Gregory T. Papanikos*

Gregory T. Papanikos*

The Current Mediterranean Crisis and

The Quest for Democracy

Athens, 20th of April 2011

Introduction

Three years ago (2008), in my opening speech to this conference[1], I made the following statement on Sarkozy’s initiative of the Union for Mediterranean (UfM)[2]:

“The recent initiative by France to create a Mediterranean Union is consistent with the approach of the “Barcelona” process. France, holding the Presidency of the Council of the European Union for the first half of 2008, has pushed this idea very hard and has included it in an Annex of the Presidency Conclusions of the recent meeting of the Council of the EU, in Brussels, on 13-14 of March 2008. Very few should be expected from such initiatives, if the aim is to create a real FTA. As we said, this should include free movement of labour and opening up the EU’s market for agricultural products”. (Emphasis added).

Today (2011), France still claims a leading role in the Mediterranean basin, but this time weapons are doing the talking. Now the main idea is to promote democracy by supporting whatever movements go against the authoritarian rulers. Suddenly the NATO countries discovered that these regimes are not democratic and that it is their duty to intervene, even militarily, in order to establish democracy. They want to make them “free” by force. This is nothing new. We have seen it many times in the past. In the EU-Mediterranean relations this has a long history. Bicchi (2009) provides an historical account of the EU’s democracy assistance in the Mediterranean. Priorities are defined and funds are spent on activities to meet them. I consider them a waste of the EU’s scarce resources. Just to note that one such priority is the abolition of the death penalty. The EU considers this a democratic assistance policy. If this is their real concern, then an equal amount of money should be spent in some states of the USA where they have not yet abolished the death penalty. However, the problem is more fundamental and it has to do with the determinants of democracy. This issue is examined below. But, first, it is important to identify the major issues that concern the Mediterranean countries. In a recently published paper by Halliday (2011), he identifies a number of themes which can be considered as being part of what constitutes the Mediterranean crisis. He identifies the issues of environment, gender, language, illegal trade (e.g. drugs) and illegal migration. Papers to be presented in this conference deal with these issues and we will have the opportunity to further discuss these themes in the relative sessions. Halliday, then, concludes that democracy is the solution to the Mediterranean crisis. I hold the opposite view. Democracy should not be a priority because it cannot be imposed. It can be achieved only if certain conditions are met. These are examined, albeit in a very sketchy form, later in this paper. Halliday, though, correctly points out that democracy has nothing to do with religion. Democracy predates Christianity and there is nothing mentioned about it in the Bible.

I claim that the most important issue in the current Mediterranean crisis is the differences in development stages. It is not an issue of democracy, political freedom or extremism as some countries claim. It is an issue of economic differences and as long as these differences remain the crisis will continue. The immigration issue has worsened. Millions of people want to move from the non-European Mediterranean Countries to European countries. These people want to move because of the poverty and economic underdevelopment in their home countries, which in many cases manifests itself as a symptom of political oppression. Promoting democracy even at gun point cannot solve the problem. Promoting economic development by opening up the borders is the only way.

My thesis is that economic development is a necessary condition for democracy. Once this is achieved, then democracy can be implemented. In a world divided between developed and less developed countries, such as the European Union Countries and the non-European members of Mediterranean countries, the only way that economic development can be promoted is if the former unilaterally and unconditionally open up their borders to receive goods and people (workers, refugees, etc.) from the less developed countries. This is the fastest and the safest way of promoting democracy in these countries. Economic development will automatically create the conditions for establishing democratic institutions in countries with authoritarian regimes. Other initiatives such as democracy promotion and assistance projects could help but they are neither necessary nor sufficient. In the following sections, I will examine the existence and the preconditions of democracy.

The Existence and the Origins of Democracy

When citizens choose their leaders at all levels, democracy exists. Democracy exists when every citizen has the right to question its existence without any, direct or indirect, negative repercussion. A modern democracy should also accept and implement all rules and regulations adopted by international organizations such as the United Nations. Being in Athens, one is tempted to say a few words on democracy’s birthplace. In the previously mentioned paper by the late Professor Halliday, who was a keynote lecturer at another conference on Mediterranean in Barcelona in 2008, democracy was linked with the centrality of the city. In ancient Greece, the city was the state. The so-called city-state of Athens is the birthplace of democracy. Two papers presented at the Annual Conference of the American Economic Association in 2010 examined the origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece and Athens in particular[3]. Both papers relate democracy to wealth. Fleck & Hanssen (2006) find, using a unique data set from the ancient Greek city-states (poleis), that authoritarian regimes (tyrants) are necessary in order to promote economic growth policies. Economic growth leads to the accumulation of wealth which is then considered as a precondition of democracy. McCannon (2010) links the origin of democracy to the volatility of wealth across generations. He finds that very few families in ancient Athens were capable of keeping the wealth bestowed upon them by their ancestors. Democracy provides insurance for the unfortunate situation where an elite’s offspring loses its wealth. In ancient Athens, for various reasons, this was the case rather than the exception. It seems from these two sources, and the other references which they cite, that in ancient Greek city-states there was a direct causal relation between economic development (wealth) and democracy. The causality runs from income and wealth to democracy. This hypothesis has been examined in modern democracies and non-democracies in an attempt to account for the determinants or the preconditions of democracy.

The Preconditions of Democracy

Are all countries suitable for democracy? The answer is that they are not. This has been known since antiquity. The idea of a philosopher-king is to invent another governing system for societies that are not ready for democracy. The ruling of a philosopher-king is the best but nevertheless utopian, alternative to a democracy. Unfortunately, a well-educated (philosopher) king does not make him/her less of a tyrant than a non-philosopher and in some cases he might be worse because he can disguise his injustices and brutalities under his philosophical (angelic) face.

What are the preconditions or determinants of democracy? Two approaches have been developed. The first was developed by Lipset (1959) and considers not only the level of income (wealth) as a determinant of democracy but its distribution as well. This is not often mentioned by those that adhere to Lipset’s thesis of ‘modernization”. Lipset (1959, p. 75) states that “[a] society divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favored elite would result either in oligarchy (dictatorial rule of the small upper stratum) or in tyranny (popularly based dictatorship)”. Actually, Lipset credits his idea to Aristotle, and Barro (1999) calls it the Lipset/Aristotle Thesis. The second approach emphasizes the role of institutions that can be considered as causing both higher income (wealth) and democracy (see Acemoglu et al., 2008). The empirical literature on the statistical relation between income and democracy has been burgeoning. Mixed evidence is found but most of these studies do not test the basic hypothesis of the effect of wealth (instead of income) and its distribution on establishing democratic regimes[4]. Wealth is the accumulation of past savings rates, which usually are achieved after a long period of high economic growth, uninterrupted by wars or national disasters. Higher wealth accumulation and its even distribution increases the number of people that invest in the accumulation of human capital and by so doing creating a wealthy and educated middle class. This by itself reinforces economic growth and facilitates the establishment of democratic institutions. Along with this process of economic growth and investments in human capital, we have an increase in the number of people that move from rural to urban areas. Since antiquity, urbanization and the establishment of cities have been considered as the building blocks of democratic institutions. Thus, I would like to conclude that there are at least three preconditions of democracy, if one accepts that preconditions exist at all. These are:

1.  A relatively long period of uninterrupted high economic growth (say at least, for one generation)

2.  A critical mass of population living in large cities (over half of the total population)

3.  A well-educated and populous middle class (close to 2/3 of the total population)

The numbers in parentheses do not constitute mechanical thresholds. However, they are suggestive of the point at which democracy can be established. These three conditions define the process of economic development. Thus, I claim that economic development is the panacea for democracy. If there are foreign countries that want to help, then they should promote economic development by all means but particularly by opening up, unconditionally, their borders for goods and people coming from these countries. Macro and micro measures are welcome but the most important is one-way free trade of goods and services (including agricultural products) and liberalization of labour flows. Free capital flows (private and public investments from rich to poor) are helpful, but their effects are limited. A country is ready for democracy when the citizens of the country do not want to move out of their country, even though they are free to do so. In addition, people from other countries want to move in. This is not the case in Mediterranean countries today. They need growth and development, not democracy. They want the rich EU countries to open their borders to their agricultural products and their labours. This has an economic cost for the EU countries but it seems that it is the only way to achieve sustainable democracy in the long-run.

Conclusion

Summing up, the poor countries of the Mediterranean are not in need of democracy, but of economic development (accumulation of wealth). Once this is achieved, democracy will be established. Absolute poverty can not sustain a democratic regime, even if it is established by external forces. The rich countries of the EU can help these countries by opening their borders to both goods and workers. The rest will follow in an almost mechanical way.

References

Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, J. A. Robinson, P. Yared ( 2008). “Income and Democracy.” American Economic Review. Vol. 98, pp. 808-842.

Bardhan, P. (1993). “Symposium on Democracy and Development”. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 7, pp. 45-49.

Barro, R. J. (1999). “Determinants of Democracy.” Journal of Political Economy 107, pp. S158-183.

Bicchi, F. (2007). European Union Foreign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

Doucouliagos, H. & M.A. Ulubaşoğlu (2008). “Democracy and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis”. American Journal of Political Science. Vol. 52, pp. 61-83

Fleck, R. K. & F. A. Hanssen (2006). “The Origins of Democracy: A Model with Application to Ancient Greece.” Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 49, pp. 115-146.

Fleck, R.K. & J. E. Walker (2010) “How Tyranny Paved the Way to Wealth and Democracy: The Democratic Transition in Ancient Greece”. Mimeo.

Halliday, F. (2011) “The Mediterranean in an Age of Globalisation”. European Political Science, Vol. 10, pp. 118-130.

Lipset, S. M. (1959). “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Journal of Political Science Vol. 59, pp. 69-105.

Londregan, J. B. & K. T. Poole (1996). “Does High Income Promote Democracy?” World Politics, Vol. 49, pp. 1-30.

McCannon, B.C. (2010). “The Origin of Democracy in Athens”. Mimeo.

Minier, J. A. (2001). “Is Democracy a Normal Good? Evidence from Democratic Movements.” Southern Economic Journal. Vol. 67, pp. 996-1009.

Muller, E.N. (1995). “Economic Determinants of Democracy”. American Sociological Review. Vol. 60, pp. 966-982.

Mueller, D. C. & T. Stratmann (2003). “The Economic Effects of Democratic Participation,” Journal of Public Economics. Vol. 87 pp. 2129-2155.

Olson, M. (1993). “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, pp. 567-576.

Persson, T. & G. Tabellini (2006). “Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details”. The American Economic Review. Vol. 96, pp. 319-324.

Smith, M.E., K. Weber & M., Baun (Eds) (2007) Governing Europe’s Neighbourhood: Partners or Periphery? Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Varwick, J. & K. Olaf Lang (Eds) (2007) European Neighbourhood Policy: Challenges for the EU-policy Towards the New Neighbours. Opladen and Farmington Hills, Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2007.

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[1] Available at http://www.atiner.gr/docs/Paper2008-01-MEDITERRANEAN.doc

[2] On the Union of the Mediterranean see the Special Issue of Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 2011. A number of books and papers deal with European Union’s Mediterranean Policy, see among others Bicchi (2007), Smith et al. (eds) (2007) and Varwick & Lang (eds) (2007).

[3] See McCannon (2010) and Fleck & Hanssen (2010).

[4] For example, Acemoglu (2008) and others claim that past savings rates affect per capita income but not democracy. But past savings rates affect the accumulation of wealth and the accumulation of wealth is the most important determinant of democracy. Wealth accumulation is achieved by a long period of high economic growth, which permits high savings rates. Bardhan (1993), Huber et al (1993), Londregan & Poole (1996), Minier (2001), Μueller & Stratmann (2003), Muller (1995), Persson & Tabellini (2006), Doucoulianos & Ulubasoglu (2008) are some studies, among many others, that examine the correlation between income and democracy.