects our programming rather than as having a two-way interaction between programming and its context. Project Managers interviewed described a wide variety of knowledge, skills and attitudes that staff need to be conflict sensitive, and between them created an impressive list that covers all key areas. The Project Managers felt that their teams had mixed abilities in these different competencies. One strong request came from a staff member for a clear articulation of the competencies required for conflict sensitivity, and a compulsion for project managers to support staff to develop these.
Recommended action plan for C-Somalia
Phase 1Ground work / Phase 2
Getting the analysis right and the systems in place / Phase 3
Reflective practices & learning
LRSP – articulate a clear vision of peace which can inform all subsequent project/programme proposals, and agree whether peacebuilding should only be cross cutting or also stand alone programming
Clear leadership statements and actions - potentially to include directives on compulsory actions and capacity building plan
Conceptual development of staff – clarity on terms/concepts, understanding latent conflict, and identification of other capacity gaps
Improve skills in conflict analysis - in particular in understanding power relations, using specific conflict analysis tools, and determining who to speak to in undertaking conflict analysis
Undertake project-specific conflict analysis, and specific research on food programming
Include robust evaluation of conflict impacts in forthcoming tsunami evaluation
Recruit conflict advisor
Set up thematic group on conflict
Articulate the learning agenda for CSMT / Implement new systems – in particular the compulsory elements in project design/implementation (see chart under ‘systems’), incentives for conflict sensitivity, & collate documentation for future learning
Develop orientation package for new staff
Review procurement, subcontracting and human resources policies
Articulate a ‘tipping point’ for programme withdrawal, and develop a means to monitor this
Research on how resources get into the hands of militia and pilot means to prevent this
Review staff workload/prioritisation to ensure there is sufficient time for analysis and reflection / Review of existing peacebuilding projects – articulate and evaluate theories of change
Develop strategies for peacebuilding at a sector and regional level based on conflict analysis & develop a process for review of these over time
Develop flashpoint papers
Review consensus-based decision making approach
Facilitate learning between projects and sectors such as through forum discussions, secondment of staff between projects and newsletters
Collate the evidence base to advocate to donors on the need for additional resources and time to enable conflict sensitive practice and undertake such advocacy
Introduction
C-Somalia is seeking to mainstream conflict sensitivity into development and relief programming, & to examine current and potential roles in peacebuilding. A strategic agreement with CIUK was developed to support this endeavour, including undertaking a baseline of current capacity and competency for conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding, to enable the CO develop capacity building and other action plans to improve conflict sensitive & peacebuilding practice. The baseline questions included knowledge, attitudes and skills of staff, programme goals; analyses and implementation strategies, C-SSS policies and practice, systems including M&E systems, reflective practices, learning and accountability, strategic directions and leadership, and decision making processes. The full set of baseline questions is included at annex 1, although not all questions were asked of all respondents.
The baseline was developed through interviews with 20 C-Somalia staff (see interview list at Annex 2) as well as from observations in three workshops (Garoowe 2006, Merka 2006 and Hargeysa 2007). Interviews were conducted with various grades of staff (ACD, Sector Co-ordinators, Project Managers, Project Officers, and specialist roles) to draw insights from a range of perspectives. Staff working in all three zones in Somalia were interviewed, although not all projects were covered.
Interviews were confidential – there is no attribution of comments made. These interviews were largely undertaken by CIUK on behalf of C-Somalia, with occasional accompaniment by C-Somalia staff. While this may have enabled staff to be more candid, it does mean that some of the information in this baseline may be surprising. This is the first such baseline undertaken, and CIUK has learnt much through the process. We hope that C-Somalia also draws much learning from it, and welcome feedback.
Analysis/recommendations are written with underline to differentiate them frominterviewee responses and observations.
Strategic direction
The C-SSS 2002-7 LRSP goal states that:
“By 2007, CARE has strengthened the capacity of communities and constituencies and, together, we have had a substantial, positive impact on efforts to create an enabling environment for peace and sustainable livelihoods”.
This LRSP goal specifies an ‘enabling environment’ which gives the CO a mandate to work particularly on structures and systems, such as local government institutions and discriminatory practices.
This concern is carried forward in one of the strategic directions:
“Promote peace building and conflict resolution through facilitation, advocacy and capacity building”.
This strategic direction relates to both peacebuilding[1] and conflict resolution[2], thus including both dealing with conflicts that erupt (conflict resolution) as well as broader efforts to construct peace, such as the enabling environment as above, or more individual levels such as attitude change (peacebuilding). The mandate from both the LRSP goal and the strategic direction is very broad – C-Somalia may want more specificity if a new strategic direction on conflict is developed.