Reducing Tension

Alexander Evans

Reducing Tension

Is Not Enough

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The Washington Quarterly • 24:2 pp. 181–193.

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY _ SPRING 2001 181

Alexander Evans is a research associate at the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s

College London. He is a regular commentator on Kashmir for BBC Television and Radio.

After 13 violent years, an air of change surrounds Kashmir. In Pakistan,

old truths are being reconsidered, even if Pakistan’s commitment to

Kashmir cannot be. In India, a newly acknowledged confidence has the potential

to encourage action. In the United States, a policy grounded in the realities

of the Cold War is being replaced by a new set of regional priorities.

Change, in this case, really could be for the better. A more realistic policy

from Pakistan, without missing the need to meet Kashmiri desires, could

mend a frayed relationship with the West and provide a basis for serious

talks with India. The question is, will India respond in kind?

President Bill Clinton’s visit in 2000 may have permanently altered the

language of U.S. engagement with South Asia, entrenching U.S. interest in a

region once branded a backwater. Kashmir will remain on the U.S. agenda,

primarily because analysts see it as a potential spark to an explosive wider

conflict in South Asia. A leading question for the administration of President

George W. Bush will be whether the friendship with India deepens or

fractures. New Delhi demands to be taken seriously, but must be treated

with care. Pakistan, meanwhile, may not have many friends, but it needs to

retain U.S. interest for regional security—and perhaps future access to energy

resources in Central Asia—to be assured. Kashmir also deserves attention,

not just because of geopolitics, but because all Kashmiris, whatever

their religion, politics, or language, deserve just and democratic rule.

Bush may run into difficulties if he attempts to strike a balance among

these three parties. Indian diplomats privately fear the possibility of revived

U.S. unilateralism under the Bush administration. Initiatives such as national

missile defense (NMD) raise more than a few eyebrows in New Delhi.

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THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY _ SPRING 2001 182

As one Indian defense analyst put it, forget North Korea or Iraq, NMD is

aimed at the emerging missile powers such as India. Perhaps this statement

reflects a mild form of Indian paranoia, but it harkens back to the simpler

days of the Cold War, during which India was constantly suspicious of U.S.

foreign policy. Regardless, sensitive South Asian politicians need to be

handled carefully or U.S. involvement could become counterproductive if

New Delhi suspects the motivation behind it.

A confident and trusting India, if well led, could seize opportunities to

enter into dialogue with moderate Kashmiri opposition leaders. Substantial

progress might not be possible, but any form of engagement would be better

than the constant irritations of the present distant and authoritarian rule

over Kashmir. Initial flirtations between Indian intelligence agencies and

Kashmiri militant leaders is one sign that the engagement process has already

begun. Simultaneously, an easing of previously stringent visa restrictions

has allowed a number of Kashmiri exiles, mostly critics of Indian rule,

to return to the Kashmir Valley. Some have been visiting their families, others

have been facilitating quiet contact between the Indian government and

some of its fiercest Kashmiri opponents.

The pressing questions in 2001 are whether another Indo-Pakistani war

will occur and can it be prevented. One more year may have passed in

peace, but some imaginative thinking is still urgently required to improve

Indo-Pakistani relations. In the past, more active effort has been poured

into regurgitating stock solutions to the Kashmir problem than into applying

imagination to tackle its various parts. This obsession with solutions is a

part of the problem, and perhaps in part explains why the Kashmir problem

has festered for so long.

Of course a solution to the Kashmir problem is needed, now more than

ever, and it should be pursued. Deeper comprehension of the Kashmir problem

is required, however, if the current low-level crisis in Kashmir is ever to be

resolved. Greater U.S. interest in the issue is welcome, therefore, and

thoughtful analysis coming from the likes of the Kashmir Study Group, operated

from New York, and other organizations could pave the way for a more

informed dialogue among India, Pakistan, and, it is hoped, the Kashmiris too.

A Heavy History

The Kashmir dispute has a long history, dating before the vagaries of partition

in 1947.1 As one of the princely states, Kashmir was ruled by a maharajah

who could choose to accede to either Pakistan or India as the British

withdrew from the subcontinent. After vacillating for several months, the

maharajah chose India in October 1947, and the then-prime minister of InTHE

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dia, Jawaharlal Nehru, promised that this decision would only be confirmed

after the Kashmiri people, mostly Muslim, had their say. The accession took

place as conflict erupted between Indian and Pakistani troops over Kashmir,

and the legacy of what became the first Kashmir war locked both countries

into historical positions that they find too difficult to grow out of today.

Early intervention by the United Nations (UN) led to a series of UN

resolutions calling for a three-stage approach to Kashmir: early withdrawal

of forces, a free and fair plebiscite, and interim government. Arguments

about how this plan might be realized continued until the early 1950s. Since

then, India has argued that the call for a plebiscite

has been overtaken by local democracy in

Kashmir.

In 1965 and 1971, India and Pakistan fought

two more wars, the first over Kashmir, the second

over what became Bangladesh. The 1965 war was

a stalemate, and the Tashkent Agreement that

followed simply reinforced this situation. The

1971 defeat of Pakistan led to the Simla Agreement,

which states that India and Pakistan will seek to resolve Kashmir bilaterally

(or through other mutually agreed peaceful means). For India, this

agreement turned Kashmir into a purely bilateral matter. For Pakistan, Simla

merely added another layer to an international dispute and by no means invalidated

existing UN resolutions.

Fifty-four years of rhetoric have reinforced two fundamentally incompatible

perspectives. India interprets the 1947 decision as final and Kashmir as

a symbol of Indian secularism. Pakistan considers the situation gravely unjust

and demands the implementation of a plebiscite in full compliance with

existing UN resolutions. Both the United States and United Kingdom view

Kashmir as a disputed territory and hope that India and Pakistan will one

day come to an agreement on its future.

Apart from the formal dispute between India and Pakistan over the piece

of real estate called Kashmir, what Kashmiris themselves want is a question.

Beginning in the 1930s, a popular political movement began fighting for democracy

in Kashmir, which the maharajah ran as a personal fiefdom. This

movement continued into the late 1940s and spawned the first popular

leader in Kashmir, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. Abdullah ruled Kashmir

from 1947 to 1953, when he was deposed by the Indian government after

suspicions that he might prefer independence to India emerged. Since then,

pro-Indian politicians have had to vie with others who would prefer Pakistan

or even independence for Kashmir. After a series of indifferent pro-Indian

chief ministers, an elderly Sheikh Abdullah was returned to power in

1975, and on his death in 1982 was succeeded by his son, Farooq Abdullah.

There is an air of

change around

Kashmir.

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THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY _ SPRING 2001 184

Dissonant voices increased throughout the 1980s in the face of unemployment,

greater media penetration, increasing Islamic assertion, and dubious

elections.2 In July 1988, this disaffection turned violent, as young

militants from the pro-independence Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front

(JKLF) launched an insurgency against Indian rule. It quickly grew, partly

because of covert support from Pakistan, partly because of exceptionally

heavy-handed Indian counterinsurgency. In 1989, the Hizbul Mujahadeen

(HM), a group fighting for Pakistani control over Kashmir, joined the fray.

By the mid-1990s, 250,000 Indian security forces were fighting 5,000

Kashmiri militants, and thousands of

Kashmiris had been killed in the process. India

was charged with serious human rights

abuses; New Delhi in turn accused Pakistan

of fostering a proxy war in Kashmir. Given

the fractured nature of politics in Kashmir,

political parties and militant groups proliferated,

and by 1995, two more fundamentalist

militant groups were playing a leading role—

the Lashkar-e-Toiba, and the Harkat-ul-

Ansar (now rebranded as the Harkatul-

Mujahadeen). Today these two groups,

alongside HM and other smaller bands, dominate a smaller, more brutal

militant campaign. The JKLF, although still a political force, today sticks to

a cease-fire declared in 1994 and has little military capacity. HM remains

significant because it draws much of its support and Kashmiri members from

the Islamist Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) party in Kashmir. The Jamaat provides continuity

and a support base that other groups find difficult to replicate.

In May 1999, the Kargil crisis destroyed a blossoming peace process between

then-Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif and Atul Behari

Vajpayee, his Indian counterpart. Pakistani infiltrators, whether militants

(as claimed by Islamabad) or soldiers (as claimed by New Delhi) seized several

barren peaks close to the strategic Srinagar-Kargil road and on the Indian

side of the line of control. After several weeks of fighting, U.S.

diplomatic intervention and Indian military gains forced a Pakistani retreat.

The damage to the region, and Pakistan’s credibility with Washington, was

substantial.

Constantly in the headlines, Kashmir remained an expensive headache

for India. The Indian commitment to Kashmir remained strong, however,

and although militant violence continued, those doing the fighting increasingly

came from outside Kashmir itself. Some terrorist incidents, ranging

from the murder of five Westerners in 1995 to the hijack of an Indian Airlines

plane in December 1999, gave weight to the Indian claim that this

India’s engagement

process with

Kashmiri militant

leaders has already

begun.

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conflict was a proxy war, not a popular uprising. Considering selected communal

massacres of minority Hindus, some suggest the movement is fundamentalist,

although this claim is not entirely accurate.3

Change in the Air

In July 2000, HM declared a surprise cease-fire. Within days, HM militants

were playing cricket with Indian security force units (and winning)—hardly

the sign of fighters eager to return underground—but other militant groups

were determined to continue to fight. More than 90 people were killed in a

series of attacks within the first 24 hours after the cease-fire was announced.

Making matters more complicated, Kashmiri separatist politicians

distanced themselves from the nascent cease-fire, sharply limiting the prospects

for negotiations.

The cease-fire swiftly crumbled in August. Kashmiris blamed India for

wavering between conducting the proposed talks strictly within the Indian

constitution (which disallows secession) or under the broader banner of

insaniyat, or humanity. India and the United States pointed toward the HM

leader in Pakistan, Syed Salahuddin, whose commitment to the cease-fire

was uncertain. Soon after the cease-fire had been declared, Salahuddin was

on every media channel possible, saying that no talks could be considered

unless Pakistan was an immediate participant in them.

Despite the chill in Indo-Pakistani relations, private contacts, known as

track two, grew in number between New Delhi and Islamabad. On its national

independence day, August 14, Pakistan once again called for direct

talks between the two countries on Kashmir. Behind the scenes, continuing

pressure came from Washington and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as

concerns about Indo-Pakistani tension mounted.

Late in the summer, rumors abounded that HM might call another ceasefire,

but this time the surprise took time. When it did come, it came from

New Delhi. On November 19, 2000, Vajpayee issued a statement indicating

that Indian security forces would not “initiate combat operations” against

militants in the Jammu and Kashmir regions during the Muslim holy month

of Ramadan. Referring back to his August call for all issues to be resolved in

the spirit of insaniyat, he once again indicated that the door was open for

talks with militants.

As Ramadan began on November 27, 2000, the Indians halted offensive

operations. Militant attacks continued, with the murder of four children in

Sarju village, 160 kilometers from Jammu. Despite this attack, Pakistan reciprocated

India’s peace move a few days later. Foreign Secretary Inamul

Haq announced that Pakistani troops along the line of control would exerl

Alexander Evans

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY _ SPRING 2001 186

cise “maximum restraint.” It looked as if moves were afoot to turn the private

contacts between India and Pakistan into a basis for formal talks.

Kashmiri leaders may or may not be involved, and only time will tell

whether this process, like many previous initiatives, dies before it can yield a

lasting peace. One thing is certain: the United States, if it continues to play

a choreographed but active role, wants to see substantive Indo-Pakistani

talks accompany genuine attempts to resolve the Kashmir problem. Bush inherits

a fairly straightforward Kashmir policy: keep a low profile and intercede,

but do not intervene.

Islamabad’s Palace Debate

Many Kashmiri separatists were angry about the 1999 Kargil crisis.4 The war

in the mountains drew attention away from Kashmiris and added weight to

Indian claims of proxy war. The impact of Kargil has also been felt throughout

the region. In India, however, Kashmir stopped being a remote issue for

many Indians and became embedded in popular culture, as the recent Indian

film, Mission Kashmir, attests.

In Pakistan, the Kargil crisis helped accelerate a process already underway.

Since 1998, a debate has been going on about Kashmir among the elite

who determine foreign and security policy. Several years ago, only the odd

voice would be raised against the existing policy on Kashmir to support

implementation of the UN resolutions. Today, a growing band of modernists

are arguing that Pakistan should amend the fixed policy it has had since

1947. The following explanation is simplified, but provides a basic understanding

of the modernists’ argument.

The modernists contend that a position based on the unfinished business

of partition no longer resonates internationally after 54 years. Speeches

about UN resolutions passed half a century ago are notorious among Western

diplomats stationed in Pakistan and often evoke a sigh from academics

and journalists working on Kashmir. Instead, the modernists argue that Pakistan

should support meaningful self-determination for Kashmiris. In practice,

this approach means including the option of independence along with

the historic choice between India and Pakistan. After all, they point out, India

is still wary of international involvement in Kashmir—much less a plebiscite—

because it cannot be sure that the so-called “misguided youth” of

Kashmir will choose India over possible alternatives. The best current option

for Pakistan, conclude the modernists, is letting the best argument have

its day in the court of Kashmiri public opinion.

A few Pakistani modernists are even unsympathetic to the national preoccupation

with Kashmir and instead argue that the fate of Pakistan will be

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determined by economic successes, not foreign policy triumphs. Today, they

argue, the fate of Pakistan lies as much with investors, reformers, and the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) as with the generals in power. The most

important people in Pakistan right now, therefore, are those who can revive

the Pakistani economy. They have little time for the Kashmir issue, which is

viewed as just one of several justifications for a heavy defense budget that

Pakistan can ill afford.

Traditionalists, on the other hand, oppose any modification of the 54-

year-old policy on Kashmir, arguing that any dilution

of the core Pakistani position will pave the

way for a de-internationalization of Kashmir,

eventually allowing India to successfully absorb

the territory. Of course, only the UN can alter existing

UN resolutions, but, nonetheless, the traditionalists

raise a compelling argument. They are

concerned that unilateral shifts of policy by Pakistan

are unlikely to be met by reciprocal concessions

from India. Because the only tangible carrot

is U.S. economic aid, and given that the IMF is unlikely to allow Pakistan to

default, they argue that Islamabad should stand firm. Their priority is the

long-term accession of Kashmir.

Some modernists propose curtailing support for militants fighting India in

Kashmir. They argue that military action alone will not dislodge India, but a

sustained political campaign that had genuine Kashmiri roots might one day

get renewed support from the international community. Traditionalists oppose

any concessions on covert support for militancy. They argue, not without

justification, that any reduction in support for militant groups would

offer India an unfair advantage.

Modernist influence may well lie behind recent statements made by the