Azerbaijan: Oil and Democracy

Original title:

Azerbaijan: Oil and Democracy

Alternatives:

Azerbaijan: The Importance of Oil in an Election Year

The U.S. and Azerbaijan: Viewing Democracy through a Fountain of Oil

Azerbaijan: From Democratic Test Bed to Potential Partner for the West

Azerbaijan and the Secret Energy Wars

Azerbaijan: Protecting its Interests with a Balanced Foreign Policy

Azerbaijan and U.S. Policy: The Price of Ignoring Discomfort

Turkey and Armenia: Rapprochement and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Turkey, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh: Issues Intertwined

Azerbaijan: In the Middle of Eurasian Geopolitics

U.S. Policy and Azerbaijan: Addressing the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

U.S. Policy and Azerbaijan: An Opening for Iran and Russia?

Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan: Binding Ties and Unresolved Issues

Turkey, Armenia and the Importance of Azerbaijani Oil

The U.S., Armenia and Azerbaijan: An Affront to the Peace Process

Armenia and Azerbaijan: Objections to U.S. Policy

By Vusala Mahirqizi, the General Director of independent Azerbaijani Azeri Press Agency.

The normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia appears to have collapsed. Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian has suspended the process of ratification of the protocols, and Turkish President Abdullah Gul is quoted as saying that "Turkey needs silent diplomacy in its relations with Armenia for the time."

In October 2009, Armenia and Turkey had signed protocols pledging their commitment to normalizing their bitter relationship. Even though Turkey was among the first countries to recognize Armenian independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the two states still do not enjoy diplomatic relations. Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993 in solidarity with Azerbaijan after Armenia occupied almost 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory, including Nagorno-Karabakh.

Turkey has a range of historical, political and economic ties to Azerbaijan that go far beyond kinship with the fellow ethnic Turkic majority of Azerbaijanis. Azerbaijan has become the main supplier of oil and natural gas to Turkey, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline transports 1 million barrels per day of oil to the world market via Turkey.

Although the October 2009 protocols between Turkey and Armenia did not explicitly mention any concurrent development on the issue of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and the status of Nagorno-Karabakh as a conditionality, Turkey has been adamant that if the principal reason for closing its borders to Armenia is not sufficiently addressed, the protocols cannot possibly be ratified by the Turkish parliament.

For Turkey – and, of course, for Azerbaijan – the issues cannot be regarded, let alone be decided on, separately. Recent statements by U.S. officials that Turkey should pursue the ratification of the protocols without any discernable progress on the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan are therefore an affront to Azerbaijan and could seriously damage relations with the United States in the long-term.

By neglecting Azerbaijan's objections to U.S. policy, Washington further risks undermining its influence in the South Caucasus and, in turn, possibly strengthening the influence of Russia and Iran. One reason Washington may want to push the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process is to diminish Armenian economic dependence on Russia and Iran. However, this policy could well backfire and serve Russia's interests if the opening of the Turkish borders transformed Armenia from a weak, dependent partner into an economically strengthened Russian ally.

This scenario is what prompts Ankara's and Baku's discomfort. Ignoring that discomfort could carry a heavy price.

Taking into account that 2010 is an election year in Azerbaijan, the present position of the West, particularly the United States, is very important.

Reviewing the policy of the West with respect to Azerbaijan after 2005, we notice economic interests more distinctly.

U.S. officials have confirmed the view that "Azerbaijan is the most important partner of Europe in energy security." This is in line with the essence of the struggle in the international arena – secret energy wars. The ongoing processes in Eurasia are basically the result of efforts to free Europe from Russia's energy dependence. In this respect, Azerbaijan is no longer "a test field for democracy" for the West, but a potential partner. Either way, the West would not like to cede as important a partner as Azerbaijan to Russia in the battle for energy.

The view that the West looks at the democratic values in Azerbaijan from within an "oil fountain" is also very popular among the Azerbaijani electorate. The recent processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States region – the defeat of the West in the Ukraine, the recent upheaval in Kyrgyzstan, Georgia's difficulties– have invariably shown the United States and Europe that they need to establish relations with partners more carefully and efficiently.

Taking into account that Azerbaijan is right in the middle of the ongoing geopolitical processes in Eurasia -- wedged between Iran, Turkey and Russia -- and in a year of parliamentary elections, we can guess that in this election, the West will also pursue the policy of not ceding Azerbaijan.

Parliament is an important political institution, as it meets the interests of the United States and Europe to shape an institution of persons with a predominantly pro-Western way of thinking, free of the interests of Iran and Russia, and founded on liberal democratic values.

The West needs to consider that it is not the only external influence on Azerbaijani voters. Iran and Russia also intend to extend their influence on the region. Perhaps the most active participants in the political life of Azerbaijan in the period between the elections were political groups with religious tendencies close to Iran. At the same time, Russia also strengthened its position in the public sphere of Azerbaijan. Russia's proactive approach was observed mostly in the social and cultural spheres, which have a more concrete positive effect on the voters' consciousness. Unlike the West, Iran and Russia have electoral groups in Azerbaijan that are loyal to them, religious and Russian-speaking, respectively. The election process will be conducted against the background of confrontation of the interests of the West, centered on energy interests, and Russia and Iran, which could form a stable electorate group in Azerbaijan.

In this circumstance, the West should test a more sensitive way of approaching Azerbaijan through Turkey, which is NATO member and uses its strategic domination for the interests of Washington.

Azerbaijan is trying to protect its interests with a balanced foreign policy. In keeping with that policy, Azerbaijan, like Ankara, expects a sympathetic attitude from Washington toward the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia.

If the United States wants to strengthen its position in the South Caucasus, it can do so by helping resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, not by removing Armenia from Turkey's blockade. Azerbaijan's position is obvious: Baku will not allow any step that denies the link between the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia.