Rinat Akhmetov — Myth

By GeorgiySemenets,Argument

Translatedfromoriginal Ukrainian

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|ВТР, 2014-05-13 08:25

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The ordinary bandit, a waterboy of the Russian secret services, have got absorbed in playing a billionaire.

“Akhmetov said…”, “Akhmetov stated…”, “Akhmetov discussed the possibility of…” Mass media abound with information about the words and acts of the richest Ukrainian and European citizen, and they look for a hidden meaning, “second bottom”, meaningful understatement and even prophesies in his words. What is really at the back of the image of Rinat Akhmetov, which has been created for two decades?

A word-bound, undereducated guy with a primitive speech — he fumbles for the right word, hardly constructs sentences of them, mechanically configuring the said in some sense. What diploma of higher education of the Donetsk National University are you talking about? No one had ever laid eyes on Akhmetov in the university, every blatnoi and every man and his dog knows about it in Donetsk, while mass media replicate the thesis of his alleged scholarship, suggested by the Akhmetov’s “puppeteers”.

HereisthespeechofthemanwhodeliversanultimatumtotheUkrainianpeopletoday:Akhmetov’s conversation with separatists near the captured Oblast State Administration in Donetsk (transcript). Incoherentbagofwords.Is it possible that this man may manage a score of industrial enterprises, a hundred of different-specialty companies, conduct complex political negotiations and generally think in terms more complex than that of a cardsharp, from which he started his “career”? That’s a laugh.

The truth about Akhmetov is that after the explosion of the most powerful Donbas bandit Akhat Bragin at the Donetsk stadium and shooting of the major Donbas businessman Yevhen Scherban, all the assets of the killed persons were formalized as the ownership of Rinat Akhmetov — a squirt from the Bragin’s immediate surround.However this was the chappy who suddenly showed up close contacts with the management of the local and Main (in Kyiv) departments of the Security Service of Ukraine. The contacts were so powerful that the local militia leaders only gave a salute while providing an operational cover for the criminal activities of the Lux OCG from the very moment when Rinat Akhmetov took the lead of the major Donbas gang (from October 1995).

During another at least three years, until autumn 1998, Rinat Akhmetov was in the sidelines, without having his cover blown. All this time, the “action wing” of the Lux OCG —the GiviNemsadze’s gang — was killing Donbas businessmen, whose business immediately passed into the official ownership of Rinat Akhmetov and less frequently of his confidants. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the times of Yuriy Lutsenko revealed more than 50 murders committed by the Akhmetov’s people, however the investigation of the case was hindered by Victor Yuschenko who advocated for conciliation with the Donbas “kings” and later on by the then Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko who was playing patience with Vladimir Putin and his “fifth column” in Ukraine (Medvedchuk, Akhmetov, Yanukovych, etc.).

Nevertheless, Lutsenko managed to make the Nemsadze’s gang with its leader to go on the run —surely to Russia. However, that was all. Nemsadze safely waited out the “oranges” in the vicinities of Moscow and came back to Ukraine as soon as the other agent of the Russian secret services Victor Yanukovych became the president, being the “political face” of the agential Lux OCG. Later on, Yu. Lutsenko remembered that being the MIA head, the then Prime Minister V. Yanukovych personally applied to him with a strong request to dismiss the prosecution of Givi Nemsadze. Lutsenko denied the request, resulting in his imprisonment in the frame-up case as soon as V. Yanukovych became the President of Ukraine.

Well, let’s go back to the second half of 1990s. While the Russian Federation’s secret services were “cleaning up” Donbas from intractable businessmenby efforts of bandits from of the Lux OCG created by them, these services were in parallel carrying out a distraction operation —a green light to “over-the-top” was given to the bandit Samvel Martirosian from Makeyevka. Thus while the Samvel’s gang was “freaking” by terrorizing the neighborhood, Kyiv received dispatches from the local law enforcement officials stating that just the Samvel’s OCG was the deadliest evil of Donbas. Both the Directorate for Combating Organized Crime (DCOC) of the Donetsk Oblast Regional Office of the MIA and the “K” department of the Donetsk Office of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) were keeping silent about “Akhmet” — such is the Rinat Akhmetov’s nickname in the criminal world — carefully relieving the Lux’s gunmen from the strike. Because both the Donetsk DCOC and SSU’s “K” department were fully controlled by the Russian Federation’s secret services. Those who served there and did not want to be soiled, retired before time…

A half of the Akhmet’s surround were killed — just those who did not consider him the successor of Akhat Bragin and even suspected the young “boss” of the punishment of “AlikGrek” on the side of the secret services (on the day of explosion at the Shakhtar stadium, when “Grek”-Bragin was killed, it was for the first time that Rinat Akhmetov “was late” for the beginning of the game of his favorite team, which had never occurred before, and survived).

…Three years of the Samvel’s “freaks” (1995-1998) were enough for the Lux OCG and its overseers to “beat down” Donbas — by liquidating all the independent, in some measure, business and criminal groups and crime lords which were “alternative” to Lux.

From then on, Rinat Akhmetov became a public person, with a promotional interview with himself posted by him for the first time in a popular weekly paper (recently, the same clownery was observed with another similar personage — Serhiy Kurchenko).

In fact, the tacit occupation of Donbas by Russia via the Lux OCG was the first major special operation of Russia against Ukraine. By creating a bridgehead in Donbas, the Russian Federation have gained an opportunity of official financing of its “fifth column” in Ukraine and its advancing to the top echelons of the Ukrainian power. As a result, a “political wing” —the Party of Regions — added to the “action wing” of the Lux OCG.

To the point:The Party of Wasted Type

This was followed by the “clean-up” of the political space for Victor Yanukovych, candidate for presidency of Ukraine from the Russian Federation—murderof his political competitor YevhenKushnariov.(Likeearlieron, ontheeveofthepresidentialelectionsof1999, theRussian Federation’ssecretserviceskilled off ViacheslavChornovil— a competitor of their protégé at the presidential elections, General of the Committee for State Security YevhenMarchuk.Also, during the presidential elections of 2004, they attempted to poison with dioxin the candidate for presidency of Ukraine Victor Yuschenko — another competitor of the Moscow candidate).

I only remind of this, in order to emphasize: from the second half of 1990s, Donbas was considered by Russia and its secret services as a strategically important region for the Russian Federation. Which Russia had taken back under its actual control by the early year 1990.

Both the “beacon” of the Lux OCG Rinat Akhmetov and gunman-murderer Givi Nemsadze, as well as the political “superstructure” of the Lux OCG Victor Yanukovych, and all the procuracy, militia, SSU staff in Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts represented a core project of the Russian Federation’s secret services, operational control of which was alternately exercised by the SSU leaders ranked as chairmen and their deputies at different times.

In other words, the cruelest gang operated in Donbas, with full support of the SSU, MIA and prosecutor’s office, which gang formally united all the somewhat significant assets of Donbas “under Akhmetov”. Leaders of the local law enforcement authorities were fully aware of the Lux OCG being an agential command under the supervisory control of the secret services, but only few persons in Kyiv from among the top management of the SSU, who actually worked for Moscow, really new the name of the game: Akhmetov was a myth, and the created gang was used by the Russian Federation’s secret services to meet the challenges in Donbas solely to the benefit of the Russian Federation.

That’s why the gunmen-killers from the Lux OCG had hundred-percent“aiming” at the killed victims, their traffic routes, workday and day-off schedules, printouts of their telephone conversations. Most importantly, the killers had a hundred-percent cover from the local militia, SSU and prosecutor’s office. In case that it came to Kyiv — then the “backings” from among the Deputy Prosecutors General (the names are commonly known) and deputy chairmen of the SSU (the names are known as well) were involved.

To the point:Puppeteers. Generals Cover Up for Bandits and Murders in Ukraine

Today, when Russia is attempting to split off Donbas from Ukraine, R. Akhmetov personally tries to distance himself from the terrorists —allegedly, he is committed to the united, strong and stable Ukraine and only asks “to hear Donbas”. In fact, the Akhmetov’s verbal patriotism is dictated by a quite another thing: concern of his backup Russian “chekist” group about the preservation of its business assets in the reminder territory of Ukraine —indeed, the business “recorded for Akhmetov” includes not only Ukrtelecom, Kyivenergo, but the assets in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, in Turkey, in London as well…

Should Akhmetov officially take side of the terrorists — and his entire business empire would be subject to international sanctions (business competitors of Rinat Leonidovych in Ukraine itself would in the first instance care of the matter). This explains thetwo-faced position taken by Akhmetov — politicians and gunmen controlled by him wage an undeclared war on Ukraine and Ukrainians, while Akhmetov himself appeals for peace and withdrawal of the Ukrainian troops from the bandit enclave created just by him. This is because the leader of the Lux OCG and his overseers in Moscow understand well: where a regular army arrives, the number of bandits slumps.

The mistake of the Ukrainian elite is that they try to speak to Akhmetov as a an equal partner, while they merely deal with the “bum” of the Russian secret services, who will, like Yanukovych, do and say what the “puppeteers” instruct. This is the deceit of the Ukrainian people, where the first persons of the Ukrainian politicum, being fully aware of the state of things, go for “negotiations” to the Akhmetov’s residence in the Donetsk Botanic Garden — Akhmetov is not independent, he is merely a “liaison”, “negotiator” with the Putin’s Kremlin, and nothing more.

It would be logical, if Rinat Akhmetov go the same way as Yanukovych, with whom he, hand in hand, built a career and made money from the Ukrainian troubles and on the humps of Ukrainians, under the patronage of the same generals from the Federal Security Service.

Ukrtelecom, Kyivenergo, Kyivvodokanal, and previously the assets currently forming part of Metinvest, SKM, DTEK, etc. — all these were “privatized” for a mere song, in point of fact — stolen from the Ukrainian people by the masters of Rinat Akhmetov.

Tothepoint: Rinat Akhmetov Has Bought Up the Ukrainian Power Industry at the Price of His Two Flats in London

When Ukrainians pay money for goods and services of the companies registered for Akhmetov — they fund the Russian war against themselves, against all Ukraine.

Today the Russian secret services assign the same role to the Lux OCG in Donbas as to the local Seylem OCG in occupying Crimea. It is obvious.

It would be logical for the government after all to tackle decisively the agential “abscess” of the Lux OCG in complex — from criminal prosecution of the core group of the bandits to physical liquidation of its armed component, and up to confiscation of the assets of the members of this criminal and agential gang in favor of the state with their subsequent auction sale.

Failuretodoso would be the crime against Ukraine.

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Georgiy Semenets,Argument