The Systematic Study of Society Is a Much Later Development in History Than the Systematic

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Channer

Sociology:

A Discourse on the Nature of the Discipline -Positivism or Interpretivism?

Sheldon D. Channer

The systematic study of the social world is a much later development in history than the systematic study of the natural world (Ross, 1957). This is evidenced by the reality that Galileo’s theory of the revolution of the heavenly bodies (one of the first significant elements of natural science knowledge) was promulgated long before Durkhiem’s theory of the relationship between social control and suicide (the seminal piece of sociological knowledge). Not to mention,Newton’s ideas on the laws of motion and the speed of falling bodies were calculated decades before Mead’s research into the impact of socialization on human social behavior. However, regardless of the huge disparity in time of discovery of these importanttheories and their contribution to the reserve of human knowledge, is the extent to which these discoveries can be considered the result of scientific pursuits.

The purpose of this essay is to analyze the arguments in the debateover the true nature of sociology in comparison to the natural sciences. The primary aim is to arrive at a conclusion as to whether it is fair to assert that sociology is not a science. The discussion has been confined to the literature of the last four decades (1957 to 2000). A combination of natural science and social science works has been consulted, more so the latter than the former. All cited sociological works make mention of the views from as early as Auguste Comte (the father of sociology), to the views of contemporary sociologists such as Anthony Giddens, (the most prolific social scientist in Britain today). The first two pages that follow lay the groundwork for a line of argument that will be developed in the closing paragraphs. The rest of the essay (and by far most) will be a presentation and discussion of the main arguments for the view that sociology cannot be considered a science.

Throughout history, humankind has attained knowledge via various means. Many primitive societies used religion, authority, tradition, and intuition as their only means of acquiring knowledge. As societies became more developed, humankind realized that these were insufficient means of explaining the world around them. The rise of the Greek civilization ushered in an era of rationalization and observation as the primary ways of acquiring knowledge. For many successive centuries, rationalism and observation reigned as the supreme pathways to knowledge. Fortunately, a few key people became dissatisfied with the inadequacies present in these pathways to knowledge. In their attempt to find a better way to know, the era of science as we know it was born. This new way of knowing was simply a unique combination of rationalization and observation into a systematic and organized set of specific principles (Ross and Van den Haag, 1957).

According to McKenzie, science is a vocation geared towards explanation, prediction, and control of both the effects of and the occurrence of phenomena (McKenzie, 1997). The major aim of scientific research is the generation of a body of knowledge that is derived from empirical observations, is tentative, testable, generaliziable and can be easily converted into laws such as Faraday’s law of electromagnetism or the law of relativity established by Einstein, or (do I dare say) Durkhiem’s law of anomie. In pursuit of these laws, scientists employ the methods of science. Many scientists argue that the method used to discover the laws is what constitutes science, not the laws generated from the use of these methods.

This idea of science as a means to an end, and not an end in itself, is shared by many scientists. According to Ross and Van Den Haag (1957), “the generalization of empirical methods is the logic of scientific procedure; it states, among other things, the logical grounds for scientific conclusions.”This view of science was also purported by social scientist Ian Boxhill. Boxhill (1994) argues that science utilizes the three accepted ways of discovering knowledge, ‘empirical, rational and abstractive’.For Boxhill, science is merely a way of knowing, “The best way currently available to man.”

However, for Alfred Shultz, science is more than a way of gaining knowledge. Shultz (2000) argues that science is more than methods of research. Science for Shultz is the results obtained from the analysis of research data, not the methods used in obtaining the data. Shultz contends that it is the knowledge gained from research that is science. Nevertheless, the only way to reap corn is to sow corn seeds. Without scientific methods, one cannot hope to obtain scientific knowledge. This indicates that science is more than just methods but methods are a key element of science. Science, therefore, is as much a way of investigating the world as it is the conclusions one arrives at from investigating.

Therefore, to determine the extent to which sociology is a science, one must look to the methods sociologists employ in their pursuit of knowledge about the social world as well as the nature of the knowledge gained.

At birth, the young sociology was either blessed or cursed with an association with science.According to Giddens (1999), “Auguste Comte, the father of the discipline, defined it as the science of society.” At that period in the history of Europe (late 17thto early 18thcentury), it was a very rewarding thing to say one is a scientist. On the other hand, Max Weber’s definition put forward many years after Comte’s, sighted by McKenzie, is that “sociology shall be taken to refer to a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences.”Weber’s definition presents sociology as having a different emphasis from the one proposed by Comte, but Weber refers to sociology as a science nonetheless.The other two founders of the discipline,Emile Durkhiem, and Radcliff Brown,like Comte, stressed the idea of sociology as similar to traditional science (Haralambus, 1995). Hence, the major figures in the history of the discipline saw it has a science.

But what is science. Well, traditionally, science referred to that dimension of study concerned with the discovery of truth and knowledge of the natural world/ the world of nature via the experimental design of research. It was in this area of study that the term science was first applied. Such disciplines as biology, geology, physic and chemistry comprise this area of study. Ross (1957) posits that modern natural science came into being fully in the sixteenth century but it was not until the seventeenth century that the natural science began to have great triumphs.

Sociology, on the other hand, came into being fully in the Nineteenth century. Sociology as a distinguish discipline developed very slowly in this period through to the twentieth century. In the twentieth century, natural science made giant steps (even on the moon). Yet, In the same period, sociology, under the watchful eyes of the Chicago School, was not even at the level that natural science was when Faraday was discovering the generator (in terms of its ability to use the experimental method of research to control, observe, and predict phenomena).

A major line of argument posited by the dissenters of the claim that sociology is a science is that to a great degree, sociology merely elaborates the obvious; it does not discover any knowledge. Ian Boxhill (1994), in refuting this point, asserts that the obvious, sometimes, has to be stated as a basis for what comes next. To say, for example,that city dwellers have different attitudes from small town resident may just be a preliminary to detailing the differences, some of which may not in the slightest way be obvious. And sometimes the full meaning of the obvious escapes us unless it is stated explicitly. According to Ross, “what is called obvious may not be obvious until after sociologists have discovered it, (e.g. Professor Paul Lazarsfield’s list of statements about the American soldier).”

One of the earliest points of dissent was that the sociologist like all men adopts the values of his society. It is argued that the sociologist, in adopting the values of his own society, cannot study any society objectively. In contrast, it is claimed that the natural scientist does not share this problem because his/her social norms and values have very little impact on his/her interpretation of the natural world. However, bothBoxhill (1994) and Mckenzine (1997) argue that the fact is, this difficulty is in principle similarly for any form of inquiry. Both natural science and sociology seek to address this difficulty in similar ways, by training, testing and re-testing of results by sociologists/scientists with differing values.

Behavior is too complex, argue dissenters, for the sociologist to isolate the relevant variables for testing in a scientific way. They claim that physics, in contrast, is very specialized in the isolation of relevant variables. Social events, unlike physical occurrences, are unique. And science is impossible unless it can deal with the recurrence of events and experimentation. Social predictions influences behavior and that influence may bring about what is predicted-or its opposite- thus making it impossible to know whether the prediction was initially correct. (This poses a problem for sociology as a science since the ability to predict is the sin qua non of science). Society is an open system in which new information constantly affects individuals’ behavior in apparently unpredictable ways. This does not obtain in the natural sciences.

Though the above is largely true, McKenzie (1997) argues that scientific explanation involves reference to general laws/theories, which state the type of conditions under which a type of event takes place. Therefore, in principle, the generality of laws/theories properly omits many particular details unique to a given occurrence of a phenomena, be it social or natural. Sociology, therefore, is no different from the natural science in this regard - take Merton’s law of deviants or Mead’s theory of socialization for example (Haralambus, 1995). As for the contention that there can be no social science for social events are unique, Boxhill argues that there is really no difference between the natural sciences and sociology, concerning this matter. In formulating general laws scientists are interested in establishing invariant relations between types of events. As such, any science studies that which is unique, “every event and every relation are unique, but they are also typical.”(Boxhill, 1993)

The most dominant and persuasive dissenting argument, however, is the assertion that sociology cannot predict with as high a degree of probability as the natural sciences. Various reasons are offered: society is more complex than nature; man is unpredictable or irrational. Yes, there is a difference between the reliability of prediction in sociology and prediction in the natural sciences, but it should not be a basis for the claim that sociology and natural science are different in principle. These are merely differences in level of control. Because a physicist can so readily isolate physical variables in his laboratory, and the sociologist cannot - in the present state of sociology - isolate human and social variables nearly as well - neither does he have a laboratory - the conclusion drawn that

because natural science and sociologydiffer in the level of probability of their predictions, they are therefore different in principle, is an incorrect one.

Principle, as used here, means a standard set of prescriptions, rules, and postulates which governs inquiry and which must be adhered to religiously to obtain scientific knowledge. Therefore, the principles of science has to do with a standard set of rules which determine whether a particular type of knowledge/truth has been arrived at scientifically, fulfills the aim of science, and can therefore be given the esteem position of a science (scientific knowledge). The claims of science as a way of truth, therefore, pertains only to matters that can in the end be tested by rigorous observation and obtain specific testable predictions. Was Durkhiem’s theory of suicide not obtained via rigorous, systematic observations that can be reproduced, tested and retested for accuracy? Is this not the essence of thescientific method? And if the knowledge was obtain via the scientific method, that would make it scientific knowledge, then wouldn’t that mean that Durkheim was a scientist for producing scientific knowledge?

It is not uncommon for sociology to be defined as positivism, from the ComteianSchool, and interpretive, from the Weberian school (Haralambus, 1995). Sociology then can be (and probably should be) seen as being concerned with explanation, prediction and control as well as understanding, interpretation and casual explanation of social processes. What needs to be appreciated is that at this point in its evolution the discipline is weak in the areas of prediction, explanation, and control via general laws of human social behavior (despite the efforts of Durkheim) because it lacks the tools to accomplish this. However, sociology’s place in the discovery of knowledge has been established. What has clearly not been decided is exactly what it is that sociologists really do.

It’s clear that sociology is not as precise as the natural sciences. However, as has been established, sociology is still a fairly young discipline; the fact that sociology is able to rigorously and objectively utilize ‘empirical, rational and abstractive’ methods in its pursuit of knowledge must count for something. Furthermore, in the final analysis, when one gets right down to the meat and potatoes of it all, most sociological knowledge is tentative, testable and to a great extent relative, so is most scientific knowledge. As such, it is this author’s opinion that sociology, though not a science in the traditional sense, is at least a quasi-science – it attempts, were ever possible, to utilize scientific methods to arrive at scientific knowledge. As sociology develops and mature over the next century it will be interesting to observe what pathways it takes.

Works Cited

Makenzie

Ian Boxhill

Michael Haralambus

Anthony Giddens

Ross

Van den Haag

Alfred Shultz

Paul Willis

© 2000 Sheldon D. Channer