17.05-05

Conceptualizing the EU as an international actor after enlargement, constitutionalization and militarization[*]

Stelios Stavridis & Natividad Fernández Sola

PhD programme on EU Studies:
University of Zaragoza,

Pedro Cerbuna 12, 50009 Zaragoza, Spain

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In May 2004, the EU witnessed its most important enlargement since its inception in the 1950s. But beyond this historic event, the Union has also deepened further thanks to its constitutionalization and its militarization. What is their impact on the EU´s role in the world? In the existing literature a number of concepts have been used to describe the EU´s international role, such as international actor, economic bloc, regional power or civilian power, and even super-power in the making. In 2005, are these concepts still useful, or do we instead need to use new ones such as the EU as a military actor or even as a civilising power? The paper concludes that we need to distinguish between what role the EU plays right now and what kind of actor it aspires to become in the future. How such a role will develop in the future will not only depend on developments in the EU but also on world events, as well as internal changes, both at the EU level and at that of its member states. We also conclude that beyond institutional/constitutional developments and increased military capacities, what will really matters at the end of the day is how coherent and consistent EU foreign policy will be in the future.

Keywords: European Union; foreign policy; defence; security; international actorness; CFSP; ESDP/CSDP

Introduction

In the existing literature it is generally argued that the 2003 Iraq war has had a negative effect on the EU in general, and over its foreign policy cohesion in particular: ´a disaster´ (Bertram 2004: 16), ´a low point´ (Bildt 2004: 23), ´a dramatically divisive experience within Europe´ (Dassu 2004: 34). It is also said that Enlargement will make things worse in the future (Serra 2004: 116). By contrast, a more ´positive´ assessment claims that too much emphasis has been given to military matters. Thus, ´le bilan de l´Union européenne est loin d´être aussi négatif´ (Gnesotto 2004: 56; see also de La Serre 2004: 708-710). Moreover, building on a tradition claim in the European integration literature that the whole process is based on overcoming crises (Taylor 1983: 1-91; Taylor 1996: 1-31; Cloos, Reisnesch, Vignes and Weyland 1993: 5-29), it is argued that, first, the war in Iraq has pushed the EU ´a few steps further in elevating its role to one of a global actor´ (Sedivy 2004: 107); and, second, that this was partly possible because ´the Iraq crisis has accelerated the development of ESDP´ (de Wijk 2004: 47, Everts and Keohane 2003).

By early 2005, the European Union had advanced its integration process on three fronts: widening its membership thanks to its May 2004 enlargement, and deepening through the signing of a new Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Rome, 29 October 2004). Deepening also occured through the implementation of the first EU military operations in the world[1], as well as other important advances, in particular the adoption of its first European Security Strategy also known as the ´Solana doctrine´ (see below).

In this article we do not enter in the debates over ´deepening versus widening´ (Preston 1997, de la Serre and Lequesne 1998), or whether this new Treaty is good[2], whether it will work, let alone if it will be adopted after a long ratification process[3]. We assess the way recent developments in the simultaneous processes of constitutionalization and militarization have affected the international role of the EU. The research question that guides this paper is as follows: what is the best concept to describe the EU in the international system now that almost 15 years have elapsed since the end of the Cold War order. How useful are ´old concepts´ such as civilian power, and how useful are any ´new concepts´.

This article consists of three parts:

- the first part presents an overview of the literature on the international role of the EU (both prior and after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq), without claiming to be totally exhaustive. Can old(er) concepts still be used to describe such a role, or are new ones required;

- the second part assesses whether the recent reforms that have taken place in the CFSP and the ESDP/CSDP[4] (within or outside the constitutional framework) have filled the gaps identified by the existing literature in Part 1;

- in the third part part, we concentrate on the CFSP dimension of the EU in world affairs. We argue that the real problem the Union is facing, especially after enlargement, is a question of consistency in its foreign policy rather than a question of institutional engineering or even military capabilities. Developments in European defence may have an impact on its international role (real or perceived), but changes in defence will depend on FP cohesion rather than the opposite.

1. The EU: what kind of international actor?

We begin with the way the external action of the EU has been analysed to date. Although we do not enter in the wider problem of which approach, indeed with discipline to use[5]. We just stress that any choice of theoretical, methodological, conceptual approaches does affect the way the EU´s international role is perceived. To use just one example, the debate over how best to define developments in European defence from either a traditional perspective (generically labelled ´rational actor choice´ approach) or a more recent one (more confusingly labelled ´constructivist´ or ´reflectivist´[6]) lead to different types of conclusions because the former deals with the ´whys and hows´ of things, whereas the latter are interested in how policies, institutions, and the like are created/´constructed´ (Sjursen 2004: 108-109). Thus, it is argued that the theoretical/methodological/ontological/deontological perspectives are simply neither comparable nor compatible (Battistella, 2003: 267-302).

This intellectual confusion is further complicated by the regular appearance of new terms (or concepts) which reflect, to a certain extent, the more sophisticated nature of the European integration process, but also, sometime, result from a re-packaging of already existing characterizations[7]. Such confusion is also visible in the debate over how to best describe the international role of the European Union.

For several decades, within the wider framework of theoretical angst about methodological and other approaches, the existing academic literature has dealt with the question of how to define the international actions of the EU (previously EEC). The original debate considered in the early 1970s -when the first formal system of foreign policy cooperation was instituted: the EPC[8]- whether the EEC was an actor in the world. A famous study concluded that the EEC was a half-baked international actor (Sjostedt 1977). Since then, the academic work has refined its approach by differentiating between role, actorness, legal personality, presence, influence, and power. It has also become more sophisticated after the end of the Cold War when the security/defence debate entered the European integration field. The concept of power as applied to the EU has also been refined with the addition of a number of qualifying epithets such as regional, economic, civilian, bloc, military, super-, global, political, normative, in-the-making, with or without question marks at the end of these qualifications.

We can group the various approaches being used to describe the international role of the EU up to 2004 in the following four categories:

- global actor.

- civilian power, with an emphasis more recently on the notion of ´soft power´.

- military power, or emerging military super-power.

- The ´European identity´ debate, and more recently the ´Civilising power Europe´ approach (normative dimension).

The first concept (´global actor´) is the result of years of academic discussion initially concerned with the existence (or lack of) of an international role for the EU (then EEC). The already mentioned 1977 Sjostedt study dealt with notions of ´international actorness´. Others concentrated on notions of ´international presence´ (Allen and Smith 1990). Both were concerned with how much actual power the EU had in the international system. This debate was accompanied by further intellectual disputes over what kind of integration process the EU was engaged in: on the road to a super federal state, or a sophisticated version of intergovernmental cooperation. This set of parallel monologues -or a ´dialogue of the deaf´ (see Stavridis 2001c)- only represents the tip of the iceberg of intellectual alternative views on how to define the European project, and, by extension, its international dimension (for details see Chryssochoou, Tsinisizelis, Stavridis and Ifantis 2003: 122-195). A further complicating factor was a lack of agreement about how to define the EU´s own international actions: the external relations of the EEC (commercial, financial, association and other international agreements), the decisions and actions within the CFSP pillar (previously EPC), the national foreign policies of its member states (see White 2004), or a combination of any of these dimensions, let alone its hard security (defence) dimension. Part of this debate was linked to the question of whether the EU was a ´(super-)state in the making´, or a new form of international organisation, or something else (´more than an international organisation and less than a state´ as a famous phrase had it in the 1980s). Similarly, there is also a claim that the EU is an ´unorthodox international actor´, because it ´challenges both established theories about international relations and basic analytical categories´ (CIDEL 2004: 1), or even a ´unique actor´ due to the combination of means in its hands (Larsen, 2002, 292). Its sui generis nature was also seen by some as a (future) model for the rest of the world[9].

Most recent studies have confirmed that the EU does play a role on the international scene. Here, we use the term ´global´ in a non-specifically geographic manner (for a geographic manner see below), that is to say that we refer to intentions, means and capabilities. As early as 1989 Roy Ginsberg produced a catalogue of EU actions in order to make such a case (Ginsberg 1989). An approach that Hazel Smith (2002) and Karen Smith (2003) have repeated more recently. The real point here is not so much whether or not the EU is an important actor in the international system, as it appears that in 2004 this point is beyond doubt. What matters is how much real influence the EU does have?

Still, a number of prominent academic observers disagree with the view that the EU plays a role as a global actor. Thus, to the question ´What international role for the EU?¨, Pierre Hassner answers: ´this question calls for the shortest possible answer, since the European Union´s role as a global actor is almost non-existent anyway, except for economic and related matters´ (Hassner 2004: 81).

According to a geographical approach, Atis Lejins sees the EU as a regional actor and ´not a global actor´ (Lejins 2004: 90). It is active and important in Europe, NATO, Central and Eastern Europe but not elsewhere. For instance even if it has had some influence in avoiding the collapse of the Palestinian Authority in recent years, it has no general influence in the Middle East. It is important to note that, in contradistinction to the above use of the term global (non-geographically defined), here we refer to the term of a ´regional actor´ in a geographically defined manner. This double use of the same term complicates the analysis of the question of what kind of international actor the EU is.

The second concept (´civilian power´ and ´soft power´)

A useful concept that was first used in the early 1970s has dominated the intellectual and academic agenda for many years. It is still present nowadays. For instance, after the 2003 Iraq war, one observer noted that the EU was not a strategic actor, but something more like a civilian one (Bertram 2004: 16). The initial debate was started by François Duchêne in the early 1970s. Expanding on the use of the concept of ´civilian power´ which was first applied to explain the economic successes of the countries that had lost World War Two (Japan and West Germany), he applied it to the EEC at the time of the first oil shock and the failure of one of the two super-powers to ´win´ the Vietnam War (Duchêne 1972; 1973). The debate has been intense, some arguing that such a concept was a ´contradiction in terms´ (Bull 1983), others that it reflected the limitations of cooperation and integration (Rummell 1988). Whereas others still stressed its utility not only in defining the ´soul´ of the integration process in Europe but also in highlighting the limitations of ´crude military power´ as a foreign policy instrument (Hill 1990). The debate rekindled once the Cold War finally ended with two contradictory arguments: the first, the dominant one, considers that the militarization of the EU means de facto the end of the utility of the concept of a European civilian power because it contradicts the very nature of the non-military means of integration (Smith, K. 2000). Others, starting with Hans Maull in his analysis of post-Cold War German foreign policy (Maull 2000), consider instead that the new international order will allow for the full use of civilian power instruments, including its military dimension, as was the case in the 1999 Kosovo War (Stavridis 2001a).

Anne Deighton has also argued that the ´ESDP ends the age of “innocence“ of civilian power Europe´ (Deighton 2002: 728), although unlike Karen Smith (2000), she welcomes such a development. Others have argued that depending on the degree of power available to EU as a civilian actor, one can argue it is not only a civilian power but even a civilian superpower. This is visible in recent work by Christopher Hill (2001; 2003). From a constructivist point of view, Larsen considers that the EU was clearly a civilian power until the 1990s, but also now if taking into account the EU´s reaction to post-September 11th developments (Larsen 2002). This renewed interest in the concept concerns the debate over une Europe puissance – une Europe super puissance – une Europe super état – une Europe puissance civile – une Europe super puissance civile. A debate that is still ´raging´ especially after Britain´s PM Tony Blair presented his case for a super-power Europe but not a super-state Europe in his October 2000 Warsaw speech (see Hill 2001).

This approach is partly linked to the ´soft power´ concept, as coined by Joseph Nye in 1990 and later developed in a number of his works (Nye 2004; 2002). He is particularly - although not exclusively - interested in the USA. The main point is that the USA (and the UK to a lesser extent) are losing the ´power of example´ (Nikolaidis and Howse 2002). According to Nye, even a superpower must combine hard power and soft power, or at least use them in a intelligent way. Soft power includes diplomatic, political, cultural and other instruments. It is the power of persuasion, which can in some cases be more effective than traditional hard power (military means).

´[soft power] is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.´ (Nye 2004: x).

He also speficically refers tothe EU as using a ´good deal of soft power´(Nye 2004: 77).

But some are critical of the concept because it is seen as a weak approach to world affairs especially after the end of the Cold War and the 11 September 2001 events (see Heisbourg 2004: 29). Thus, the lessons of the Balkans in the 1990s have shown that ´soft power alone is often unable to resolve conflicts´ (Grant 2004: 70). This argument is reminiscent of Hedley Bull´s ´civilian power Europe: a contradiction in terms´ approach (see above). In our opinion, the EU can be described as a form of soft power only if we consider it as a security actor according to its still limited military capabilities; but in traditional civilian power Europe terms, the EU is one of the most powerful actors in international arena[10]. Moreover, what is often missed in the literature is that, in the US case, to apply the concept of soft power is only relevant in conjunction with whatever else the USA does possess and that is not soft power. Thus, ´military capabilities could also protect civilian populations from terrorist attacks´ (Smith, K. 2003: 176). This is a view that is much closer to a civilian power à la Maull than Karen Smith´s own approach in 2000. Perhaps this represents a clear sign in the literature of a growing consensus on the need to take into consideration not only the means but also the objectives.

Finally, as Giegerich and Wallace (2004) have argued, whilst the EU might be described as a soft power in the past, recent developments tend to demonstrate the contrary. Thus, in peace-keeping operations, so many EU member states are now acting together in one way or another, and within the past decade EU governments have doubled the number of troops deployed abroad. They also stress how important gendarmerie and police force deployments have also been. In brief, ´Not Such a Soft Power´ (their own article title) after all. In the same vein, since the end of the 1990s, according to discourse analysis in external relations, the EU is more than a mere civilian power because of its own decision to develop itself in the long(er) term into a political actor with a global role (Larsen, 2002).