November 21, 2008
Chapter 4
1. Introduction
In this chapter, I will provide further illustration of our methodological proposal, building on the empirical paradigms discussed in chapter 2. I will make crucial reference to the model of prediction making put forth in chapter 3 and illustrate what is suggested in chapter 3 as to how we can deal with the failure of a prediction. In sections 2, I will first consider the bound variable paradigm discussed in chapter 2 in light of the proposal in chapter 3. The discussion will lead us to address in sections 3 and 4 the effects of so-called Binding Principle B in Japanese in some depth. The discussion will illustrate how we can maintain our proposal about the Computational System and retain a repeatable phenomenon by modifying certain aspects of what gives rise to the empirical prediction while maintaining our hypothesis about properties of the Computational System, without rendering our 'move' theoretically degenerating in the terms of Lakatos 1970/1978. We will then discuss in sections 5 whether we can in a similar way save from refutation the hypotheses discussed in chapter 2 that zibunzisin and otagai are 'local anaphors', i.e., that they are lexically specified in the same way, in the relevant respect, as the English reflexives and reciprocals. It will be concluded that such attempts to save those hypotheses would, at best, end up being theoretically degenerating because it would result in the elimination of the *Schema-based prediction, without introducing a new *Schema-based hypothesis, thereby leaving us with a proposal that cannot be empirically disconfirmed.
2. The BVA (Bound variable anaphora)
2.1. The linguistic intuition BVA
Let us first go over again what is meant by the intuition BVA(A, B)[1], which plays a central role in our empirical discussion. Our initial illustration in chapter 2 of what is intended by BVA was based on examples like (1) in English.
(1) a. every teacher looked at his student
b. *?his student looked at every teacher
We let BVA(A, B) express an intuition that (i) B does not have an inherent referent of its own, and (ii) its 'value' co-varies with that of A; e.g., BVA(every teacher, his) as it is intended in (1a) expresses the intuition that has often been stated as in (2a).
(2) a. For all x, teacher(x), x looked at x's student
b. For all x, teacher(x), x's student looked at x
It is commonly understood that (1b) cannot be interpreted as (2b) while (1a) can be interpreted as (2a).
As noted in chapter 3: 6.2, we do not wish to define BVA(A, B) as an intuition that arises whenever B is interpreted as a variable bound by A in terms of logical representation. For example, the anaphoric relation holding between someone and his in (3a) is not an instance of BVA(A, B) for our purposes although it is often expressed as in (3b).
(3) a. Someone washed his car.
b. some x, person(x), x washed x's car
We intend BVA(A, B) to have the properties in (4).
(4) a. A is not singular-denoting; i.e., either there are two or more individuals or entities that are 'expressed' by A or there is no individual or entity expressed by A.
b. B does not refer to a particular individual or entity.
c. B is singular-denoting.
d. B is understood to 'express the same thing' as A is understood to express; i.e., the value of B co-varies with that of A.
What is crucial in our characterization of BVA(A, B) are (4a) and (4c), which ensures that the anaphoric relation between A and B cannot be an instance of coreference.[2] A in BVA(A, B), in fact, need not contain a quantifier in its standard sense. For example, we regard the intuition that even John and his can be anaphorically related in (5) as an instance of BVA(even John, his) although even is not a quantifier.
(5) even John criticized his teacher.
BVA(even John, his)
We might thus consider the linguistic expressions in (6) as a candidate for A of BVA(A, B) and those in (7) as a candidate for B of BVA(A, B).
(6) a. every boy
b. Toyota and Nissan
c. the three companies
(7) a. it
b. him
c. the boy
In (8a) and (8b), for example, we could address BVA(every boy, his) and BVA(every boy, the boy), respectively.
(8) a. every boy called his mother
b. every boy called the boy's mother
With such a BVA, (8a) and (8b) both correspond to the interpretation in (9).
(9) every x, boy(x), x called x's mother
If there were no restrictions in regard to the overt marking of singularity and plurality of the relevant linguistic expressions, the sentences in (10) might be interpreted as in (11) and the BVAs would be BVA(Toyota and Nissan, it) for (10a) and BVA(the three companies, it) for (10b).
(10) a. Toyota and Nissan criticized its attorneys.
b. The three companied criticized its attorneys.
(11) a. every x, x is a member of the set {Toyota, Nissan}, x criticized x's attorneys
b. every x, x is a member of the set of the three companies, x criticized x's attorneys
The English examples in (10), however, cannot yield the BVAs as corresponding to (11). The impossibility of BVA(Toyota and Nissan, it) and BVA(the three companies, it) in English, and other similar languages, seems to be due to some restriction in regard to the overt marking of singularity and plurality on the two NPs/DPs that are intended to stand in an anaphoric relation.
If a language does not have such a restriction, as it seems to be the case in Japanese, the BVA is possible in analogous examples. For example, BVA(Toyota to Nissan 'Toyota and Nissan', soko 'it') and BVA(ano mitu-no kaisya 'those three companies', soko 'it') are possible in (12), despite the fact that soko is singular-denoting, as will be illustrated directly.
(12) a. Toyota to Nissan-ga soko-no mein banku-o uttaeta (to sitara)
'(if it happened that) each of Toyota and Nissan sued its main bank'
b. Ano mitu-no kaisya-ga soko-no mein banku-o uttaeta (to sitara)
'(if it happened that) each of those three companies sued its main bank'
As discussed in Hoji 1995, so-ko must be singular-denoting. Consider the examples in (13) and (14).[3]
(13) a. (Hoji 1995: 259, (16), slightly adapted)
*Toyota1-ga Nissan2-ni [CP zeimusyo-ga so-ko1+2 -o sirabeteiru to] tugeta (koto)
Toyota-nom Nissan-dat tax:office-nom that-place-acc is:investigating that informed (fact)
'Toyota1 informed Nissan2 that the tax office was investigating it1+2'
b. *Toyota1-wa Nissan2-ni [NP so-ko1+2-no goodoopaatii-no kaizyoo]-o teiansita.
Toyota-top Nissan-dat that-place-gen joint:party-gen place-acc suggested
'Toyota1 suggested to Nissan2 (about) a place for its1+2 joint party'
(14) a. Tom1-ga Nick2-ni [CP CIA-ga karera1+2-o sirabeteiru to] tugeta (koto)
Tom-nom Nick-dat CIA-nom they-acc is:investigating that informed (fact)
'Tom1 told Nick2 that the CIA was investigating them1+2'
b. A-no ninensei1-wa a-no itinensei2-ni aitura1+2-no atarasii kooti-o syookaisita.
That-gen sophomore-top that-gen freshman-dat they-gen new coach-acc introduced
'That sophomore1 introduced to that freshman2 their1+2 new coach.'
c. A-no ninensei1-wa a-no itinensei2-ni [kooti-ga aitura1+2-o mihatteiru koto]-o morasitesimatta.
that-gen sophomore-top that-gen freshman-dat coach-nom they-acc is:watching fact -acc revealed
'That sophomore1 revealed to that freshman2 that the coach was watching them1+2 (from somewhere).'
d. A-no ninensei1-wa a-no itinensei2-ni [kooti-ga soitura1+2-o mihatteiru koto]-o morasitesimatta.
that-gen sophomore-top that-gen freshman-dat coach-nom they-gen is:watching fact -acc revealed
'That sophomore1 revealed to that freshman2 that the coach was watching them1+2 (from somewhere).'
The split antecedence is not possible in (13), in contrast to (14). As pointed out in Hoji 1995, this observation can be accounted for if so-ko 'that place', used in (13), is understood to be singular-denoting, in contrast to karera 'they', aitura 'those guys', and soitura 'those guys', used in (14).
The anaphoric relation as indicated in examples like (15) therefore cannot be that of coreference.
(15) a. (Hoji 1995: (17)), slightly adapted)
Toyota to Nissan-ga John-ni [CP CIA-ga so-ko-o sirabeteiru to] tugeta (koto)
Toyota and Nissan-nom John-dat CIA-nom that-place-acc is:investigating that told
'each of Toyota and Nissan informed John that the CIA was investigating it'
b. Toyota to Nissan-ga so-ko-no torihikisaki-o uttaeta (koto)
Toyota and Nissan-nom that-place-gen business:associate-acc sued
'each of Toyota and Nissan sued its business associate(s)'
It is argued in Hoji 1995 that the anaphoric relation in examples like (15), holding between Toyota to Nissan 'Toyota and Nissan' and so-ko 'that place, it' is an instance of bound variable anaphora, i.e., BVA(Toyota to Nissan, so-ko) in the terms of the present discussion. If so-ko is replaced by a-soko the BVA is no longer available, as indicated in (16).
(16) a. *Toyota to Nissan-ga John-ni [CP CIA-ga a-soko-o sirabeteiru to] tugeta (koto)
Toyota and Nissan-nom John-dat CIA-nom that-place-acc is:investigating that told
'each of Toyota and Nissan informed John that the CIA was investigating it'
b. *Toyota to Nissan-ga a-soko-no torihikisaki-o uttaeta (koto)
Toyota and Nissan-nom that-place-gen business:associate-acc sued
'each of Toyota and Nissan sued its business associate(s)'
The contrast between (15) and (16)—and, more generally, the contrast between a so-NP and an a-NP—is discussed in chapter 2, in relation to examples such as (17).
(17) a. (=chapter 2: (72b))
90% izyoo-no ki-ni so-re-o ueta sotugyoosei-no namae-ga kizamareteiru rasii.
90% or:more-gen tree-on that-thing-acc planted graduate-gen name-nom be:engraved seem
'It seems that on each of 90% or more trees is engraved the name of the graduate who has planted it.'
b. (chapter 2: (71b))
90% izyoo-no ki-ni a-re-o ueta sotugyoosei-no namae-ga kizamareteiru rasii.
90% or:more-gen tree-on that-thing-acc planted graduate-gen name-nom be:engraved seem
'It seems that on each of 90% or more trees is engraved the name of the graduate who has planted it.'
The contrast is quite striking in light of the fact that both so-ko and a-soko can be coreferential with Toyota, as indicated in (18) below.
(18) a. Toyota-ga so-ko-no roodoo kumiai-o hihansi-ta (koto)
Toyota-nom that-place-gen labor union-acc criticize-past (fact)
'Toyota criticized its labor union.'
b. Toyota-ga a-soko-no roodoo kumiai-o hihansi-ta (koto)
Toyota-nom that-place-gen labor union-acc criticize-past (fact)
'Toyota criticized its labor union.'
The generalization in question has been noted in works such as Hoji 1991 among others and is often stated as in (19), as noted in chapter 2.
(19) A so-NP can be 'bound' by a quantificational NP while an a-NP cannot.
The pair in (20) further illustrates the contrast between the so- and the a-demonstratives.
(20) a. (Hoji et al. 2003: (15a))
Toyota-sae-ga [{so-ko/*a-soko}-no ko-gaisya]-o suisensita.
Toyota-even-nom that-place-gen child-company-acc recommended
'Even Toyota recommended [its subsidiary].'
b. Toyota-sika {so-ko/*a-soko}-no sitauke-ni toohyoosinakatta
Toyota-SIKA that-place-gen subsidiary-dat did:not:vote:for
'No company other than Toyota voted for its subsidiaries.'
2.2. The bridging statement
2.2.1. The Lexical condition[4]
The bridging statement relates the informant's linguistic intuitions to theoretical concepts. The general form of the bridging statement given in chapter 3 is as in (21).
(21) (=chapter 3: (36))
A certain linguistic intuition such as the sense of the availability of interpretation g(a, b) arises only if (a) certain condition(s) is/are met at LF.
The lexical condition on BVA(A, B) in Japanese as noted in the preceding subsection can be stated as in (22a) or (22b), depending upon whether we take the relevant lexical marking as a 'positive' or 'negative' specification for the availability of BVA(A, B).
(22) a. BVA(a, b) arises only if b has a lexical marking M on it at LF.
b. BVA(a, b) arises only if b does not have a lexical marking M on it at LF.
The relevant hypothesis about items in the mental Lexicon of the speakers of Japanese must have the consequence in (23) or (24)
(23) Under (22a):
a. An a-NP does not have a lexical marking M on it at LF.
b. A so-NP has a lexical marking M on it at LF.
(24) Under (22b):
a. An a-NP has a lexical marking M on it at LF.
b. A so-NP does not have a lexical marking M on it at LF.
In chapter 2, we expressed the relevant contrast by adopting Ueyama's (1998) theory of anaphoric relations; we introduced in chapter 2 the following aspects of Ueyama 1998.[5]
(25) There are three types of individual-denoting NPs:[6]
a. D-indexed NPs[7]
b. Non-indexed NPs
c. I-indexed NPs
(26) a. A-NPs are D-indexed.
b. So-NPs are either I-indexed or non-indexed.
From (26) we obtain (27).
(27) a. A-NPs are D-indexed.
b. So-NPs are not D-indexed.
And our account in chapter 2 of the contrast noted above was based on the assumption that a necessary condition for an NP B to be BVA(A, B) is the absence of a D-index on B. In the terms of Ueyama 1998, the lexical marking M in (22) amounts to being D-indexed. The bridging statement in (28), combined with (27), we obtain (29).
(28) BVA(a, b) arises only if b is not D-indexed.
(29) So-NPs can be B of BVA(A, B) but a-NPs cannot.
Given the view we adopt that the demonstratives so/a (and ko/do) are not the heads of so/a-NPs (or ko/do-NPs)[8], it is not entirely clear how the lexical specification on the demonstratives so- and a- has the said consequence on the entire so-NPs and a-NPs. I will assume that so/a as in (30) is an adjunct rather than the head, as suggested (or only hinted at?) in Hoji 1995, and that it serves to provide a (partial) 'instruction' as to how the value of what it modifies is to be determined.[9]
(30) a. so-re
b. so-ko
c. so-no N
d. a-re
e. a-soko
f. a-no N
In sum, the hypothesis about the so- and a- demonstratives we adopt is that they are marked in the mental Lexicon of the Japanese speakers in such a way as to have the consequence that an a-NP cannot be B of BVA(A, B) while so-NP can. Such a lexical hypothesis is language-particular while the structural hypothesis on the availability of BVA(A, B), on the other hand, is universal.
2.2.2. The Structural condition
In chapter 2, we considered the possibility of BVA in paradigms with 'binder-bindee' pairs such as those given in (31).
(31) a. NP-sae ('even NP'), so-ko ('that place/it')
b. NP-dake ('only NP'), so-ko ('that place/it')
c. 10 izyoo-no NP ('ten or more NPs'), so-ko ('that place/it')