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A REASONABLE THEODICY?
TACKLING THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
John Mark Hicks
My book Yet Will I Trust Him?, in reflecting on divine providence and human suffering, hastened to decry the importance we often give to reason. Indeed, reason can blind us to our own limitations. It can set itself up as a god which judges all reality. That kind of reason I have capitalized and called, "Reason." However, we cannot avoid the use of human reason in defending and understanding our faith. Faith should be reasonable even though it cannot be exhausted by reason.
Consequently, I do not react negatively to philosophical or theoretical attempts to deal with the problem of evil, that is, to construct a reasonable theodicy. There is a role for such exercises. However, some of the best attempts of theologians have been shipwrecked on the beaches of Reason itself. Revelation must always function as the sphere of faith's defense and understanding. Such defenses, however, should be reasonable (coherent) in the light of revelation. Thus, a theodicy which seeks to build a reasonable defense in this context is welcome and deserves examination.
This appendix offers a theoretical theodicy contextualized by biblical theology and particularly by the story outlined in this book. It deals with the traditional problem of evil within the context of the discpline called the philosophy of religion. I attempt to integrate the previous discussion of the main text into a reasonable understanding of theodicy. While the argument may seem rather philosophical at times (and I make no apology for this), my goal is always to root this defense in divine revelation. It is a reasoned attempt to understand the implications of biblical theology for theodicy in the context of modern thought.
Why attempt such a thing given the previous discussion in this book? Opponents of theism, and many believers as well, will regard the conclusions of the book as a retreat from reason into mystery. They will attack it as irrational. As a result, there is a need to demonstrate its reasonableness. God has given us reason as a tool to understand his world and his revelation. God does not ask us to believe the irrational or the unreasonable. He does ask us to believe some things which are beyond reason or incomprehensible, but that does not mean he asks to be irrational. Belief of the incomprehensible can be reasonable. Mystery intervenes in all belief systems at some point. No one seriously claims to have all the answers. Even science reaches the outer limits of knowledge and must bow before mystery at some point. But while the ultimate answer to the problem of innocent suffering may be incomprehensible within our finitude, it is not necessarily irrational. Therefore, there is a need to give a reasoned defense of biblical theism. More particularly, there is a need to give a reasoned defense of the perspective outlined in this book in the light of contemporary philosophy of religion.
Two caveats, however, are necessary. First, my discussion of the problem of evil is not the last word. I have no illusions about the limitations of my own rational abilities or anyone's rational abilities. I know that I can never fully justify God. Theodicy is an attempt, as Milton put it, to justify "the ways of God to man." To justify him in an ultimate sense presupposes infinity itself. I cannot put God in a box for inspection and then rationally dismiss the charges against him in the case of evil's existence. My defense seeks only plausibility within the framework of biblical revelation. If the reader will judge my understanding of theodicy as plausible as another, then I will have succeeded. After all, the problem of evil is an attack on the self-consistency of theism. To demonstrate plausibility, or even logical possibility, then, is a sufficient intellectual response to the attack. In the final analysis, however, God does not need my justification. I only offer it for the sake of those whom it might help.
Second, I fully understand that a reasoned understanding of the problem of evil is almost useless in the midst of suffering. Reasoned explanations are often, if not always, emotionally unsatisfying. To reason with a mother at the funeral of her child is not only unwise, but heartless. She needs caring and compassion, not philosophical discussion. She needs to hear the gospel story, a kind of "practical" theodicy and know that God suffers with her.[1] The emotional trauma of suffering is not overcome in the intellectual exercises of philosophical discussion, but in trusting a loving and caring God. Only in the presence of the transcendent God will the emotional and spiritual needs of the individual find genuine comfort and resolution. The needs of the emotions are different from the needs of the intellect. Each of these needs must be met, but usually they are not met the same way. The discussion below addresses the intellect, not the emotions. It is hoped that the previous discussion of the book has addressed some of the practical and theological needs however feeble that attempt may have been.
Introduction: The Problem Stated
The fact of human suffering has been a problem for theists from the beginning. It is reflected in the book of Job. It is discussed in both ancient and medieval literature. The reality of evil in this world has not gone unnoticed by any age. Yet, the flowering of the Enlightenment brought the problem to bear as a major weapon against theism. Set in the age of Reason, the argument regarding the problem of evil became and remains a major stumbling-block for faith in the biblical God. David Hume set the tone for this age of skepticism by the use of the argument. Quoting the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus, he states: [2]
Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?
However, as twentieth century moderns see it, the problem has become even more acute. The Holocaust coupled together with all the other cruelties and devastations of the twentieth century has forced us to confess the existence of evil, even the existence of radical evil. The Holocaust, as was noted in chapter one, has become the touchstone of theodicy. Whatever we say about the problem of evil must be consistent with the fact of the Holocaust and the extermination or starvation of 15 million people. Irving Greenberg said it best when he set down this fundamental premise for theological thought: "No statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would not be credible in the presence of burning children."[3]
The dilemma is still the same. Whether in the mouth of Epicurus, or Hume, or modern skeptics, the issue boils down to whether the existence of an absolutely good and omnipotent God is consistent with the existence of evil. The twentieth century has simply bolstered the question by coming to an understanding of both the radical nature and the magnitude of evil in this world. Is the existence of an absolutely good and omnipotent God consistent not only with the existence of evil, but is it consistent with the amount and kind of evil that is in the world? One cannot study the Holocaust without contemplating the pointedness of that question.
If God were good, why did he not intervene in the Holocaust and stop the evil of Nazism? Why did he not stop the extermination of a race of people? Could it be that God is not as good as we thought he was? Some have so argued.[4] If God were almighty, why did He not intervene in the Holocaust? Could it be that God could not prevent or act to stop the Holocaust? Could it be that God is not as powerful as we thought he was? Some have so argued.[5] The evil of the Holocaust has called into question the traditional understanding of God.[6] For many, evil has become too obvious and too radical to believe in the biblical God of mercy, justice and power. Admittedly, the force of the argument is strong and practically overwhelming. Its force is illustrated in the book of Job itself as we have seen.
The Holocaust was a moral evil. It was perpetrated by human agents. Hitler along with Himmler, Eichman and the SS chose to exterminate and starve millions. Their acts were acts of free agents. Within theism this is regarded as sin. It is moral evil. However, there is another kind of evil which is not moral. This evil is not perpetrated by human agents. Rather, it comes through natural fortunes. Tornadoes, earthquakes, hurricanes and other natural phenomena maim, destroy and kill. If nature were an human agent, it would be punished most severely for its evils. Yet, nature is impersonal, but the evil (the misfortune and calamity) it creates is real and tragic. Natural evil, then, is also a problem for the theist, especially the theist who understands that God controls nature. For the theist who lives in the world of Job, who prays like a biblical saint, natural evil is a more significant problem than moral evil.
The skeptical attack on theism is first an attack on its logical consistency. But the second attack is an attack on the plausibility of the theistic position. If a belief is inconsistent, or even unreasonable, there is reason to reject it. Consequently, theism is obligated to respond to the skeptical attacks. But the skeptic must not object when the theist responds out of his worldview. The issue is whether the theistic system is internally consistent and plausible with regard to known facts (i.e, the existence and amount of evil). The question is, does the theist have a reason to believe that God has some good reason for the existence of radical evil, and the amount of that evil, in the world? The only requirement is that the theistic worldview with regard to the problem of evil be consistent, plausible and reasonable. I will attempt to set forth such a view.
In summary, my approach is basically this. First, moral evil is the result of the free acts of human agents. God is responsible for creating free beings, but he is not indictable when those free beings choose moral evil. In other words, God is not culpable for moral evil. Moral evil is something that God never intended, but given its existence, he uses it for his purposes. Second, natural evil is the result of natural forces operating in a fallen world. God is responsible for creating the natural world, but he is not culpable for the existence of a fallen world. A fallen world entails natural evil that God never intended in creaton, but given the fact of a fallen world, he uses it for his purposes. In other words, God justly uses natural evil to serve his purposes. Third, God will fully resolve the guilt and misfortunes of evil in the eschaton through Jesus Christ. God has acted in Jesus Christ to destory both moral evil (sin) and natural evil (death). God in Jesus Christ has offered his own self-justification. But theodicy is not limited to this present experience, but ultimately it seeks vindication in the consummation. Only there will evil find its final and full defeat; and only there will God be fully justified in the light of his work in Christ.
Moral Evil
Alvin Plantinga has offered a reasonable theodicy for moral evil. He has demonstrated the logical consistency of theism with respect to moral evil. My discussion is, in many ways, indebted to him and what is generally known as the "Free Will Defense".[7]
The "Free Will Defense" depends upon a proper understanding of the goodness and omnipotence of God. If we can demonstrate a meaning of these attributes consistent with the existence of moral evil, then the defense succeeds.
The key issue is omnipotence. Does this mean that God can do anything at all? Omnipotence implies that God can do "all things," but that statement means that God can do all things that can possibly be done. God cannot do what is logically impossible to do. For example, he cannot make a "round square." Such a "thing" is nonsensical. It is, in fact, a non-entity. No such thing can exist. The possibility of its existence is exculded by the definition of its terms. Consequently, God's omnipotence means that God can do anything that is subject to power, that is, he can do anything that can possibly be done.
We must add one further point to this definition of omnipotence. God cannot act contrary to his nature. If God is absolutely good, then he cannot commit moral evil. He cannot, for example, lie. It is impossible for God to sin. Thus, God is omnipotent only in the sense that he can do anything that is logically possible and at the same time is not contrary to his absolutely good nature.
With this understanding of God, the theist can construct a defense which renders his system self-consistent. God created human beings for his own glory. He created them with the freedom of contrary choice. He created them so that they could freely love or not love God; so that they could freely give God glory or glorify themselves. With this freedom, human beings may choose either good or evil. God is responsible for the freedom, that is, he created humanity with it, but God is not guilty when they abuse that freedom by choosing moral evil. Only human agents culpable when they choose moral evil.
Two questions arise at this point. First, why did not God create an agent who always and freely chooses good? God cannot do what is logically impossible. To guarantee the "always," God would have to implant some necessity in the agent. Is it possible to create a free agent who necessarily chooses good? Necessity and freedom are exclusives. A free agent does not necessarily choose anything; he freely chooses. He has the power to choose either good or evil. If the power to choose evil is lost, so is the freedom. Since God wanted agents who would freely love him, and not love him by some compulsion or necessity, he created them with the power of contrary choice. The power of contrary choice, then, implies the possibility of moral evil which, alas, we have so often exercised. God could not create an agent who necessarily but freely chooses good, or at the very least God decided to create free beings because he values the genuine relationship which freedom yields.